of Issue No 1, as framed by the Labour Court, and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate thereon, is fundamentally bereft of substance. In my view, there is no necessity to refer, for the purpose, to any judicial pronouncements. The plea of abandonment, by the petitioner, of his services, was the defence put up, by the respondent, to the plea of termination, by the respondent, of the services of the petitioner, as urged by the latter. It is a matter of simple common sense that a lis cannot be adjudicated merely by referring to the stand of one of the parties thereto, without appreciating the merits of the stand, put up by the other, by way of rebuttal. The plea of abandonment, in the present case, being the response, by the respondent, to the plea of termination, urged by the petitioner, it was incumbent, on the Labour Court, to examine the merits of the said plea. Expressed otherwise, it would have been impossible – as well as impermissible – for the Labour Court to render a verdict, in the matter, merely by examining whether the respondent had, or had not, terminated the services of the petitioner, without addressing, equally, the plea of the respondent that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, abandoned his services. It is appropriate, in this context, to understand that abandonment also results, in the ultimate consequence, in termination. Though established abandonment, by an employee, of his service, would result in snapping of the jural link between him and his employer, the sequitur would be termination of the employee‟s employment with the employer.
