been made from the appellant, it does not follow that it is he, who used the same to commit the culpable homicide, much less the murder of the deceased. There are innumerable other hypothesis, which could explain the recovery of the pistol in question from the appellant, and which would not point conclusively to his guilt in the commission of the murder of the deceased. The deceased could have been shot in the Santro car, using the recovered pistol by the co-accused Sunder, or by any other person; he could have shot himself in the said car with the recovered weapon and the appellant may have found the pistol in the Santro car while riding in it with the co-accused Sunder after taking a lift from him, or with someone else, and he could have kept the same; some one – who may have either committed the offence, or found the pistol after the same had been used to cause the death of the deceased, may have given the pistol to the appellant either as a gift, or for consideration. Any number of other possibilities could realistically be visualised. Pertinently, neither of the accused is shown to have been acquainted with the deceased, or even with one another. Neither of them has been shown to have any motive to commit the murder of the deceased either individually, or collectively. The accused has the right to remain silent, and it is for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The weakness in the defence of the accused cannot lead to the inference of his guilt.
