Disposed

Sadhana Sanitary Fitting v. Punjab National Bank

DRT28 Oct 2025SA/259/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Tribunal dismissed the applicant's amendment application challenging a fresh possession notice as filed beyond the 45-day limitation under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application to quash the limitations period was allowed, resulting in disposal of the original application as infructuous.

What did the court decide?

Amendment application IA/1130/2025 dismissed; IA 1519/2025 allowed; Original SA disposed of as infructuous.

Sadhana Sanitary Fitting versus Punjab National Bank — Banking and Recovery | DRT (2025)

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DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL, KOLKATA -1

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Order Sheet

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Case No. SA	259 of 2022 M/S. SADHANA SANITARY FITTINGS & ANR. -VS- PUN NATINAL BANK & ANR.	JAB
Date of the Order	Order with Signature	Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary
28.10.202 5	Learned counsel Mr. Gourav Singh appeared for the Sarfaesi Applicants.
	Learned counsels Ms. Anindita Das and Ms. Dona Karmakar appeared for the Respondent Bank. Learned counsel for the sarfaesi applicant has filed IA 1130 of 2025 for amendment of SA on the ground that respondent bank has issued demand notice dated 23/09/2024 withdrawing the demand notice dated 27/04/2022 and subsequent Sarfaesi action and issued possession notice dated 8.1.2025 which was published on 13.1.2025 and the applicant received the notice on 20.01.2025. The applicant has filed this amendment application challenging the latest possession notice and demand notice by amending the original SA. Learned counsel for the sarfaesi applicant has relied upon the judgments of :
	i) the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/s. Sri Vishnu Steels -vs- Union Bank of India & Anr. (Para 9); ii) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur. -vs- Bhagwan Das (Dead) by LRS. (Para 16).
	Learned counsel for the respondent bank has filed objection to this IA 1130 of 2025 and also filed separate application IA 1519 of 2025 challenging the maintainability of the

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Rina S.

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of the Order		Order with Signature
	application f petition has receipt of po from the issu IA. Lear the authoritie i) ii) iii)	or amendment of SA contending that amendment been filed beyond period of 45 days from the date of ssession notice, i.e. 20.1.2025 and after four months ance of possession notice and prayed for dismissal of ned counsel for the respondent bank has relied on s of : the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in M/s. Shaila Motors Private Limited & Ors. -vs- Indian Bank & Ors. (Paras 31 & 32); the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. -vs- M/s. Ashok Saw Mill, (Para 22); the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat
	iv)	Commercial Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. -vs- Kalpana Chakraborty & Ors., (Para 13); the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the Authorised Officer, Indian Bank -vs- K.J. George & Ors., (Para 11);
	v) vi)	the Hon’ble DRAT, Kolkata, in Vijaya Durga Agencies, -vs- The Authorised Officer, SBI & Ors. the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Damodhardas Govindprasad Sangi -vs- Fatehsinh, though L.Rs & Ors., Para 14 , in which the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has relied on the authority of the Hon’ble
	vii)	Supreme Court in Asian Hotels, sub-para (iv)1,7,10. the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asian Hotels (North)

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order Limited -vs- Alok Kumar Lodha & Ors., reported in (2022) 8 SCC 145, Para 36. Learned counsel for the Sarfaesi applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/s. Sri Vishnu Steels -vs- Union Bank of India & Anr. (Para 9); The Hon’ble High Court at paragraph 6 has observed that: “6. The cardinal issue that arises in these writ petitions is whether in the eventuality of issuance of any subsequent notice to the borrower during the pendency of SA, the borrower is required to file fresh S.A. every time or can invoke the jurisdiction of the DRT by filing I.A. or by amending the pending petition before the Tribunal.” The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court has referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill, (2009) 8 SCC 366. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this authority has held that : “11. Considering the rival submission, the first question is: whether the D.R.T. has jurisdiction to deal with post-Section 13(4) situation. Both the Tribunal as well as Appellate Tribunal have proceeded on the basis that it is not open to the borrower to question the sale of the property which is post-Section 13(4) situation. This issue has now been authoritatively answered by the Apex Court in the recent decision in the case of Authorized Officer, Indian Overseas Bank v. Ashok Saw Mill, III (2009) BC 640 (SC)= VI (2009) SLT 10 =2009 (9) SCALE 649. The main question examined by the Apex Court in this direction was whether the Debts Recovery Tribunal would have jurisdiction to

