Dismissed

Aalayaams Agro Food LLP v. Indian Bank

DRT2 May 2025SA/37/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Tribunal dismissed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing a Securitization Application challenging an auction sale notice under the SARFAESI Act. The Tribunal held that Section 17's 45-day limit is mandatory and cannot be extended.

What did the court decide?

The application for condonation of delay and the Securitization Application challenging the sale notice stand dismissed.

Aalayaams Agro Food LLP versus Indian Bank — Company and Corporate | DRT (2025)

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-III, CHENNAI

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Dated this the 02^nd day of May, 2025

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Present: SMT. S.V. GOWRAMMA Presiding Officer

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I.A. No.999 of 2025

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S.A. No.37 of 2025

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M/s Aalayams Agro Foods LLP

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Represented by its Partner Mr. M. Murali

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No.6/118 B, Mettupalayam Road Banaveduthottam, Poonamallee Post

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Chennai – 600 056

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Mr. M. Murali

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S/o Mr. Munirathnam

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Partner of M/s Aalayams Agro Foods LLP No.3/180, Banaveduthotam

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Thundarai Road

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Poonamallee

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Chennai – 600 056

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Mr. M. Sudhakar S/o Mr. Munirathnam Partner of M/s Aalayams Agro Foods LLP No.3/40, Pidarithangal Thundarai Road Poonamallee, Chennai – 600 056

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Mr. M. Rajesh S/o Mr. Munirathnam Partner of M/s Aalayams Agro Foods LLP 1/34, Anjaneyar Koil Street Banaveduthottam, Poonamallee Post

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Chennai – 600 056

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Mr. Munirathnam S/o Late Mannar Naidu 1/34, Anjaneyar Koil Street Banaveduthottam, Poonamallee Post Chennai – 600 056

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….Applicants

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

02.05.2025

-Vs-

The Authorised Officer M/s Indian Bank Stressed Asset Management Branch, Chennai 2^nd Floor, Wellington Estate No.55, Ethiraj Salai Egmore, Chennai – 600 008

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Mr. Kanala Srinivasarao S/o Mr. Kanala Guru Murthy H No.8-95/2, Sathavahana Nagar 4A, Line, Eluru, Koppaka, West Godavari Andhra Pradesh – 534 003 ….Respondents

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Counsels on record / appeared:

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Counsel for Applicant : M/s S. Vignesh Counsel for 1^st Respondent : M/s M. Balachandar Associates Counsel for 2^nd Respondent : M/s G K Devi Kamatchi

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: - ORDER ON IA No.999 of 2025- :

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The Securitization Application [SA] No. 37/2025 is filed challenging

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the Auction Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 fixing the sale on 20.03.2024, under the SARFAESI measures initiated by respondent financial institution for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,00,24,352/- culminating into issuance of sale certificate dated 10.04.2024 in favor of 2^nd respondent herein

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Admittedly as the challenge to the sale notice dated 01.03.2024 is not

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within the period of 45 days as required under S.17 of the Act, the applicants have filed IA No.999/25, to condone delay of 230 days in filing the SA.

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

02.05.2025

Pleadings of IA:

In the affidavit filed along with IA, it is contended that the present SA challenging the Auction Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 is dispatched on 04.03.2024, and the SA ought to have been filed within 45 days i.e., on or before 18.04.2024 and the present SA is filed on 06.12.2024.

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It is contended that applicants came to know about the sale of the secured asset only on 11.11.2024, when the respondent during the course of hearing in SA No.777/2024 filed by the applicant challenging the Section 14 order dated 19.10.2024 passed by Ld. CJM, Tiruvallur in Crl.M.P. No.9551 of 2024 before this Tribunal. Thereafter, the applicants verified with the Sub-Registrar Office, Kundrathur and on 13.11.2024 obtained the certified copy of sale certificate dated 10.04.2024, registered as Document No.8054/2024

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It is asserted that the impugned sale notice dated 01.03.2024 fixing the auction sale on 20.03.2024 was not served on the applicants in a manner known to law.

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It is further contended that 5^th applicant was hospitalized during June 2024 and was under treatment in ICU and discharged. Further, Mrs. Gunasundari, wife of the 5^th applicant and mother of applicants 2 to 4 underwent a surgery during April, 2024. Similarly, 3^rd and 4^th applicants

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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were also under medical treatment, which is evident from the medical records produced along with IA.

