Secretary Hppwd and Others Vs Chaman Lal and Others

¶1

Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:3216 )

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

¶3

RSA No. 130 of 2024 Reserved on: 24.05.2024 Date of decision: 11.06.2024

¶4

Secretary, HPPWD, Shimla, H.P. & others

¶5

....Appellants Versus

¶6

Chaman Lal & others

¶7

....Respondents

¶8

Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the Appellants : Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr. Devender K. Sharma, Advocate.

¶9

Rakesh Kainthla,Judge

¶10

The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2022, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned First Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Court No.1, Sunderngar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was partly modified. ( Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience ).

¶11

¶12

Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

¶13

2

¶14

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction. It was asserted that the suit land described in para 1 of the judgment of the learned Trial Court is owned and possessed by the plaintiffs. The defendants have no right, title or interest over the same. The defendants constructed a road from Jarol to Behna without the consent of the plaintiffs through the suit land. The plaintiffs repeatedly asked the defendants to acquire the suit land. They even served a legal notice upon the defendants but in vain. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above.

¶15

The suit was opposed by the defendants by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections, regarding lack of maintainability, plaintiffs being estopped from filing the suit by their acts and conduct and the suit being barred by limitation. It was asserted that the portion of the road, namely, Jarol-Salwana-Behna was completed before 1989. The road was declared fit for plying of vehicular traffic on 19.05.1989. The portion of the road from Jarol to Behna was made fit for

¶16

3

¶17

vehicular traffic on 05.03.2005. Peoplehave been using the road for more than 20 years. The road could not have been constructed without the express consent of the land owners. The plaintiffs did not raise any objection to the construction of the road. The plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation after 20 years. All the landowners had given their verbal consent to the construction of the road. Mehar Chand, predecessor-ininterest, was the Nambardar of the area. He requested the HPPWD department and other government representatives to construct the road from his land. The plaintiffs have no right to challenge the construction of the road. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

¶18

4. No replication was filed.

¶19

The learned Trial Court framed the following issues

¶20

on 15.11.2019: -

¶21

Whether the defendants have constructed a road over the suit land owned and possessed by the plaintiffs without their consent and without acquiring the same through process of law, as alleged? OPP

¶22

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to

¶23

4

¶24

acquire the suit land through process of law, as prayed? OPP.

¶25

Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form, as alleged? OPD.

¶26

Whether there lies no cause of action and locus standi in favour of the plaintiffs to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD.

¶27

Whether the suit is bad for the non-joiner of necessary parties, as alleged? OPD.

¶28

Whether the suit is barred by statutory period of limitation, as alleged? OPD.

¶29

Relief.

¶30

The parties were called to produce their evidence

¶31

and plaintiffs examined Ajay Kumar (PW-1), Rajinder Kumar (PW-2), Lata Devi (PW-3), Jai Prakash (PW-4), Shiv Ram (PW5) and Plaintiff No.3Hans Raj (PW-6). The defendants examined Bhim Singh (DW-1) and Hitesh Kumar (DW-2).

¶32

The learned Trial Court held that the defendants

¶33

had not disputed that the road was constructed over the suit land. They claimed that the road was constructed with the consent of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. However, they failed to lead any evidence to prove this fact. Compensation was paid to Jai Prakash (PW-4), whose land was also acquired for constructing the road. A person cannot be

¶34

5

¶35

deprived of his property except as per the law. The suit was not barred by limitation. Hence, issues N0. 1 and 2 were answered in affirmative, rest of the issues were answered in negative and the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed.

¶36

Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Sudnernagar, (learned First Appellate Court). Learned First Appellate Court held that no oral consent was proved. The witnesses of the defendants were not posted in the area at the time of construction of the road and their testimonies regarding the consent were not acceptable. Compensation was awarded to some of the landowners and there is no justification for denying the same to the plaintiffs. The State cannot appropriate the land of the citizen without payment of the compensation. The suit is within limitation as the cause of action is continuing; therefore, judgment and decree were upheld with a slight modification that the defendants were directed to restore the suit land in its original position or to initiate the process for acquisition of the suit land.

