Fourth bail application under Section 483 BNSS by truck driver and handyman charged under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C)/25/29 NDPS Act after seizure of about 530 kg ganja, a commercial quantity. Holding the twin conditions of Section 37 unsatisfied and no inordinate trial delay, the High Court rejected bail.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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GAHC010140532024
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Bail Appln./2048/2024
SAHIL SHARMA AND ANR
S/O JAGADISH SHARMA, R/O SIORA TANDA, AKHNOOR, GANDHARWAN, JAMMU, J AND K-181201
2: AKSHAY KUMAR S/O GORI LAL R/O BOLYAN BAJJA BOLYAN BOLIAN DODA JAMMU AND KASHMIR-18220
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE STANDING COUNSEL, CUSTOMS
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. D K BAIDYA, MR. M S HUSSAIN
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, CUSTOMS,
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA
ORDER
Date : 05.08.2024
Heard Mr. D.K. Baidya, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr.
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S.C. Keyal, learned counsel for the respondent, i.e. Union of India, represented by the Customs Department.
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under-trial prisoners considering the length of their detention. It was also submitted that even the Supreme Court of India had deprecated the long incarceration of under-trial prisoners for a long time and that on the ground that the right of the petitioners under Article 21 of the Constitution of India was violated and thus, the petitioners have become entitled to be released on bail.
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on 07.02.2020, (ix) Hafijul Mandal & Anr. v. Narcotics Control Bureau, Guwahati, B.A. No. 364/2024, decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 20.04.2024, (x) Rabi Ahmed Barbhuiya v. Union of India, B.A. No. 449/2024, decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 20.04.2024, (xi) Pawan Kumar Yadav & Anr. v. The State of Assam, B.A. No. 2824/2023, decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 03.04.2024, (xii) Gautam Saha & Anr. v. The State of Assam, decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court on 26.06.2024.
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mention that the Final complaint discloses sufficient material against the petitioners and thus, upon explaining charges to the petitioners vide order dated 30.08.2023, the trial against the petitioners has begun.
14 . We may, however, hasten to add that while considering an application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court is not called upon to record a finding of ‘not guilty’. At this stage, it is neither necessary nor desirable to weigh the evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the accused has committed offence under the NDPS Act. What is to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence(s) he is charged with and further that he is not likely to commit an offence under the said Act while on bail. The satisfaction of the Court about the existence of the said twin conditions is for a limited purpose and is confined to the
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question of releasing the accused on bail.
15 . Bearing in mind the above broad principles, we may now consider the merits of the present appeal. It is evident from the afore-extracted paragraph that the circumstances which have weighed with the learned Judge to conclude that it was a fit case for grant of bail are: (i) that nothing has been found from the possession of the respondent; (ii) he is in jail for the last three years and (iii) that there is no chance of his appeal being heard within a period of seven years. In our opinion, the stated circumstances may be relevant for grant of bail in matters arising out of conviction under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 etc. but are not sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements as stipulated in sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Merely because, according to the Ld. Judge, nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, it could not be said at this stage that the respondent was not guilty of the offences for which he had been charged and convicted. We find no substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that the observation of the learned Judge to the effect that “nothing has been found from his possession” by itself shows application of mind by the Ld. Judge tantamounting to “satisfaction” within the meaning of the said provision. It seems that the provisions of the NDPS Act and more particularly Section 37 were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge.
16 . Thus, in our opinion, the impugned order having been passed ignoring the mandatory requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration of the application filed by the respondent for suspension of sentence and for granting of bail, keeping in view the parameters of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, enumerated above. We further direct that the bail application shall be taken up for consideration only after the respondent surrenders to custody. The respondent is directed to surrender to custody within two weeks of the date of this order, failing which the High Court will take appropriate steps for his arrest.
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11 . It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be factored in. The conditions imposed in sub- section (1) of Section 37 is that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
12 . The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira, (2004) 3 SCC 549 a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus:-
13 . The expression 'reasonable ground' came up for discussion in State of Kerala & Ors. v. Rajesh and others, (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this Court has observed as below:
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Such an assumption would be premature at this stage.
