Allowed

Union of India and 4 Ors. v. Shri Thungbemo and 5 Ors.

Gauhati HC2 Mar 2026I.A.(Civil)/176/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

State sought condonation of a 485-day delay in filing a writ appeal against an order allowing a writ petition, citing interdepartmental approvals. Relying on Supreme Court precedent on substantial justice over technicality, the court condoned the delay and allowed the application.

What did the court decide?

Delay of 485 days in filing WA No. 28/2025 condoned; interlocutory application allowed.

Union of India and 4 Ors. Vs Shri Thungbemo… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Gauhati HC (2026)

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Page No.# 1/9

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GAHC020006202025

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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH

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Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/176/2025

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UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE HOME AFFAIRS, GOVT. OF INDIA

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2: THE CHAIRMAN STAFF SELECTION COMMISSION BLOCK NO. 12 CGO COMPLEX LODHI ROAD NEAR JLN STADIUM NEW DELHI DELHI-110003

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3: DIRECTOR GENERAL CRPF CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE RECRUITMENT BRANCH EAST BLOCK - 7 LEVEL 4 SECTOR- 1 R.K. PURAM NEW DELHI-110066 MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

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4: NORTH EASTERN REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF SELECTION COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY REGIONAL DIRECTOR HOUSEFED COMPLEX WEST END BLOCK LASAT GATE-BASISTHA ROAD PO ASSAM SACHIVALAYA DISPUR GAUHATI-781006

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5: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL GROUP CENTRE CRPF RECRUITMENT BRANCH ADARINI SALBAGAN AGARTALA WEST TRIPURA TRIPURA-7990 VERSUS SHRI THUNGBEMO AND 5 ORS S/O LATE NZANBEMO ODYUO, H/NO. 285-A, LOWER PWD, KOHIMA NAGALAND 2:SHRI IMNAMEREN S/O TAKUMBUBA ALICHEN MOKOKCHUNG NAGALAND 3:SHRI MOAKABA S/O MOAMEREN. H.NO. 803 LONGSA VILLAGE MOKOKCHUNG NAGALAND 4:SHRI SHECUTO S/O NEHUSA SAKRABA VILLAGE PHEK NAGALAND 5:SHRI NUVOSA SWURO S/O VILATO SWURO CHESEZU VILLAGE PHEK NAGALAND 6:SHRI LIBEMO MOZHUI S/O THUNGLAMO MOZHUI SENJUM VILLAGE DIMAPUR NAGALAN

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Advocate for the Petitioner : YANGER WATI,

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Advocate for the Respondent : ,

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Linked Case : WA/28/2025 UNION OF INDIA AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE HOME AFFAIRS GOVT. OF INDIA 2: THE CHAIRMAN STAFF SELECTION COMMISSION BLOCK NO. 12 CGO COMPLEX LODHI ROAD NEAR JLN STADIUM NEW DELHI DELHI-110003 3: DIRECTOR GENERAL CRPF CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE RECRUITMENT BRANCH EAST BLOCK - 7 LEVEL 4 SECTOR- 1 R.K. PURAM NEW DELHI-110066 MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

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4: NORTH EASTERN REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF SELECTION COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY REGIONAL DIRECTOR HOUSEFED COMPLEX WEST END BLOCK LASAT GATE-BASISTHA ROAD PO ASSAM SACHIVALAYA DISPUR GAUHATI-781006

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5: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL GROUP CENTRE CRPF RECRUITMENT BRANCH ADARINI SALBAGAN AGARTALA WEST TRIPURA TRIPURA-79901 VERSUS SHRI THUNGBEMO AND 5 ORS

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S/O LATE NZANBEMO ODYUO H/NO. 285-A LOWER PWD KOHIMA NAGALAND 2:SHRI IMNAMEREN S/O TAKUMBUBA ALICHEN MOKOKCHUNG NAGALAND 3:SHRI MOAKABA S/O MOAMEREN. H.NO. 803 LONGSA VILLAGE MOKOKCHUNG NAGALAND 4:SHRI SHECUTO S/O NEHUSA SAKRABA VILLAGE PHEK NAGALAND 5:SHRI NUVOSA SWURO S/O VILATO SWURO CHESEZU VILLAGE PHEK NAGALAND 6:SHRI LIBEMO MOZHUI S/O THUNGLAMO MOZHUI SENJUM VILLAGE DIMAPUR NAGALAND -----------Advocate for : YANGER WATI Advocate for : T. B. JAMIR appearing for SHRI THUNGBEMO AND 5 ORS

