High Court quashed FIR and consequent proceedings under Ss. 324, 341, 323, 34 IPC upon receipt of compromise between victim and accused. Court held offences were petty and non-heinous, making continuation a service of no purpose.
FIR No. 310 dated 22.8.2021 and consequential proceedings quashed; petitioners acquitted of charges.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
ON THE 3RD DAY OF AUGUST, 2022
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA
CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CRPC NO. 509 OF 2022
Between:-
1. AMANDEEP SINGH S/O SHRI BALWANT SINGH R/O SANOLI, POLICE STATION UNA, TEHSIL & DISTRICT UNA, H.P. AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
2. NITISH KUMAR S/O SHRI BALWANT SINGH R/O SANOLI, POLICE STATION UNA, TEHSIL & DISTRICT UNA, H.P. AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS
3. DINESH KUMAR S/O SHRI ROSHAN LAL R/O VILLAGE BANGARH, POLICE STATION UNA, TEHSIL & DISTRICT UNA, H.P. AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS
PETITIONERS
(BY MR. DHEERAJ K. VASHISHT, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF H.P.
2. IQBAL SINGH SANDHU S/O DIDAR SINGH SANDHU, R/O WARD NO.4 MAJARA, P.O. SANOLI, TEHSIL & DISTRICT UNA, HIMACHAL PRADESH
RESPONDENTS
(MR. SUDHIR BHATNAGAR AND MR. NARINDER GULERIA, ADDITIONAL ADVOCATES GENERAL WITH MR. SUNNY DHATWALIA,
2
ASSISTANT ADVOCATE GENERAL, FOR R-1)
(MR. SHUBHAM SOOD, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
Whether approved for reporting:
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This petition coming on for orders this day, the court passed the following:
O R D E R
By way of instant petition filed under S.482 CrPC, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 310, dated 22.8.2021 under Ss. 324, 341, 323 and 34 IPC registered at Police Station Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (III), Una, Himachal Pradesh in case State v. Amandeep Singh and others, on the basis of compromise (Annexure P-3).
2. Precisely the facts of the case as emerge from record are that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2/complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant;) who alleged that on 22.8.2021 at 9.45 pm, while he was going from his home towards Bathal Factory, a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-72247, wherein three persons were sitting, stopped and said persons started giving beatings to him, as a consequence of which he suffered injuries on his face, head and legs. After completion of investigation, police have presented Challan in the competent court of law against the petitioners herein and case is now pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (III), Una.
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3. During the pendency of the trial, petitioners and respondent No.2, have entered into compromise, whereby parties have resolved to settle the dispute inter se them amicably, and as such, petitioners have approached this court in the instant proceedings, for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings.
4. Vide order dated `21.6.2022, this court, while directing learned Additional Advocate General to verify the correctness of the compromise placed on record, also deemed it necessary to cause presence of parties, especially respondent No.2.
5. Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned Additional Advocate General has placed on record communication dated 8.7.2022 received from Superintendent of Police Una, perusal whereof reveals that during pendency of case before learned trial Court, parties have compromised the matter whereby they hare resolved to settle the dispute inter se them amicably.
6. Respondent No.2 has also come present in the court and is being represented by Mr. Shubham Sood, Advocate. Respondent No.2 states on oath that he, of his own volition and without any external pressure, has entered into compromise with the petitioners whereby they have resolved to settle the dispute inter se them amicably. He states that since the petitioners have apologized for their behaviour and have undertaken not to repeat such acts in future, he shall have no objection in case prayer made by the petitioners for quashing of FIR alongwith consequential proceedings is accepted and petitioners are acquitted of
the charges framed against them While admitting the
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contents of the compromise to be correct, he admits his signatures on Annexure P-3, i.e. compromise.
7. After having heard statement of respondent No.2, learned Assistant Advocate General states that the chances of conviction of petitioners are remote and bleak and as such, respondent-State shall have no objection in case prayer of the petitioners for quashing of FIR alongwith consequential proceedings is allowed.
8. The question which now needs consideration is whether FIR in question can be ordered to be quashed when Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466 has specifically held that power under S. 482 CrPC is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
9. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh (supra), whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred to above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon’ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power
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to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between themselves, however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution. Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as
under:-
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries
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suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime”.
10. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that such
a power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
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may be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors . vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors . (2013( 11 SCC 497 has also held as under:-
“7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were noncompoundable. A two Judges’ Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)
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quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis supplied)
12. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another , passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:
“13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle
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the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482:
“…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved."
“... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…”
“…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…”
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the
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nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
13. In the case at hand, the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused are petty offences and further in view of the fact that the complainant has compromised the matter with the respondents and is no more interested in pursuing the case further, there are bleak and remote chances of conviction of accused and as such, this court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made by petitioners for quashing of FIR.
14. Since the matter stands compromised between the parties and the complainant is no more interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings against the accused, no fruitful purpose would be served in case proceedings against the accused are allowed to continue, as such, prayer made in the petition at hand can be accepted.
15. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No. 310, dated
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22.8.2021 under Ss. 324, 341, 323 and 34 IPC registered at Police Station Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (III), Una, Himachal Pradesh in case State v. Amandeep Singh and others, are quashed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the charges framed against them in the said FIR/proceedings.
16. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications.
Copy Dasti.
(Sandeep Sharma) Judge August 3, 2022 (Vikrant)
3 issues framed by the court
Whether FIR under Ss. 324, 341, 323 and 34 IPC can be quashed in view of compromise despite offences being non-compoundable.
Whether continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law given remote chances of conviction.
Whether power under S. 482 CrPC can be exercised sparingly to acquit petitioners based on settlement between victim and accused.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and anotherRelied on¶8
(2014) 6 SCC 466 · Who else cites this
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr.Explained¶11
(2012) 10 SCC 303 · Who else cites this
Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors.Explained¶11
(2013 11 SCC 497) · Who else cites this
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder SinghExplained¶12
(2016) 1 SCC 389 · Who else cites this
State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi StanleyExplained¶12
(2016) 1 SCC 376 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Amandeep Singh
Nitish Kumar
Dinesh Kumar
State of H.P.
Iqbal Singh Sandhu
Sandeep Sharma
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