¶37

6

¶38

Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court the defendants filed the present appeal with the following proposed substantial questions of law: -

¶39

i) Whether the learned Appellate Court has felled in error of law in entertaining the suit beyond the period of limitation?

¶40

ii) Whether without specific pleadings and evidence, the relief of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction i.e. either to restore the suit to its original or to initiate the process for acquisition of the land of respondents/plaintiffs can be granted?

¶41

iii) Whether the findings of the learned Appellate Court are liable to be set aside in view of judgments passed by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Digamber and a full bench of the Hon’ble High Court of H.P., in CWP No.1966/2020 (Shankar Dass Vs. State)?

¶42

iv) Whether the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is barred upon mis-appreciation of facts and evidence on record?

¶43

I have heard Mr H.S. Rawat, learned Additional

¶44

Advocate General for the defendants/appellants and Mr Devender K. Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents.

¶45

Mr. H.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellants-defendants submitted that the learned First

¶46

7

¶47

Appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit. The suit was filed after the lapse of 20 years and the same is barred by delay and latches. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar 1995 (4) SCC 683 and judgement passed by this Court in Shankar Dass Vs State of HP, 2013(2) Him L.R.698(FB), Rattan Lal vs. State of H.P. & Others, passed in CWP No. 1433 of 2019, decided on 16.07.2019 in support of his submission. He prayed that the present appeal be admitted on the proposed substantial questions of law.

¶48

Mr. Devender K Sharma learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents supported the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below and submitted that no substantial question of law arises in the present case. He prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

¶49

I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶50

The defendants have not disputed the construction of the road through the suit land. Their plea is that the road was constructed through the suit land with the consent of Mehar

¶51

8

¶52

Chand, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. It was also asserted that in para (e) of the grounds of appeal that Mehar Chand, predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, had given his suit land willingly for the construction of the road being a Namberdar of the area. He requested the HPPWD department and other government officials to construct the road from his land because his house was not connected to the road at that time. Hence, the only question is whether the road was constructed with the consent of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs or not.

¶53

Bhim Singh (DW-1) admitted in his crossexamination that no document exists regarding the plaintiffs’ consent for the construction of the road. He also admitted that he had not talked to the general public in the years 2004-2005.

¶54

Hitesh Kumar (DW-2) also stated in his crossexamination that he had not talked to the people of the area in the year 2004-2005 when the road was constructed. These testimonies mean that people had not consented to the construction of the road on their land in the presence of these witnesses. Further, Bhim Singh (DW-1) was posted as J.E. in

¶55

9

¶56

Sub-Division Dehar in the year 2018, whereas Hitesh Kumar (DW-2) was posted as Assistant Engineer, in the year 2017. This shows that they were not even posted in the area at the time of the construction of the road and they were not competent to testify about the consent of the landowners at the time of the construction of the road.

¶57

In Nokhia & Others vs. State of HP ILR 1984 HP 906 , the State Government had used the land for the construction of the link road without acquiring the same. A writ petition was filed before this Court. State Government had taken a defence of the consent. This Court held that the State has to bring the material on record to show that free and informed consent was given and consent based upon the representation that payment of the compensation would be made, is no consent at all. This Court issued the following directions: -

¶58

“8. On this occasion, once again, the Court draws the attention of the State Government to the state of affairs which have come to light in this and similar cases and directs that:

¶59

(a) instructions be issued to all limbs and subordinates that no citizen should be deprived of his property save in accordance with law, that is, the law relating to the acquisition and requisitioning of property and that in rare and

¶60

10

¶61

exceptional cases of emergent public utility projects, the execution whereof cannot brook any delay in the public interest and where the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be resorted for reasons such as the nature and character of land, possession of the land or any specified portion thereof may be taken with the consent, as explained above of the person(s) interested in the land after the execution of an agreement, in writing, between the said person(s) and the competent authority, in accordance with law, incorporating the conditions, inter alia, that the land acquisition proceedings shall be initiated and completed and the compensation will be paid within a reasonable time to be specified in the agreement and that interest will be paid from the date of taking over of possession ; and