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BEFORE HONBLE MR JUSTICE KARDAK ETE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER

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ORDER

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Date : 03-03-2026 (Kardak Ete, J)

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Heard Mr. Y. Wati, learned counsel for the applicants. Also

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Page No.# 5/9 heard Mr. I. Jamir, learned counsel for the opposite party/respondents.

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2. This is an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 485 days in filing the connected Writ Appeal No. 28/2025.

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3. The opposite parties herein, who were the writ petitioners, had filed WP(C) No. 76/2022, which was disposed of by order dated 21.05.2024, whereby the writ petition was allowed.

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4. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 21.05.2024, the applicants have filed the present application seeking condonation of delay in preferring the connected writ appeal. The applicants have set out the reasons for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, which, inter alia, arose on account of the time consumed in interdepartmental correspondence and in obtaining the necessary approvals from the competent authorities for filing the connected writ appeal, which process ultimately culminated on 20.05.2025.

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5. It is submitted that the opposite parties have already filed a contempt petition seeking compliance of the order dated 21.05.2024, which is stated to be pending.

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6. Mr. I. Jamir, learned counsel for the opposite parties, has vehemently opposed the prayer for condonation of delay. He submits that the reasons assigned for the delay have not been satisfactorily explained and that the delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of administrative correspondence, which, according to him, does not constitute a reasonable or

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sufficient cause.

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7. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the grounds set out in the application explaining the delay in filing the writ appeal within the prescribed period of limitation.

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8. It is a settled position of law that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. In this regard, a profitable reference may be made to the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Azadul Haque , in SLP (Civil) Diary No. 3916/2025, dated 12.09.2025, wherein it has been held as under:

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“… When substantial justice is pitted against technicalities, necessarily such technicalities will have to kneel down before the substantial justice or in other words, where the cause shown for the delay is sufficient and the opposite party can be suitably compensated for such delay, necessarily the delay has to be condoned, irrespective of the length of delay. On the other hand, if the delay is short, the cause shown would not be in the proximity of truth or contrary to facts, then in such circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned and the application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed. This proposition also gets support from the law laid down by this Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353, whereunder this Court has held as follows:

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“ 3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

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Page No.# 7/9 “ 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

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2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

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3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

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4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

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5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

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6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

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Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on

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merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.”

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6. Keeping the aforestated principles in mind when the facts on hand are examined, we observe that the cause shown for the delay has been explained as the officials being involved in Special Summary Revision 2024 and also in the programme of "Sarkar Aapke Dwaar". Though the cause shown in the application for condonation of delay is casual, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the State being an impersonal machinery moves at a snail’s pace, there will be no personal interest of the officials in withholding the file. Even when there is bureaucratic lethargy, the substantial justice cannot be sacrificed at the cost of public good. Under similar circumstances, this Court in the Case of State of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao & Ors., 2005 (3) SCC 752 has held:

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“ 12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression “every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

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Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.”

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9. Having considered the grounds set forth and cause shown in the application and in view of the settled position of law, we are of the considered opinion that, although the delay extends to 485 days, the cause shown for the delay has been explained by the applicants to justify condonation, as the same has been due to inter-departmental correspondence and approval. We are satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown by the applicants in not preferring the connected appeal within the limitation period.

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10. Accordingly, the delay of 485 days in filing the connected appeal, WA No. 28/2025, is hereby condoned.

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11. The interlocutory application stands allowed and disposed of.

Sd/-

Sd/-

JUDGE JUDGE

Comparing Assistant

Union of India and 4 Ors. v. Shri Thungbemo and 5 Ors.

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Union of India and 4 Ors. v. Shri Thungbemo and 5 Ors.

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