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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consider and adjudicate with regard to post-Section 13(4) events or whether its scope in terms of Section 17 of the Act would confine to the stage contemplated under Section 13(4)? The Apex Court has answered the said issue in the affirmative. It has held that the consequences of the authority vested in Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the D.R.T. is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditors and the transactions entered into by virtue of Section 13(4) of the Act. It has expounded that the Legislature by including sub-section (3) in Section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the D.R.T. with authority to even set-aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. It has also noted that the dichotomy in the views expressed by the Bombay High Court and the Madras High Court has in fact been resolved to some extent in the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra) and also by virtue of the amendment effected to Sections 13 and 17 of the principal Act. It has thus, held that the D.R.T. has jurisdiction to interfere with the action taken by the secured creditor even after the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act, as the action of the secured creditor is not only open to scrutiny and can be set-aside but it is also open to the Tribunal to restore status quo ante in a given situation.”

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The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court at paragraph 13 held that :

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“13. In view of the above, in the absence of any specific prohibition to the rights of the borrower to file an application for amendment due to subsequent event, the borrower who had invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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laying challenge to the recovery proceedings initiated against him would have remedy by way of either filing an application challenging the same purely on legal issues or for amendment of the original SA in case assailed on facts or to file a separate SA questioning the subsequent action of the secured creditor. Once having chosen a particular remedy, the borrower thereafter would be bound by the same.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur. -vs- Bhagwan Das (Dead) by LRS. Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 16 held that : “16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil AIR 1957 SC 363 which still holds the field, it was held that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions: (a) of not working injustice to the other side, and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs. (Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v. Prabhakar Mohanlal Kalwar. (1990) 1 SCC 166.)”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court passed this judgment under order 6 Rule 17 of CPC.

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Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in M/s. Shaila Motors Private

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of the Order

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Order with Signature

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Limited & Ors. -vs- Indian Bank & Ors. at Para 31 & 32 has held that : “31. In this regard, it is absolutely essential to focus my attention on the settled proposition of law which clearly mandates that if a preliminary issue like maintainability is not properly addressed by DRT then the DRAT is generally expected to remand the case back for fresh adjudication as DRAT is not positioned to act as the first forum for determining issues involving disputed facts or when there are unresolved preliminary issues that require examination of evidence. In this regard, Hon'ble Apex Court is also of the opinion that DRT must conduct a thorough examination of evidence and apply the law to the facts before any appellate review can take place. If DRT fails to perform its obligations in it's entirety then DRAT will be absolutely justified in remanding the case back. 32. Based on the legal principles outlined hereinabove, if I keep both the orders passed by the DRT as well as the DRAT in juxta position, in my opinion, it would be clear that DRT has not performed its due obligation in resolving the preliminary issue relating to maintainability as well as the issue of limitation. The operative portion of the order passed by the Ld. DRT would also crystallize the fact that there is hardly any reasoning to justify its observation which is not permissible in the eye of law.”

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Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of Auth. Officer., Indian Overseas Bank & Anr vs M/S. Ashok Saw Mill at Para 22 has held that :

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“22. In order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and to prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error on the part of the Banks or Financial Institutions, certain

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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checks and balances have been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person, including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor, to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken for the reliefs indicated in Sub-Section (3) thereof.”

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The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat Commercial Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. -vs- Kalpana Chakraborty & Ors., at Para 13 has held that :

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“ Therefore, the learned Single Judge did not appreciate the specific law laid down in the case of Gopal Sardar vs. Karuna Sardar (supra), approving Serish Maji (supra), and erred in law in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to a proceedings under Section 17(1) of the Act by placing reliance upon the principles laid down in the decisions of the Apex court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and Asia Resorts Ltd (supra) which have no application to a proceeding before the Tribunal.

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We have already pointed out that the by virtue of the provisions contained in Sections 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act and Section 24 of the Recovery of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act would "as far as may be" applicable but not all the provisions of the said Act. The legislature having consciously applied the provisions of the Limitation Act "as far as may be" by conjoint effect of Sections 17(7) and 24 of the two Special Acts, there is no scope of further application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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to the proceedings before the Tribunal so as to apply Sections 4 to 29 thereof over again.

