Laxmikant Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Panchayat & Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)

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2 - Director Directorate of Panchayat, Second Floor, Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)

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3 - Commissioner Durg Division, District Durg (C.G.)

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4 - Collector Balod, District Balod (C.G.)

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5 - Chief Executive Officer Zila Panchayat Balod, District Balod (C.G.)

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6 - Deputy Director Panchayat Balod, District Balod (C.G.)

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7 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Gunderdehi, District Balod (C.G.) (As Per Honble Court Order Dated 17-10-2025)

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... Respondents

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner	: Ms. Priyanka Rai, Advocate
For State/Respondents	: Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Panel Lawyer
No.1 to 4 and 6
For Respondents No.5 and 7	: Mr. Baldau Prasad Banjare, Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

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Order on Board

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06.04.2026

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1. By filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner assails the impugned order of dismissal dated 13.07.2023 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent No.3/Commissioner, Durg Division, whereby the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Grade-III, which was earlier made vide order dated 19.11.2019, has been cancelled. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :-

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“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside the impugned order dated 13-07-2023 (Annexure P-1).

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10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, as it may deem-fit and appropriate. ”

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2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, a resident of the State of Chhattisgarh, is duly qualified, possessing a postgraduate degree along with a Postgraduate Diploma in Computer Application, and has also cleared the Certificate in Hindi Shorthand. It is the case of the petitioner that he had been working as a daily wager for the last about 15 years in Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi, on the post of Data Entry Operator. Upon a vacancy arising on the post of Assistant Grade-III, the petitioner submitted an application dated 29.07.2019 before the President, Janpad

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Panchayat, seeking appointment on the said post (Annexure P-2). The said application was placed before the General Administration Standing Committee in its meeting scheduled on 07.08.2019, wherein, after due consideration of the petitioner’s candidature along with two other candidates, the petitioner was found most suitable and a unanimous resolution was passed recommending his appointment (Annexure P-4).

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3. Thereafter, the resolution of the General Administration Committee was placed before the General Body of Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi, which approved the same after due deliberation (Annexure P-5). On the basis of the said resolutions, the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi, forwarded the proposal to the Collector, District Balod, vide communication dated 17.09.2019 (Annexure P-6). It is submitted that the Collector, Balod, as well as the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Balod, accorded their approval for appointment of the petitioner, as is evident from the relevant note sheets and proceedings (Annexure P-7).

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4. Pursuant to the aforesaid approvals, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Assistant Grade-III vide order dated 19.11.2019 (Annexure P-8), and he joined his duties and continued to discharge the same with utmost sincerity and dedication. Subsequently, a complaint was made before the Commissioner regarding the petitioner’s appointment, which was forwarded to the

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Collector, Balod, and thereafter to the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Balod, vide letter dated 17.01.2023 (Annexure P-9). Upon inquiry, the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Balod, submitted a detailed report dated 23.01.2023, concluding that the petitioner’s appointment was made after due scrutiny, following the prescribed procedure, and with the approval of the competent authorities (Annexure P-10).

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5. However, despite the aforesaid position, the petitioner was taken by complete surprise upon issuance of the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 (Annexure P-1) by respondent No.3, whereby the petitioner’s appointment dated 19.11.2019 has been cancelled. The petitioner contends that the said action has been taken in an arbitrary and illegal manner, without affording any opportunity of hearing and in violation of the principles of natural justice, thereby necessitating filing of the present writ petition.

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6. Ms. Priyanka Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 (Annexure P-1) is wholly arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law, and therefore, deserves to be quashed. She contends that the said order has been passed in a mechanical manner without conducting any enquiry whatsoever and without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner, thereby being in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that the

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Commissioner, Durg Division, has acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him while passing the impugned order.

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7. Learned counsel further submits that the Commissioner is neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority in respect of the petitioner, and thus, had no authority to cancel the appointment of the petitioner. It is argued that the petitioner’s appointment was made strictly in accordance with law, particularly in terms of Rule 7(4) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Recruitment and General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1999 (for short, ‘Rules of 1999’), after due consideration and approval by the competent authorities.