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was fixed on 10.11.2023. But the PWs were absent both on 10.11.2023 and 06.12.2023 and therefore, the date of trial was re-fixed on 11.01.2024. On 11.01.2024, the PW-1 was partly examined and the next date of trial was fixed on 25.01.2024 for further examination of PW-1, but the PWs were absent both on 25.01.2024 and 20.02.2024 and the trial was next fixed on 18.03.2024. The PW-1 was partly examined on 18.03.2024. On 27.03.2024, the PW-1 was examined and cross-examined and the further cross-examination was deferred to 22.04.2024. The PW-1 was partly cross-examined on 22.04.2024. On 20.05.2024 and 07.06.2024, the PW-1 had prayed for adjournment and the further cross-examination of PW-1 was fixed on 08.07.2024, and on the said date, the PW-1 was cross-examined and discharged. On 09.07.2024, the prosecution had filed a petition to examine Vishvendra Singh Rawat, which was fixed for consideration on 19.07.2024. However, by order dated 19.07.2024, the said petition was kept in abeyance till the listed witnesses were examined. The case was then fixed on 03.08.2024 for further PWs.
436A. Maximum period for which an under trial prisoner can be detained.Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone
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detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties:
Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:
Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.
Explanation.—In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.
“Where undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of ten years and a minimum fine of Rupees one lakh, such an under-trial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail for not less than five years provided he furnishes bail in the sum of Rupees one lakh with two sureties for like amount.”
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in the case of Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain (supra), it appears that the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satender Kumar Antil (supra) had not been placed. Therefore, the law as laid down in the case of Satender Kumar Antil (supra), is not found to have been diluted in any manner.
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18 . At this stage, we think it apposite to advert to another aspect which is sometimes highlighted. It is quite common that a contention is canvassed in certain cases that unless there is a speedy trial, the concept of fair trial is totally crucified. Recently, in Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408, a three-Judge Bench, after referring to the pronouncements in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578: (2002) 0 Supreme(SC) 499, Zahira Habibulla H. Shekh and another v. State of Gujarat and others, (2004) 4 SCC 158, Satyajit Banerjee & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC 115, pointed out the subtle distinction between the two in the following manner:-
“40 “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a person accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused’s right of fair trial. Unlike the accused’s right of fair trial, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The right to speedy trial is in its very nature relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of such case. Mere lapse of several years since the commencement of prosecution by itself may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning the accused’s right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of crime, persons involved, social impact and societal needs must be weighed along with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution may be brought to an end.” [Emphasis added]
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19 . It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of the accused is to have a speedy trial and on the other, the quashment of the indictment or the acquittal or refusal for sending the matter for re- trial has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of the crime on the society and the confidence of the people in the judicial system. There cannot be a mechanical approach. From the principles laid down in many an authority of this Court, it is clear as crystal that no time limit can be stipulated for disposal of the criminal trial. The delay caused has to be weighed on the factual score, regard being had to the nature of the offence and the concept of social justice and the cry of the collective. In the case at hand, the appellant has been charge-sheeted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for disproportionate assets. The said Act has a purpose to serve. The Parliament intended to eradicate corruption and provide deterrent punishment when criminal culpability is proven. The intendment of the legislature has an immense social relevance. In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenet of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law. Be it noted, system of good governance is founded on collective faith in the institutions. If corrosions are allowed to continue by giving allowance to quash the proceedings in corruption cases solely because of delay without scrutinizing other relevant factors, a time may come when the unscrupulous people would foster and garner the tendency to pave the path of anarchism.
20 . It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance. It is worth noting that immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the people believing in honesty, and history records with agony how they have suffered. The only redeeming fact is that collective sensibility respects such suffering as it is in consonance with the constitutional morality. Therefore, the relief for quashing of a trial under the 1988 Act has to be considered in the above backdrop.
21 . It is perceivable that delay has occurred due to dilatory tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the part of the prosecution and faults on the part of the system, i.e., to keep the court vacant. It is also interesting to note that though
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there was no order directing stay of the proceedings before the trial court, yet at the instance of the accused, adjournments were sought. After the High Court clarified the position, the accused, by exhibition of inherent proclivity, sought adjournment and filed miscellaneous applications for prolonging the trial, possibly harbouring the notion that asking for adjournment is a right of the accused and filing applications is his unexceptional legal right. When we say so, we may not be understood to have said that the accused is debarred in law to file applications, but when delay is caused on the said score, he cannot advance a plea that the delay in trial has caused colossal hardship and agony warranting quashment of the entire criminal proceeding. In the present case, as has been stated earlier, the accused, as alleged, had acquired assets worth Rs.33.44 lacs. The value of the said amount at the time of launching of the prosecution has to be kept in mind. It can be stated with absolute assurance that the tendency to abuse the official position has spread like an epidemic and has shown its propensity making the collective to believe that unless bribe is given, the work may not be done. To put it differently, giving bribe, whether in cash or in kind, may become the “mantra” of the people. We may hasten to add, some citizens do protest but the said protest may not inspire others to follow the path of sacredness of boldness and sacrosanctity of courage. Many may try to deviate. This deviation is against the social and national interest. Thus, we are disposed to think that the balance to continue the proceeding against the accused-appellants tilts in favour of the prosecution and, hence, we are not inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings. However, the learned Special Judge is directed to dispose of the trial by the end of December, 2013 positively.
