Mohd. Sadik Momin Vs State of Chhattisgarh

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through - The Secretary, Law And Legislative Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)

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2 - Secretary Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority, Office At Vidhik Seva Marg Opposite SBI ATM, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh)

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3 - Chairman District Legal Services Authority, Kanker, District - North Bastar - Kanker (C.G.)

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4 - Assistant Auditor / Establishment Branch Chhattisgarh State Legal Service, Bilaspur, District - Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner	: Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, Advocate
For State/Respondent No.1	: Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate
For Respondents No.2 to 4	: Mr. Rohit Sharma, Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

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Order on Board

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11.03.2026

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1. Heard Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent No.1 and Mr. Rohit Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.2 to 4.

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2. The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner assailing the order dated 09.04.2021, whereby the petitioner, who was working as a Grade-III employee on the post of Driver under the Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority, has been inflicted with the major penalty of termination from service pursuant to a departmental enquiry. The petitioner has also challenged the subsequent order dated 11.05.2023, whereby the appeal/representation preferred by the petitioner against the order of termination has been rejected by the respondent authorities. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s):-

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“ 10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records about the case of the petitioner.

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10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to reduce the punishment given to the petitioner, as the punishment is too harsh considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and the materials available on record.

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10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased this Hon'ble Court may kindly direct to set-aside/quash the order dated 11-052023 and 09-04-2021 (Annexure P-1 & P-2) and also reconsider their decision.

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10.4 That, any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper, may also be passed in favour of the petitioner considering his economical condition and the duration of service left to serve in the respective department. ”

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3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as a Grade-III employee on the post of Driver under the Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority. Vide order dated 28.03.2016, the services of the petitioner were made permanent with effect from 01.01.2016. On the same date, the petitioner was transferred from District Legal Services Authority, Durg to District Legal Services Authority, Kanker, which is situated at a distance of about 150– 200 kilometers from the place where the petitioner and his family were residing.

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4. Being aggrieved by the said transfer and the difficulties likely to be faced by him, the petitioner had earlier approached this Court by filing WPS No.1137/2016, wherein Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.09.2016 directed the respondent authorities to consider and decide the representation submitted by the petitioner.

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5. It is the case of the petitioner that since his family was residing at Bilaspur and there was no other male member to look after the family affairs, it became extremely difficult for the petitioner to manage the day-to-day responsibilities. Various representations were also submitted by the wife of the petitioner and recommendations were made by different authorities seeking transfer of the petitioner to a suitable place, however, no relief was granted.

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6. It is further the case of the petitioner that owing to the aforesaid family circumstances and obligations, the petitioner had to remain absent from duty on certain occasions. Thereafter, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 29.01.2020 mainly on the allegations of unauthorized absence, usage of mobile phone during office hours and entering into disputes with outsiders. According to the petitioner, the leaves earlier availed by him had already been sanctioned as unpaid leave by the respondent authorities. However, a departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner, which according to him was carried out in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no relevant documents were supplied to him and no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was provided.

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7. The enquiry was conducted in a prejudiced manner and without any proper evidence to substantiate the charges levelled against him. On the basis of the said enquiry, a major penalty was

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imposed upon the petitioner and his services were terminated. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner submitted a detailed representation seeking reconsideration of the punishment imposed upon him; however, the same was rejected by the respondent authorities.

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8. Thereafter, the petitioner once again approached this Court by filing WPS No.8195/2022, wherein Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.12.2022 granted liberty to the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of appeal. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner preferred an appeal/representation before the competent authority on 16.01.2023, which too came to be rejected by order dated 11.05.2023.

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9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders and contending that the departmental proceedings and the punishment imposed are illegal, arbitrary and disproportionate, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition.

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10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire departmental proceeding culminating in the order of termination has been conducted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice as well as the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966. It is contended that no proper opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner during the course of the enquiry. Neither the relevant documents

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relied upon by the department were supplied to the petitioner nor was he given an opportunity to effectively defend himself. It is further submitted that the witnesses, if any, relied upon by the department were never produced before the petitioner for the purpose of cross-examination, thereby depriving him of a fair opportunity to contest the allegations levelled against him.

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11. Learned counsel further submits that the charges levelled against the petitioner, particularly with regard to alleged usage of mobile phone during office hours and entering into disputes with outsiders, are wholly vague and unsupported by any cogent evidence. No document has been placed on record to substantiate such allegations and no witness has been examined in the departmental enquiry to prove the said charges. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in LIC of India & Another vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen (2010) 4 SCC 491 , learned counsel submits that mere production or marking of documents as exhibits does not amount to proof of the charges. The documents are required to be proved through witnesses who must be made available for examination and cross-examination by the delinquent employee. In the absence of such procedure being followed, the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

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12. It is also contended that the petitioner had remained absent from duty only due to compelling family circumstances, as his family

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was residing at Bilaspur and there was no other male member to look after the family responsibilities. The wife of the petitioner had also submitted several representations requesting the respondent authorities to transfer the petitioner to a suitable place, however, the same were not considered. Learned counsel submits that the leaves earlier availed by the petitioner had already been sanctioned as unpaid leaves by the competent authority and therefore the same could not subsequently be treated as misconduct forming the basis of disciplinary action.

