D.P. Vipra College Vs State of Chhattisgarh

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Secretary, Ministry Of Higher And Technical Education, Man Power Deployment, Science & Technology, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)

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2 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Through its Staff Officer, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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3 - First Appellate Authority, Directorate of Higher Education, Indravati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)

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4 - The Public Information Officer, Higher Education Department, Govt. Of Chhattisgarh, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Raipur Chhattisgarh

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5 - Dr. Ramadhaar Prasad Pandey R/o House No. 16/2017, Ahead Of

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Krishna Vihar, Ward No. 16 (New No. 28), Vidhya Up Nagar, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Karunendra Pratap Singh, Advocate
For Respondent/	: Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government Advocate
State
For Respondent	: Mr.Palash Tiwari, Advocate
No.5

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SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Order on Board

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06/04/2026

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By way of the present petition, the Petitioners seek to impugn the order dated 26.8.2021 (Annexure P/9) passed by Respondent No.2 in Second Appeal No.A/3994/2020. By the impugned order, a penalty of Rs.25,000/- was imposed upon Petitioner No.2 under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (henceforth “the Act of 2005”) for the alleged non- compliance of the order dated 20.5.2020 passed in the First Appeal. It is contended by the Petitioner that the said order dated 20.5.2020 was never served upon her. Furthermore, upon gaining knowledge of the directions, the Petitioner supplied 178 pages of the requested documents.

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The petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs in the petition :

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10.1 A writ and/or an order in the nature of appropriate writ do issue calling relevant records pertaining to case of petitioners for perusal of this Hon'ble Court, if thinks fit in the facts & circumstances of case.

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10.2 A writ and/or an order in the nature of writ of certiorari do issue quashing order dated 26.8.2021 (Annexure P-9) imposing penalty of Rs.25,000/- in alleged exercise of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act of 2005 and recovery thereof from the amount payable to petitioner No.2 as salary, being arbitrary, illegal, beyond scope of Section 20 of the Act of 2005 and in violation of principles of natural justice as also petitioners' fundamental, constitutional and other rights.

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10.3 Cost of the proceedings.

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10.4 Any other writs and directions that may be deemed fit and just in the facts & circumstance of case.

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Succinctly stated facts of the case, as canvassed by the Petitioners, are that Petitioner No.2 is the Principal of Petitioner No.1-College and by virtue of her office, serves as the Public Information Officer (PIO). Respondent No.5 is a ‘chronic litigant’ who has consistently acted with the intent to disparage the reputation of the institution. On 24.1.2020, an application was moved by Respondent No.5 under the Act of 2005 seeking copy of service book. Thereafter, on 1/2-3-2020, he filed another application stating that he is ready to pay requisite charges for issuance of a certified copy of service book. Initially, the Petitioners withheld the information on the ground that an objection had been raised by the Local Fund Audit with regard to conduct of respondent No.5. An Enquiry Committee was constituted by the Petitioner-College to investigate the conduct of the said respondent. Subsequently, respondent No.5 filed First

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Appeal No.305/2020 on 7.3.2020 under the Act of 2005. The First Appellate Authority heard the matter on 20.5.2020 and passed an order on the same day directing that the requested information be provided within a period of 15 days, free of cost. This order was passed ex-parte and without notice to the petitioners, in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and the maxim audi alteram partem . According to the Petitioners, the order dated 20.5.2020 was never served upon them. After receiving notice of Second Appeal No.A/3994/2020 for hearing through video conferencing, the petitioners discovered the existence of the previous order. Notwithstanding the non-service, the Petitioners demonstrated bonafide intent by immediately supplying 178 pages of documents to respondent No.5 free of cost. The Petitioners have also taken a ground of COVID-19 pandemic, contending that the procedure for hearing before the judicial/quasi judicial authorities underwent a significant change during the said period on account of the lock-downs imposed since March 2020. However, despite the Petitioners’ compliance and absence of evidence regarding service of the First Appellate Authority’s order, Respondent No.2 passed the impugned order dated 26.8.2021 (Annexure P/9). This order imposed a penalty of Rs.25,000/- on Petitioner No.2 under Section 20(1) of the Act of 2005, to be recovered from her salary and deposited into the Government Treasury. Hence, this Petition.

