Amarnath Katiyar Vs Chief Electoral Officer

1. Chief Electoral Officer In Front Of Dau Kalyan Singh Bhawan Indravati Block Old Mantralaya Parisar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh

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2. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Estate Director (Department Of Home) Its Allotment Officer, Mahanadi Bhavan, Mantralaya, New Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner	:	Mr. V.K. Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1	:	Mr. Animesh Tiwari, Advocate
For State	:	Mr. AbhyudayTripathi, P.L.

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey

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Judgment On Board

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12.5.2026

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1) By way of this petition, petitioner has sought following reliefs:-

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10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set-aside/quash the Copy of impugned order Dated 22.08.2017 (Annexure-P/1) issued by Chief Electoral Officer, Raipur and to reinstate the petitioner

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forthwith and further to count the services of the petitioner on continuous basis;

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10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent to pay the petitioner's salary for inter-regnum along-with interest;

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10.3 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue any other order or orders, writ or writs, direction or directions as this Hon'ble court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case in favor of the petitioners, in the interest of justice.

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2) Facts of present case are that initially petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Grade-III in the O/o Chief Electoral Officer, State of Madhya Pradesh vide order dated 26.10.1995. After bifurcation of State of Madhya Pradesh in the year 2000, petitioner was allocated to State of Chhattisgarh in the year 2001 and he joined services in September, 2001. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 17.5.2007 w.e.f. 24.5.2002. The claim of petitioner with regard to promotion to the post of Assistant Grade-I was due and he filed WPS No. 5567 of 2009. While petitioner was posted as Assistant Grade-III, an article of charges was issued wherein six allegations were leveled and departmental inquiry was contemplated against the petitioner.

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3) Petitioner preferred departmental appeal on 27.8.2014 but no decision was taken despite repeated reminders therefore petitioner preferred WPS No. 34 of 2015 which was disposed vide order dated 3.8.2016 directing the respondents therein to conclude the proceedings of departmental appeal within period of

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three months. Petitioner preferred Contempt Case (Civil) No. 71 of 2017 as no decision was taken by the State. Contempt Case was disposed vide order dated 2.3.2017. Petitioner also filed WPS No. 1563 of 2017 challenging – (i) order of suspension dated 12.2.2012 ; (ii) order dated 1.8.2014 issued by CEO, Raipur whereby petitioner was reverted from the post of AG-III to AG-I and (iii) order dated 31.8.2016 issued by Joint CEO, Raipur whereby appeal was dismissed.

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4) State Government floated a policy dated 25.4.2017 providing for review of cases of government servants who had either attained the age of 50 years or completed 20 years of qualifying service for the purposes of compulsory retirement in public interest. In compliance of the aforesaid policy, a screening committee was constituted on 12.7.2017 and its meeting was convened on 14.7.2017 wherein the committee examined the cases of employees including petitioner. Upon evaluating the petitioner’s complete service record, annual confidential reports (ACRs), and overall conduct, the committee found the petitioner suitable for compulsory retirement. Subsequently, an order was passed in this regard by Chief Electoral Officer, State of Chhattisgarh on 22.8.2017, which is the subject matter of this petition.

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5) Mr. V.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that ACR of year 2009 was manipulated by the employees of CEO, Raipur. He further submits that in the ACR of year 2004, petitioner

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was graded ‘Very Good’ but it was changed in the year 2007 with ‘Average’ grade and likewise in the ACR of year 2005, petitioner was graded ‘Excellent’ grade but it was changed with ‘Average’ grade. He also submits that ACRs of years 2007 and 2008 also reflect similar discrepancy and this fact is evident from the reports dated 4.6.2012 and 23.6.2012. He contends according to the circular dated 29.11.1984 issued by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh, respondent No. 1 was under obligation to communicate the ACR within three months to the concerned employee whereas ACRs of past ten years prior to 2017 were never communicated to the petitioner therefore those remarks made in those ACRs could not have been made foundation to pass the order of compulsory retirement. He further contends that petitioner’s date of birth is 1.1.1970 and on the date of consideration i.e. 25.4.2017, he was aged 47 years thus he would not come within the purview of the policy dated 25.4.2017. He also contends that decision with regard to compulsory retirement can be taken against a government servant if his/her honesty and/or integrity is doubtful or if there is reduction in physical abilities or performance of the concerned government servant is not up to the mark or he/ she has secured lower than ‘good’ grade in the ACRs.

