Smt. Vidya P. Tandy Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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Digitally signed by YOGESH YOGESH TIWARI TIWARI Date: 2026.04.17 19:05:20 +0530

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2026:CGHC:17639

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AFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Order reserved on : 01.04.2026 Order delivered on : 17.04.2026

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WPS No. 1465 of 2023

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Smt. Sumitra Mallick W/o Shri Subhash Mallick, Aged about 43 years, Presently posted as Demonstrator (contractual), at Govt. Nursing College, Raipur, Resident of : B.M.Y. Shikshit Nagar, Charodha, P.S. Bhilai District - Durg C.G.

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Smt. Priyanaka P. Ashwagan W/o Dr. Prashant John Ashawan, Aged about 40 years, Presently posted as Demonstrator (contractual), At Govt. Nursing College Raipur, Resident of: D-23, Bhavana Nagar, Khamardih Main Road, Shankar Nagar, P.S. Raipur, Telibanda, District - Raipur CG.

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3.Smt. Shalini Agrawal, age-39 years. W/o Mr. Ravi Kumar Agrawal, Jiwaji Heights, Flat no. 304, Kapil Nagar Chowk, Sarkanda Bilaspur (CG)

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Smt. Anima Lakra, W/o Dr. Rajesh Sachin Panna, aged about 40 years R/o 162/B, Ramkirshna Nagar, Mopka Bilaspur CG

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------Petitioners

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through: Secretary, Ministry of Health and Medical Education Mantralay Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur (CG)

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The Director, Directorate of Medical Education Old Nurses Hostel, DKS Bhavan, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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--- Respondents

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WPS No. 3647 of 2023

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Smt. Vidya P. Tandy W/o Shri Sunil Tandy, Aged about 50 years, Presently posted as Demonstrator (contractual), at Govt. Nursing College, Ambikapur, Permanent Resident of: near Christian Hospital Dhamtari P.S. Dhamtari District - Dhamtari (C.G.)

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Smt. Anju Bodalkar W/o Mr. Nikhil Kumar Bodalkar, Aged about 39 years, Presently posted as - Demonstrator, (contractual), At Govt. Nursing College Jagdalpur, Resident of: MIG First floor 08, Housing board colonly, Aghanpur, Dharmpura, Jagdalpur, P.S. Jagdalpur District-Bastar (C.G)

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Smt. Asha Sahu W/o Mr. G.G. Sahu, Aged About - 40 years, Presently posted as - Demonstrator, (contractual), At Govt. Nursing College Jagdalpur, Resident of: MIG 34 GF, Housing Board Colony, Aghanpur, Dharmpura, Jagdalpur, P.S. Jagdalpur District- Bastar (C.G)

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Smt. Anita Rani Gupta, W/o Mr. Harsh Gupta, Aged About -40 years, Presently posted as Demonstrator, (contractual), At Govt. Nursing

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College Jagdalpur Resident of: Flat No. 2/36, 440, Housing Board Colony, Lalbagh, Jagdalpur, P.S. Jagdalpur District- Bastar (C.G)

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Smt. Vidya Ansh W/o Ansh Raghavan, Aged About - 42 years, Presently posted as Demonstrator, (contractual), At Govt. Nursing College, Jagdalpur, Resident of: Sanjay Gandhi Ward 34, opposite to Manke furniture, Bhodhgat road Jagdalpur, P.S. Jagdalpur DistrictBastar (C.G).

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Smt. Priyanka Shirke W/o Dhushyant Meshram, Aged About 38 years Presently posted as Demonstrator, (contractual), At Govt. Nursing College, Jagdalpur Resident of: MIG 11, Housing Board Colony, Aghanpur, Dharmpura Jagdalpur, P.S. Jagdalpur DistrictBastar (C.G)

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Miss Anupa Tirkey as D/o Shri S. Tirkey, Aged About - 37 years, Presently posted Demonstrator (contractual), at Govt. Nursing College, Ambikapur, Resident of: Namnakala, Patpariya, Ambikapur, P.S. Gandhinagar District- Sarguja (C.G).

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Smt. Purnima Shukla W/o Shri Devendra Pathak, Aged about 39 years, Presently posted as - Demonstrator (contractual), at Govt. Nursing College, Ambikapur, Resident of: Ram Mandir Road Brahampara Ambikapur, P.S. Kotwali, District Sarguja (C.G).

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------Petitioners

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through: Secretary, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur District Raipur (CG)

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Directorate of Medical Education Old Nurses Hostel, DKS Bhavan, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, through: The Secretary, Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission, Shankar Nagar Road, Near Bhagat Singh Square, District -Raipur (C.G.)