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Mr. Karunendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned order does not fulfill the specific

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statutory requirements stipulated under Section 20 of the Act of 2005. The sine qua non for imposing a penalty is a finding of malafide refusal or unreasonable delay. He submits that in the present case, the authority below has failed to record any finding of intentional defiance by the Petitioners. He submits that the order of the First Appellate Authority was never served upon the Petitioners and this assertion remains uncontroverted by the respondents. The Petitioners had no knowledge of the direction they were allegedly defying. He further submits that immediately upon gaining the knowledge of the above order, the Petitioners provided the requisite documents to Respondent No.5 free of cost and the receipt of the said documents has been duly acknowledged by Respondent No.5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the Petitioners places reliance on the judgment rendered in the matters of Manohar Vs. State of Maharashtra , reported in (2012) 13 SCC 14 . In view of the above, learned counsel for the Petitioners prays that the impugned order be set-aside.

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Per contra, Mr. Palash Tiwari, learned counsel for respondent No.5 submits that this petition is an ill-founded attempt by the Petitioners to escape the statutory liability arising out of an unexplained delay of one year in furnishing information under the Act, 2005. He submits that Respondent No.5 sought a copy of his service book on 24.1.2020 and the said request was duly received by the petitioners on 3.2.2020. Under 7(1) of the Act of 2005, the information was mandatorily required to be supplied

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within 30 days. However, instead of complying with the said mandate, the Petitioners deliberately withheld the information on untenable grounds i.e. pendency of an internal enquiry and audit objections. He submits that internal administrative issues cannot override the statutory obligations cast upon the authority under the Act of 2005. Ultimately, Respondent No.5 preferred a First Appeal on 7.3.2020. The First Appellate Authority, by order dated 20.5.2020, directed the Petitioners to furnish the information within 15 days free of cost. Even thereafter, the Petitioners did not comply with the order within the specified time-frame. The information was eventually supplied only on 9.7.2021, after a delay of about one year, which is per se unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of the statutory framework. He submits that the contention raised by the Petitioners that the order dated 20.5.2020 was not served is devoid of merit. Even assuming that the said order was not served upon the Petitioners, the Petitioners were already under a statutory obligation, independent of any appellate direction, to furnish the information within 30 days of the original application. He further submits that the plea raised by the petitioners that Respondent No.5 is a ‘chronic litigant’ is wholly irrelevant and extraneous. He further submits that the right to seek information is a statutory right and its enforcement cannot be diluted on such grounds. He submits that the imposition of penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005 is fully justified. He also submits that the Petitioners’ reliance on COVID-19 pandemic as a defence for the delay is entirely

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misplaced and factually unsustainable, as the delay commenced prior to the onset of the pandemic. Learned counsel for Respondent No.5 lastly submit the penalty imposed is not only justified but is, in fact, lenient, considering the prolonged delay. The Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any ‘reasonable cause’ as required under Section 20 of the Act of 2005. Hence, learned counsel for Respondent No.5 prays for dismissal of this petition.

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Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned counsel for the State submits that the main dispute lies between the Petitioners and the private respondent i.e. Respondent No.5. He submits that no specific allegations have been levelled nor any relief sought against the State-respondents. Furthermore, no order passed by the Staterespondents is under challenge in the present petition.

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I have learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents annexed with the petition carefully.

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Admittedly, the Petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 26.8.2021 passed by Respondent No.2 in Second Appeal No.A/3994/2020, whereby a cost of Rs.25,000/- was imposed upon Petitioner No.2 under Section 20 of the Act, 2005 on the ground that she, being the Public Information Officer, failed to furnish the information sought by Respondent No.5 (the information seeker). It is manifest that the Petitioner could not furnish the said information within the statutory period resulting in a delay of about one year.

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For a proper adjudication of the controversy, it would be

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appropriate to reproduce Section 20 of the Act of 2005, which is extracted as under :

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20. Penalties.—(1) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or,obstructed in any manner in furnishing the information, it shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till application is received or information is furnished, so however, the total amount of such penalty shall not exceed twenty-five thousand rupees:

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Provided that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any penalty is imposed on him:

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Provided further that the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently shall be on the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be.

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(2) Where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has, without any reasonable cause and persistently, failed to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time specified under sub-section (1) of section 7 or malafidely denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in fumishing the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against the Central Public

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Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the service rules applicable to him.