¶62

(b) in order to avoid proliferation of litigation and to alleviate genuine hardship of persons similarly situate, all cases like the present, where there has been a deviation from law and persons have been deprived of the possession of their property save in accordance with law, be taken up for regularisation by initiating/ completing acquisition proceedings in accordance with law with the utmost expedition and within a time-limit which may be set up by the State Government bearing in mind the need of striking a just balance between the inevitable lapse of time which is reasonably likely to occur even if urgent action is taken in that direction and the duty of providing quick relief by emergent remedial measures to the aggrieved persons and, in all such cases, equitable compensation, on the basis on which the Court has so far awarded the same in such and similar cases and proposes to award herein, be paid to such persons from the date of taking over of possession till the date of actual payment, in addition to the compensation,

¶63

11

¶64

solatium and interest at the statutory rate which becomes payable under the law. The Court has so far viewed cases where such unauthorized actions were taken in the past leniently but any future lapse will have to be strictly viewed if it is brought to its notice.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶65

Therefore, in view of the directions issued by this

¶66

Court, it is impermissible to use the land of the person without his consent and if consent has to be taken it has to be through an agreement in writing between that person and the competent authority. These directions are binding upon the State and it is not permissible for the State to say that it had taken the oral consent of the owner.

¶67

This judgment was followed in Lata vs. State of H.P. 2009 (1) Shim. L.C. 107 and it was held that mere bald assertion that the landowners had orally consented to the taking of possession of the land on a verbal assurance is not sufficient. The State has to give the details of when the consent was obtained, who was the authority that obtained the consent and in what manner. It was observed:

¶68

“12. The respondent state has only made a bald assertion that the landowners had orally consented to the taking of possession of the land on a verbal assurance. The respondents have not given details when the consent was obtained who was the authority that obtained the

¶69

12

¶70

consent and in what manner. The plea set up by the State that the owners have given consent and voluntarily handed over the land cannot be accepted.”

¶71

20. This question was also considered by the Hon'ble

¶72

Supreme Court in Vidya Devi Versus State of H.P. 2020(2) SCC 569 and it was observed: -

¶73

“12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find a complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.”

¶74

Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

¶75

Court in Sukh Dutt Ratra & another Vs. State of H.P & others 2022

¶76

(7) SCC 508 wherein it was observed:

¶77

“21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this court finds that the contentions raised by the State, do not inspire confidence and deserve to be rejected. The State has merely averred to the appellants' alleged verbal consent or the lack of objection but has not placed any material on record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State was unable to produce any evidence indicating that the land of the appellants had been taken over or acquired in the manner known to the law, or that they had ever paid any compensation. It is pertinent to note that this was the State's position, and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007 as well, in the other writ proceedings.

¶78

This court is also not moved by the State's contention that since the property is not adjoining to that of the appellants, it disentitles them from claiming benefit on the ground of parity. Despite it not being adjoining

¶79

13

¶80

(which is admitted in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellants), it is clear that the subject land was acquired for the same reason - construction of the Narag Fagla Road, in 1972-73, and much like the claimants before the reference court, these appellants too were illegally dispossessed without following due process of law, thus resulting in violation of Article 31 and warranting the High Court's intervention under Article 226 jurisdiction. In the absence of written consent to voluntarily give up their land, the appellants were entitled to compensation in terms of law. The need for written consent in matters of land acquisition proceedings has been noted in fact, by the full court decision of the High Court in Shankar Dass {supra) itself, which is relied upon in the impugned judgment.

¶81

This court, in Vidya Devi {supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances - rejected the contention of 'oral' consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State:

¶82

"12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

¶83

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual

¶84

14

¶85

rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension. "

¶86

In the present case, the defendants have failed to prove any writing or even the plea of the predecessor of the plaintiffs’ oral consent by leading satisfactory evidence. Therefore, both the learned Courts below had rightly held that the oral consent was not proved.