8.5. The problem of drug addicts is international and the mafia is working throughout the world. It is a crime against the society and it has to be dealt with iron hands. Use of drugs by the young people in India has increased. The drugs are being used for weakening of the nation. During the British regime control was kept on the traffic of dangerous drugs by enforcing the Opium Act, 1857. The Opium Act, 1875 and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930. However, with the passage of time and the development in the field of illicit drug traffic and during abuse at national and international level, many deficiencies in the existing laws have come to notice. Therefore, in order to remove such deficiencies and difficulties, there was urgent need for the enactment of a comprehensive legislation on Narcotic Drugs and
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Psychotropic Substances, which led to enactment of NDPS Act. As observed herein above, the Act is a special law and has a laudable purpose to serve and is intended to combat the menace otherwise bent upon destroying the public health and national health. The guilty must be in and the innocent ones must be out. The punishment part in drug trafficking is an important one but its preventive part is more important. Therefore, prevention of illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 came to be introduced. The aim was to prevent illicit traffic rather than punish after the offence was committed. Therefore, the Courts will have to safeguard the life and liberty of the innocent persons. Therefore, the provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the object and purpose of NDPS Act; impact on the society as a whole and the Act is required to be interpreted literally and not liberally which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and preamble of the Act. Therefore, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute canvassed on behalf of the accused and the intervener that quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be taken into consideration and it is only actual content of the weight of the offending drug, which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute "small quantity or commercial quantity", cannot be accepted.
29 . For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in Common Cause case (I) (as modified in Common Cause (II) and Raj Deo Sharma (I) and (II), the Court could not have prescribed periods of limitation beyond which the trial of a criminal case or a criminal proceeding cannot continue and must mandatorily be closed followed by an order acquitting or discharging the accused. In conclusion we hold:-
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(3) The guidelines laid down in A.R. Antulay’s case are not exhaustive but only illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made.
(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The timelimits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I), Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The criminal courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as prescribed by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I), Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A.R. Antulay’s case and decide whether the trial or proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused. (5) The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 311 and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate relief or suitable directions.
(6) This is an appropriate occasion to remind the Union of India and the State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary-quantitatively and qualitatively-by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. We hope and trust that the Governments shall act.
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context of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, has observed as follows:-
20 . It is also difficult to countenance the submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra that the investigation qua the appellant is complete and the trial of the cases likely to take long time. According to him the appellant ought not to be incarcerated indefinitely merely because the investigation is kept open with regard to the other accused. In this regard, it may be noted that the appellant has not been able to overcome the threshold stipulations contemplated in Section 45 namely he has failed to prima facie prove that he is not guilty of the alleged offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It cannot be gainsaid that the burden of proof lies on the accused for the purpose of the condition set out in the Section 45 that he is not guilty of such offence. Of course, such discharge of burden could be on the probabilities, nonetheless in the instant case there being sufficient material on record adduced by the respondent showing the thick involvement of the appellant in the alleged offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the said Act, the Court is not inclined to grant bail to the appellant.
21 . The apprehension of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial is likely to take long time and the appellant would be incarcerated for indefinite period, is also not well founded in view of the observations made by this Court in case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine 929. On the application of Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it has been categorically held therein that:-
“419. Section 436A of the 1973 Code, is a wholesome beneficial provision, which is for effectuating the right of speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and which merely specifies the outer limits within which the trial is expected to be concluded, failing which, the accused ought not to be detained further. Indeed, Section 436A of the 1973 Code also contemplates that the relief under this provision cannot be granted mechanically. It is still within the discretion of the Court, unlike the default bail under Section 167 of the 1973 Code. Under Section 436A of the 1973 Code, however, the Court is required to consider the relief on case-to-case basis. As the proviso therein itself recognises that, in a given case, the detention can be continued by the Court even longer than one-half of the period, for which, reasons are to be recorded by it in writing and also by imposing such terms and conditions so as to ensure that after release, the accused makes himself/herself available for expeditious completion of the trial.”