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--- Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioners	: Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, Advocate
For State	: Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government
	Advocate with Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel
	Lawyer
For CGPSC	: Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

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CAV Order

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1. Heard Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners as well as Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate with Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State and Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the CGPSC.

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2. Since a common question of law and fact is involved in all both

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the writ petitions, they were clubbed together, heard analogously with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, and are being decided by this common order.

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3. The grievances raised by all the petitioners in the present writ petitions are essentially common in nature. The petitioners are qualified individuals who were appointed as Demonstrators in various Government Nursing and Government Polytechnic Colleges under the State after following due process of law. Although their initial appointment was made on a contractual basis for a period of one year, the petitioners have continuously discharged their duties for more than 16-17 years by virtue of periodic extensions granted by the respondent authorities.

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4. According to the petitioners, their appointments were made against sanctioned posts and after proper selection procedure, and they have been rendering satisfactory services without any complaint. Despite their long and continuous service, the respondent authorities have neither framed any policy nor taken any steps for their regularization/absorption against regular posts. The petitioners have made several representations before the competent authorities seeking regularization of their services; however, no action has been taken thereon.

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5. Thus, in sum and substance, the core grievance of all the petitioners is that despite being eligible and having rendered long years of continuous service, they are being denied consideration

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for absorption/regularization, which is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

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6. By way of the present petitions, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 29.12.2022 (Annexure P-1), whereby the respondent State has failed to consider the case of the petitioners for regularization and has continued its arbitrary and nonconsiderate approach. The impugned action is contrary to the settled legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court. The petitioners have, therefore, sought quashment of the impugned order and issuance of appropriate directions to the respondent authorities to consider and grant regularization/absorption to the petitioners on the regular posts in accordance with law.

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7. In both the writ petitions being WPS No.1465/2023 and WPS No.3647/2023, the petitioners have prayed for similar reliefs, which are as under :-

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“ A. May, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ directing the respondents to produce all the relevant records pertaining to the case of petitioner, if the Hon'ble Court may so desire.

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B. May this Hon'ble Court be pleased to Quash the order dated 29.12.2022 (Annexure P-1) and direct the Respondents to frame a policy for regularization of the contractual

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employees in light of the Judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Uma devi Case.

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C. May, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to absorb/ regularize the services in the regular post with all consequential benefits.

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D. May, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to Issue any other order or orders, writ or writs, direction or directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit.

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E. Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts & circumstances of case.

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F. Cost of the petition may also be awarded. ”

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8. Brief consolidated facts of this batch of writ petitions are that: the State of Chhattisgarh came into existence on 01.11.2000 upon its bifurcation from the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State framed various service rules, including the Chhattisgarh Civil Sewa (Samvida Niyukti) Niyam, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 2004”), governing contractual appointments under the State. The said Rules, inter alia, prescribe the eligibility criteria, mode and manner of selection, and constitution of the Selection Committee for such appointments. At the relevant point of time, the State had established several Government Nursing Colleges, including

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newly established institutions, wherein posts of Demonstrators were sanctioned. During the years 2008–2009, advertisements were issued inviting applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the said posts. In response to advertisements, a large number of candidates participated in the selection process.

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9. The petitioners, being eligible and duly qualified, applied for the said posts and participated in the selection process. Their candidature was scrutinized by the competent authorities, and they were called for interview. The selection process was conducted by duly constituted Selection Committees comprising senior officers and subject experts, including officers from the Directorate of Medical Education and Principals of Nursing Colleges. The petitioners were selected on the basis of their merit and performance in the interview, in accordance with the applicable rules and reservation policy.

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10. Pursuant to their selection, the petitioners were appointed as Demonstrators in different Government Nursing Colleges, including institutions at Ambikapur, Jagdalpur, Raipur and Bilaspur, during the years 2008–2009. Their appointments were made against sanctioned posts and initially for a contractual period of one year, as per the provisions of the Rules of 2004 and the terms of appointment. As per the applicable conditions of service, the contractual appointments of the petitioners were subject to extension upon satisfactory performance. The record

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indicates that the services of the petitioners were extended from time to time on yearly or shorter-term basis, based on evaluation of their performance by the competent authorities. The petitioners continued to discharge their duties as Demonstrators throughout this period, and there is nothing on record to indicate any adverse remarks against them.

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11. Over a period of time, the petitioners have rendered continuous and uninterrupted service for more than 16 to 17 years in their respective institutions. During the course of their service, certain amendments were made to the Rules of 2004, including in the years 2012 and 2019, and the services of the petitioners continued to be governed under the amended framework. The extension orders issued to the petitioners from time to time reflect continuation of their engagement under the prevailing rules. It further appears from the record that the petitioners were subjected to conditions similar to those applicable in regular service, including deductions towards schemes such as Life Insurance or Provident Fund, as provided under the terms of their contractual engagement. The petitioners continued in service during the said period, including during the COVID-19 pandemic, and discharged their duties in the respective institutions. Their services have been utilized by the State continuously against the sanctioned posts of Demonstrators.

