Dismissed

Ved Parkash v. State of Hp

Himachal Pradesh HC12 Jun 2024CRMP/1014/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed an application to recall its order dated 05.01.2024 that had dismissed a petition for non-prosecution. The court held that Section 362 Cr.P.C. prohibits a court from altering or reviewing a signed final order except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors, and inherent powers under Section 482 cannot override this bar. The applicant's absence was not a violation of natu

What did the court decide?

Application for recall of order dated 05.01.2024 dismissed.

Ved Parkash Vs State of Hp — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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Ved Prakash and Ors. Vs. State of H.P.

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Cr.MP No. 1014 of 2024 in CrMMO No. 16 of 2016 Reserved on 29.05.2024

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12.06.2024 Present: Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate, for the applicants / petitioners.

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Ms. Leena Guleria, Deputy Advocate General for the non-applicant respondent/State.

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The applicants have filed the present

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application for recalling of the order dated 05.01.2024, vide which the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution. It is asserted that the learned counsel could not appear when the matter was taken up by the Court as he was present before the Coordinate Bench. On enquiry, it was found that the matter was adjourned but the petition was dismissed for non-appearance. The non-appearance before the Court was neither willful nor intentional but under the bona fide belief that the matter stood adjourned, otherwise a request for recalling the order would have been made on the very same day. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the main petition be ordered to be restored.

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2. No reply was filed.

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I have heard Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners and Ms. Leena Guleria, learned Deputy Advocate General for the non-applicant/respondent/State.

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Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the applicants/petitioners submitted that he could not appear before the Court as he was busy before the Co-ordinate Bench, therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the order passed by this Court be recalled. He has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Chaman Lal Vs. Budhi Singh bearing Cr.MP No. 590 of 2021 decided on 20^th April 2021 and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnu Agarwal vs the State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. 2011 (14) SCC 813 in support of his submissions.

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Ms. Leena Guleria, learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that the Court does not have the power to recall the order once it has signed judgment/order disposing of the petition in view of the bar contained in Section 362 of Cr.P.C. She submitted that the facts of the judgments cited by the

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learned Counsel for the applicants/petitioners do not apply to the present case and the judgments are distinguishable.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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Section 362 of Cr.P.C. reads as under: -

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Court not to alter judgment.- Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.

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A plain reading of the Section shows that a

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Court is not competent to alter or review the judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct the clerical or arithmetic error. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711 that when the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are susceptible to only one meaning, they must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences. It was observed: -

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8. The language of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 is

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absolutely clear and does not permit any artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences. The language of the sub-rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in innumerable cases in India and England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr Vijay Anand Maharaj [(1963) 1 SCR 1: AIR 1963 SC 946: 45 ITR 414] when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwell stating:

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“The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases omitted from the natural meaning of the words.”

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This judgment was followed by

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Gopalkrishnan v. State of Kerala, (2020) 9 SCC 161 , wherein it was observed: -

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“20. It is a well-established position that when the statute is unambiguous, the Court must adopt plain and natural meaning irrespective of the consequences as expounded in Nelson Motis v. Union of India [Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711: 1993 SCC (L&S) 13 ] . On a bare reading of Section 207 of the 1973 Code, no other interpretation is possible. ”

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In Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962

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SC 1208 appeal was dismissed due to non-appearance but was restored when an application was filed that learned counsel could not appear before the Court due to delay of Ekka. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the order of rehearing could not have been passed in view of the prohibition contained in Section 369 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: -

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“9. It has been urged for the appellants that Shri Tej Pal Singh could order the rehearing of the appeal in the exercise of the inherent powers which every court possesses in order to further the ends of justice and that Shri Tripathi was not justified in any case to sit in judgment over the order of Shri Tej Pal Singh, an order passed within the jurisdiction, even though it be erroneous. Assuming that Shri Tej Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge, could exercise inherent powers, we are of the opinion that he could not pass the order of the rehearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a court. Inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the court from doing. Shri Tripathi was competent to consider when the other party raised the objection whether the appeal was validly up for rehearing before him. He considered the question and decided it rightly.

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10. It is also urged for the appellants Shri Tej Pal Singh had the jurisdiction to pass orders on the application presented by the appellants on 17-12-1956, praying for the rehearing of the appeal and that therefore his order could not be

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said to have been absolutely without jurisdiction. We do not agree. He certainly had jurisdiction to dispose of the application presented to him, but when Section 369 of the Code definitely prohibited the court's reviewing or altering its judgment, he had no jurisdiction to consider the point raised and to set aside the order dismissing the appeal and order its rehearing.”

