M/S. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010259982026

2026:CGHC:30145-DB

NAFR

Digitally signed by ALOK ALOK SHARMA SHARMA Date:2026.07.21 16:40:18 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 3540 of 2026

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1 - M/s. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. A Company Registered Under Companies Act, 1956, Having Its Office At Simplex House 27, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata, (W. B.) 700017 Through Its Authorised Representative Shri Kaustab Chakraborty, S/o. Narayan Chandra Chaudhri, Aged About 59 Years, R/o. 188/50, Prince Anwar Saha Road, Near Syndicate Road, Lake Gardens, Kolkata (W. B.) - 700045.

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Housing And Environment, Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) – 492002.

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2 - Nava Raipur Atal Nagar Vikas Pradhikaran Through Its Chief Executive Officer, Paryavas Bhawan, North Block,sector 19 Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Chhattisgarh – 492002

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3 - Chief Engineer, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar Vikas Pradhikaran, Paryavas Bhawan, North Block, Sector 19, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Chhattisgarh - 492002.

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Petitioner(s) :	Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Abhinav Kardekar, Advocate.
For State/Respondent :	Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate
No. 1	General.
For Respondent No. 2 :	Mr. Amrito Das, Senior Advocate and Mr.
and 3.	Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 16/07/2026

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1 . Heard Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate, along with Mr. Abhinav Kardekar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/Respondent No. 1, Mr. Amrito Das, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 2 and 3.

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The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the following prayers:-

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“10.1 To kindly be pleased to quash the Tender Cancellation order numbered 1645/4(3) Engg. Sec./CE/TC-334/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 30.06.2026 (ANNEXURE P/1) issued by Respondent No. 3, whereby the Respondent No. 3 has cancelled the Tender No. 01/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 23.04.2026;

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10.2 To kindly be pleased to quash/set aside the issuance of the (Request for Proposal) RFP No. 26/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 01.07.2026 (ANNEXURE P/2) issued by Respondent No. 2;

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10.3 To direct the Respondent authorities to continue with the Tender process initiated under the RFP No. 01/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 23.04.2026 and issue Notice of Award to the qualifying/succesful bidder in accordance with Clause 3.29.5 of the Instruction to Bidders under RFP No. 01/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 23.04.2026 issued by Respondent No. 2;”

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The subject matter, in brief, is that the petitioner is a company engaged

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in the business of construction and infrastructure development for over nine decades. Respondent No. 2 issued Request for Proposal (RFP) No.

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01/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 23.04.2026 for selection of a developer for development of infrastructure under the Town Development Scheme (Layer-II) of Nava Raipur Atal Nagar in lieu of development rights over saleable land. As per the terms of the RFP, the successful bidder was to be selected on the basis of the least net saleable land quoted, subject to a maximum limit of 200 acres. The petitioner submitted its bid on 11.06.2026 along with the prescribed bid security of Rs. 8 crores and quoted 136.63 acres of saleable land, which was substantially lower than the maximum permissible limit. Upon opening of the technical and financial bids, the petitioner emerged as the L-1 (lowest) bidder amongst all participating bidders. According to the petitioner, having fulfilled all the eligibility criteria and conditions of the RFP, it had a legitimate expectation of issuance of the Notice of Award in terms of Clauses 3.29.1 and 3.29.5 of the RFP and had accordingly made necessary financial and logistical arrangements for execution of the project.

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However, instead of issuing the Notice of Award, Respondent No. 3 issued the impugned Office Order dated 30.06.2026 cancelling the entire tender process without assigning any reason. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 issued a fresh RFP dated 01.07.2026 for the very same project on substantially identical terms. The petitioner contends that the cancellation of the tender after opening of the financial bids is arbitrary, contrary to the terms and conditions of the RFP, and beyond the powers reserved under the tender conditions. It is further contended that with the opening of the financial bids, the petitioner's commercial bid, business strategy, and proprietary information regarding the identification of saleable land parcels had already become known to the competing bidders, thereby depriving the petitioner of its