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Our aforesaid interpretation of Section 17(1) gets support from the intention of the legislature as reflected in the said Section itself where in sub- section (5) thereof, a time-limit of 60 days has been given for the disposal of such application and according to sub-section (6), if the application is not disposed of by the Tribunal within 4 months, any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

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Therefore, there being specific time-limit of 45 days for invoking the original jurisdiction of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, which has been found to be, in essence, a suit and a further tentative time-limit of 60 days for disposal of the proceedings, and giving a right to the party to complain before the appellate forum for compliance of such provisions alleging violation thereof if not completed within four months, it was never the intention of the legislature to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such original proceeding by giving power to entertain the application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act by merely showing sufficient cause for the delay without putting any restriction upon the Tribunal and we, therefore, hold that the time period of 45 days provided in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act which is original in nature cannot be extended by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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Once we hold that the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the Act is like that of a suit and that the Limitation Act applies as

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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far as may be applicable by virtue of Sections 17(7) and 24 of the two Special Laws, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has no application and thus, the various decisions cited on behalf of the respondent by showing the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot have any application to the original proceedings like a suit before a tribunal. The other provisions of the Limitation Act, for instance, Sections 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 etc. should, however, apply in appropriate cases.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asian Hotels (North) Limited -vs- Alok Kumar Lodha & Ors., reported in (2022) 8 SCC 145 at Para 36 has held that: “ The High Court while allowing the amendment application in exercise of powers under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not properly appreciated the fact and / or considered the fact that As such, by granting such an amendment and permitting plaintiffs to amend the plaints incorporating the prayer clause to declare the respective charges / mortgages void ab-initio, the nature of the suits will be changed. As per the settled proposition of law, if, by permitting plaintiffs to amend the plaint including a prayer clause nature of the suit is likely to be changed, in that case, the Court would not be justified in allowing the amendment. It would also result in misjoinder of causes of action.”

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Ld. Advocate for the Respondent Bank has relied upon some other decisions which are proposition of law regarding amendment and limitation to file application challenging the measures and those decisions are not taken into consideration.

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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As per the authority of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in M/s. Sri Vishnu Steels -vs- Union Bank of India & Anr. and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in North Eastern Railway Administration, Gorakhpur. -vs- Bhagwan Das (Dead) by LRS. for subsequent development applicant is aggrieved to make amendment in the pleadings but as per the authority of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. -vs- M/s. Ashok Saw Mill, any person if aggrieved only file within 45 days.

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As per the authority of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat Commercial Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. -vs- Kalpana Chakraborty & Ors., measures can be challenged by Applicant u/s 17 within 45 days. Tribunal has authority to condone delay.

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In the authority of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in M/s. Shaila Motors Private Limited & Ors. -vs- Indian Bank & Ors. Hon’ble High Court held that:

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“tribunal ought to have first decided the maintainability issue and then should have proceeded with the merit of the main application preferred under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.” In the authority of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asian Hotels (North) Limited -vs- Alok Kumar Lodha & Ors., reported in (2022) 8 SCC 145, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

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“As per the settled proposition of law, if, by permitting plaintiffs

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to amend the plaint including a prayer clause nature of the suit is likely to be changed, in that case, the Court would not be justified in allowing the amendment. It would also result in misjoinder of causes of action.”

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Section 17 (1) of in SARFAESI Act, 2002 provides that

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“(1)Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of Order with Signature the Order

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secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, [may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed,] [Substituted by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 (30 of 2004), Section 10, for "may prefer an appeal" (w.r.e.f. 21.6.2002).] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:”

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In this case the Respondent Bank has withdrawn earlier Demand Notice and issued fresh Demand Notice dated 23/09/2024 and possession notice issued on 08/01/2025 which was published in the newspaper on 13/01/2025. Applicant has filed postal cover enclosing possession notice which was received on 20/01/2025. Applicant has filed application IA/1130/2025 on 18/04/2025. Applicant has received possession notice on 20/01/2025 and challenged the Possession Notice by amendment petition IA/1130/2025 on 18/04/2025 which is beyond 45 days. As per decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Court applicant cannot be permitted to make amendment in the pleading of the SA challenging Possession Notice which is beyond 45 days. Therefore, IA/1130/2025 is liable to be dismissed and IA 1519 of 2025 is liable to be allowed. It is ordered as follows:

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ORDER

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i) IA/1130/2025 is dismissed on contest against Respondent Bank.

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ii) IA 1519 of 2025 is allowed on contest against Sarfaesi Applicant. iii) As the Respondent Bank has withdrawn earlier Demand Notice dated 27/04/2022 and possession notice

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Office action with date and dated Signature of Parties when necessary

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Date of the Order	Order with Signature
	dated 08/08/2022, SA is disposed of as infructuous.
	(Ambuja Mohan Das) Presiding Officer

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Rina S.

Sadhana Sanitary Fitting v. Punjab National Bank

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sadhana Sanitary Fitting v. Punjab National Bank

Case brief

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