which is placed on record by the Petitioner is crucial in clarifying the Petitioner’s role and evidently the disengagement of Respondent No. 2’s services. The letter explicitly states that the designs for the project were to be prepared ‘in-house’ by the MPPWD, thereby indicating that the responsibility for architectural design had been taken over by the Chief Architect of MPPWD. This suggests that the contractual relationship between Respondent No. 2 and MPPWD may have been effectively terminated at that point. The Petitioner, appointed as a DPR consultant under a separate contractual arrangement, was operating under the direct instructions of the MPPWD. Therefore, the grievance of Respondent No. 2 appears to stem from a loss of their engagement with MPPWD, rather than any professional misconduct by the Petitioner. The Council, in this context, has overstepped its jurisdiction by assuming that the Petitioner acted improperly in accepting payment from MPPWD. Pertinently, if Respondent No. 2 had any dispute over the termination of their services, it should have been directed towards MPPWD rather than unfairly targeting the Petitioner, who was merely fulfilling her obligations under a legitimate contract. Furthermore, if the Respondents No. 2 and 3 perceived that the Petitioner had indulged in copyright or design infringement, they should have approached the Court of competent jurisdiction or an appropriate forum for agitating these claims.