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12. At various points of time, representations were submitted by the

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petitioners and similarly situated contractual employees seeking consideration for regularization/absorption in service, in view of their long tenure and continuous engagement. The record further indicates that issues relating to regularization of contractual employees had also arisen in other cases before this Court, wherein directions were issued for consideration of such claims. It is also borne out from the record that certain communications and deliberations took place at the departmental level regarding the issue of regularization of contractual employees. However, no comprehensive policy or statutory framework for regularization was brought into force by the State.

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13. Subsequently, the representations submitted by the petitioners came to be considered by the respondent authorities and were rejected vide order dated 29.12.2022, primarily on the ground that there exists no provision or rule enabling regularization of contractual employees. The record further indicates that the services of the petitioners have continued to be extended even after the said rejection order, by issuance of extension orders for specified periods, and as per the latest extensions, the petitioners have continued in service up to the year 2022–2023 and thereafter. It has also been brought on record that the petitioners are continuing to work on the posts of Demonstrators as on date, and by virtue of successive extensions, they have completed more than one and a half decades of service under the State without any break.

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14. The present writ petitions have been filed challenging the aforesaid order dated 29.12.2022 and raising issues relating to continuation and regularization of the petitioners in service.

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15. Mr. Apoorva Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, would submit that the impugned action of the respondent-State is ex facie arbitrary, illegal, perverse and contrary to the settled principles of constitutional and service jurisprudence. It is contended that the rejection of the petitioners’ claim for regularization vide order dated 29.12.2022 is not only non-speaking and mechanical, but also reflects complete nonapplication of mind to the factual matrix as well as binding judicial precedents governing the field. Learned counsel submits that the State, being a model employer, cannot adopt an exploitative approach by continuing the petitioners for nearly two decades and thereafter deny them legitimate consideration on untenable grounds.

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16. It is further submitted that the initial appointments of the petitioners were made strictly in accordance with law, pursuant to a public advertisement, against sanctioned vacant posts, and after undergoing a due process of selection as prescribed under the Rules of 2004 framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners participated in a competitive selection process, were found eligible and meritorious, and were appointed only after due scrutiny and interview conducted by duly

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constituted Selection Committees comprising senior officials and subject experts. It is thus contended that the appointments of the petitioners cannot be termed as illegal or backdoor entries, but at the highest, even if any procedural deficiency such as nonconsultation with the Public Service Commission is assumed, the same would render the appointments merely irregular and not illegal.

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17. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siraj Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2020) 19 SCC 480, wherein it has been held that absence of prior concurrence of the Public Service Commission would not render the appointment illegal, but at the most irregular. It is submitted that the said principle is squarely applicable to the case at hand. Further reliance is placed upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , to contend that where appointments are made after following a procedure consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, minor procedural deviations would not vitiate the appointment as illegal.

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18. Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioners have rendered continuous and uninterrupted service for more than 17– 18 years against sanctioned posts without the benefit of any interim protection from any court, thereby squarely satisfying the

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conditions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 247 . Referring to the said judgment, it is contended that employees who have worked for more than ten years, whose appointments are not illegal, and who possess the requisite qualifications, are entitled to be considered for regularization in terms of the principles laid down in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . It is submitted that the petitioners fulfill all the conditions laid down therein and are therefore entitled to consideration as a matter of right.

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19. Learned counsel has also drawn attention to the consistent line of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which have recognized the rights of long-serving contractual employees. Reliance is placed on Vinod Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2024) 9 SCC 327 , wherein it was held that mere nomenclature of employment as “temporary” or “contractual” cannot be used to deny regularization when employees have performed duties akin to regular employees for long periods. Further reliance is placed on Jaggo v. Union of India and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 , wherein it was held that long and uninterrupted service extending beyond a decade cannot be ignored merely on the ground of contractual status.

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20. Learned counsel has further relied upon Shripal & Anr. v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 and Dharam

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Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735 , to contend that the State cannot take shelter under absence of a policy to deny regularization, as such inaction itself amounts to exploitation and arbitrary exercise of power. Reliance is also placed upon the recent judgment in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 129 , wherein in similar circumstances involving long-serving contractual employees appointed against sanctioned posts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed regularization and held that the State cannot deny constitutional protection merely on the ground of contractual nomenclature.

