The Gauhati High Court dismissed a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC. The court held no substantial question of law arose, as lower courts did not solely rely on signature comparison and properly addressed limitation and joinder of parties.
The instant appeal stands dismissed; the Defendants/Respondents shall be entitled to all costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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GAHC010002392008
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : RSA/56/2008
BANWARILAL SHARMA.
S/O DURGA PRASAD SHARMA, R/O ADARSH NAGAR NEAR MAHESWARI BHAWAN, ATHGAON, GHY-8, PS. BHARALUMUKH.
VERSUS
SMT. KAMALA DEVI AJITSARIA.. - 2:RENU SUREKHA AJITSARIA
3:LALITA KESHAN
4:INDIRA AGARWALLA
5:PINKI AGARWALLA NO.1 IS THE WIFE AND 2 3 4 and 5 ARE THE DAUGHTERS OF LATE RUKMANAND AJITSARIA. ALL ARE RESIDENT OF JAI NARAYAN ROAD FANCY BAZAR GHY-1
6:RAJESH AGARWAL
S/O SRILAL AGARWAL PERMANENT RESIDENT OF SONAPUR SAW MILL SONAPUR DIST. KAMRUP AND ALSO R/O JAI NARAYAN ROAD FANCY BAZAR GHY-
Advocate for the Petitioner : R P N SINGH
Advocate for the Respondent : G N SAHEWALLA
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BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)
Date : 13-05-2022
Heard Mr. S.P. Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and Mr.G.N.Sahewalla, the learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. S. Todi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents.
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would lie in cases which involves substantial question of law. The word ‘substantial’ prefixed to ‘question of law’ does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to the impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ‘Substantial question of law’ means not only ‘substantial question of law’ of general importance, but also a substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of Section 100 of the CPC, any question of law, which affects the final decision in a case is a ‘substantial question of law’ as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a ‘question of law’, by the Supreme Court or even by this Court, it cannot be said that the case involves a ‘substantial question of law’. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled, arises for consideration in the case but this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective meaning thereby that where there is a clear enunciation of law and the Lower Court has followed or rigidly applied, such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not be considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance. On the other hand, if there is a clear enunciation of
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law by the Supreme Court or by this Court, but the Lower Courts had ignored or
misinterpreted or misapplied the same and correct application of the law as declared or enunciated by the Supreme Court or by this Court would have led to a different decision, the appeal would involve a ‘substantial question of law’ as between the parties. Even where there is an enunciation of law by the Supreme Court or by this Court and the same has been followed by the Lower Court, if
the appellant is able to persuade this Court that the enunciated legal position needs reconsideration, alteration, modification or clarification or that there is a need to resolve an apparent conflict between two different viewpoints, it can be
said that a substantial question of law arises for consideration. In other words, there cannot, therefore, be a straight jacket definition as to when a substantial
question of law arises in a case, it shall depend on the facts of each case along with the decision rendered by the Courts below.
Goyal reported in ( 2008 ) 8 SCC 92 at paragraphs 14 & 14, dealt with the
procedural aspect relating to Second Appeal. The said Paragraphs being relevant are quoted herein below :
“ Procedure relating to second appeals
14. We may next refer to the procedure relating to second appeals as evident from Section 100 read with Order 42 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
(a) The appellant should set out in the memorandum of appeal the
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substantial questions of law involved in the appeal.
(b) The High Court should entertain the second appeal only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(c) While admitting or entertaining the second appeal, the High Court should formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the case.
(d) The second appeal shall be heard on the question(s) of law so formulated and the respondent can submit at the hearing that the second appeal does not in fact involve any such questions of law. The appellant cannot urge any other ground other than the substantial question of law without the leave of the Court.
(e) The High Court is at liberty to reformulate the substantial questions of law or frame other substantial question of law, for reasons to be recorded and hear the parties on such reformulated or additional substantial questions of law.
15. It is a matter of concern that the scope of second appeals and as also the procedural aspects of second appeals are often ignored by the High Courts. Some of the oft-repeated errors are:
(c) Admitting second appeals by formulating a standard or mechanical question such as “whether on the facts and circumstances the judgment of the first appellate court calls for interference” as the substantial question of law.
(d) Failing to consider and formulate relevant and appropriate substantial question(s) of law involved in the second appeal.
(e) Rejecting second appeals on the ground that the case does not involve any substantial question of law, when the case in fact involves substantial questions of law.
(f) Reformulating the substantial question of law after the conclusion of the hearing, while preparing the judgment, thereby denying an opportunity to the parties to make submissions on the reformulated substantial question of law.