¶87

The Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted the right of a person to possess the property and the international framework for compulsory acquisition in Urban Improvement Trust v. Gordhan Dass , (2024) 3 SCC 250: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1368

¶88

and observed:

¶89

( ii ) International legal framework on compulsory land acquisition

¶90

18. Before proceeding to deal with the issue of the legitimacy of the land acquisition proceeding, it would be appropriate to set out the international legal framework on compulsory land acquisition. The right to selfdetermination is enshrined within the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“I CESCR ”) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), amongst other instruments which is defined as the right of all people to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources, and that no person may be deprived of its means of subsistence. Article 17 of the

¶91

15

¶92

Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that, “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Selfdetermination also includes an obligation for States to refrain from any forcible actions that deprive people of enjoying such rights.

¶93

19. The concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (“FPIC”) within international development law is most clearly stated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Articles 10, 11, 19, 28 and 29 which prescribe situations in which FPIC must be obtained before granting compensation, taking of indigenous property, etc. Development experts have recognised that FPIC is not only important for Indigenous people but can also be used as a positive approach to involve local communities in decisionmaking about any proposed development. Engaging them in such processes fosters a greater sense of ownership and engagement and helps safeguard their right to development as a basic human rights principle [ Sambhav Shrivastava et al., “Subversion of Due Process for Seeking the Consent of Communities in Land Acquisition and Resultant Land Conflicts” (Oxfam 2020) <https://policy-

¶94

practice.oxfam.org/resources/subversion-of-dueprocess-for-seeking-the-consent-of-communities-inland-acquis-621109/> accessed on 19-9-2023.]. These principles are not to be found under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 but the concept of acquiring land through consent and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) on whether a project serves a “public purpose” has been added in the 2013 avatar of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is found to be more attuned to the notion of fairness and is progressive to this extent.

¶95

16

¶96

20. While there are many instances of the authorities failing to adhere to the acquisition regime, this Court has the benefit of a study conducted by the Lands Rights Initiative of the Centre for Policy Research [ Namita Wahi, Ankit Bhatia et al., “Land Acquisition in India: A Review of Supreme Court Cases 1950-2016” (Centre for Policy Research 2017).]. The outcome of the extensive study of around 1269 judgments of the Supreme Court of India between 1950 to 2016 on the legal trajectory of land acquisition cases in India leads to the following comments:

¶97

“The process of land acquisition in India has been the source of increasing political and legal contestation for almost two hundred years. This stems from the inherently coercive nature of the process, which creates a severe imbalance in power between the State and land losers. Our review of the Supreme Court litigation since the time India became a constitutional republic in 1950 shows that while much of this imbalance was created within the very text of the Land Acquisition Act, a considerable part of it could also be attributed to executive non-compliance with the rule of law . The result was a situation of great inequity for the land losers.”

¶98

(emphasis supplied) 21. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment had the occasion to look at the process of compulsory land acquisition where the landowners had practically no means to oppose the proposed acquisition. A two-judge Bench in Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569: (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 799] speaking through Indu Malhotra, J. made the following significant observation : (SCC pp. 572-73, para 12)

¶99

“ 12 . … 12.2 . The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (FortyFourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [ Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ)

¶100

17

¶101

491 ] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [ K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414 ]

¶102

12.3 . To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution.”

¶103

(emphasis supplied)

¶104

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidya Devi (supra) that a person cannot be deprived of his property without any legal sanction of law. It was held: -

¶105

“12.7. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

¶106

12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find a complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State.

¶107

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed

¶108

18

¶109

on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &Ors, 2013 1 SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare state governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

¶110

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.”

¶111

This question was also considered by the Hon'ble

¶112

Supreme Court in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra 2020(9) SCC 356 and it was held that the Municipal Corporation is under obligation to acquire the land used for constructing the road. It was observed: -

¶113

“93. On perusal of the documents, there can be no doubt at all that the road in question measuring 444.14 sqm. never belonged to the Pune Municipal Corporation. In the property records, there was no private road. There were three plots 473 B1, B2, B3 and 473B4 shown as vacant land held by the owners of all the three adjacent plots.

¶114

The Municipal Corporation was never shown as the owner of the vacant plot or any private road. Even assuming that there was any policy decision to have an approach road to every plot, it was incumbent upon the authorities concerned to acquire the land. On the other hand, the scheme clearly records that the same was

¶115

19

¶116

based on entries in property records and the award of the arbitrator.”