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21. It is next contended that the impugned order is also liable to be set aside as it is in direct contravention of binding precedents of this Court. Learned counsel submits that an identical order had earlier been quashed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 265 of 2017 (Smt. Nidhi Das v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, decided on 11.12.2018) , wherein the claims of similarly placed Demonstrators were directed to be considered. It is submitted that despite being aware of the aforesaid binding precedents, the respondents have passed the impugned order on identical grounds, which amounts to disregard of judicial discipline.

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22. Finally, learned counsel would submit that the action of the respondent-State in continuing the petitioners for nearly 18 years,

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extracting work from them on sanctioned posts, and thereafter seeking to displace them by fresh recruitment or by accommodating other persons, is wholly arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the petitioners have crossed the upper age limit for alternative employment and have devoted the prime years of their lives in service of the State, including during the COVID-19 pandemic. Reliance is also placed on State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148, Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 , and Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 15 SCC 236 , to contend that the State cannot exploit employees indefinitely and deny them security of tenure. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned order be quashed and appropriate directions be issued to the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioners in accordance with law.

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23. Learned counsel also placed very recent pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Sagir and others v. Nagar Nigam Kanpur , passed in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14760-14762/2024 decided on 16.03.2026, Abhishek Sharma v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 342 and Pawan Kumar and others v. Union of India and others , passed in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.29214/2019 decided on 13.02.2026 , to buttress his submissions.

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24. On the other hand, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate along with Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State, vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners in both the writ petitions and submitted that the present writ petitions, being based on identical facts and seeking similar reliefs, are liable to be dismissed as being devoid of merit and substance. It is contended that the petitioners in both petitions have failed to establish any enforceable legal or statutory right in their favour so as to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The relief sought, particularly for regularization and for issuance of a direction to frame a policy, lies within the exclusive domain of the State and cannot be claimed as a matter of right.

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25. Learned State counsel would submit that in both writ petitions, the respective petitioners were appointed purely on contractual basis under the applicable Rules and terms of agreement. Their appointments were for a fixed tenure, subject to renewal from time to time, and clearly stipulate that such engagement would continue only till regular appointments are made or till the contractual period expires. It is argued that the continuation of the petitioners for a considerable length of time on the basis of successive extensions does not confer any vested right upon them for absorption or regularization. Their service conditions are governed by the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract

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Appointment) Rules, 2012 (for short, ‘the Rules of 2012’) and the specific terms of their contractual engagement, which unequivocally negate any claim for permanency. It is further contended that the petitioners, instead of participating successfully in the regular recruitment process, are attempting to secure entry into regular service through judicial intervention, which is impermissible in law. Learned counsel submits that some of the petitioners had in fact participated in the direct recruitment process pursuant to advertisement dated 30.07.2014 after obtaining No Objection Certificates from the competent authority, but having failed therein, they are now seeking regularization through the present writ petitions. Such a course would amount to permitting backdoor entry into public employment, which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and contrary to the settled principles governing public recruitment.

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26. Learned State counsel has placed heavy reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , particularly paragraphs 47 and 52, to contend that a temporary or contractual employee, being fully aware of the nature of appointment, cannot claim regularization as a matter of right nor invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation. It is further submitted that issuance of a writ of mandamus presupposes the existence of a legal right and a corresponding duty on the part of the State, both of which are conspicuously absent in the present

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case. Reliance is also placed on Yogesh Mahajan v. Professor R.C. Deka, (2018) 3 SCC 218 and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Paramjeet Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 250 , to reiterate that contractual employees do not have any vested right to continuation or renewal of their contractual engagement.

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27. It is lastly submitted that both the writ petitions are premature and based merely on apprehension, as no adverse order of termination or discontinuation has been passed against the petitioners in either case. The petitioners continue to work on contractual basis subject to extensions, and therefore no cause of action has arisen warranting interference by this Court. It is also contended that the petitions suffer from misjoinder of parties and causes of action, as the petitioners were appointed at different points of time under separate contractual arrangements. Further, as per the existing cadre strength, a substantial number of posts are already filled through regular recruitment, and the remaining contractual engagements are purely stop-gap arrangements. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that both the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed.

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28. Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission (CGPSC), while adopting the submissions advanced by the learned Government Advocate for the State, submits that the role of the Commission is confined strictly to recruitment to regular posts in accordance with

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the constitutional mandate and the relevant statutory rules. It is contended that the petitioners were never appointed through a selection process conducted by the CGPSC for regular appointment, and therefore, no right accrues in their favour to seek regularization through the Commission. The claim of the petitioners, if any, lies against the State Government and not against the Commission. It is further submitted that any direction for regularization or absorption of the petitioners without following the due process of recruitment through the CGPSC would be in direct contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Commission cannot be compelled to recognize or regularize contractual appointments made dehors the prescribed recruitment procedure. Hence, in absence of any statutory obligation or role attributable to the CGPSC in the engagement of the petitioners, the present writ petitions, insofar as they concern the Commission, deserve to be dismissed.