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13. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent authorities proceeded with a preconceived and prejudiced mind against the petitioner and treated the petitioner as if he were an accused in a criminal proceeding. It is contended that even in the enquiry report the alleged misconduct has been described as a punishable offence, whereas the proceedings in question relate only to civil service misconduct. Such approach clearly demonstrates that the enquiry was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner.

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14. Lastly, learned counsel submits that even otherwise the punishment of termination imposed upon the petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the nature of allegations levelled against him. The petitioner had been serving the department sincerely and the alleged misconduct, even if assumed to be correct, does not warrant the extreme penalty of termination from service. It is therefore prayed that the impugned orders passed by the

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respondent authorities be set aside and appropriate relief be granted to the petitioner.

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15. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the petitioner is an employee of respondent No. 2 i.e. Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority, Bilaspur and the impugned orders have been passed by respondent No. 2 and its officers i.e. respondents No. 3 and 4. It is submitted that from a bare perusal of the writ petition it is evident that no specific allegation has been made against the State and the grievance of the petitioner is primarily directed against respondents No. 2 to 4. It is further submitted that respondent No. 2 and its officials constitute an independent legal entity and are competent to place the relevant facts before this Court and defend the impugned action. Therefore, the State has been impleaded only as a formal party in the present proceedings.

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16. Learned counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 to 4 submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived and has been filed primarily seeking re-appreciation of evidence which was duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority in the course of departmental enquiry. It is submitted that the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters arising out of departmental proceedings is extremely limited and this Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. P.

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Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, learned counsel submits that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence, examine the adequacy or reliability of the evidence, or interfere with the findings of fact recorded in the departmental enquiry so long as the enquiry has been conducted in accordance with law.

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17. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 29.01.2020 on account of repeated unauthorized absence from duty and other acts of misconduct. Pursuant thereto, a regular departmental enquiry was instituted in which an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were duly appointed. The enquiry proceedings continued for a considerable period of time and the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to participate in the enquiry. It is contended that the relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner and the statements of the departmental witnesses were recorded in his presence with full opportunity of cross-examination. Two witnesses were examined by the department who substantiated the charges levelled against the petitioner and the petitioner, despite cross-examining them, failed to discredit their testimony.

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18. It is also submitted that the petitioner himself admitted the correctness of the statements made by the witnesses during the course of his examination and did not produce any witness in support of his defence. The record clearly demonstrates that the petitioner had remained unauthorizedly absent from duty for

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considerable periods and his conduct reflected negligence and indifference towards the discharge of official duties. In such circumstances, the Enquiry Officer, after due consideration of the material placed on record, submitted the enquiry report holding the charges proved, on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 09.04.2021 imposing the penalty upon the petitioner.

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19. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations raised by the petitioner that the departmental enquiry was an eye-wash or that the principles of natural justice were violated are completely baseless and unsupported by any material on record. The punishment imposed upon the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct proved against him, particularly in view of his repeated absenteeism and disregard for official responsibilities. It is therefore contended that the present writ petition, being devoid of merit and substance, deserves to be dismissed.

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20. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the pleadings and documents placed on record, this Court finds that the controversy in the present case essentially revolves around the legality, propriety and validity of the order dated 09.04.2021, passed by the Disciplinary Authority, whereby the petitioner, who was working as a Grade-III employee on the

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post of Driver under the Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority, has been inflicted with the major penalty of termination from service pursuant to a departmental enquiry. The petitioner has further assailed the order dated 11.05.2023, passed by the Appellate Authority rejecting the appeal/representation preferred by the petitioner against the said order of punishment.

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22. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was working as a Driver under the Chhattisgarh State Legal Services Authority and his services were made permanent vide order dated 28.03.2016 with effect from 01.01.2016. It is also borne out from the record that the petitioner was transferred from District Legal Services Authority, Durg to District Legal Services Authority, Kanker. Subsequently, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 29.01.2020 primarily on the allegations of unauthorized absence from duty and certain acts of indiscipline. Pursuant thereto, a departmental enquiry was instituted against the petitioner, which ultimately culminated in the submission of enquiry report dated 15.01.2021 holding the charges to be proved, on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 09.04.2021 imposing the major penalty upon the petitioner.