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It is the case of applicants that the medical records would reveal that between March and September, 2024, one or other close family member were falling sick, warranting treatment and the applicants were totally in a state of darkness completely unaware of the happenings around them and were frequenting hospitals to get rid of the ailments and lost focus in their business for a while.

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Therefore, there occurred a delay of 230 days in filing the present SA

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which is neither willful nor wanton but only due to the above bonafide reason. If the delay is not condoned, applicants will be put to severe mental agony and hardship.

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Counter of 1^st respondent bank:

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The 1^st Respondent bank filed counter denying all the averments in SA and submitted that the SA itself is not maintainable as it is barred by limitation.

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It is the case of the bank that they have issued Sale Notices dated 28.12.2023; 31.01.2024 which did not fructify in a sale. Hence, they issued Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 which is sent to all the applicants returned as ‘unclaimed’. The Sale Notice was affixed on 04.03.2024 in the property

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where in the borrower is running the unit and the impugned Sale Notice was

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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published in ‘The New Indian Express’ and ‘Dinamani’ on 05.03.2024 apart from affixture in the premises of the property. The auction took place on 20.03.2024 and sale certificate is issued in favour of the successful bidder, Mr. Kanala Srinivasarao on 10.04.2024 and the Sale certificate was registered as Document No.8054 of 2024 before SRO, Kundrathur.

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It is further submitted that the SA is time barred and the applicants have come before this Tribunal after more than six months, after the Sale Notice was published. It is a well settled principle of law that the right of redemption of mortgage gets extinguished once the Sale Notice is published. As a matter of fact, after the last Sale dated 20.03.2024 the respondent bank filed Caveats before this Tribunal and also before DRT-II.

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Before filing the caveat, the notice sent to respondents, also returned as ‘unclaimed’, which is deemed service, and the applicants are aware of the steps taken for sale of the property by the respondent bank. Hence all the averments in the SA are false and the deponent of the affidavit who had sworn false affidavit thereby committed perjury. For this act of perjury, the Tribunal should initiate action against the deponent of the affidavit and all the applicants, so that the valuable court time is not wasted.

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The applicants ought to have filed the SA on or before 18.04.2023 but have filed the same with a delay of 230 days. The delay ought not to be

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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condoned as no sufficient cause is shown and every day’s delay should be explained.

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The reason for delay as mentioned in the affidavit is that one or other close family members of the applicants were allegedly falling sick and warranting treatment, the respondent bank denies the genuineness of the medical records produced by the applicants before this Tribunal.

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The respondent denies that no sale notice is served to the applicants as the Sale Notice sent to the applicant returned as ‘unclaimed’, which is deemed to be proper service. In fact, it is applicants admission in SA No. 777/24 and in the instant matter that they are running the unit with a meager of 20 employees to keep business afloat and to prevent the machinery from going defunct. As applicants are running the business the affixture of the Sale Notice in the running unit ought to have caught their eye, however they have purposely avoided the notices issued by the bank.

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The Sale Notice was published in one English newspaper and one Tamil newspaper apart from affixture in the premises. The applicants have kept quiet and have not raised any objection at any stage and now, after the property is sold to a bonafide auction purchaser are raising untenable grounds and obstructing the bank from recovering the amount due and also its duty towards the auction purchaser.

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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Though applicants having received the Sale Notice for sale on 24.01.2024, has not raised any objection or challenged the said notice or the subsequent Sale Notices including the impugned Sale Notice on any ground. The reserve price was fixed in consideration of Valuation Report by Mr. C. Jayakumar dated 23.05.2023 and Mr. P. Ravi Kumar dated 27.02.2023 and the property is sold was for a higher value than the reserve price mentioned in the Sale Notice.

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The Respondent bank has followed all the provisions of SARFAESI Act and Rules in bringing the property to sale and that there are no infirmities in the procedure adopted by the respondent bank, hence prayed for dismissal of MA.

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Counter of 2^nd respondent / auction purchaser:

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The 2^nd respondent is the auction purchaser ascertained about Sale Notice dated 04.03.2024 issued by the first respondent bank under SARFAESI Act through advertisement published in ‘The New Indian Express’ on 05.03.2024. Thereafter he enquired about the property which is morefully detailed in the SA schedule; about the availment of loan, mortgage created by applicants over the said property, default committed by them and the consequential SARFAESI action by respondent bank for recovery of its dues.