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29. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at considerable length and have bestowed my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced across the Bar. I have also carefully perused the pleadings filed in all the connected writ petitions, the annexures appended thereto, the original records made available by the learned State counsel, as well as the statutory provisions and notifications governing the field.

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30. Upon consideration of the pleadings and material placed on record, it emerges that the petitioners were appointed as Demonstrators pursuant to a due process of selection initiated through public advertisement during the years 2008–2009. Their appointments were made against sanctioned posts in Government Nursing Colleges under the applicable Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Though the initial appointments were contractual in nature for a limited period, the services of the petitioners were continuously extended from time to time, and they have remained in uninterrupted service for more than 16–17 years.

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31. It is also not in dispute that throughout this long tenure, the petitioners have discharged duties identical in nature to those performed by regular employees holding the same posts. The record does not disclose any adverse remarks regarding their performance. On the contrary, their services have been repeatedly extended by the competent authorities, which prima facie reflects satisfactory discharge of duties and continued requirement of their services against the sanctioned posts.

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32. The principal issue that arises for consideration in the present batch of writ petitions is whether the petitioners, having been appointed through a process consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of Indian and having rendered long years of continuous service against sanctioned posts, are entitled to

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consideration for regularization/absorption, and whether the rejection of their claim vide order dated 29.12.2022 is sustainable in law.

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33. The impugned order dated 29.12.2022 reveals that the claim of the petitioners has been rejected primarily on the ground that there exists no policy or provision for regularization of contractual employees. The said reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be accepted in a mechanical manner, inasmuch as the absence of a policy cannot be a ground to defeat a claim which otherwise requires consideration in light of settled legal principles governing the field.

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34. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Umadevi (3) (supra), wherein a distinction has been drawn between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. While illegal appointments being those made dehors the constitutional scheme without any selection process are not amenable to regularization, irregular appointments, where substantial compliance with the procedure has been followed, stand on a different footing and may be considered for regularization subject to conditions.

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35. The principles laid down in Umadevi (3) (supra) were subsequently explained and clarified in M.L. Kesari (supra), Jaggo (supra), Shripal (supra), Vinod Kumar (supra) and Dharam Singh (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if an employee has worked for ten years or more in a duly

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sanctioned post and was appointed through a process consistent with Article 14, though not strictly in accordance with the rules, such case would fall within the exception contemplated in Umadevi (supra) and would require consideration for regularization, subject to fulfillment of eligibility conditions.

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36. Recently, in Bhola Nath (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has again emphasized that where employees have been engaged pursuant to a due selection process against sanctioned posts and have rendered long and uninterrupted service for over a decade, mere description of their engagement as “contractual” cannot be a ground to indefinitely deny them consideration for regularization, particularly when the State continues to avail their services. The Court reiterated that the State cannot perpetuate ad-hocism and defeat legitimate expectations arising from long and continuous service by relying solely on contractual nomenclature. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issue, has held as under :-

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“Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements:

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13.2. In the present case, the respondentState had engaged the services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since the year 2012. It was only towards the end of the year 2022 that the respondents communicated that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement was likely to be granted.

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13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-State initially engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public duties and functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when the employment opportunities that may have been available to them a decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints.

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13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service. We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship between the appellants and the respondentState was mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants’ experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be supported by cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order.

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13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years and has been granted

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repeated extensions cannot, overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or regular.

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13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, this Court underscored that governmentdepartments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the organization.

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13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India , this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court further clarified

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that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”, the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions.

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13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. , this Court strongly deprecated the culture of “ adhocism” adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement practices.

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FINAL CONCLUSION :

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14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we summarize our conclusions as follows:

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I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration for regularization.

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II. Abrupt discontinuance of such longstanding engagement solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording cogent reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

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III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from constitutional scrutiny.

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IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual labels or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-hocism or to discard longserving employees in a manner inconsistent with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.

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V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment.”

¶136

37. The aforesaid aspect has also been considered and affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar (supra) , wherein the Court reiterated that where employees have been engaged against sanctioned posts and have rendered long years of continuous service, the State cannot arbitrarily deny consideration of their claim for regularization, particularly when such engagement was not tainted by illegality. The Hon’ble Supreme

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Court emphasized that fairness in State action requires that such employees be at least considered under an appropriate policy framework and held as under :-

¶139

“9. Besides the aforesaid aspects, we find that the law laid down by this Court in Jaggo (supra) supports the case of the appellants in their prayer for regularization. In paragraphs 13, 20, 21 and 26, it has been held as under:

¶140

“13. The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’ termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor occasional.

