Allowed

Daulat Ram Chauhan v. State

Himachal Pradesh HC28 Nov 2017CWP/10776/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Himachal Pradesh High Court allowed a writ petition filing land acquisition proceedings. The court rejected the respondents' plea of laches and estoppel, directing the Land Acquisition Collector to determine market value and pay compensation under the 1980 Act and RFLARR Act, 2013.

What did the court decide?

Directed Land Acquisition Collector to complete proceedings by 31.3.2018 and determine compensation under Section 27 of RFLARR Act, 2013.

Daulat Ram Chauhan Vs State — Land Acquisition | Himachal Pradesh HC (2017)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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CWP No. 10776 of 2012

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Date of decision: 28.11.2017

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Daulat Ram		…… Petitioner
	Vs.
State of H.P. and others		….. Respondents

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Coram

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The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.

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*Whether approved for r*	*eporting?* *1 Yes*
For the petitioner	: Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate.
For the respondents	: Mr. Neeraj Kumar Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.

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Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral)

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This writ petition has been filed with the following

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prayer:

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“(a) Directing the respondents to initiate land acquisition proceedings with respect to Khasra No. 208/1, owned by the petitioner as envisaged under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and after assessing the correct market value pay to the petitioner reasonable and just compensation in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.”

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Certain undisputed facts need to be noticed.

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Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes

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…2…

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The petitioner is owner in possession of 3 plots of land measuring 4 bighas 2 biswas comprised in Khasra Nos. 113, 114 and 115 besides other land situated at Village and Mohal Pohal, Tehsil Kotkhai, District Shimla, H.P. The respondents intended to construct Gumma-Bakhol Road and for that purpose acquired land in the said village. This included some land of the petitioner that was acquired and finally award to this effect came to be passed in his favour on 19.8.2011 vide award No. 46 of 2011.

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It appears that during the revenue settlement which took place in the said village, some of the land of the petitioner through which the road came to be constructed was denoted by Khasra No. 208 measuring 0-06-46 hectares and the same was duly reflected in the revenue record to be owned by the State of Himachal Pradesh and in possession of Public Works Department. However, as the land belonged to the petitioner, he filed an application for correction of the revenue entries on 2.9.2008 before the Collector Settlement, Shimla Division, Shimla and ultimately the revenue entries were ordered to be corrected with respect to Khasra No. 208. After the order of correction, Khasra No. 208/1 measuring 0-03-00 hectares was ordered to be recorded in the ownership of the petitioner and in possession of Public Works Department, whereas Khasra No. 208/2 measuring 0-03-46 hectares was ordered to be recorded in the ownership of the State of Himachal Pradesh and in

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…3…

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possession of Public Works Department. But the fact remains that when notification under Section 4 was issued, the aforesaid land on account of wrong revenue entries made during the settlement, continued to be reflected in the name of the State Government and thus no compensation thereof was paid to the petitioner.

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Thereafter the petitioner on the basis of the aforesaid correction approached the respondents with the request to acquire the land comprised in Khasra No. 208/1. However, as usual and on account of red-tapism the request so made was not acceded to, constraining him to file the instant petition.

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Even though the respondents have filed their reply, but it would be noticed that the only defence taken by them to oppose the petition is the plea of limitation and acquiescence while the factual matrix as has been noticed above, has not been denied. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the petition is in fact barred by delay and laches and further as to whether the petitioner is estopped from filing the instant petition.

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At the out-set, I may observe that it does not behove the State to take such technical objections, more particularly, in light of the fact situation obtaining in the present case. Indubitably, the application for correction as filed by the petitioner came to be finally allowed by the Settlement Collector only on 23.8.2011. The petitioner thereafter made a

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…4…

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request to the respondents to acquire the land which request was declined vide communication dated 3.11.2012 and the present petition was thereafter promptly filed on 14.12.2012. Therefore, it is not only difficult to comprehend but even appreciate as to how the plea of laches or for that matter estoppel is available to the respondents.

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It is also well settled that delay defeats equity. Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. “Laches” or “Lashes” is an old French word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the laches in one case might not constitute in another. The laches to non-suit, an aggrieved person from challenging the acquisition proceedings should be inferred from the conduct of the land owner or an interested person and that there should be a passive inaction for a reasonable length of time. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

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Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. Vs. Prosper Armstrong (1874) 5 PC 221 thus:

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…5…

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“Now, the doctrine of latches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were after wards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”

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The words “reasonable time”, as explained in Veerayeeammal Vs. Seeniammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC

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134 is as follows:

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“13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word

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…6…

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“reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyaar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean:

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“A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently too do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.”