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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It is further submitted that the valuation report of the applicant is overestimated under the influence of applicant’s instruction. The valuation report of two appraisers filed by the respondent bank is genuine as the appraisers have evaluated the property considering the location, size, condition and recent sales of similar properties in the area. The bank has taken measures to sell the property at market price in par with the valuation reports, due diligence was the motto during the course of recovery proceedings.

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After examining the procedures followed by the respondent bank, he participated in the E-auction held on 20.03.2024, remitted 10% of the reserve price as EMD i.e., Rs.22,50,000/- to 1^st respondent bank and 2^nd respondent was declared as successful bidder of the secured asset. Subsequently remitted 15% of Rs.33,87,000/- on the next day. Due to the year end closing by 1^st respondent bank, lump sum of Rs.1,69,08,750/0 i.e., balance 75% has been paid on 10.04.2024 and sale certificate was issued, which came to registered as Document No.8054 of 2024 on the file of Sub Registrar, Kundrathur.

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It is contended by 2^nd respondent that the amount remitted was out of the sale proceeds of one of the other property and the 2^nd respondent had to undergo hardship because of the present litigation, which is filed with a delay of 230 days and the same is not maintainable as applicants did not show sufficient cause for condonation of delay, depriving the rights of 2^nd

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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respondent, who had made a lawful purchase of the subject property. Hence 2^nd respondent prayed for dismissal of IA.

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Heard counsels for respective parties and perused records of

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the case.

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The Applicants are borrowers have impugned the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 issued by respondent bank, fixing the sale on 20.03.2024, for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,00,24,352/-. As challenge to the Sale Notice is not within the period of 45 days as required under S.17 of SARFAESI Act, the applicants have filed present IA No.999/25 to condone the delay of 230 days in filing the present SA.

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The affidavit filed along with IA does not explain each day’s delay in preferring the SA. On the other hand, the applicants have relied on the medical records of Mrs. Gunasundari, Mrs. Bujji, Mr. Munirathinam, Miss. Darshana, Mrs. Swathi from pages 40 to 65 of the SA, contending that the applicants could not challenge the measure of Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 within the period of 45 days as they were unaware of the happenings around them.

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The point for consideration is whether the applicants were aware of the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024?

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The medical record relied upon is that of Mrs. Gunasundari, Mrs. Bujji,

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Mr. Munirathinam, Miss. Darshana, Mrs. Swathi who are not parties to the

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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loan transaction nor to the measures taken by the bank as per the address of the parties. It is also manifest from records that Applicants No.2 to 5 are family members, and the other applicants are sons of Mr. Munirathnam who are residing in the same address had no impediment to challenge the sale notice and the 1^st applicant Company represented by Mr. M. Murali, 2^nd applicant herein to file the SA challenging the Sale Notice within the period of 45 days. Hence, the medical reports relied upon by the applicant do not explain the inordinate delay of 230 days in preferring the SA.

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Secondly, it is contended that applicants got to know about the sale and the sale certificate only on 11.01.2024 in SA No.777/2024, where the applicants have challenged the Section 14 measure. Per contra, on perusal of the respondent bank counter and type set of documents in SA, it is seen that the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 was sent by RPAD. Admittedly, the applicant have not received the Sale Notice which has returned as ‘unclaimed’, which amounts to deemed service. Hence it is only to be construed that the applicants had knowledge of the issuance of the Sale Notice, which was posted to their addresses and was not claimed as per the postal endorsement on the returned covers. Further, it is not the case of the applicant that they were totally ignorant about the measures taken by the respondent bank under the SARFAESI Act after challenging the S.14 order in SA 777/24. Hence the applicants claiming to be in knowledge of

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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the sale notice only during the proceedings of SA 77/24 is indefensible and same cannot sustain.

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Undeniably, the applicants have challenged Section 14 order in SA No.777/2024, with the knowledge that any measures under the Act is to be challenged within the period of 45 days from the date of the measure. It is pertinent to note that the applicant was silent spectator to the auction and after the issuance of the sale certificate, have chosen to challenge the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024, raising the medical grounds without any reasonable justification for each day delay.

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The record of the case clearly reflects that the Sale Notice was sent to the address of the applicants, which were not claimed, amounting to deemed service. Further the affixture of sale notice is on the business running unit and it is seen from the affixture of sale notice that the security guard is standing in the building. Hence the contention that the applicants were not aware of the issuance of sale notice is not sustainable as the affixture of the sale notice on the running business unit cannot go unnoticed, more so when the photo reflects the security guard of the building is seen.