¶141

20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra) does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or its

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instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional requirements. However, where appointments were not illegal but possibly “irregular,” and where employees had served continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair and humane resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a regular basis can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization. In a recent judgement of this Court in Vinod Kumar and Ors. Etc. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 5, it was held that held that procedural formalities cannot be used to deny regularization of service to an employee whose appointment was termed "temporary" but has performed the same duties as performed by the regular employee over a considerable period in the capacity of the regular employee. The relevant paras of this judgement have been reproduced below:

¶144

“6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) by the High Court does not fit squarely with the facts at hand, given the specific circumstances under which the appellants were employed and have continued their service. The reliance

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on procedural formalities at the outset cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive rights that have accrued over a considerable period through continuous service. Their promotion was based on a specific notification for vacancies and a subsequent circular, followed by a selection process involving written tests and interviews, which distinguishes their case from the appointments through back door entry as discussed in the case of Uma Devi (supra).

¶147

7. The judgement in the case Uma Devi (supra) also distinguished between “irregular” and “illegal” appointments underscoring the importance of considering certain appointments even if were not made strictly in accordance with the prescribed Rules and Procedure, cannot be said to have been made illegally if they had followed the procedures of regular appointments such as conduct of written examinations or interviews as in the present case…”

¶148

21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the initial label of the appellants’ engagements and the outsourcing decision taken after their dismissal. Courts must look beyond the surface labels and consider the realities of employment: continuous, longterm service, indispensable duties, and absence of any mala fide or illegalities in

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their appointments. In that light, refusing regularization simply because their original terms did not explicitly state so, or because an outsourcing policy was belatedly introduced, would be contrary to principles of fairness and equity.

¶151

26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases where regularization is appropriate.

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This selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered indispensable services over decades.”

¶154

10. The aforesaid observations are sufficient to hold that the Tribunal was not justified in denying relief to the appellants by relying upon the decision in Umadevi (3) and Ors. (supra). The High Court also erred in affirming the decision of the Tribunal. The appellants are entitled to similar reliefs as granted by this Court in Ravi Verma and Ors. (supra) as well as in Raman Kumar and Ors. (supra).

¶155

11. For all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the High Court dated 26.08.2019 in M.P. No.3460/2018 is set aside. The services of the appellants be regularized from 01.07.2006 on the same terms as made applicable in Ravi Verma and Ors. (supra) as well as in Raman Kumar and Ors. (supra). The benefits be released in favour of the appellants within a period of three months from today.

¶156

12. The applicants in Interim Application No.42233/2020, who were impleaded as party respondents in view of the order dated 15.03.2021 are also entitled to the aforesaid reliefs.”

¶157

38. Further, in Abhishek Sharma (supra) , while dealing with a similar controversy relating to long-serving contractual employees, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the State cannot take

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advantage of the contractual nature of appointment after having utilized the services of such employees for a prolonged period. It was held that where the appointments are not illegal and the employees have continued for a considerable duration, their claim deserves due consideration in accordance with law, rather than being rejected in a mechanical manner and observed as under :-

¶160

“10.8. More recently, a 7-Judge Bench of this Court, in State of Punjab and others v. Davinder Singh and others, had occasion to consider the permissibility of sub-classification within the framework of affirmative action, in the context of the equality mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution. While delineating the parameters governing the creation of classifications without transgressing the principle of equality before the law, this Court observed as follows: -

¶161

“84. Article 14 employs two expressions — equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Both different in content and sweep. “Equality before the law”, an expression derived from the English Common law, entails absence of special privileges for any individual within the territory. It does not mean that the same law should apply to everyone, but that the same law should apply to those who are similarly situated. The expression “equal protection of the laws” means that among equals, laws must be equally administered.

¶162

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It enjoins the State with the power to reasonably classify those who are differently placed. The mandate of “equal protection of laws” casts a positive obligation on the State to ensure that everyone may enjoy equal protection of the laws, and no one is unfairly denied this protection. In essence, the guarantee of equality entails that all persons in like circumstances must be treated alike. That there must be a parity of treatment under parity of conditions. Equality does not entail sameness. The State is allowed to classify in a manner that is not discriminatory. The doctrine of classification gives content to the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Under this approach, the focus is on the equality of results or opportunities over equality of treatment.