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Thus, what can be taken to be settled on the strength of the aforesaid exposition of law is that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court while exercising such discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High

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…7…

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Court may decline to intervene and grant relief. However, this would be particularly so when the third party rights have been created. However, no rigid rule can be cast in a straitjacket formula for exercising discretion and granting relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

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Reverting back to the facts, it would be noticed that even though the respondents have come up with a very strong plea of laches, whereas, the fact of the matter was that it ought to have been graceful enough to acknowledge and concede its mistake in light of the order of correction passed by the Settlement Collector dated 23.8.2011 particularly when one of their own officials had candidly acknowledged and admitted the title of the petitioner. A small acknowledgement on their part could have conveniently avoided the instant litigation.

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Indubitably, the petitioner even after the order of correction passed by the Settlement Collector could not have directly filed a writ petition without first making a demand to the respondents which is essential prerequisite for issuing a writ of mandamus as it is only on refusal of such demand that one can file a writ petition. Admittedly, such refusal was communicated to the petitioner only on 3.11.2012 and the writ petition came to be filed within 40 days of its communication and was filed on 14.12.2012 and obviously, therefore, there is no delay or laches in filing of the writ petition.

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…8…

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As regards the plea of estoppel by conduct, certain basic conditions have to be satisfied and those have been succinctly stated in case of Seton Laing Co. Vs. Lafone reported in 1887 (19) QBD 68 and are as under:

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(i) Where a man makes a fraudulent misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its true detriment;

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(ii) Another may be where a man makes a false statement negligently though without fraud and another person acts upon it; and

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(iii) There may be circumstances under which, where a misrepresentation is made without fraud and without negligence, there may be an estoppel.

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(iv) There should be a statement made, which should have induced the other party to do an act which otherwise he would have abstained from doing though the said statement in some situations.

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Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law as

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also the test laid therein, I am at a complete loss to appreciate as to how even the plea of estoppel by conduct could have been raised by the respondents as none of the tests as set out above, are satisfied. After all, the question of estoppel arises only when the representor wishes to disavow the assumptions contained in his earlier representation and it is in these circumstances that Courts examine whether it would be unjust or unequitable to

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…9…

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allow the representor to resile from his statement while this admittedly is not the fact situation obtaining in the present case. 15. It is, therefore, high time that before instituting or defending a litigation, the State first implements and follows the provisions of the H.P. State Litigation Policy, 2011 which shall not only ensure that there is no unnecessary burden on the State Exchequer, but would also ensure that the dockets of the Court are not unnecessarily clogged with unproductive and otherwise unavoidable litigation, which is one of the main objective of the Litigation Policy laid down in Clause 1.2 of the Policy which reads thus:

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“ 1.2 Objective:

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The Policy outlines the broad guidelines on litigation strategies to be followed by the State Government or its agencies with a view to reduce litigation, saving avoidable costs on unproductive litigation, reducing avoidable load on judiciary with respect to government induced litigation and thus realising the promise of Article 39A of the Constitution, which obligates the State to promote equal justice and provide free legal aid.”

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In light of the aforesaid discussion, obviously the respondents could not have refused to acquire the land of the petitioner. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the Land Acquisition Collector Sh. Rajesh Bhandari, who otherwise is present in the Court today, is directed to complete the entire acquisition proceedings before 31.3.2018 . It is made clear that since there is no dispute qua the title of the petitioner, who otherwise happens to be sole claimant, the Land Acquisition

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…10…

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Collector is directed not to unnecessarily issue notice under Chapter IV of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘Act’) and should straightway determine the market value of the land under Section 26 and thereafter determine the amount of compensation under Section 27 of the Act.

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It goes without saying that while determining the compensation, the provisions of Sections 28 to 30 of the Act shall also be borne in mind by the Collector. Since no notice is to be issued to the petitioner, he is directed to appear in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector (SZ), Winter Field, Shimla at 11.00 a.m. on 18.12.2017.

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With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s) if any, also stands disposed of.

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Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, who, in turn, is directed to issue instructions to all concerned to ensure that before the matters are instituted or defended in the Court, the provisions of the H.P. State Litigation Policy are adhered to and followed in its letter and spirit.

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28^th November, 2017. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan), (GR) Judge

Daulat Ram Chauhan v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Daulat Ram Chauhan v. State

Case brief

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