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competitive advantage and causing serious financial and commercial prejudice. Aggrieved by the arbitrary cancellation of the tender and the consequential initiation of the re-tender process without any valid or disclosed reason, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the Office Order dated 30.06.2026 as well as the subsequent re-tender notification dated 01.07.2026 and seeking appropriate consequential reliefs.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a technically qualified and eligible bidder, who participated in the tender process pursuant to RFP No. 01/TPS/EEC5/CE/NRANVP/2026-27 dated 23.04.2026 after depositing the requisite bid security of Rs. 8 crores and quoting 136.63 acres of saleable land, which was the lowest amongst all participating bidders. It is submitted that upon opening of the financial bids on 25.06.2026, the petitioner emerged as the L-1 bidder and, in terms of Clauses 3.29.1 and 3.29.5 of the RFP, became entitled to issuance of the Notice of Award. However, contrary to the express terms of the RFP, Respondent No. 3 arbitrarily cancelled the tender process by Office Order dated 30.06.2026 without assigning any reason whatsoever and, immediately thereafter, issued a fresh RFP dated 01.07.2026 for the very same work on substantially identical terms and conditions. It is contended that the cancellation order is wholly arbitrary, non-speaking, violative of the tender conditions and Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and therefore deserves to be quashed.

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Learned counsel would further submit that once the financial bids had been opened and the petitioner had been declared the lowest bidder, the bidding process stood concluded and a valuable and legitimate right accrued in favour of the petitioner. It is argued that the power to cancel the tender

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could not have been exercised after completion of the bidding process in the absence of any allegation of fraud, collusion or overriding public interest. It is further submitted that the arbitrary cancellation has caused grave prejudice to the petitioner, inasmuch as its commercial bid, proprietary business strategy, and identification of valuable land parcels, prepared after extensive market research, have become available to competing bidders, thereby depriving the petitioner of its competitive advantage in the subsequent re-tender. According to the learned counsel, the action of the respondents is actuated by mala fides and has resulted in serious financial and commercial loss to the petitioner.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would also contend that the action of the respondents is contrary to the settled principles governing public procurement. It is submitted that the sanctity of a concluded tender process cannot be defeated by arbitrary executive action and that the respondents are bound to act fairly, transparently and in accordance with the terms and conditions governing the tender process. It is further contended that the petitioner had acquired a legitimate expectation that the tender process would be carried to its logical conclusion in accordance with law, and that the respondents could not have cancelled the tender process and initiated a fresh tender without any valid, cogent or justifiable reason. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned Office Order dated 30.06.2026 cancelling the tender, as well as the consequential fresh RFP dated 01.07.2026, be quashed and appropriate directions be issued to the respondents to proceed with the original tender process in accordance with law.

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Learned State counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 would submit that the decision to cancel the tender process falls within the domain of the

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tendering authority and is an administrative decision taken in exercise of the powers reserved under the terms and conditions of the RFP. It is contended that no bidder acquires an indefeasible or vested right merely by emerging as the L-1 bidder, and the tendering authority is competent to cancel the tender process before issuance of the Notice of Award if it considers such action necessary in the interest of fairness, transparency or public interest. It is further submitted that the scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is limited and the Court ought not to interfere unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory or actuated by extraneous considerations. As the impugned decision was taken in exercise of the powers available to the respondents under the tender conditions and in larger public interest, no interference is warranted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

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Learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 would submit that the impugned order dated 30.06.2026 cancelling the tender process is a bona fide administrative decision taken on the unanimous recommendation of the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) and not an arbitrary or unilateral exercise of power. It is submitted that due to the configuration of the e- procurement portal, the technical bids and financial bids of all participating bidders were opened simultaneously before any technical evaluation could be undertaken, which was contrary to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the RFP requiring technical evaluation to precede the opening of financial bids. In view of the compromise of the prescribed bidding process and confidentiality of the bid parameter proposals, the TEC recommended cancellation of the entire tender process and issuance of a fresh RFP so as to preserve fairness, transparency and equal treatment amongst all bidders. The

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decision was uniformly applied to all seven participating bidders without conferring any advantage upon any particular bidder and was taken strictly in exercise of the powers reserved under the terms and conditions of the RFP, which expressly empowered the authority to suspend or cancel the bidding process at any stage without incurring any liability.

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Learned counsel would further submit that the petitioner did not acquire any vested or enforceable right merely by emerging as the lowest bidder, as no technical evaluation had been completed, no bidder had been declared technically qualified, and no Letter of Award or work order had been issued. It is contended that the fresh tender has already been issued, in which the petitioner is equally eligible to participate, and therefore no legal prejudice has been caused. It is further submitted that the scope of judicial review in contractual and tender matters is extremely limited and the Court ought not to interfere with a bona fide administrative decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or intended to favour a particular party. In the present case, the cancellation was necessitated to maintain the sanctity of the tender process, ensure procedural fairness and transparency, and protect the larger public interest. The respondents have acted fairly, uniformly and in accordance with the terms of the RFP, and, therefore, the writ petition being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the material available on record.