¶164

85. The Constitution permits valid classification if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from others left out of the group. The phrase “intelligible differentia” means difference capable of being understood. The difference is capable of being understood when there is a yardstick to differentiate the class included and others excluded from the group. In the absence of the yardstick, the differentiation would be without a basis and hence, unreasonable. The basis of classification must be

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deducible from the provisions of the statute; surrounding circumstances or matters of common knowledge. In making the classification, the State is free to recognise degrees of harm. Though the classification need not be mathematical in precision, there must be some difference between the persons grouped and the persons left out, and the difference must be real and pertinent. The classification is unreasonable if there is “little or no difference”. Second, the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law, that is, the basis of classification must have a nexus with the object of the classification.”

¶167

(emphasis supplied)

¶168

Article 14 of the Constitution, therefore, does not fetter the power of the State to frame classifications, for equals alone are entitled to equal treatment. Persons who are not similarly situated cannot claim parity. However, the said principle does not confer upon the State an unfettered licence to carve out artificial distinctions within a class of persons who are otherwise similarly situated. Any such artificial or unreasonable classification would strike at the very core of the right to equality and violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.

¶169

***

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12. In light of the foregoing analysis and discussion, we summarise our conclusions as under: -

¶172

I. Nomenclature is not determinative of constitutional entitlement. Where employees appointed on an “academic arrangement” basis are similarly situated to those engaged on ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis in terms of duties, tenure, conditions of service and mode of appointment, denial of equal treatment solely on the basis of nomenclature is impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

¶173

***

¶174

V. The State, as a model employer, cannot adopt artificial classifications to deny statutory benefits. Repackaging contractual engagements under a different nomenclature, while denying regularization, violates the equality mandate under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”

¶175

39. Very recently, in Mohammad Sagir (supra) , while examining the issue of regularization, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that the principles laid down in Umadevi (supra) cannot be applied in a rigid or hyper-technical manner so as to defeat legitimate claims arising from long and continuous service. The Court underscored that where employees have worked for substantial periods against sanctioned posts and their appointments are not per se illegal, the State is obligated to adopt

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a fair and reasonable approach in considering their cases for regularization or by framing an appropriate scheme and held as

¶178

under :-

¶179

“13. We are conscious of the law that the burden to prove that a workman had worked continuously for 240 days in the preceding one year prior to the alleged retrenchment lies on the workman. However, each case is to be decided on its own facts. In a case where engagement is for a substantial length of time, a presumption would arise that the work for which the workmen is engaged is of a perennial nature and there exists a vacant post. In the instant case, there is no dispute that workmen were initially engaged in the year 1993 and their services were dispensed with in the year 2006. It is difficult to accept that for that long period of time they were only working as substitutes for regular workers. In such circumstances, when they had led evidence regarding their continuous service and a direction was issued to the employer to produce the relevant records and, despite such direction, records were not produced, if the Labour Court had raised an adverse inference, the same could not have been faulted.

¶180

14. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment and order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside. However, merely because the retrenchment procedure was not

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followed may not automatically entitle the workmen to be reinstated with full back wages.

¶183

15. In this case, though, we are of the view that the workmen were entitled to reinstatement as they had served for over a decade, however, whether they were entitled to full back-wages/ arrears or lesser amount, requires adjudication based on assessment whether they were gainfully employed elsewhere in the interregnum. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to remand the matter to the High Court to decide on the entitlement for back-wages. Insofar as direction in the award(s) to reinstate the said workmen is concerned. the same is upheld. ”

¶184

40. Reverting to the facts of the present cases, and upon a holistic consideration of the pleadings, documents placed on record, and the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties, this Court finds that the foundational facts are largely undisputed. The petitioners in both the writ petitions were appointed as Demonstrators pursuant to a duly notified selection process conducted in the years 2008–2009. Their appointments were made against sanctioned posts in Government Nursing Colleges after following a procedure consistent with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners possessed the requisite qualifications, participated in a process of selection conducted by duly constituted committees, and were appointed on the basis of merit.

¶185

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41. It is further evident from the record that although the petitioners were initially appointed on contractual basis, their services have been continuously extended from time to time for more than 16– 17 years without any break. During this entire period, the petitioners have discharged duties identical to those performed by regular employees and have continued to serve against sanctioned posts. There is no material on record to suggest that their appointments were tainted by any illegality, fraud or backdoor entry. On the contrary, the consistent extension of their services by the State itself demonstrates the continued necessity of their services and satisfaction of their performance.