(g) Deciding second appeals by reappreciating evidence and interfering with findings of fact, ignoring the questions of law.
These lapses or technical errors lead to injustice and also give rise to avoidable further appeals to this Court and remands by this Court, thereby prolonging the period of litigation. Care should be taken to ensure that the cases not involving substantial questions of law are not entertained, and at the same time ensure that cases involving substantial questions of law are not rejected as not involving substantial questions of law.”
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16/3/2009, this Court had admitted the Appeal for hearing on two questions formulated—
of law so formulated with due respect, cannot be a substantial question of law. Therefore, this Court confines itself as to whether the substantial question of
law as formulated in Sl. No. 1 is a substantial question of law involved in the instant appeal.
so formulated at Sl.No. 1 is a substantial question of law involved in the instant
Appeal and as to whether the same arises at all, it would be relevant to take note of the relevant facts of the instant case.
Patta No. 661 of Village Chartribari vide a registered Sale Deed No.7213 dated
30/11/1992 from one Rukmanand Ajitsaria(since deceased), who happened to
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be the husband of the Defendant No. 1 and father of the Defendant Nos. 2 to 5.
The Plaintiff’s further case is that he had taken the possession of the entire suit land measuring 2 Katha 17 Lechas more than 20 years ago and he mutated his name in the revenue records and the structures including Assam Type House and the building standing over the suit land were also duly assessed under the Holding No. 388 of Ward No. XVIII of GMC and the Plaintiff was paying the taxes to the GMC regularly. However, on 25/9/1997, the Plaintiff came to know that without having any right, title and interest and possession over the suit land, the Defendants mutated the names in respect to 17 lechas of land as legal heirs of the original pattadars Rukmanand Ajitsaria. It is the further case of the Plaintiff that apart from the Defendants, one Pawan Kumar Ajitsaria was the adopted son of Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria and the said Pawan Kumar Ajitsaria had filed a Title Suit No. 74/1997 which was pending between the said Pawan Kumar Ajitsaria and the Defendants for disposal. The Plaintiff’s further case is that on coming to learn about the order of mutation the Plaintiff filed a Revenue Appeal No. 47/1997-98 before the ADC, Kamrup. The Defendants thereupon tried to evict the Plaintiff from the suit land and the premises on 5/12/1997 by threatening the Chowkidar to vacate the suit premises. The Defendants also threatened to demolish the houses standing on the suit land and entered the office of the Plaintiff and ransacked the furniture with an intent to evict the
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Plaintiff from the said room. In that regard the Plaintiff also stated that he had filed an FIR at Fatasil Ambari Police Outpost. It has also been alleged that the Defendants again tried to dispossess the Plaintiff from the suit premises on 6/12/1997 but could not do anything due to the protest of the Plaintiff. Though from a perusal of a plaint, it appears on the face of it that the rights of the Plaintiff over the suit land as described in the Schedule to the plaint were put to challenge in as much as the Defendants had obtained the mutation over the land which as per the Plaintiff, he had challenged in an appeal before the ADC, Kamrup, however, the Plaintiff did not seek for a declaration of the right, title and interest and instead the Plaintiff sought for a decree for declaration that the Defendants have no right to evict the Plaintiff from the suit premises as described in the Schedule forcibly and illegally without following the procedure established by law and also have no right to cause any kind of threatening, intimidation, annoyance and to disturb the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff over the suit land in any manner without following the procedure established by law. In terms with the said declaration, a permanent injunction was also sought against the Defendants from disturbing the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff in the suit land and from causing any kind of nuisance, obstruction, intimidation and threatening to the Plaintiff in respect to the suit land as described in the Schedule below without following the procedure established by law. Therefore,
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from a perusal of the plaint, it would be clear that the Plaintiff has not sought for declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land and rather sought only for a declaration and permanent injunction against the Defendant not to disturb the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff over the suit land without following the procedure established by law. It may be relevant herein to mention that a perusal of the plaint also would not show that the Plaintiff had disclosed construction of apartments/flats over the Schedule land.
