96. There is another, and more empirical, aspect of the matter. It cannot be said, with any modicum of legitimacy, that the DDA has any axe to grind against any person to whom land is to be allotted by it, or that it acts mala fide in that regard. To be fair, no such mala fides have been alleged, either, by the petitioner. The decision of allotment of alternative plots, to persons whose lands have been acquired, is, at all times, essentially and fundamentally a decision of policy. So long as the decision does not result in unconstitutional, or unjust, deprivation of the right of the citizen to property, it remains substantially immune from judicial review. Courts are not the best, or even the better, arbiters of the areas in which alternative plots are to be allotted, or the price at which such allotments are to take place. Caution and circumspection must necessarily inform the decision of any court which is called upon to sit in judicial review over policy decisions. Policy decisions which derogate from public interest, unquestionably, may be justifiably decapitated by the judicial scimitar. However, assessment of public interest is itself an intricate, and involved, exercise, and the court must desist from the temptation of adopting any watchdog approach in this regard. The DDA, like any public authority of similar standing, is presumed to act in public interest, and in full awareness thereof. The ultimate duty of the DDA is to ensure the development of Delhi as efficiently, and in as optimum a manner, as is possible, and, in discharging the said duty, the DDA has necessarily to be allowed the latitude to exercise discretion, vested in it for the said purpose, as it thinks best. Even if, in a given case, the Court were to feel that the DDA could have acted otherwise, restraint has, nevertheless, to be exercised, and deference accorded to the subjective discretion conferred, by law, on the DDA.