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6) He has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Dev Dutt Versus Union of India and Others¹ , Sukhdev Singh Versus Union of India and

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1 . (2008) 8 SCC 725

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Others² , Rukhsana Shaheen Khan Versus Union of India and Others³ and Nand Kumar Verma Versus State of Jharkhand and Others⁴ . He has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the co-ordinate Bench in the matter of Sushil Kumar Banchhor Versus State of Chhattisgarh and Others passed in WPS No. 54 of 2018. He prays to set aside the order impugned and allow this petition.

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7) On the other hand, Mr. Animesh Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 would oppose. He submits that it is a well settled principle of law that while considering compulsory retirement in public interest, the employer is entitled to examine the entire service record of such employee, including both favorable and adverse entries. He further submits that the screening committee considered the overall service profile and arrived at a bona fide satisfaction that his continuation in service was not in public interest and the decision was taken objectively after examining the entire material available on record and such decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or mala fide in any manner. With regard to allegation regarding manipulation or noncommunication of adverse entries made in ACRs, he contends that this fact was within the knowledge of petitioner and he was properly communicated. He further contends that grievance regarding individual ACR entries cannot invalidate the process of

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2 . (2013) 9 SCC 566

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3 . (2018) 18 SCC 640

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4 . (2012) 3 SCC 580

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compulsory retirement particularly when overall assessment is based on the employee’s complete service record and principles of natural justice would not apply in the matter of compulsory retirement as such an order cannot be construed as stigmatic or punitive in nature. He also contends that while taking decision of compulsory retirement in public interest according to the policy, no departmental inquiry or prior opportunity of hearing is required. He argues that the reliance placed upon the Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra) is misplaced as those judgments pertain the communication of ACRs/ APARs in matters relating to promotion and career advancement, whereas the present case concerns compulsory retirement in public interest, which stands on an entirely different footing. He further argues that the challenge to the policy dated 25.4.2017 is devoid of merit as the said policy is applicable on petitioner as he completed more than 21 years of service on the date of consideration.

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8) He has placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Baikuntha Nath Das Versus Chief District Medical Officer⁵ and Union of India Versus Col. J.N. Sinha⁶ . He has also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by this Court in the matter of Nagendra Bahadur Singh versus State of Chhattisgarh⁷ .

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5 . (1992) 2 SCC 299

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6 . (1970) 2 SCC 458

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7 . 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 12907

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9) Mr. Abhyuday Tripathi, learned State counsel would support the arguments advanced by Mr. Verma.

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10) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection.

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11) The judgments quoted by Mr. V.K. Pandey are summarized herein below :-

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i. In Rukhsana Shaheen Khan (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that uncommunicated adverse ACRs cannot be relied upon for consideration of promotion and directed the competent authority to ignore the uncommunicated adverse ACRs and take decision afresh after granting opportunity of hearing to the appellant therein. Relevant paragraph 2 reads as under :-

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2. In view of the decision of this Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, there cannot be any dispute on this aspect. This Court has settled the law that uncommunicated and adverse ACRs cannot be relied upon in the process.

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ii. In Sukhdev Singh (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that every entry in ACR, whether poor, fair, average, good, very good or outstanding, should be communicated to employee concerned within a reasonable period enabling such employee to make representation for upgradation of the remarks. It was further held that such communication of every entry in the ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public servant and the system becomes more conforming to the

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principles of natural justice. Relevant paragraph 8 reads as under :-

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8. In our opinion, the view taken in Dev Dutt that every entry in ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period is legally sound and helps in achieving threefold objectives. First, the communication of every entry in the ACR to a public servant helps him/her to work harder and achieve more that helps him in improving his work and give better results. Second and equally important, on being made aware of the entry in the ACR, the public servant may feel dissatisfied with the same. Communication of the entry enables him/her to make representation for upgradation of the remarks entered in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public servant and the system becomes more conforming to the principles of natural justice. We, accordingly, hold that every entry in ACRpoor, fair, average, good or very good-must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period.