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23. The record further reveals that being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of punishment, the petitioner submitted a representation seeking reconsideration of the penalty and thereafter preferred an

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appeal before the competent authority. However, the said appeal/representation came to be rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 11.05.2023. The grievance of the petitioner is that the departmental enquiry as well as the consequential orders passed by the respondent authorities suffer from violation of the principles of natural justice and are otherwise arbitrary and disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

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24. The law is well settled that an appellate order must be a speaking and reasoned one. The Appellate Authority, while exercising its jurisdiction under Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, is statutorily required to examine whether the prescribed procedure has been duly followed; whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are supported by evidence on record; and whether the penalty imposed is commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct. Each of these aspects has to be considered objectively and discussed in the appellate order. In the absence of such consideration, the order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

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25. It is trite law that a quasi-judicial authority must pass a reasoned order reflecting conscious application of mind to the issues raised. The requirement of assigning reasons is not an empty formality but an integral part of the principles of natural justice. A reasoned order ensures transparency, accountability, and fairness in administrative action and facilitates judicial review, if challenged.

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26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 , has held that “recording of reasons is the heartbeat of every conclusion,” and absence thereof renders the decision arbitrary and unsustainable. It was held as under :

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“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

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(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

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(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

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(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

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(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

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(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

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(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decisionmaking process as observing principles of

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natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

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(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

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(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

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(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

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(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency.

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(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

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(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

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(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decisionmaking not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)

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(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”.

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(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due process”.

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27. Further, in the Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran , (2015) 2 SCC 610 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar issue, has held as under :-

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“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

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(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

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(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

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( c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

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(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

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(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influencedby irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

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(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no

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reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

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(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

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(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

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(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

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13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

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(i) reappreciate the evidence;

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(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

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(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

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(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

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(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

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(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

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(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. ”

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28. Very recently, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh,

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 891 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

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“12. M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Company Limited v. The Workmen and Others is a decision arising from an award under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Law has been laid down therein as follows:

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“9. … Innumerable statements, letters, balance-sheet, profit and loss account and other documents called for or otherwise were filed on behalf of the appellants. It cannot be denied that the mere filing of any of the aforementioned documents does not amount to proof of them and unless these are either admitted by the respondents or proved they do not become evidence in the case.

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14. … But the application of principle of natural justice does not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On the other hand what it means is that no materials can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjected to cross- examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When the appellant produced the balance-sheet and profit and loss account of the company, it does not by its

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mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of the entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking from the entries made therein. If a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact which is relevant to the enquiry the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact. … ” (emphasis ours)

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13. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Others, it was held that an officer conducting an enquiry has a duty to arrive at findings in respect of the charges upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. It has also been held therein that any evidence collected during investigation by an investigating officer against the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceedings.

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14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties’ (to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to

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departmental enquiries, which are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken by producing any witness.

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15. We may further refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha where disciplinary proceedings were drawn up against the respondent, Saroj Kumar Sinha, under the 1999 Rules itself with which we are concerned.

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Paragraphs 26 to 30 and 33 of the said decision being relevant are quoted below:

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“26. The first inquiry report is vitiated also on the ground that the inquiry officers failed to fix any date for the appearance of the respondent to answer the charges. Rule 7(x) clearly provides as under:

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‘7. (x) Where the charged government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding in spite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the inquiry officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the inquiry officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet in absence of the charged government servant.’

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27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule shows that when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation to the charge-sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is only in a case when the government servant despite notice of the date fixed failed to appear that the inquiry officer can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such circumstances it is incumbent on the inquiry officer to record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet. Since the government servant is absent, he would clearly lose the benefit of cross-examination

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of the witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the charges the Department is required to produce the necessary evidence before the inquiry officer. This is so as to avoid the charge that the inquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge.

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28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.

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29. Apart from the above, by virtue of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India the departmental enquiry had to be conducted in accordance with the rules of natural justice. It is a basic requirement of the rules of natural justice that an employee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceedings which may culminate in punishment being imposed on the employee.

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30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.

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33. As noticed earlier in the present case not only the respondent has been denied access to documents sought to be relied upon against him, but he has been condemned unheard as the inquiry officer failed to fix any date for conduct of the enquiry. In other words, not a single witness has been examined in support of the charges levelled against the respondent. The High Court, therefore, has rightly observed that the entire proceedings are vitiated having been conducted in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair play. The respondent never had any opportunity at any stage of the proceedings to offer an explanation against the allegations made in the charge-sheet.”

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(emphasis ours)

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16. It appears that the appellant is yet to take lessons despite the admonition in Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra). The same kind of omissions and commissions that led to setting aside of the order of punishment imposed being upheld by this Court were repeated in the present case.

