Special Civil Application seeking quashing of a detention order under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities (PASA) Act. The court found that the allegations did not establish the petitioner as a 'dangerous person' or threat to public order.
The detention order dated 02.04.2014 is quashed; the petitioner is set at liberty forthwith.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5422 of 2014
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.J.DESAI
=============================================
| 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? |
No |
|---|---|
| 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? |
No |
| 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? |
No |
| 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? |
No |
| 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? |
No |
=============================================
DILIP @ DIPO DAHYABHAI CHUNARA....Petitioner(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & 2....Respondent(s)
============================================= Appearance:
MR BHUNESH C RUPERA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MS AMITA SHAH, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=============================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.J.DESAI
Date : 04/09/2014
ORAL JUDGMENT
Page 1 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
conferred under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short 'the PASA Act') by detaining the detenue as a 'dangerous person' as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act.
Page 2 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
decision of above referred Special Civil Application No. 4002 of 2014, which came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.M.Sahai and Honble Mr.Justice R.P.Dholaria) vide order dated 22.08.2014 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 905 of 2014, and therefore, the present petition be dismissed.
Page 3 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
and therefore, the detention order confirmed by the learned Single Judge came to be quashed and set aside.
Page 4 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
similar repetitive acts but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts and that repeated, persistent and similar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It, therefore, necessarily follows, that in order to bring a person within the expression "dangerous person" as defined in clause (c) of Sec. 2 of the Act, there should be positive material to indicate that such person is habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of offences which are punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of I.P.C. or under Chapter V of the Arms Act and that a single or isolated act falling under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of I.P.C. or Chapter V of the Arms Act cannot be characterised as a habitual act referred to in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.
9. Further, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act confers power on the State Government and a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police under the direction of the State Government to detain a person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order". The explanation attached to Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 reproduced above in the foregoing para contemplates that "public order" shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-sec. (4) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 also provides that for the purpose of Sec. 3, a person shall be deemed to be 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' when such person is a "dangerous person" and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a "dangerous person" his alleged activities fall within the ambit of the expression 'public order'. A distinction has to be drawn between law and order
Page 5 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
and maintenance of public order because most often the two expressions are confused and detention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in respect of the activities of a person which exclusively fall within the domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order. In this connection it may be stated that in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order", the fall out and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of "law and order" or it amounts to "public order". If the activity falls within the category of disturbance of "public order" then it becomes essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his activities would fall beyond the frontiers of law and order, disturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the specified locality. In the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of W. B., 1970 (1) SCC 98 this Court had an occasion to deal with the distinction between law and order and public order. Hidayatullah, C. J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court observed that public order would embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. It has been further observed that the implications of public order are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized
Page 6 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Again in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 322 : [1989(1) GLR 563 (SC)], this Court took the view that in order that an activity may be said to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, there must be material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public. If any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. The commission of an offence will not necessarily come within the purview of public order which can be dealt with under ordinary general law of the land.”
Page 7 of 8
C/SCA/5422/2014 JUDGMENT
(A.J.DESAI, J.)
**_Kazi..._*
Page 8 of 8
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the petitioner qualifies as a 'dangerous person' under Section 2(c) of the PASA Act based on isolated offences.
Whether the detention order deprives the accused of personal liberty without sufficient material to justify it.
Whether the petitioner was prejudicial to public order under Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh V. M.M.Mehta, Commisioner of Police & Ors.Followed¶24
1995(2) G.L.R.1268
Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad [Vekaria] v. State of GujaratReferred¶45
2000[3] GLR 2696
Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, SuratReferred¶45
2000[1] GLH 393
District Collector, Ananthapur V/s. V. LaxmananDistinguished¶45
(2005) 3 SCC 663 · Who else cites this
Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan V/s. State of GujaratDistinguished¶45
AIR 1999 SC 2197 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 1 enactments
DILIP @ DIPO DAHYABHAI CHUNARA
STATE OF GUJARAT
A.J.Desai
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