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purpose of a go-down at a monthly rent of Rs.4100/- payable within the first week of every succeeding English Calender month. The remaining land of the suit Dag had been given to Rukmanand Ajitsaria Charity Trust. During the life time of Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria, the Plaintiff was regularly paying rent and thereafter the Defendants collected the rent from the Plaintiff. It was mentioned that the vacant part of the land was under the possession of Lt. Rumanand Ajitsaria. It was further mentioned that the relationship of the Plaintiff with Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria was very cordial and after the death of Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria, the Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 as legal heirs inherited all the properties including the suit land and the house left by Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria. It was mentioned that since about 10 years prior to the death of Rukmanand Ajitsaria, he became extremely infirm and he was not in a position to sign and execute any documents. After the death of Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria, the plaintiff failed to pay the rent for the suit premises. The Defendants/Counter Claimants’ further case was that when they instituted the Mutation Case No.420/96-97, they came to know about the mutation of 2 Kathas of land of the suit land in the name of the Plaintiff. The Defendants preferred an appeal against the order of mutation in respect to 2 Kathas of land wherein in the said proceedings, the Plaintiff claimed that he purchased 2 Kathas of land, of the suit patta vide registered Sale Deed No.7213/92. It is the case of the Defendants that the said Sale Deed
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is fraudulent, collusive and liable to be cancelled. It was also mentioned in the counter claim that the Plaintiff constructed a C.I. Sheet fencing so that his nefarious activities could not be seen from the public road and that the Plaintiff collected huge quantity of building materials and started construction of a new building in spite of protest raised by the Defendants. It is on the basis thereof, the Defendants sought for dismissal of the suit and for declaration that the Defendants’ right, title and interest over the suit property; for declaration that the Sale Deed No. 7213/92 dated 30/11/92 is fraudulent, collusive and void ab initio and the same has not conferred any right, title and interest to the Plaintiff over the suit property or any part thereof and for delivering up and cancelling of the Sale Deed; for ejectment of the Plaintiff from the suit property; for recovery of khas possession of the suit property by evicting and removing the Plaintiff and all his men and materials therefrom; for permanent injunction restraining the Plaintiff and his men, agents, servants etc from entering into the suit property and from interfering with peaceful enjoyment and possession of the Defendants over the suit property; for recovery of Rs. 1 lakh as compensation for the wrong done to the go-down house and the structure over the suit land; for issuance of a precept directing the Sub-Registrar to record cancellation of the Sale Deed No. 7213/92 dated 30/11/1992; to issue a precept to the Revenue and Municipal Authority for correction of the revenue and municipal
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records in accordance with the decree etc.
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documents which were marked as Ext.1 to Ext. 13, both inclusive. The Defendants adduced the evidence of two witnesses and exhibited various
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documents marked as Ext.-A to Ext. G. Ext.5 was the Sale Deed No.7312 dated
30/11/92 which was put to challenge in the counter claim. The records reveals that the Sale Deed was produced before the Trial Court and was proved in original. It is also relevant to take note of Ext.C which is a certified copy of the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No.7312/92. A perusal thereof shows that the said certified copy was issued on 16.6.2000. Ext.D is a Deed of Sale dated 30/6/1947, wherein Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria has put his signatures and signatures were exhibited as Ext. D1 and Ext. D-2. Ext.E is a registered General Power of Attorney, wherein Late Rukmanand Ajitsaria had appointed one Kanailal Sarma as his Attorney. The signatures of Rukmanand Ajitsaria were exhibited Ext.E (1), Ext. E(2), Ext.E (3) and Ext. E(4). Ext-F is the challan wherein Late Rukmanand Ajitsaria had put his signature and his signature was exhibited as Ext. F(1). Pertinent herein to mention the evidence on affidavit of the DW-2, who was one Mr. Ram Narayan Sarma. In his evidence-in-chief, he stated that Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria had vide a Deed of Sale bearing Deed No. 5840 dated 7/11/1991 sold a plot of land measuring more or less 1Katha 6 Lechas covered by Dag No. 2317 of K.P. Patta No. 1262 of Saher Sarania Part-II under Mouza Ulubari to the said DW-2. The Deed of Sale was exhibited as Ext.G and the thumb impression of Late Rukmanand Ajitsaria was put Ext. G(1), G(2), G(3), G(4), G(5), G(6) and G(7). In the said evidence in chief it was
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mentioned that Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria due to shivering of his hand, he could not write at all, for which he had to put his thumb impression at the time of execution of the Sale Deed. During cross-examination of the DW-2 , he categorically stated that before 1991 Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria used to sign documents and after the execution of Ext.G, Lt. Rukmanand Ajitsaria was not in a position to put his signature in any other documents till his death.