¶117

26. It was further observed that the right of property is a

¶118

statutory right and no person can be deprived of the right to his property. It was observed: -

¶119

“96. The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A and a human right as observed by this Court in VimlabenAjitbhai Patel vs. VatslabenAshokbhai Patel and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 649 (para 42) . In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The appellant trust cannot be deprived of its property save in accordance with the law.

¶120

Article 300A of the Constitution of India embodies the doctrine of eminent domain which comprises two parts, (i) possession of the property in the public interest; and (ii) payment of reasonable compensation. As held by this Court in a plethora of decisions, including State of Bihar and Others vs. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Others, (2006) 2 SCC 545, 574 (para 69); JelubhaiNanbhai Khachar and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. (1995) Suppl. 1 SCC 596; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1982) 1 SCC 39 the State possesses the power to take or control the property of the owner for the benefit of the public. When, however, a State so acts it is obliged to compensate the injury by making just compensation as held by this Court in Girnar Traders vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 555 (paras 55 and 56) .”

¶121

This position was reiterated in Dharnidhar Mishra v.

¶122

State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 932 wherein it was observed:

¶123

20

¶124

18. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 ]

¶125

19. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 , this Court held that:

¶126

“ 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid .”

¶127

(Emphasis supplied)

¶128

20. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517 , this Court held that:

¶129

“ 21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law . Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such rights. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed .”

¶130

(Emphasis supplied)

¶131

21. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354 , this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the following words:

¶132

“ 30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is

¶133

21

¶134

an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government . Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seedbed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists .”

¶135

(Emphasis supplied)

¶136

22. In JilubhaiNanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 , this Court held as follows:

¶137

“ 48 . … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A . In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”

¶138

(Emphasis supplied)

¶139

23. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , this Court held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

¶140

24. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as the right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.

¶141

Dealing with the remedy available to a person in case

¶142

of forcible dispossession, it was held that a person can file a

¶143

22

¶144

writ of mandamus for payment of compensation. It was observed in Vidya Devi (supra):-

¶145

“99. In case of dispossession except under the authority of law, the owner might obtain restoration of possession by a proceeding for Mandamus against the Government as held by this Court in Wazir Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC415 . Admittedly, no compensation has been offered or paid to the appellant Trust. As observed by this Court in K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Anr. vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 even though the right to claim compensation or the obligation of the State to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property is not expressly provided in Article 300A of the Constitution, it is inbuilt in the Article. The State seeking to acquire private property for a public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall be paid. The Regional and Town Planning Act also does not contemplate deprivation of a landholder of his land, without compensation. Statutory authorities are bound to pay adequate compensation.

¶146

The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty-bound to exercise such power, where the Government or public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide, or on irrelevant consideration.”

¶147

Similarly, it was held in Syed Maqbool Ali vs. State of

¶148

Utter Pradesh 2011(15) SCC 383 that the remedy of a person whose land is taken without acquisition is to file a civil suit for

¶149

23

¶150

recovery of possession or payment of compensation. It was

¶151

observed:-

¶152

“9. The remedy of a landholder whose land is taken without acquisition is either to file a civil suit for recovery of possession and/or for compensation or approach the High Court by filing a writ petition if the action can be shown to be arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, biased, mala fide or without the authority of law, and seek a direction that the land should be acquired in a manner known to law.”

¶153

Thus, a person deprived of his property unlawfully is

¶154

entitled to the restoration of the possession or the payment of compensation.

¶155

It was submitted that no objection was raised at the time of construction of the road and the suit was filed after the lapse of 20 years which is impermissible. A similar situation arose before the this Court in Jai Ram Vs State of H.P. 2011 (3)

¶156

Shim. L.C. 91 and it was held that non-raising of objection by a landowner when his land is being encroached upon either by the State or its Agencies or even by a private person does not disentitle him to seek his legal remedy. It was observed:-

¶157

“5. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had offered his land for being utilized for the construction of a road, under the aforesaid PGSMY Scheme. Their plea is that the petitioner did

¶158

24

¶159

not object to the construction of the road on the site. Non-raising of objection by a landowner, when his land is being encroached upon, either by the State or its Agencies or even by a private person, does not disentitle him from seeking his legal remedy. Neither the scheme of PGMSY authorizes the State nor its Agencies to utilize private lands, without payment of compensation to the landowners nor could have a provision like that been made in the scheme as the same would have been contrary to the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.”