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In Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500 an application was filed by a party for recall of the order on the ground that she was not a party in the original proceedings but the order affected her. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such an application could not have been allowed. It was observed: -

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“5. The appellant points out that he invoked the inherent power of the High Court saved by Section 482 of the Code and that notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362, the High Court had the power to grant relief. Now it is well settled that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code ( Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1208: 1962 Supp 2 SCR 817: (1962) 2 Cri LJ 288] ). It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is “otherwise provided by this Court or by any other law for the time being in force”. Those words, however, refer to those provisions only where the court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the

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attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail.

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6. The High Court, in our opinion, is right in declining to entertain the application. The appeal must be dismissed. But we may observe that anything said by the High Court in the criminal proceeding against Kailash Chandra Jain should not be allowed to influence the judgment of the court in the civil suits mentioned above or in any proceeding arising therefrom.”

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It was held in Kencha v. State of Karnataka,

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1985 SCC OnLine Kar 217: ILR 1985 Kar 2819 that it is impermissible to recall the order pronounced by the High Court. It was observed:

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“3. Section 362 Cr. P.C. says that except as otherwise provided in the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its Judgment or final order disposing of the case shall alter or review the said Judgment or order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The present Section 362 corresponds to old Section 369 except for a slight change and one such change brought about in the new Section is that apart from a Judgment, a final order disposing of a case is also brought within the scope of Section 362. In that way, the scope of the Section is widened. Examining the scope of the old Section 369, the Supreme Court observes in State of Orissa v. Ramchander Agarwala [AIR 1979 SC 84.] , that “once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same….”. The

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request in I.A. II is to recall the order already pronounced.

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4. Placing reliance on Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1980) 1 SCC 43: AIR 1980 SC 258.] the Learned Counsel or the applicant in I.A. II submitted that exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. the Court may, in the circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that his client had not been heard, may recall that order. The ratio in Raj Kapoor's case [(1980) 1 SCC 43: AIR 1980 SC 258.] will not govern this case. What the Supreme Court observes in that case is that the High Court can in an appropriate case revise an order of a Court subordinate to it exercising its inherent powers under Section 482, even if its revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. It is one thing to say that by exercising its inherent powers this Court can interfere with a finding, an order or a sentence of a Court subordinate to it. But it is entirely a different matter to urge that power is available to this Court to review or recall its own Judgment or final order without there being a specific provision in the Code itself for doing so. The inherent powers of the Court cannot be used to circumvent a specific mandate of the Code itself. The present Section 482 corresponds to old Section 561A and dealing with the question of the Court's inherent powers the Supreme Court in Ramchander Agarwal's case [AIR 1979 SC 84.] itself says that “the provisions of Section 561A cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code.”

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5. For the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this I.A. Therefore, the same is hereby dismissed.”

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13. This judgment was followed in Anjanamma

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v. State of Karnataka, 1988 SCC OnLine Kar 326/

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A similar view was taken in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 , wherein it was observed: -

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10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. The reliance of the respondent on Talab Haji Hussain case [AIR 1958 SC 376: 1958 Cri LJ 701: 1958 SCR 1226] is misconceived. Even in that case, it was pointed out that inherent powers conferred on High Courts under Section 561-A (Section 482 of the new Code) have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is not disputed that the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High Court on 7-1-1999. The new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the Joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final

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orders other than the judgment.

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It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Venus Steel Products vs. Michael Francis Pinheiro (06.05.2005 - BOMHC): MANU/MH/0756/2005 that a petition for restoration of the revision petition dismissed in default will not lie under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in view of the prohibition contained in Section 362 of Cr. PC. It was observed:

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“12. It is to be noted that the language of Section 369 of the old Code and Section 362 of the new Code differ in certain aspects and Section 362 of the new Code speaks not only of judgments but also of final order which can be reviewed only for the purposes of correcting clerical or arithmetical error. As far as the order dated 21.4.04 is concerned, there can be no dispute that it is a final order dismissing the revision petition.

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In the case of Sankatha Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/0142/1962: AIR1962SC1208 the Supreme Court stated that the Sessions Judge could not pass the order of re-hearing of the appeal (which was dismissed for default), in the exercise of powers under Section 369 r/w Section 424 of the Code because a specific prohibition regarding altering or reviewing of its order by Court. The Court further observed that inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from doing.