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that embargo under section 37 of the NDPS Act applied in cases where commercial quantity of drugs was seized and that liberty available under Article 21 of the Constitution of India must override the statutory embargo created under section 37 of the NDPS Act.
14 . This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, inter-alia, provides that no person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied, namely (i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail.
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1973 (2 of 1974):
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section 37(1)(b)(ii) of NDPS Act is firstly that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and secondly, that he is not likely to commit such offence while on bail, which are cumulative and not alternative and that satisfaction of existence of those twin conditions had to be based on reasonable grounds as referred therein. Moreover, the case of Rajesh (supra), has also been referred to.
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of ganja; 31 kilograms of opium; 1,38,161 bottles of codeine based cough syrup; 13,03,278 tablet/capsules; 10 kilograms of morphine; 0.002 kilograms of cocaine; 978 kilograms of cannabis and 2 kilograms of methamphetamine have been seized amid intensified operations against drug traffickers. During the said period cash amounting to Rs.43,94,966/- has also been seized. Moreover, 20 bighas of cannabis plantation have also been destroyed during the period. During this period the Assam Police had arrested 2,294 persons and had registered 1462 cases in less than 6 months this year. It appears that this does not include the data of drug seized by Customs and NCB. The learned standing counsel for the respondent had submitted that in view of enormous seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances being seized, there is also some inadvertent delay in releasing FSL reports.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the petitioners in custody for 809 days were entitled to bail under Section 436A CrPC and Article 21 despite only one witness examined.
Whether the twin conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act for bail involving commercial quantity of contraband were satisfied.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Shariful Islam @ Sarif v. State of West BengalDistinguished¶14
2022 SCC OnLine SC 2069 · Who else cites this
Rabi Prakash v. State of OdishaDistinguished¶23
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109 · Who else cites this
Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan v. The State of West BengalDistinguished¶23
SLP (Crl.) No. 5769/2022
Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh v. The State of GujaratDistinguished¶23
SLP (Crl.) 5530/2022
Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi)Distinguished¶24
(2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 289
Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar PradeshDistinguished¶23
2023 SCC OnLine SC 919 · Who else cites this
Anjan Nath v. The State of AssamDistinguished¶23
SLP (Crl.) No. 9860/2023
Chitta Biswas @ Subhas v. The State of West BengalDistinguished¶23
Crl. Appeal No. 245/2020
Hafijul Mandal & Anr. v. Narcotics Control Bureau, GuwahatiDistinguished¶37
B.A. No. 364/2024
Rabi Ahmed Barbhuiya v. Union of IndiaDistinguished¶37
B.A. No. 449/2024
Pawan Kumar Yadav & Anr. v. The State of AssamDistinguished¶37
B.A. No. 2824/2023
Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit AggarwalRelied on¶17
AIR 2022 SC 3444 · Who else cites this
Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of InvestigationFollowed¶26
AIR 2022 SC 3386 · Who else cites this
Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal & Anr. v. State of MaharashtraRelied on¶28
(2013) 4 SCC 642 · Who else cites this
Hira Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.Relied on¶29
AIR 2020 SC 3255 · Who else cites this
P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of KarnatakaFollowed¶31
(2002) 4 SCC 578 · Who else cites this
Tarun Kumar v. Assistant Director, Directorate of EnforcementReferred¶32
(2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 1163
Baiju Thakur v. Union of IndiaDistinguished¶33
B.A. 3765/2023
Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr.Relied on¶34
(2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 104
Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh @ PappuFollowed¶35
(2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 285
State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo & Anr.Followed¶36
2024 Legal Eagle SC 646
Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva NodiraRelied on¶27
(2004) 3 SCC 549 · Who else cites this
State of Kerala & Ors. v. Rajesh and othersRelied on¶38
(2020) 12 SCC 122 · Who else cites this
6 provisions across 4 enactments
Sahil Sharma
Akshay Kumar
Union of India (represented by Standing Counsel, Customs)
Kalyan Rai Surana
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