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8. She would further submit that the appointment of the petitioner was made pursuant to resolutions passed by the General Administration Committee, the General Body, and the competent authorities of Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi, and thereafter, approval was duly accorded by the District Magistrate. Despite the same, the impugned order has been passed after a lapse of more than four years, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without properly appreciating the relevant records, which renders the action arbitrary and unjustified.

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9. It is also contended that earlier complaints made in respect of the petitioner’s appointment were duly inquired into, and upon directions issued by the Director, Panchayat, vide letter dated 03.03.2020 (Annexure P-11), the competent authority had clarified,

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vide communication dated 05.03.2020 (Annexure P-12), that the appointment of the petitioner was made after due compliance with the applicable Rules of 1999. However, the impugned order has been passed in complete disregard of the said communications.

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10. Lastly, learned counsel submits that the services of the petitioner were subsequently regularized after successful completion of probation, vide order dated 03.02.2023, pursuant to a resolution of the General Body of Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi. Despite this material development, the Commissioner has passed the impugned order behind the back of the petitioner, overlooking vital aspects of the matter, which further vitiates the impugned action.

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11. Per contra, Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondents No.1 to 4 and 6, opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that all the adverse allegations levelled against the answering respondents are emphatically denied. He submits that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived, devoid of merit and substance, and the petitioner has failed to demonstrate existence of any legal right, infringement whereof would warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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12. Learned State counsel would submit that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 has been passed after due consideration of the material available on record and upon receipt of a complaint dated

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26.12.2022 regarding the irregular appointment of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Grade-III in Janpad Panchayat, Gunderdehi. It is contended that pursuant to the said complaint, the Divisional Commissioner sought a report from the Collector, District Balod, and thereafter, the relevant records were examined, which revealed that the appointment of the petitioner was made in contravention of the prescribed procedure and the statutory provisions governing recruitment.

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13. He further submits that as per the provisions of the Rules of 1999, particularly Rules 7, 12 and 14, the recruitment to the post in question is required to be made through a prescribed process involving proper advertisement, constitution of a selection committee, and adoption of a fair selection procedure. However, in the present case, the appointment of the petitioner was made without following the due procedure, merely on the basis of resolutions, without there being any transparency or adherence to statutory requirements, thereby vitiating the entire selection process.

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14. Learned counsel for the State also submits that the Divisional Commissioner, Durg Division, is competent and duly empowered to pass the impugned order in view of the notification dated 04.08.2008 issued by the State Government, whereby the Commissioners have been authorized to exercise disciplinary powers, as well as the order dated 17.04.2014 declaring the

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Commissioner as Head of the Department. It is thus contended that the impugned order has been passed well within the jurisdiction and authority vested in the said officer.

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15. It is further submitted that the impugned order is a well-reasoned and speaking order, passed after due application of mind and consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter, including the records and applicable rules. According to the learned State counsel, the appointment of the petitioner was made only to accommodate him, dehors the rules, and therefore, the same has rightly been cancelled. He would thus contend that there is no violation of principles of natural justice or any illegality in the action of the respondents. On the aforesaid grounds, learned State counsel prays that the writ petition, being devoid of any merit, deserves to be dismissed.

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16. Mr. Baldau Prasad Banjare, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.5 and 7, supported the stand taken by the State and submits that all the allegations levelled by the petitioner against the answering respondents are wholly baseless and are emphatically denied. He submits that the present writ petition is devoid of any merit and has been filed without there being any enforceable legal right in favour of the petitioner, and therefore, the same deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.

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17. Learned counsel would submit that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 has been passed by the Divisional Commissioner,

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Durg Division, after due consideration of the complaint dated 26.12.2022 and the material available on record. Pursuant to the said complaint, a report was sought from the Collector, District Balod, and upon examination of the records, it was found that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Assistant Grade-III was not made in accordance with the prescribed statutory provisions and procedure. He further submits that as per the Rules, of 1999, the recruitment is required to be undertaken through a transparent process, including issuance of public advertisement, constitution of a proper selection committee and adherence to due procedure. However, in the present case, the appointment of the petitioner was made merely on the basis of resolutions passed by the committees of the Janpad Panchayat, without following the mandatory provisions of law, thereby vitiating the entire selection process.