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consideration the submission made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff that the Plaintiff had constructed apartments/flats on the suit land and sold the said flat to 20 flat owners, the Trial Court held that at the time when the suit and the counter claim were filed, the building was not in existence, and as such the same would not affect the rights of the Trial Court to pass a decree as prayed for in the counter claim. Accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit and decreed the counter claim with cost declaring the right, title and interest of the Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 over the suit land and cancellation of the Sale Deed No. 7312/92 dated 30/11/1992 as fraudulent. It was further decreed that the Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 are also entitled to get possession of the suit land by evicting the Plaintiff and his men under him and/or steps into his shoes by removing the building constructed by the Plaintiff over the suit land during the pendency of the suit and after recovery of possession the Defendants shall be entitled to permanent injunction to restrain the Plaintiff and his men under him from entering into the decreetal property. 18. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 25/9/2006, the Appellants herein preferred an appeal before the Court of the District Judge, Kamrup(M) at Guwahati. The said appeal was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No. 109/2006. The First Appellate Court vide a judgment and decree dated 15/9/2007 dismissed the appeal thereby affirming
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the findings and conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree dated 15/9/2007 would show that the First Appellate Court had taken into consideration the contentions put forth pressed by the parties and had given reasons for the decision. It is against the said judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court dated 15/9/2007 that the Appellants are before this court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
the certified copy of the Sale Deed bearing No. 7213/92.
and 15 submits that the perversity in the judgments of both the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court in not considering the Extx. 14 and 15 in as much as if the said Exhibits would have been considered the counter claim would be barred by limitation. As noted herein above, in the counter claim at
paragraph 29 (xv), it has been specifically mentioned that the Defendants first
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came to know about the execution and registration of the Sale Deed 7213/92
dated 30/11/92 on 28/2/1997. The counter claim was filed on 10th of February, 1998.
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under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by itself is a substantial question of law which is involved in the instant appeal. He refers to two judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Thiruvengdam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal And Another reported in ( 2008 ) 4 SCC 530 and Ajay Kumar Parmar Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in ( 2012 ) 12 SCC 406 .
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should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. It was observed that the Court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the said judgment being relevant are quoted herein below:-
17. The decision in Murari Lal and Lalit Popli should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further, even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal.”
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“ 25. In Murari Lal v. State of M.P. this Court, while dealing with the said issue, held that, in case there is no expert opinion to assist the court in respect of handwriting available, the court should seek guidance from some authoritative textbook and the court’s own experience and knowledge, however even in the absence of the same, it should discharge its duty with or without expert, with or without any other evidence.
26. In A. Neelalohithadasan Nadar v. George Mascrene, this Court considered a case involving an election dispute regarding whether certain voters had voted more than once. The comparison of their signatures on the counterfoil of the electoral rolls with their admitted signatures was in issue. This Court held that in election matters when there is a need of expeditious disposal of the case, the court takes upon itself the task of comparing the signatures, and thus it may not be necessary to send the said signatures for comparison to a handwriting expert. While taking such a decision, reliance was placed by the Court, on its earlier judgments in State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram and Ram Pyaralal Shrivastava v. State of Bihar.
27. In O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran, this Court considered a similar issue and held that the facts of a case will be relevant to decide where the court will exercise its power for comparing the signatures and where it will refer the matter to an expert. The observations of the Court are as follows: (SCC p. 713, para 18)
28. The opinion of a handwriting expert is fallible/liable to error like that of any other witness, and yet, it cannot be brushed aside as useless. There is no legal bar to prevent the court from
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comparing signatures or handwriting, by using its own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing and then from applying its own observation to prove the said handwritings to be the same or different, as the case may be, but in doing so, the court cannot itself become an expert in this regard and must refrain from playing the role of an expert, for the simple reason that the opinion of the court may also not be conclusive. Therefore, when the court takes such a task upon itself, and findings are recorded solely on the basis of comparison of signatures or handwritings, the court must keep in mind the risk involved, as the opinion formed by the court may not be conclusive and is susceptible to error, especially when the exercise is conducted by one, not conversant with the subject. The court, therefore, as a matter of prudence and caution should hesitate or be slow to base its findings solely upon the comparison made by it. However, where there is an opinion whether of an expert, or of any witness, the court may then apply its own observation by comparing the signatures, or handwritings for providing a decisive weight or influence to its decision.”
with the power to compare the signature in terms with Section 73 of the Indians Evidence Act., 1872. However, the Court has to be slow to base its finding solely made upon the comparison made by it.
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how and on what basis did the Courts below made comparison of the
signatures as appearing in Ext.5 with the Exts, D, E, F and G and did the Courts base their findings solely on the comparison . Paragraph No. 26 to Paragraph 29
of the Trial Court Judgment being relevant is quoted herein below :--
“26. Ext. –D is a Sake Deed executed by Rukmanand Ajitsaria on 30/6/47, Ext.-E is a power of Attorney executed by Rukmanand Ajitsaria on 23/12/52 and Ext.F is a Treasury Challan signed by Rukmanand Ajitsaria on 23/7/53.