¶160

Similarly, it was held in Jeet Ram Versus State of H.P.

¶161

Latest HLJ 2016 HP 615 that there can be no waiver or estoppel

¶162

regarding constitutional rights. It was observed:

¶163

“4. No person can be deprived of his property without following due process of law. Respondents have utilised the land of the petitioner without paying him any compensation. There is no contemporaneous record placed on record by the respondent-State to show that the petitioner had consented to the construction of the road through his land. It is evident from the contents of Annexure P-1 that the nature of land in Khasra no. 279, as per Jamabandi for the year 2001-02, is Bagicha. A valuable piece of land of the petitioner has been utilised in an arbitrary manner by the respondent-State, for the purpose of construction/widening of the Shillaru-Reog road.

¶164

xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

¶165

The legitimate right of a citizen, that too pertaining to valuable property, cannot be defeated merely on the technical objections. There ought to be a difference in the approach of a private litigant vis-a-vis the State. The

¶166

25

¶167

State stands on a higher pedestal. It is the duty of the functionaries of the State to maintain the Rule of Law. There cannot be any estoppel/waiver against the constitutional/ fundamental/ legal rights.”

¶168

Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held

¶169

in Raj Kumar Versus State of H.P. in Civil Appeal no. 9105 of 2015 , decided on 29.10.2015 that where the land was utilized for construction of the road without the payment of the compensation and there was no proof of the consent, State is liable to pay compensation. Since in the present case the consent was not established, therefore, the plaintiff are entitled to the relief sought by them and the learned First Appellate Court had rightly granted the relief of mandatory injunction.

¶170

This position was reiterated in Sukh Dutt Ratra &

¶171

another vs. State of H.P & others 2022 (7) SCC 508, wherein it was

¶172

observed:-

¶173

“13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right [ Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. ], It is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.

¶174

It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without

¶175

26

¶176

due process, or authorization of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench in Entick v. Carrington, [1765] EWHC (KB) 198 and by this court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1955 (1) SCR 408 . Further, in several judgments, this court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law.

¶177

When it comes to the subject of private property, this court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, 1962 (2) SCR 69 this court rejected the contention that the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order, and instead concluded that the executive action taken by the State and its officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. This court, in another case - State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors, 1989 (1) SCR 176 , held:

¶178

"A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under the law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all

¶179

27

¶180

actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'".

¶181

Given the important protection extended to an individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains - Can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.

¶182

When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State's actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend the benefit of the court's directions to those who specifically approached the courts. The State's lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated 23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of acquiring land required for public use in the manner prescribed by law.

¶183

There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches which conclude either way - as contended by both sides in the present dispute - however, the specific factual matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself

¶184

28

¶185

behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation; there cannot be a 'limitation' to doing justice. This court in a much earlier case - Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1969 (1) SCR 808 ', held:

¶186

"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, the lapse of time and delay are most material.

¶187

But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy. "

¶188

The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants' prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of the cause of action), undoubtedly warranted consideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226

¶189

29

¶190

jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) - a similar case where the name of the aggrieved had been deleted from revenue records leading to his dispossession from the land without payment of compensation - held:

¶191

"Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the case projected before the court by the appellants is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating from any State which professes the least regard to being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the State should be gracious enough to accept its mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the respondent, the State has taken an intractable attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.