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18. Learned counsel also submits that the Divisional Commissioner is duly empowered to pass the impugned order in view of the notification dated 04.08.2008 as well as the order dated 17.04.2014, whereby the Commissioner has been conferred with the powers of Head of the Department and is competent to take appropriate action in such matters. It is contended that the impugned order is a well-reasoned and speaking order passed strictly in accordance with law and within the jurisdiction of the authority concerned. As such, prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

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19. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length and have also perused the pleadings and documents placed on record with utmost circumspection.

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20. From the record, it appears that a co-ordinate Bench of this Court had passed an interim order in favour of the petitioner vide order dated 24.07.2023, to the effect that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, this Court, as an interim measure, directed that the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing.

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21. From a bare perusal of the record and the statutory framework governing the field, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent authorities have acted in clear deviation of the procedure envisaged under Rules 5 and 7 of the Rules of 1999. The petitioner, who was duly appointed on the post of Assistant Grade-III vide order dated 19.11.2019 and thereafter confirmed in service on 03.02.2023 upon successful completion of probation, has been visited with the drastic consequence of cancellation of appointment after a lapse of about four years. Such action, in effect, amounts to removal from service, which is undeniably a major penalty having serious civil consequences. It is trite law that any such action must be preceded by adherence to the principles of natural justice, including issuance of a show cause notice, holding of a proper enquiry and affording reasonable opportunity

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of hearing to the affected employee. Admittedly, no such procedure has been followed in the present case and the impugned order has been passed behind the back of the petitioner.

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22. Very recently, in State of Punjab and others v. Ex. C. Satpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848 , while considering the scope of disciplinary action and the requirement of adherence to principles of natural justice in service jurisprudence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has comprehensively examined the issue as to whether and in what manner the past conduct of an employee can be taken into consideration while imposing punishment by observing as under :-

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“19. This Court, in K. Manche Gowda’s case (supra), has held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to disclose that his past record will also be taken into consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the past conduct of the respondent while passing the dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence

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and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice to the respondent and had observed that despite the receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not submit his reply, which shows that the respondent accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his absence for 224 days and for which he was punished accordingly.

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20. To properly understand the controversy in the light of question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra), dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an employee in a similar situation, as follows: -

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“7. It is true that the last sentence suggests that the past record of Bose has also been taken into consideration. But it does not follow from this that that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion that Bose's services must be terminated in the interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give additional weight to the decision already arrived at. Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was not competent to go behind the finding of the Managing Director and consider for itself

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the evidence adduced before him. The order of the Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and directing his reinstatement is, therefore, set aside as being contrary to law.”

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21. In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sai Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: -

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“6. ... Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the

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department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works.”

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22. Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was dismissed from service on account of misconduct having been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working hours

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and had also been earlier imposed with minor punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as under: -

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“32. ... In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.”

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23. Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. vs. Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was employed as police constable was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court had held that: -

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“5. ....In our opinion there can be no hardand-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often [necessary] only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority.”

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24. This Court in Bishamber Das Dogra’s case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda’s case

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(supra) held as under: -

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“24. In State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda, this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject-matter of the charge at the first instance.

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30. In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require. [Emphasis Supplied]

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31. It is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline [vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226, para 6).]

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32. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

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33. Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the showcause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the line for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned.

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34. The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt had ever been made at any stage by the respondent employee to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him by nonfurnishing of the enquiry report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the respondent employee had never denied at any stage that

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he had not been punished three times before initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause notice in the instant case. No explanation could be furnished by the respondent employee as under what circumstances he has not even considered it proper to submit the application for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the statutory appellate authority giving cogent reasons.

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35. The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…”

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25. As observed, in the present case, the absence of the respondent from the duty on various occasions in a short tenure of service of around 7 years, is a gross indiscipline on the part of the respondent and therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order passed by the disciplinary authority whereby the services of the respondent have been dismissed.