The Defendant through PW-2 proved the signatures of Rukmanand Ajitsaria in Ext-D, E and F. DW1 Amit. Indira Agarwal is the daughter of Rukmanand Ajitsaria. she also proved the signatures of Rukmanand Ajitsaria in Ext-D, E and F.
Here in the instant case, one can compare the alleged signatures of Rukmanand Ajitsaria appeared in Ext-5 and Ext-D to F without the old of microscopic enlargement of expert evidence. A bare eye comparison of the signatures Ext.-D (1), Ext-E (1), (2) (3) and Ext-F (1) appear in ExtD, Ext-E and Ext-F shows that the said signature are same and similar. But without taking any help from the hand-writing expert one can draw opinion by comparison of the signatures Ext-5(1) to 5(10) with the signatures Ext.-D(1), Ext-E(1), (2), (3) and Ext-F91) that the person who signed the Ext-D, E and F is not the person who signed the Ext.-5.
The defendants examined aforesaid Shri Ram Narayan Sarman as DW2. DW 2 in his evidence on affidavit stated that he was a tenant under Rukmanand Ajitsaria. As such, he knew that due to shivering of his hand due to illness he was not in a position to write for about ten years prior to his death. DW 2 was vigorously cross-examined by the plaintiff. DW 2 in cross-examination also confirmed that due to trembling on his hand Rukmanand Ajitsaria could not sign. But before 1991 he used to sign document. DW 2 proved the LTI of Rukmanand Ajitsaria put in Ext.’G’.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff vehemently contended that the defendants without obtaining any leave from the Court have produced the Ext.’G’, therefore, Ext-‘G’ is not admissible in evidence. A careful scrutiny of record supports the contention raised by the learned counsel. However, if the Ext-‘G’ is not accepted as evidence the entire evidence of DW 2 cannot be discarded. i found no reason to discard his evidence-in-chief and cross examination, reproduced above. The above evidence of DW 1 that prior to his death Rukmanand Ajitsaria was not in a position to write or sign for several years.
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the identifier of seller Rukmanand of Ext.-5, I am constrained to hold that Rukmanand Ajitsaria never executed Ext-5 in favour of the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff has acquired no right, title and interest over the suit land.”
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Court under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in the opinion of this Court does not suffer from any illegality committed by the Trial Court or by the First Appellate Court as would be apparent from a perusal of the above quoted portion of the judgments of the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Under such circumstances, the question of law so suggested by the learned counsel for the Appellant during the course of hearing cannot also be considered to be a question of law involved in the instant appeal.
is a photocopy of the certified copy of the Deed of Sale bearing Deed No. 7213/92 dated 30/11/92. It shows the last of such date as 2/9/1997 and as
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such on the basis of Ext.15, it cannot be said that the Defendants had knowledge about the execution of the Deed of Sale/bearing No. 7213/92 prior to 28/2/1997.
absence of the said owners being brought on record, the Trial Court as well as
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the First Appellate Court could not have passed the decree. The said submission
on the face of it is misconceived in a proceedings under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in as much as this Court’s power under Section 100 of the CPC can be exercised only on a substantial question of law and it is no longer res integra that such substantial question of law so sought to be raised has to have a foundation in the pleadings. A perusal of the plaint would clearly show that there is no foundation laid as regards the existence of multi storey building wherein flats have been sold to various persons. The record on the other hand, shows that the construction of building was carried out during the pendency of the litigation and as such any change brought to the status of the property shall is always subject to the result of the litigation. Consequently, the same cannot also be a substantial question of law involved in the instant proceedings.
JUDGE
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Comparing Assistant
3 issues framed by the court
Whether non-consideration of specific exhibits renders the finding of no cause of action perverse?
Whether the Trial Court's comparison of signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act was illegal?
Whether the counter claim was barred by limitation or non-joinder of an adopted son?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. S.N. GoyalReferred¶34
State Bank of India & Ors. Vs. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 92 · Who else cites this
Thiruvengdam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal And AnotherReferred¶24
Thiruvengdam Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal And Another (2008) 4 SCC 530 · Who else cites this
Ajay Kumar Parmar Vs. State of RajasthanReferred¶24
Ajay Kumar Parmar Vs. State of Rajasthan (2012) 12 SCC 406 · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
BANWARILAL SHARMA
SMT. KAMALA DEVI AJITSARIA
RENU SUREKHA AJITSARIA
LALITA KESHAN
INDIRA AGARWALLA
PINKI AGARWALLA
DEVASHIS BARUAH
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
