the respondent in terms of the provisions of the contract. Part of the work was done and rice handed over to the claimant up to 31st May, 1995. Reliance in this regard appears to have been placed upon the provision of clause 7 and clause 8(iii) which relates to losses and shortfall in the delivery of the product. There is an independent provision relating to delay so caused. Clause 9(iii), while prescribing the time frame of the work to be done, vests the powers in FCI to give relaxation in this regard, which, of course, in the present case was given while extending the date of completion of work from 28th February, 1995 to 31st May, 1995. Letter dated 14.8.1995 issued by FCI enables the FCI staff to allow extension in appropriate cases. Visiting of penal consequences because of noncompletion of the work within time frame is a provision of substantive and independent nature. As such, the same, if so required, should have been provided for by a specific distinct clause. There is substance in the argument of the respondent‟s counsel that to have two standards of treating the delivery of rice after milling is arbitrary and is not envisaged by the terms of the contract. The same being of a substantive provision calls for a specific provision in the agreement. Dependence on clauses relating to consequences of shortfall or losses does not help in the present situation. Clause 9(iii) is reliable to time frame. It does not have a penalty provision in the nature 1.5 times. Rather it is so liberally couched that it authorises senior officers of FCI to condone delays. No specific argument have been put forward in the claim in the matter of amount claimed against entry at Sr. No.17 of the balance sheet.