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In the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala MANU/SC/0179/1978: 1979CriLJ33 the Supreme Court referring to 561A of the old

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Code stated that inherent power cannot relate to any of the matters specifically dealt with by the Code and that it would follow that inherent powers cannot be invoked to exercise powers which would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. The saving of inherent power is only for giving effect to orders passed under the Code, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court further stated that if Section 369 (old) of the Code is understood as applying to judgments on appeal by the High Court, Section 561-A cannot be invoked for enabling the Court to review its order which is specifically prohibited by Section 369 by providing that, no Court when it has signed the judgment, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error. The Supreme Court referred to two of its earlier decisions namely Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/0142/1962: AIR1962SC1208 ) and the case of U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, MANU/SC/0028/1955: 1955CriLJ1410 and observed that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and Anr., MANU/SC/0228/1981: 1981CriLJ296 the Supreme Court observed that the inherent powers of the Court were not contemplated by saving provision in Section 362 of the Code.

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In the case of Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Ors. (200) 1 S.C.C. 169 the Supreme Court referred to the said case of U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay MANU/SC/0028/1955: 1955CriLJ1410 and stated that the said decision

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laid down that a judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the provisions of Section 561-A of the Code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The Supreme Court further observed that Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentailed to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. The Supreme Court further observed that the new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the Joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment.

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Again the case of R. Annapurna v. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna Sastry and Ors. MANU/SC/2813/2000: (2002)10SCC401 the Supreme Court stated that the High Court has no power to recall or review its own order under Section 482 of the Code.

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The applicant's application has been styled as an application for restoration. The concept

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of restoration is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The only remedy which might have been available to the applicant under the Code was either of recalling the order of dismissal or reviewing the same. As already stated, the Order dated 21.4.04 is a final order disposing of the criminal revision application filed by the applicant. The same cannot be recalled or reviewed in view of the specific bar created by Section 362 of the Code and as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove.”

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It was held in State v. K.V. Rajendran , (2008) 8 SCC 673 that it is not permissible to reopen a final order except in case of clerical or arithmetic errors. It was observed: -

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22. As notedhereinearlier, Section 362 of the Code prohibits reopening of a final order except in the cases of clerical or arithmetical errors. Such being the position and in view of the expressed ( sic express) prohibition in the Code itself in the form of Section 362, the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to reopen or alter an order disposing of a petition decided on merits.

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A similar view was taken in State of Punjab

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v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar(2011) 14 SCC 770 , wherein

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it was observed: -

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44. There is no power of review with the criminal court after the judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 CrPC is based on an acknowledged principle of law

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that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the order for disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. There is also no provision for modification of the judgment. (See Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113 ] and Chhanni v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 396 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 466] )

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45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section 362 CrPC is absolute; after the judgment is signed, even the High Court in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same. (See Moti Lal v. State of M.P. [(2012) 11 SCC 427: AIR 1994 SC 1544], Hari Singh Mann [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair [(2001) 4 SCC 752: 2001 SCC (Cri) 808] .)

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained the power of recall in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (supra) as under:

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46. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason

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that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 CrPC would not operate. In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment. However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to establish that it was not at fault. (Vide Chitawan v. Mahboob Ilahi [1970 Cri LJ 378 (All)], Deepak Thanwardas Balwani v. State of Maharashtra [1985 Cri LJ 23 (Bom)], Habu v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1987 Raj 83], Swarth Mahto v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh [(1972) 2 SCC 273: 1972 SCC (Cri) 676], MakkapatiNagaswara Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan [(1981) 1 SCC 62: 1981 SCC (Cri) 111], Asit Kumar Kar v. State of W.B. [(2009) 2 SCC 703 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 851 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 541] and Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. [(2011) 14 SCC 813] )

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It was further noticed that an express power of review has been vested before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 137 of the Constitution of India, no such power has been vested in the High Court. It was observed: -

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47. This Court by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution has been invested with an express power to review any judgment in criminal law and while no such power has been conferred on the High Court, the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code itself. (Vide State v. K.V. Rajendran [(2008) 8 SCC 673 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 600 : AIR 2009 SC 46] .)