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iii. In Dev Dutt (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that all grading whether “very good”, “good”, “average” or “poor” require to be communicated to employees working in government offices, statutory bodies or other State instrumentalities. Relevant paragraphs 17 and 18 read as under :-

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17. In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because noncommunication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in two ways: (1) had the entry been communicated to him he would know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which would enable him to improve his work in future; (2) he would have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence, non-

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communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India³ that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

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18. Thus, it is not only when there is a benchmark but in all cases that an entry (whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good) must be communicated to a public servant, otherwise there is violation of the principle of fairness, which is the soul of natural justice. Even an outstanding entry should be communicated since that would boost the morale of the employee and make him work harder.

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iv. In Nand Kumar Verma (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that formation of opinion of compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but such satisfaction must be based on a valid material and the courts may ascertain whether a valid material exists or not. It is further held that selective consideration is not permissible while taking decision with regard to compulsory retirement. Relevant paragraphs 34 and 35 read as under :-

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It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but such satisfaction must be based on a valid material. It is permissible for the courts to ascertain whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on which the subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority is based. In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively taken into consideration the service record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACRs. There appears to be some discrepancy. We say so for the reason that the appellant has produced the copies of the ACRs which were obtained by him from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a comparison of these two would positively

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indicate that the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents of the ACRs.

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The High Court has taken the decision on the basis of selective service record which includes the summarised ACRs, as quoted in the impugned judgment, for the selected years. The ACRs for the initial years 1975-1976 and 1976-1977 remark him as capable of improvement against the quality of work, the ACRs for the years 1982-1983, 1983-1984 point that his work is unsatisfactory, the ACRs for the years 19841985, 1987-1988 remark his work performance as unsatisfactory with bad reputation and quarrelsome attitude, and the ACRs for the later years 1993-1994 and 1994-1995 refer to some private complaints and remark that his powers were divested by the High Court and the ACRs for the recent years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999 point no defect in judicial work but disposal of cases is poor. Whereas, the appellant furnished certain service records which include the ACR recorded by the Inspecting Judge in the year 1985 which evaluate the appellant as B Satisfactory against the entry "Net result", further the ACR prepared by the District and Sessions Judge, Samastipur for the year 1997-1998 assessed him as an officer of average merit, maintaining good relationship with bar, staff and colleagues but poor disposal, and the ACR prepared by the District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur for the year 1998-1999 assessed him as a good officer but poor disposal. However, his poor disposal during this period is justified up to certain extent in the background of his involvement in the continuous and unnecessary disciplinary proceedings which was based on the charges of granting of bail indiscriminately, even after the fact that he had been exonerated of these charges long back in the year 1995 by the High Court at Patna.

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12) Below is a summary of the judgments cited by Mr. Animesh Tiwari :-

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i. In Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement is not a punishment and does not cast any stigma upon the employee and hence principles of

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natural justice have no place in context of compulsory

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retirement. Relevant paragraphs 33 and 34 read as under :-

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33 . At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well stated in J.N. Sinha and other decisions referred supra.

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34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:

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(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.

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(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.

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(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.

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(iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a

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higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.

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(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.

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ii. In Col. J. N. Sinha (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. It is also held that if that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. Relevant paragraph 9 reads as under :-

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9. Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56(j), it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule.' one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. The 1st respondent challenged the opinion formed by the government on the ground of mala fide. But that ground has failed. The High Court did not accept that plea. The same was not pressed before us. The impugned order was not attacked on the ground that the required opinion was not formed or that the opinion formed was an arbitrary one. One of the conditions of the 1st respondent's service is that the government can choose to retire him any time after he completes fifty

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years if it thinks that it is in public interest to do so. Because of his compulsory retirement he does not lose any of the rights acquired by him before retirement. Compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences. The aforementioned rule 56(j) is not intended for taking any penal action against the government servants. That rule merely embodies one of the facets of the pleasure doctrine embodied in Art. - 3 1 0 of the Constitution. Various considerations may weigh with, the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in all organizations and more so in government organizations, there is good deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual government servant and the interests of the public. 'While a minimum service is guaranteed to the government servant, the government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest.