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The main question that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the decision of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to cancel the tender process after opening of the technical and financial bids and to issue a fresh Request for Proposal for the same work warrants interference in

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exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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It is well settled that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to award of contracts and public tenders is extremely limited. The Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the decision of the tendering authority and is only required to examine whether the decision-making process suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, irrationality, favouritism or is in violation of any statutory or constitutional provision. Unless the action of the authority is shown to be actuated by mala fides or is so arbitrary that no reasonable authority could have arrived at such a decision, the Court would ordinarily refrain from interfering in contractual matters.

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In the present case, the material placed on record reveals that the impugned decision to cancel the tender process was not taken unilaterally by the respondents but was preceded by the recommendation of the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). The proceedings of the Committee disclose that owing to the configuration of the e-procurement portal, both the technical bids and the financial bids of all participating bidders were opened simultaneously before any technical evaluation could be undertaken. Such simultaneous opening of bids was contrary to the procedure contemplated under the RFP, which envisaged technical evaluation in the first stage and opening of financial bids only of technically qualified bidders thereafter. Once the confidentiality of the bid parameter proposals stood compromised before completion of technical scrutiny, the entire tender process lost its sanctity and fairness.

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It is relevant to notice here the observations of the Technical Evaluation Committee dated 30.06.2026, which read as under:-

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Observations of the Committee:-

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“1. वि�षयां��वि�तवि�वि�दा�में� Single Stage- Two step process अप��यां�गईथी�।इस�� अ��स�रप्रथीमेंचरणमें� वि�वि�दा��र�द्वा�र�प्रस्त�तत��दास्त��जों��! Open �र त��में"ल्यां� � �वि�यां�जों��र RFP ��शत% ए��प्र��धा�� अ��स�रप�त्रवि�वि�दा��र��! स"च�बद्ध�र��वि�यांतथी�। इस��उपर��तत��रूपस�प�त्रवि�वि�दा��र��वि�त्ती�यां प्रस्त��खो!ले�जों��थी�।

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परन्त�उक्तवि�वि�दा�में�जोंबत��प्रस्त��खो!ले�गयां�तब यांहस�ज्ञा��में�आयां�वि�, वि�वि�दा��र��द्वा�र� Envelope- A में� त��दास्त��जोंयांथी�- विबडप्र!स�सिंस7गफी�स, ईएमेंड�, प��र ऑफीअटॉ;�<, त��दाक्षत�तथी�वि�त्ती�यांदाक्षत�स�स�ब�धिधात दास्त��जोंआदिदाअपले!डवि�यां�गयां�थी�तथी� Envelope-B में� वि�त्ती�यांप्रस्त�� (वि�वि�दा�) अपले!डवि�यां�गयां�।

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प्रचलिलेत eproc.cgstate.gov.in �� System Configuration ��अ��स�र Envelope- A तथी� EnvelopeB ए�स�थीखो�लेत�हA, जिजोंस�� परिरण�मेंस्�रूपवि�षयां��वि�त वि�वि�दा�में�सभी�वि�वि�दा��र��त��प्रस्त��स�थी-स�थी वि�त्ती�यांप्रस्त��भी�प्रदार् श ि7तह! गयां�।

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उल्ले�खो��यांहF वि� RFP ��विड�� 1.2.1 ��अ��स�र, "All Bidders shall submit their Technical Proposal and Bid Parameter Proposal against this RFP in a single stage. The first step of the process involves qualification on the basis of the Technical Proposal submitted by the Bidders in accordance with the provisions of RFP. At the end of the first step, the Authority shall shortlist qualified Bidders. In the second step of the process, Bid Parameter Proposal of only these shortlisted qualified Bidders shall be opened and evaluated for identification of the Successful Bidder" ��प्र��धा�� हF।अतG RFP में�वि�विहतक्रधिमें�में"ल्यां� � ��प्रविक्रयां� RFP में� उल्ले�खिखोतप्र��धा��स�भिभीन्नह! गई।जिजोंस��रणइसवि�वि�दा�में� वि�ष्पक्षत�ए��प�रदार् श ि7त��स�थीत��में"ल्यां� � �वि�यां� जों��स�भी��हM रह�।

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परिरण�मेंस्�रूप RFP ��विड�� 6.2 "The Authority, in its sole discretion and without incurring any obligation or liability, reserves the right, at any time, to;

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(a) Suspend and/ or cancel the Bidding Process and/ or amend and/ or supplement the Bidding Process or modify the dates or other terms and conditions relating thereto;" �� अ��स�रइसवि�वि�दा�प्रविक्रयां��! वि�रस्त�र��वि�णNयांलिलेयां�

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जों��प्रस्त�वि�तवि�यां�जों�त�हF।

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:सम�ति �कि ी�अनु�शं�स�

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वि�षयां��वि�तवि�वि�दा��त��में"ल्यां� � �सधिमेंवितद्वा�र��हM वि�यां�जों�रह�हF।

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उपर!क्ततथ्यां�ए�� RFP में�वि�विहतप्र��धा��परिरप�क्ष्यांमें� वि�षयां��वि�तवि�वि�दा��! वि�रस्त�रत�हुएप � G ��वि�वि�दा� आमें�वित्रतवि�यां�जों��प्रस्त�वि�तहF।

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आमें�वित्रतवि�यां�जों��ले��वि�वि�दा�में�वि�त्ती�यांप्रस्त�� अपले!ड�र��प्रविक्रयां��! औरभी�स�स्पष्टतर��स� RFP में� उल्ले�खिखोतवि�यां�जों�यां�।"

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The contention of the petitioner that having emerged as the L-1 bidder, it acquired an indefeasible or vested right to issuance of the Notice of Award cannot be accepted. Merely because a bidder has quoted the lowest financial bid does not, by itself, confer an enforceable right to award of the contract. In the present case, admittedly no technical evaluation had been completed, no bidder had been declared technically qualified and no Letter of Award or work order had been issued in favour of the petitioner. Therefore, no concluded contract had come into existence nor had any vested right accrued in favour of the petitioner so as to compel the respondents to proceed with the original tender process.

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The submission of the petitioner that the respondents lacked the authority to cancel the tender after opening of the financial bids also deserves rejection. The terms and conditions of the RFP expressly reserve power in favour of the tendering authority to suspend or cancel the bidding process. The decision to exercise such power has been shown to be based upon the recommendation of the Technical Evaluation Committee, which found that the prescribed tender procedure had been materially compromised. In such circumstances, the decision to cancel the tender cannot be termed arbitrary or irrational merely because it was taken after opening of the financial bids.

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The contention regarding disclosure of the petitioner's commercial strategy and proprietary information also does not persuade this Court to interfere with the impugned decision. The opening of the financial bids was not confined to the petitioner alone but extended uniformly to all participating bidders due to the system-related anomaly. The cancellation of the tender process was equally applicable to all bidders, and no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that any particular bidder has been favoured or that the impugned action was actuated by mala fides or extraneous considerations.

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It is also significant to note that immediately after cancellation of the earlier tender, the respondents issued a fresh Request for Proposal for the same project, thereby ensuring that the implementation of the public project was not unnecessarily delayed. The petitioner continues to remain eligible to participate in the fresh tender process. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondents have acted in a discriminatory manner or have deprived the petitioner of an opportunity to compete.

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This Court, in Ramraja Minerals and Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2026 SCC OnLine Chh 9426, decided on 22.04.2026, while considering the scope of judicial review in contractual/tender matters, held in Para-11 that:-

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“11. However, insofar as the action of cancellation of tender and forfeiture of security deposit is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that the scope of judicial review in contractual matters is limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, has held that interference is warranted only when the decision-making process is arbitrary, mala fide or intended to favour someone. In the present case, the petitioner admittedly did not deposit the additional performance guarantee within the stipulated period, which constituted

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non-compliance of a material condition of the Letter of Acceptance. Though the petitioner sought adjustment against alleged outstanding dues, such request was not accepted by the Respondent authority. In absence of any established mala fides or arbitrariness in the decisionmaking process, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the cancellation of tender and consequential forfeiture.”

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In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Others , (2007) 14 SCC 517, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the tests for judicial interference in tender matters held that:

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“22. (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached;”

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(ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.”

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The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner laying down the principles relating to legitimate expectation and sanctity of public contracts are distinguishable on facts. In the present case, the tender process itself had not culminated into a concluded contract, nor had the petitioner acquired any enforceable contractual right. On the other hand, the respondents have satisfactorily explained the reasons which necessitated cancellation of the tender in order to preserve fairness, transparency and the integrity of the procurement process. Thus, the action of the respondents cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned decision dated 30.06.2026 cancelling the tender

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process and the consequential issuance of fresh RFP dated 01.07.2026 does not suffer from any illegality, irrationality, arbitrariness or procedural impropriety warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has failed to establish any vested legal right or violation of any statutory or constitutional provision so as to justify issuance of a writ in its favour.

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Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed . No order as to costs.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Alok

M/S. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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M/S. Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

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