¶192

Ours is a constitutional democracy and the rights available to the citizens are declared by the Constitution. Although Article 19(l)(f) was deleted by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution, which reads as follows:

¶193

"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

¶194

This is a case where we find an utter lack of legal authority for the deprivation of the respondent's property by the appellants who are State authorities. In our view, this case was an eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution... "

¶195

Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi {supra) While dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held as follows:

¶196

30

¶197

"There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grants of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claims for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for a grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. "

¶198

xxxx

¶199

Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative [ Relying on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 2005 Supp (3) SCR 388; N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors. 2011 (12) SCR 191; and JilubhaiNanbhaiKahchar v. State of Gujarat 1994 Supp (1) SCR 807 . ] of both their human right and constitutional right under Article 3 00-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case.”

¶200

It was submitted that the State has been in possession for more than 20 years and the plaintiffs are not

¶201

31

¶202

entitled to possession. This cannot be accepted. The defendants are the State and its instrumentalities. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1341 that the State cannot take the plea of adverse possession to grab the property of its citizens. If the protectors of the law will become grabbers of the property, then the people will be left with no protection and there will be total anarchy in the entire country. It was observed at page 419

¶203

If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No government department, public undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grabbing the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case.

¶204

This position was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme

¶205

Court in Vidya Devi Versus State of H.P. 2020(2) SCC 569 wherein it was held: -

¶206

“10.6. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it

¶207

32

¶208

would be tantamount to "adverse" possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.”

¶209

It was laid down by this Court in Tilak Raj vs. Bhagat

¶210

Ram & Another 1997 (1) Sim. LC 281 that a suit based on the title, where no plea of adverse possession had been raised, could not

¶211

be barred by limitation on the ground that it was filed after more than 12 years from the date of dispossession. It was observed: -

¶212

“10. The present suit is for possession on the basis of title. Article 63, Limitation Act, 1963, governs the present case. It provides that for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on the title, the limitation of twelve years begins to run from the date of the defendant's interest becomes adverse to the plaintiffs

¶213

It is well settled that adverse possession means a hostile assertion, that is, a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner.

¶214

It is also well settled that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must plead and prove by clear and unequivocal evidence, that is, possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts of the defendant constitute adverse possession, regard has to be had to the animus of such defendant which has to be

¶215

33

¶216

ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case.

¶217

It is equally well settled that mere possession for however long a period is not enough to claim title inasmuch as the possession has to be adverse.

¶218

In Liaq Mohammad v D. D. A. and others, AIR 1994 NOC (Delhi) 35 , it has been held that a suit for possession based on title, where a plea of adverse possession has been raised, would not be barred by limitation on the ground that it has been filed after the expiry of twelve years from the date of dispossession.

¶219

Equally, it can be said that once the defendant has failed to establish his adverse possession for the statutory period, a suit for possession based on title cannot be dismissed as being time-barred on the ground that the same was filed after the expiry of twelve years from the date of dispossession.”

¶220

Similarly, it was held in Indira vs. Arumugam &

¶221

Another (1998) 1 SCC 614 that in a suit based on the title, when

¶222

the title has been established, the plaintiffs cannot be dispossessed on the ground of limitation unless the plea of adverse possession is established. It was observed:-

¶223

“4. The aforesaid reasoning of the learned Judge, with respect, cannot be sustained as it proceeds on the assumption as if old Article 142 of the earlier Limitation Act was in force wherein the plaintiffs who based his case on the title had to prove not only the title but also possession within 12 years of the date of the suit. The said provision of law has undergone a metamorphic sea change as we find under the Limitation Act, 1963 Article 65 which reads as under:

¶224

34

¶225

Description of the	Period of	Time from w	hich
suit:- For	limitation:-	period begins	to
possession of immovable property or any interest therein	Twelve years	run: - When possession of defendant beco	the the mes
based on the title		adverse to plaintiffs.	the

¶226

It is, therefore, obvious that when the suit is based on the title for possession, once the title is established on the basis of relevant documents and other evidence unless the defendant proves adverse possession for the prescriptive period, the plaintiffs cannot be non-suited. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter was missed by the learned Judge and, therefore, the entire reasoning for disposing of the Second Appeal has been vitiated. Only on that short ground and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the question of law framed by the learned Judge for disposing of the Second Appeal, this appeal is allowed.”