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13) Bearing in mind the aforesaid factual position and the legal principles established by the Apex Court, we will now advert to the facts of the case.

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14) Pursuant to policy dated 25.4.2017, a three member committee was constituted which convened its meeting on 14.7.2017. The minutes of said meeting has been placed along with the reply marked as Annexure R/2. From bare perusal of aforesaid document, it transpires that the committee was convened to consider the cases of government servants who had attained 50 years of age or 20 years of service. The committee while

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scrutinizing the cases considered – (i) the ACRs of past ten years ; (ii) leaves availed by the government servant and (iii) departmental inquiry(s) and criminal case(s), pending against the government servant.

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15) In the meeting dated 14.7.2017, names of five employees were considered including petitioner. The screening committee scrutinized the petitioner’s complete service record and noted the following facts :-

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i. Petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Assistant GradeIII on 26.10.1995 and on the date of consideration for compulsory retirement i.e. 12.7.2017, he had put in 21 years and 8 months of service.

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ii. During the service career, petitioner was inflicted with following penalties :-

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Penalty of reversion from the post of Assistant Grade-II to Assistant Grade-III vide order dated 1.8.2014.

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Penalty of stoppage of one increment with non cumulative effect vide order dated 1.2.1999 on account of unauthorized absence.

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Order of recovery of Rs. 8,820/- was inflicted against petitioner as he illegally availed the benefit of HRA despite retaining the government accommodation.

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iii. Petitioner used foul and unparliamentary language towards the Hon’ble Governor and superior authorities in his letters/

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representations and this fact has not been controverted by the petitioner.

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iv. Petitioner was served with show notices on nine separate occasions during his entire service career.

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v. In the ACRs of preceding ten years, petitioner was awarded grade “A” once, grade “B” twice, he remained suspended for two years, received grade “C” in the rest of the years and ACR of one year was not available.

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16) Petitioner has impugned the order of compulsory retirement solely on the ground that ACRs of the preceding years were not duly communicated to the petitioner and there were manipulations in the entries made therein.

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17) Notably, this Court in Nagendra Bahadur Singh (supra) while dealing with the similar issue discussed the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra), State of Gujarat Versus Suryakant Chunilal Shah⁸ and Nand Kumar Verma (supra) at length and arrived at the conclusion that the un-communicated adverse remarks cannot be made a basis to disturb the finding recorded by the competent authority and the principles of natural justice have no application in the context of compulsory retirement. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 13 read as under :-

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9. The petitioner worked with the department for a period of 12 years but he attained the age of 50 years when

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8 . (1999) 1 SCC 529

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the decision of compulsory retirement was taken by the respondent authorities on 17.11.2017. Fundamental Rule No. 56(2)(a) specifically states that if a government servant has completed 20 years of service or has attained 50 years of age, in that case, the State can take the decision to compulsorily retire such an employee. The State has to consider honesty, integrity, physical capability, work and conduct and there should be subjective satisfaction of the competent authority in this regard. According to this circular, it would not be necessary to communicate the adverse remarks to such a government servant.

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10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar issue in the matter of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) para 34 held as under:-

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34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:

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(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not

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upon seniority.

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(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference."

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of State of Gujarat and another Vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529 in para 27 held as under:-

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" 27. The whole exercise described above would, therefore, indicate that although there was no material on the basis of which a reasonable opinion could be formed that the respondent had outlived his utility as a government servant or that he had lost his efficiency and had become a dead wood, he was compulsorily retired merely because of his involvement in two criminal cases pertaining to the grant of permits in favour of fake and bogus institutions. The involvement of a person in a criminal case does not mean that he is guilty. He is still to be tried in a court of law and the truth has to be found out ultimately by the court where the prosecution is ultimately conducted. But before that stage is reached, it would be highly improper to deprive a person of his livelihood merely on the basis of his involvement. We may, however, hasten to add that mere involvement in a criminal case would constitute relevant material for compulsory retirement or not would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the nature of offence allegedly committed by the employee."