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17. Next, the decision in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Another18 deserves consideration where the concept of preliminary enquiry being distinct from a regular enquiry was noticed and discussed. Paragraphs 45 and 51 from such decision read as follows:

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“42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway, AIR 1960 SC 992, held that the purpose of holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a particular alleged misconduct is only for the purpose of finding a particular fact and prima facie, to know as to whether the alleged misconduct has been committed and on the basis of the findings recorded in preliminary inquiry, no order of punishment can be passed. It may be used only to take a view as to whether a regular disciplinary proceeding against the delinquent is required to be held.

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43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854, a Constitution Bench of this Court while taking a similar view held that preliminary inquiry

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should not be confused with regular inquiry. The preliminary inquiry is not governed by the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of the Government though usually for the sake of fairness, an explanation may be sought from the government servant even at such an inquiry. But at that stage, he has no right to be heard as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government as to whether a regular inquiry must be held. …

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45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.”

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18. Guided by the law declared in the aforesaid decisions, we can safely conclude that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer in a manner not authorised by law could not have formed the basis of the order of punishment dated 24th March, 2015 imposed on the respondent. The first two issues are, therefore, answered in the negative.

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19. In view of our answers to the first two issues and the glaring fact of the report of enquiry not having seen the light of the day, the third issue may not detain us for long. However, before specifically answering this issue, we need to deal with the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the test of ‘prejudice’ ought to be applied in this case since the respondent did not participate in the enquiry and, therefore, there was no obligation for the disciplinary authority to furnish such report. This argument has necessitated a study of the law declared in B. Karunakar (supra), in some depth, to assess how the jurisprudence has developed on the issue of non- furnishing of the report of enquiry in the light of such decision. ”

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29. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the above judicial precedents, it is quite vivid that the scope of interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though limited as delineated in P. Gunasekaran (supra), nonetheless extends to examining whether the departmental proceedings have been conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure and in compliance with the principles of natural justice, and whether the decision-making process is vitiated on account of arbitrariness or non-application of mind.

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30. Simultaneously, as held in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. (supra),

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the requirement of recording reasons is an indispensable facet of

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fair adjudication. In the present case, the challenge raised by the petitioner is not directed towards re-appreciation of evidence but is primarily founded on the alleged denial of reasonable opportunity during the enquiry and the failure of the Appellate Authority to pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the specific grounds urged. Therefore, this Court is well within its jurisdiction to scrutinize the decision-making process and the legality of the appellate order on the touchstone of the aforesaid settled principles of law.

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31. In the case at hand, upon careful perusal of the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority, this Court finds that the said order does not disclose any meaningful consideration of the grounds raised by the petitioner in his appeal. The petitioner had specifically contended that the departmental enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as relevant documents were not supplied to him and no effective opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was afforded. However, the appellate order does not advert to these objections nor does it record any independent finding with regard to the fairness or legality of the enquiry proceedings.

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32. The Appellate Authority, while exercising jurisdiction under Rule 27 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, is required to examine whether the procedure prescribed under the rules has been complied with,

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whether the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are supported by evidence on record and whether the penalty imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved. A perusal of the impugned appellate order, however, reveals that none of these aspects have been examined in the manner contemplated under the statutory scheme.

¶160

33. The appellate order merely records a conclusion affirming the decision of the Disciplinary Authority without undertaking any independent analysis of the material placed on record. The order does not discuss the nature of the evidence relied upon by the department, the defence taken by the petitioner during the enquiry or the specific grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal. Such a cryptic and non-speaking order cannot be sustained in law.

¶161

34. It is a settled principle of administrative law that an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority must be supported by reasons. Recording of reasons ensures transparency and fairness in the decision-making process and enables the superior courts to effectively exercise the power of judicial review. An order which does not disclose reasons or application of mind to the issues raised by the affected party cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

¶162

35. In the present case, the petitioner had also raised the contention that the punishment of termination from service was highly disproportionate to the nature of allegations levelled against him, particularly when the primary charge relates to unauthorized

¶163

29

¶164

absence from duty owing to personal and family difficulties. The Appellate Authority was therefore required to consider whether the extreme penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was commensurate with the misconduct alleged. However, the impugned order does not reflect any consideration on the aspect of proportionality of punishment as well.

¶165

36. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellate order dated 11.05.2023 suffers from non-application of mind and failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the Appellate Authority under the relevant service rules. The order, being non-speaking and cryptic in nature, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

¶166

37. Accordingly, the order dated 11.05.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority is hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Appellate Authority concerned to reconsider the appeal preferred by the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. The Appellate Authority shall examine the grounds raised by the petitioner, consider the record of the departmental enquiry and thereafter pass a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

¶167

38. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the charges levelled against the petitioner and all questions in that regard are left open to be considered by the

¶168

30

¶169

Appellate Authority. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

¶170

39. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition stands disposed of . No order as to costs.

¶171

Sd/-

¶172

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

¶173

Yogesh

Mohd. Sadik Momin v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Mohd. Sadik Momin v. State of Chhattisgarh

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