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Though the applicants had knowledge of the measures, they did not file the present SA challenging the sale and the auction purchaser who is third party has filed copy of the sale certificate dated 10.04.2024.

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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It is evident that the applicant has challenged the Section 14 order in SA No.777/2024 on 08.11.2024, which clearly reflects that the applicants were waiting for an adjudication of Section 14 order, and has chosen to challenge the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024 with a delay of 230 days relying on the medical reports of family members. Thus it is only to be concluded that applicants were aware of the issuance of Sale Notice.

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Now, considering the delay application, the Tribunal is posed with the question whether the Tribunal can condone the delay under S.17 of the SARFAESI Act?

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For appreciation of the facts S.17(1) is extracted as under: -

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S.17(1):

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Application against measures to recover secured debts (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

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[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.]

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[Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section(1) of section.17.]

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A reading of the above provision it is palpable that there is no provision made by the Parliament for condonation of delay in approaching the DRT against the measures, no matter whatever be the cause and howsoever justifiable it may sound. Unless power to condone delay is legislatively granted expressly or by inference, the Tribunal cannot condone delay. It is the indication of Parliament that one who wants to have redressal must knock the doors of DRT within 45 days and subsequently those doors should permanently stand closed. In other words, law does not come to the aid of those who are sleepy & late.

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Thus, it is clear that any person aggrieved by any measures under Section 13[4] is required to approach the Tribunal under S.17 within 45 days from the date of the measure. Evidently, the present SA challenging the Sale notice dated 01.03.2024, fixing the sale on 20.03.2024 is not filed within the period of 45 days and the same is filed with a delay of 230 days.

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This view of the Tribunal is confirmed by the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Bank of Baroda – Vs.- Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd, reported in 2022 Livelaw (SC) 671 , at para 12, observed that a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is provided for quick enforcement of the security is as under:

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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“ The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment. In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr. this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security. It is unfortunate that proceedings where a property that has been brought to sale and third-party rights created under the provisions of the Act, have remained inconclusive even after a decade.”

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Further the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat Commercial

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Pvt Ltd. Vs. Kalpana Chakroborty has taken view that S.17 is mandatory and therefore the question of condoning the delay does not arise. If the Parliament intended that DRT should have power to condone delay, it would have enacted a provision like S.5 of Limitation Act to SAFAESI Act. As it consciously chosen not to do it clearly emphasis the purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

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The Tribunal is of the view that DRT has no power to condone delay in an application under S.17 of the Act, as it is a special law for speedy recovery of money due to bank in enforcing the security available to them is reinforced at para 65 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors [Mumbai][P]

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Ltd., reported in [2024] 2 SCC 1 at para 65 which is reproduced here

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under:

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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“The SARFAESI Act is a special law containing an overriding clause in comparison to any other law in force. The SARFAESI Act is a special law of recovery with a paradigm shift that permits expeditions recovery for the banks and the financial institutions without intervention of Courts. If the general law is allowed to govern in the manner as sought to be argued by the borrowers, it will defeat the very object and purpose….”

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Therefore, it is obvious that when a special legislation grants aright of action it is subject to certain conditions and create a forum for its implementation, that right becomes exercisable on satisfying such conditions and not otherwise and Limitation period is one such condition.

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It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it must be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Tribunal has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation as per the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:-

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"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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Hence, the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.

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The question whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal can entertain an application under S.17 of the Act after 45 days of measure referred to in sub section [4] of S.13 is no more res integra.

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The Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeal No.1797 of 2009 in W.P.(C) No.22192 of 2007 in the case titled K.PJayan vs. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd and

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others decided on 31.08.2015 had categorically held that the power to condone delay in entertaining an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It further held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot consider an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The relevant paras is extracted as under:

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“7. Referring to these provisions the contention urged before us is that since section 24 of the RDB Act makes Limitation Act applicable and as the DRT constituted under the RDB Act is conferred with jurisdiction under section 17, Limitation Act governs applications made in a proceedings under section 17 also. We are unable to accept this contention. Both the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are independent enactments, although certain provisions of the RDB Act are made applicable in respect of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act also. However, that does not mean that every provision of the RDB Act would apply to every proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. In so far as this case is concerned, proceedings were initiated under SARFAESI Act and in view of the

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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provisions contained in section 17 conferring jurisdiction on the DRT constituted under RDB Act application is made by the appellant before the DRT. That does not mean that provisions of section 24 of the RDB Act governing the proceedings taken thereunder would get automatically attracted to such proceedings before the DRT. Therefore, the contention raised relying on section 24 in so far as this case is concerned is only to be rejected and we do so. This is further clear from section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, which confines the applicability of the Limitation Act to measures under section 13(4) of the said Act.”