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of Nand Kumar Verma Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2012) 3 SCC 580 in paras 34 and 36 held as under:-

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34. It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but such satisfaction must be based on a valid material. It is permissible for the courts to ascertain whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on which the subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority is based. In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively

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taken into consideration theservice record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACRs. There appears to be some discrepancy. We say so for the reason that the appellant has produced the copies of the ACRs which were obtained by him from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a comparison of these two would positively indicate that the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents of the ACRs.

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36. The material on which the decision of the compulsory retirement was based, as extracted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, and material furnished by the appellant would reflect that totality of relevant materials were not considered or completely ignored by the High Court. This leads to only one conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the High Court was not based on the sufficient or relevant material. In this view of the matter, we cannot say that the service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory which would warrant premature retirement from service. Therefore, there was no justification to retire the appellant compulsorily from service."

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court In the matter of S. Ramachandra Raju Vs. State of Orissa, (1994) Supp (3) SCC 424 in para 9 held as under:-

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9 . It is thus settled law that though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and the government employee is entitled to draw all retiral benefits including pension, the Government must exercise its power only in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of the service. The dead wood needs to be removed to augment efficiency. Integrity in public service needs to be maintained. The exercise of power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant but must act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency of service and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would live by reputation built around him. In an appropriate case, there may not be sufficient evidence to take punitive disciplinary action of removal from service. But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest. The entire service record or character rolls or confidential reports maintained would furnish the backdrop material for

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consideration by the Government or the Review Committee or the appropriate authority. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances alone, the Government should form the opinion that the government officer needs to be compulsorily retired from service. Therefore, the entire service record more particular the latest, would form the foundation for the opinion and furnish the base to exercise the power under the relevant rule to compulsorily retire a government officer. When an officer reaching the age of compulsory retirement, as was pointed out by this Court, he could neither seek alternative appointment nor meet the family burdens with the pension or other benefits he gets and thereby he would be subjected to great hardship and family would be greatly effected. Therefore, before exercising the power, the competent appropriate authority must weigh pros and cons and balance the public interest as against the individual interest. On total evaluation of the entire record of service if the Government or the governmental authority forms the opinion that in the public interest the officer needs to be retired compulsorily, the court may not interfere with the exercise of such bona fide exercise of power but the court has power and duty to exercise the power of judicial review not as a court of appeal but in its exercise of judicial review to consider whether the power has been properly exercised or is arbitrary or vitiated either by mala fide or actuated by extraneous consideration or arbitrary in retiring the government officer compulsorily from service."

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11. Now coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the overall grade of the petitioner was average or below average and the same is evident from the chart prepared in para No. 8. The decision could have been taken by the State authorities with regard to compulsory retirement as the petitioner had completed 50 years of age. The un-communicated adverse remarks cannot be made a basis to disturb the finding recorded by the competent authority. It is also a wellsettled principle of law that an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and does not have any stigma attached to it. The decision with regard to compulsory retirement was taken by the State authorities in public interest and the order was passed on subjective satisfaction. It is also clear that principles of natural justice have no application in the context of

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compulsory retirement. There is no allegation with regard to malafide intention or biasness. The matter of the petitioner was considered by the review committee thoroughly and thereafter, the decision was taken.

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12. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Apex Court and the facts of the present case, in the opinion of this Court, no interference is required.

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13. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).

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18) In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that the authority concerned formed its opinion for compulsory retirement on subjective satisfaction based on valid material. The screening committee considered the entire service record of the petitioner and recorded its satisfaction accordingly and the decision was taken by Chief Electoral Officer, State of Chhattisgarh in public interest to compulsorily retire the petitioner. Furthermore, it is wellsettled principle of law that order of compulsory retirement does not have any stigma attached to it.

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19) In result, this petition is dismissed.

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20) No order as to costs.

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Sd/(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE

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A j i n k y a

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Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2026.05.20 15:20:12 +0530

Amarnath Katiyar v. Chief Electoral Officer

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Amarnath Katiyar v. Chief Electoral Officer

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Bhikham Ram Sori Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Banshidhar Chouhan Vs State of Chhattisgarh