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This Court also held in Pushap Raj Vs. Ram Dhan 2018 (1) HimLR 13 that there is no power under Cr.P.C. to recall or review the judgment and no application for recall of the petition dismissed in default can be filed. It was observed:

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“2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the considered view that this application is not maintainable. There is no provision under the Cr. P.C., wherein powers stand conferred upon this Court to recall or review its judgment. Power of review is not a common law right but is a statutory right. In the absence of there being any power of review or recall its judgment conferred upon this Court under the Cr. P.C., this Court cannot either review or recall its judgment so passed in the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It is necessary to point out that Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. envisages that save as otherwise provided by the said Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. In view of the above reasoning, as there is no merit in the present application, the same is accordingly dismissed.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Atul Shukla v. State of M.P., (2019) 17 SCC 299 that it is not permissible to review or modify the order dismissing the petition under Section 482 in view of the bar contained under Section 362 of Cr.P.C. It was

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observed: -

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7. The High Court while dismissing the petition under Section 482 observed that it would be open to the second respondent to pursue his remedies after framing of the charge. In view of the specific bar which is contained in Section 362, we are of the view that the impugned order [ Surendra Singh v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1424 ] of the High Court is unsustainable. Such an application for review or modification could not have been entertained.

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Allahabad High has also taken a similar

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view subsequently in Yaqoob Husain v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine All 1495 wherein it was observed: -

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43. Simply because the counsels had not appeared in the revised call, the decision rendered by the coordinate Bench after perusing the record cannot be rendered otiose and the order cannot be recalled. Bar expressed under Section 362 Cr.P.C. is clear, that once the Court has signed its judgment or final order, disposing of a case, it shall not alter or review the same except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error.

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44. This bar has been provided by the legislature intentionally so as to safeguard that the final judgment and orders are not altered or reviewed now and then. Apex Court has also felt that if any leverage is granted and the orders are permitted to be recalled on the ground of absence of counsels, it would cause great chaos and thus has propounded six legal propositions wherein the Courts can decide the cases in absence of counsel only after perusal of record and the same can be remedied only by the

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higher Court.

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45. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, no judgment or order can be altered, reviewed or recalled in view of the bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C.

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This position was reiterated in Govind v.

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State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine All 273 wherein it was observed:

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17. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that the criminal justice delivery system does not empower the Court to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as has specifically been provided under the statute itself that after the pronouncement of the judgment the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

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18. In view of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court coupled with the provisions of Section 362 Cr. P.C., I am not inclined to recall my order dated 28.9.2022 disposing of the revision.

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Bombay High Court also held in Joseph B.

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Braganza v. State of Goa, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 402

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that the Court does not have the power to revive its own order. It was observed: -

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“17. The decision in Raj Narnin (supra) rendered by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court does suggest that limited powers of review can be exercised by invoking the provisions of Section 561-A of CrPC 1898 (now corresponding to Section 482 of CrPC, 1973).

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However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ram Chander Agarwala (supra) , after specific reference to the Full Bench decision in Raj Narain (supra) , has held in paragraph 20 that the provisions of Section 561-A of the Code cannot be invoked in the exercise of power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. As a result, the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the contention on behalf of the State of Orissa and held that the High Court has no power to revive its own order.”

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Thus, it is apparent from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other High Courts that the High Court does not have the power to review its own order. The power of recall is vested when there is a violation of natural justice or the order was obtained by an abuse of the process of the Court.

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In Chaman Lal’s case (supra) , the judgment was pronounced in the absence of learned counsel for the accused and it was held that the matter could not have been adjudicated without any representation from the accused and the Court should have appointed a legal aid counsel or an amicus curiae on his behalf to provide a right of representation, therefore, it was a case of violation of natural justice and the Court had exercised the power to recall the order because of the breach of violation of natural

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justice.

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Perusal of the record of this Court shows that there was no representation on behalf of the applicants/petitioners on 20.07.2022, 19.07.2023, and 20.09.2023 despite the repeated calls. The Court adjourned the matter on earlier dates of hearing and when it was found that none was appearing on behalf of the applicants/petitioners, it dismissed the petition for non-prosecution on 05.01.2024, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of violation of the natural justice. More than adequate opportunities were granted to the applicants/petitioners to appear before the Court and argue the matter. When there were persistent defaults, the Court had no option but to dismiss the matter for non-prosecution. Hence, no case of violation of natural justice is made out to recall the order.

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Consequently, the present application fails and the same is dismissed.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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June 12, 2024

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(ravinder)

Ved Parkash v. State of Hp

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Ved Parkash v. State of Hp

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