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A plain reading of Section 20 of the Act of 2005 would show that for imposition of a penalty, the conditions prescribed therein must be strictly followed. Any imposition of penalty in departure from these statutory requirements is legally unsustainable. Before imposing a penalty, providing a reasonable opportunity of of being heard is a sine qua non , which has not been afforded in the present case. Since the imposition of penalty entails penal consequences, a reasonable opportunity of hearing ought to be afforded and the failure to accord such opportunity to the Petitioners, is violative of the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act of 2005. Further, there is nothing on record to show any deliberate inaction on the part of the Public Information Officer i.e. Petitioner No.2. On the contrary, the record reflects that as soon as the Petitioner became aware of the order directing disclosure of information, the same was duly supplied to Respondent No.5. As such, the grievance of the information seeker has been redressed.

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In the matter of State of Manohar (Supra) , the Supreme Court has held the following in para 16, 21, 22 & 23 :

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16. The State Information Commission has been vested with wide powers including imposition of penalty or taking of disciplinary action against the employees. Exercise of such power is bound to adversely affect or bring civil consequences to the delinquent. Thus, the provisions relating to penalty or to penal consequences have to be

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construed strictly. It will not be open to the Court to give them such liberal construction that it would be beyond the specific language of the statute or would be in violation of the principles of natural justice.

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21.Referring to the requirement of adherence to principles of natural justice in adjudicatory process, this Court in Namit Sharma v. Union of India [(2013) 1 SCC 745 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 786 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 244 : (2012) 8 Scale 593] held as under: (SCC p. 799, para 99)

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“99.It is not only appropriate but is a solemn duty of every adjudicatory body, including the tribunals, to state the reasons in support of its decisions. Reasoning is the soul of a judgment and embodies one of the three pillars on which the very foundation of natural justice jurisprudence rests. It is informative to the claimant of the basis for rejection of his claim, as well as provides the grounds for challenging the order before the higher authority/constitutional court. The reasons, therefore, enable the authorities, before whom an order is challenged, to test the veracity and correctness of the impugned order. In the present times, since the fine line of distinction between the functioning of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies is gradually becoming faint, even the administrative bodies are required to pass reasoned orders. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 981] and CCT v. Shukla & Bros. [(2010) 4 SCC 785 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 725 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1201 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 133] ”

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22. We may notice that proviso to Section 20(1) specifically contemplates that before imposing the penalty contemplated under Section 20(1), the Commission shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the officer concerned. However, there is no such specific provision in relation to the matters covered under Section 20(2). Section 20(2) empowers the Central or the State Information Commission, as the case

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may be, at the time of deciding a complaint or appeal for the reasons stated in that section, to recommend for disciplinary action to be taken against the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be, under the relevant service rules. Power to recommend disciplinary action is a power exercise of which may impose penal consequences. When such a recommendation is received, the disciplinary authority would conduct the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law and subject to satisfaction of the requirements of law. It is a “recommendation” and not a “mandate” to conduct an enquiry. “Recommendation” must be seen in contradistinction to “direction” or “mandate”. But recommendation itself vests the delinquent Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer with consequences which are of serious nature and can ultimately produce prejudicial results including misconduct within the relevant service rules and invite minor and/or major penalty.

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23. Thus, the principles of natural justice have to be read into the provisions of Section 20(2). It is a settled canon of civil jurisprudence including service jurisprudence that no person be condemned unheard. Directing disciplinary action is an order in the form of recommendation which has far reaching civil consequences. It will not be permissible to take the view that compliance with principles of natural justice is not a condition precedent to passing of a recommendation under Section 20(2).

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Reverting to the facts of the present case, it would be pertinent to emphasize that during the period in question, the entire world was grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic situation and the same was a plausible reason for the delay in furnishing the information sought by Respondent No.5. The subject RTI application was filed on 24.1.2020 and barely two months thereafter, in March

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2020, the global pandemic emerged. Thus, the delay occurred on account of these extraordinary circumstances and it cannot be said to be unjustifiable or deliberate. Since the delay was occasioned by the factors entirely beyond the control of the Petitioners, it does not warrant imposition of penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005.

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For the foregoing reasons, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned order dated 26.8.2021 (Annexure P/9) imposing penalty on Petitioner No.2 is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be and is hereby quashed.

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Accordingly, the Petition is allowed.

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Sd/-

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(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

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Judge

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Shyna Ajay

D.P. Vipra College v. State of Chhattisgarh

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D.P. Vipra College v. State of Chhattisgarh

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