¶187

42. Insofar as WPS No.1465/2023 is concerned, the petitioners therein have approached this Court challenging the rejection of their claim for regularization vide order dated 29.12.2022 and seeking a direction for consideration of their case in light of settled legal principles. Similarly, in WPS No.3647/2023, the petitioners, who are identically situated, have raised the same grievance arising out of the same impugned action and have sought analogous reliefs. Thus, both the writ petitions arise out of a common cause of action and involve identical questions of fact and law, namely, the entitlement of long-serving contractual Demonstrators to be considered for regularization.

¶188

43. The stand taken by the respondent-State in opposing the petitions is primarily premised on the contractual nature of appointment

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and absence of any policy for regularization. However, as discussed hereinabove, such a stand cannot be accepted in a mechanical or absolute manner. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Umadevi (supra) , as subsequently explained and clarified in M.L. Kesari (supra) and further reiterated in recent judgments including Jaggo (supra) , Vinod Kumar (supra) , Shripal (supra) , Dharam Singh (supra) , Bhola Nath (supra) , Pawan Kumar (supra) , Abhishek Sharma (supra) and Mohammad Sagir (supra) , makes it abundantly clear that the State cannot perpetuate a regime of ad-hocism by continuing employees for decades and thereafter deny them consideration for regularization by relying solely on the contractual label of their engagement.

¶191

44. The distinction between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments, as carved out in Umadevi (supra) , assumes significance in the present case. The appointments of the petitioners, having been made through a transparent selection process against sanctioned posts, cannot be termed as illegal. At the highest, even if any procedural irregularity is assumed, the same would not disentitle the petitioners from consideration for regularization, particularly when they have rendered long and uninterrupted service exceeding more than one and a half decades.

¶192

45. The law is now well settled that where employees have worked for more than ten years against sanctioned posts without the

¶193

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protection of any interim order, and their appointments are not illegal, they are entitled to be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. The petitioners in both the writ petitions clearly satisfy the said parameters. The State, by continuing the petitioners for such a prolonged period and extracting work of a perennial nature, cannot now turn around and deny them consideration on the ground that no policy exists.

¶195

46. The impugned order dated 29.12.2022, whereby the representations of the petitioners have been rejected, reflects a mechanical approach and non-application of mind. The rejection is founded solely on the absence of a policy, without examining whether the petitioners fall within the category of employees entitled to consideration under the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Such an approach, in the considered opinion of this Court, is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.

¶196

47. The contention of the State that the petitioners have no enforceable right and that the petitions are premature also does not merit acceptance. The rejection of their claim vide the impugned order constitutes a clear cause of action. Moreover, the right asserted by the petitioners is not an absolute right to regularization, but a right to fair and lawful consideration of their case, which is well recognized in service jurisprudence.

¶197

48. This Court is also mindful of the fact that the petitioners have now crossed a substantial part of their service life and have devoted

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the prime years of their career in service of the State. Denial of consideration at this stage, after utilizing their services for nearly two decades, would not only be inequitable but would also offend the principles of fairness and reasonableness which are integral to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

¶200

49. In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon a careful consideration of the authoritative pronouncements rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as referred to hereinabove, this Court arrives at a firm and well-reasoned conclusion that the petitioners in both the writ petitions have successfully established their case. The legal position being settled and the factual matrix being clear and undisputed, the petitioners are held entitled to the reliefs sought for, and accordingly, both the writ petitions deserve to be allowed.

¶201

50. Consequently, and in light of the reasons recorded hereinabove, the impugned order dated 29.12.2022 (Annexure P-1) cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are, therefore, directed to take immediate and appropriate steps to regularize the services of all the petitioners against the duly sanctioned posts to which they were originally appointed. Such exercise shall be carried out expeditiously, without any avoidable delay. The petitioners shall further be entitled to all consequential service benefits flowing from such regularization, including but not limited to continuity of service,

¶202

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proper fixation in the applicable regular pay scale, and all other

¶204

attendant and ancillary benefits.

¶205

51. In the ultimate analysis, and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, both the writ petitions being WPS No.1465/2023 and WPS No.3647/2023, stand allowed . The reliefs as prayed for by the petitioners are hereby granted in terms of the directions and observations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this order. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

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52. There shall be no order as to costs.

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Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

¶208

Yogesh

¶209

The date when the	The date when the	The date when the judgment is
judgment is	judgment is	uploaded on the website
reserved	pronounced
		Operative Full
01.04.2026	17.04.2026	------ 17.04.2026

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Head Note

¶212

Long and uninterrupted service rendered against duly sanctioned posts, pursuant to a proper and transparent selection process, cannot be disregarded merely on the ground that the appointments are described as “contractual”. Any rejection of the claim for regularization, if made in a cursory or mechanical manner without due consideration of these relevant factors, would be legally unsustainable.

Smt. Vidya P. Tandy v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Smt. Vidya P. Tandy v. State of Chhattisgarh

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