¶227

39. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Shishi Ram

¶228

Vs. Megh Chand AIR 2013 HP 65 , wherein it was held: -

¶229

“12. It is settled law that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner, and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession/ roved must be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owner must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be

¶230

35

¶231

evidence of the adverse possession actually informing the real owner of the former's hostile action.

¶232

The learned first Appellate Court thus rightly conclude that when the plaintiffs had filed a suit for possession based upon the title and the defendant had taken plea of adverse possession to defend his title, in that eventuality of the defendant's failure to prove his adverse possession, the suit filed by the plaintiffs could not have been dismissed on the ground that the defendant failed to prove the possession within a period of 12 years prior to the filing of the suit as held by the Apex Court in Indira v. Arumgam [AIR 1999 SC 1549] .”

¶233

In the present case, the State cannot take the plea of

¶234

adverse possession and the limitation will not start running against the State. Hence, the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation.

¶235

It was submitted that plaintiffs have acquiesced and were not entitled to the possession. This is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamakshi Builders vs. Ambedkar Educational Society 2007 (12) SCC 27 that acquiescence does not confer any title. It was observed: -

¶236

“ 23. Acquiescence on the part of Respondent No. 1, as has been noticed by the High Court, did not confer any title on Respondent No. 1. Conduct may be a relevant fact, so as to apply the procedural law like estoppel, waiver or acquiescence, but thereby no title can be conferred.

¶237

24. It is now well-settled that time creates a title.

¶238

36

¶239

25. Acquisition of a title is an inference of law arising out of a certain set of facts. If in law, a person does not acquire title, the same cannot be vested only by reason of acquiescence or estoppel on the part of other.

¶240

26. It may be true that Respondent No. 1 had constructed some buildings, but it did so at its own risk. If it thought that despite its status as a tenant, it would raise certain constructions, it must have taken a grave risk. There is nothing on record to show that such permission was granted. Although Respondent No. 1 claimed its right, it did not produce any document on that behalf. No application for seeking such permission having been filed, an adverse inference in that behalf must be drawn.”

¶241

Therefore, the principle of acquiescence will not help the defendants in any manner whatsoever.

¶242

Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar (supra) Rattan Lal (supra) and Shankar Dass (supra), however, these judgments were delivered in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction which is based upon the principle of delay and latches. A civil suit is governed by the Limitation Act and when the suit has been held to be within limitation, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.

¶243

In Dharnidhar Mishra (supra) the writ petition filed by the landowner seeking compensation for the land was

¶244

37

¶245

dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and observed:

¶246

25. We regret to state that the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not deem fit even to enquire with the State whether just and fair compensation was paid to the appellant or not. The learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition only on the ground of delay. As held by this court in Vidya Devi v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569 , delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. As held by this Court, it would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

¶247

26. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [See: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 ]

¶248

27. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows:

¶249

“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claims for educational facilities and other categories of similar

¶250

38

¶251

cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law . The appellants had asked repeatedly for a grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode .”

¶252

(Emphasis supplied)

¶253

28. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that we should set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remit the matter for fresh consideration.

¶254

Thus, no advantage can be derived by the defendants from the principle of delay and laches.

¶255

Hence, the suit was within limitation. The defendants had unauthorisedly used the suit land and they were rightly directed to restore the suit land to its original condition or to initiate the process of acquisition of the land. The judgments of Digambar ( supra), Rattan Lal (supra) and Shankar Lal (supra) do not apply to the present case and there is no misappreciation of the evidence. Hence, no substantial question of law arises in the present case.

¶256

No other point was urged.

¶257

39

¶258

In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the

¶259

same is dismissed with costs throughout. The record of the learned courts below be returned forthwith.

¶260

Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s)

¶261

disposed of.

¶262

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶263

11^th June, 2024. (Ravinder)

Secretary Hppwd and Others v. Chaman Lal and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Secretary Hppwd and Others v. Chaman Lal and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Sushma Gautam Vs State of Hp and Others

Nirat Ram Vs Tej Ram and Another

Vijay Ram Vs Rattan Lal and Anr.

Hari Singh Vs Khub Chand

Uttam Chand and Another Vs Piar Singh and Another

Atul Kumar Vs State of Hp