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26. The facts of Mohd. Yunus Khan’s case

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(supra), upon which the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance, is based on different facts and therefore, is of no help to the respondent. In that case, the Administrative Tribunal, examining the punishment order, had concluded that the absence of the delinquent for a short period was bona fide and legally permissible, but on account of his subsequent misconduct and disobedience, held that the dismissal orderwas justified. In that situation, this Court had held that the Tribunal, before taking into consideration the past conduct of the delinquent, must give notice to the delinquent. In such circumstances, the facts of the case of Mohd. Yunus Khan’s case (supra) are distinguishable from the case of the respondent.

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33. In the facts of the present case, it is clear that the respondent was dealt by the department earlier on three occasions having remained absent from duty and the penalties were inflicted for the same. It is the fourth time when he remained absent to which, a chargesheet was issued and his guilt was found proved. He himself had not cross-examined the departmental witnesses and also had not produced any witness in his defense. Considering all these aspects and having found proved his misconduct, notice to show cause from dismissal was

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issued to the respondent. The disciplinary authority, while imposing the penalty, had merely referred the past conduct and also given weight to the gravest act of misconduct. The order of dismissal is not based on the charge of “cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service”. Therefore, mere reference of the past conduct would not amount to constitute dismissal of the respondent based on the second limb of Rule 16.2(1). In our view, the High Court was not justified to apply the principle of K. Manche Gowda (supra) while setting aside the judgment passed by the two Courts. As such, it is concluded that the dismissal of the respondent was based on gravest act of misconduct, for which he was dealt with by the disciplinary authority following the procedure as prescribed and in due observance of principles of natural justice, hence, we do not find any fault in the same. Accordingly, the present appeal stands allowed setting aside the judgment of the High Court. In consequence, suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff stands dismissed. In the facts, parties to bear their own costs. ”

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23. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is quite vivid that the impugned order has been passed not only in violation of the statutory provisions governing the field, but also in utter disregard of the settled legal principles governing service jurisprudence as

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enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the present case, the respondents have sought to justify their action on the basis of a complaint; however, even in such circumstances, the minimum requirement of affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner could not have been dispensed with.

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24. It is an admitted position that no show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, nor was any departmental enquiry conducted prior to passing of the impugned order. The petitioner has been visited with serious civil consequences, namely, cancellation of appointment after more than four years of service and subsequent regularization, without being afforded any opportunity to defend himself. Such an action strikes at the very root of the principles of natural justice.

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25. Furthermore, the petitioner had continued in service for a considerable period and had even been regularized, thereby creating a legitimate expectation in his favour that his service would not be disturbed except in accordance with law. The abrupt cancellation of his appointment, that too behind his back, is arbitrary, unjust and unsustainable in the eyes of law.

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26. Thus, in light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ex. C. Satpal Singh (supra) and the facts obtaining in the present case, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned action of the respondents cannot be sustained and is liable to be interfered with.

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27. It is also pertinent to note that a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, vide interim order dated 24.07.2023, had stayed the effect and operation of the impugned order, and pursuant thereto, the petitioner has continued in service. The said interim protection has remained operative and there is nothing on record to indicate any misconduct or disqualification attributable to the petitioner during this period.

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28. In view of the foregoing discussion, as well as the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned order dated 13.07.2023 (Annexure P-1) is arbitrary, illegal, and violative of the principles of natural justice and, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed.

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29. Consequently, the petitioner shall be entitled for reinstatement and to continue on the post of Assistant Grade-III with all consequential benefits. However, it is made clear that the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law, if so advised, but only after strictly adhering to the prescribed procedure, including issuance of show cause notice, conducting a proper enquiry and affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

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30. The interim order dated 24.07.2023 stands merged into the present final order.

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31. The writ petition is accordingly allowed . There shall be no order

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as to costs.

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Sd/-

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(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

Yogesh

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Head-Note

Cancellation of an employee’s appointment after a substantial period of service and subsequent regularization, without issuing show cause notice or holding enquiry, is illegal and unsustainable being violative of principles of natural justice, irrespective of alleged irregularity in initial appointment.

Laxmikant Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Laxmikant Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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