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Further, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has also considered the issue in the case titled The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Vs. K.J. George, order dated 02.11.2020 has placed reliance on K.P. Jayan V. Hong Kong

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& Shanghai Banking Corporation and has held that DRT has no power to condone the delay u/s.17 of the Act.

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As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, an application against measures to recover secured debts, must be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken. It further observed that "The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security, which can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment. In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr, this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security.

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Additionally in the instant matter the applicants have failed to make

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a case to condone each day’s delay by producing the medical records in

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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support of their case without any justifiable reasons. However, the delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds and in support of its view, the reliance is placed on the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Lingeswaran Vs. Thirunagalingam where it is observed that an application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed, if it is found that the delay is not properly explained and that the period of limitation cannot be extended on equitable ground. Otherwise, it would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. The court also observed "The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court also noted the following observations made

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in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai

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(2012) 5 SCC 157, while dismissing the SLP:

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"The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

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The Tribunal also places reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in the case of Kailasam P – Vs.The Karnataka Bank Limited, Rep. by its Authorised Officer in Writ Petition No.11273 of 2024 (GM-DRT) has held that:

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“law of Limitation fixes upon a particular period within which a party is entitled to institute legal proceedings and if he fails to do so, ordinarily the cause of action dies subject to just all exceptions. Law of Limitation is statute of repose. True it is that any welfare State like ours is bound in good faith to furnish its citizens all needful legal remedy however it is not bound to keep its Courts and Tribunals open ad infinitum. If an aggrieved person neglects or refuses to apply for redress within the prescribed period of limitation, his claim is lost in the lapse of time.”

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In other words, the statutory time of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act is mandatory and no discretion has been conferred upon the DRT to extend such period. It is pertinent to note that the Securitization Act is for quick enforcement of the security interest created favouring the respondent bank for the recovery of the amount due.

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In fact the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder cast an obligation upon the secured creditor for strict compliance of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder. Each measure is to be followed meticulously giving a time frame to proceed further. Firstly, the

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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measures can be initiated after the account is classified as NPA, then issuance of statutory notice ie., demand notice demanding outstanding due to be repaid within 60 days.

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The secured creditor must wait for completion of 60 days and then proceeds further under S.13[4] possession notice which is challengeable within a period of 45 days. Similarly, the Order of CJM or DM is also to be challenged within 45 days. In other words, ample opportunity is granted by the Act for an aggrieved person to invoke his right of appeal under S.17 of the Act within a period of 45 days from the date of measure. The provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder puts the borrower/guarantor/mortgagor notices in advance before taking measures under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 and 9, giving the aggrieved person ample of time and opportunities to assail measure within a period of 45 days.

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Thus, the provisions of the Act and Rules ensures that the borrowers have advance notice of the proposed measure to be taken by the secured creditor. The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda – Vs.- Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd has given a quietus to

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the conundrum which existed until that time on the power of the DRT to condone the delay in filing an SA after the statutory period of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act.

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IA 999/25 in SA 37/2025

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02.05.2025

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The applicant though had challenged Section 14 order in SA No.777/2024, has challenged the Sale Notice dated 01.03.2024, with an inordinate delay, which cannot be condoned.

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In the present IA, there is no justification given for each day’s delay and the applicants had relied on the medical reports of their relatives who are not parties to the measures taken by the bank, except that of 5^th applicant. As there is no grievance with regard to the measures taken by the bank by the aggrieved parties, the reason as put forth by the applicants for condonation of delay would not sustain.

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The Tribunal placing reliance of the above judgments comes to inevitable conclusion that in absence of any enabling provision to condone the delay, this Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeal u/s.17(1) of the Act.

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For the foregoing discussions, the IA.No.999/2025 a petition to condone the delay of 230 days stands dismissed. Consequently, S.A.No.37/2025 also stands dismissed.

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