Bhukhan Singh (Since Deceased) through Ramavtar Vs Kaushilya Bai

¶1

1

¶2

AFR

¶3

Digitally VISHAKHA signed by BEOHAR VISHAKHA BEOHAR

¶4

HIGH Court OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

WPC No. 2928 of 2021

¶6

1 - Bhukhan Singh (Since Deceased) Through Ramavtar S/o Late Bhukhan Singh Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s)

¶7

versus

¶8

1 - Kaushilya Bai D/o Kejau Verma Aged About 50 Years Resident Of Ward No. 8, Kurmipara Bemetara, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 2 - Shanti Bai D/o Kushal Verma Aged About 66 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 3 - Rohit Kumar Verma S/o Kushal Verma Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 4 - Tara Kumari D/o Kushal Verma Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 5 - Meenakumari Ben Verma D/o Kushal Verma Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 6 - Kumari Ben Verma D/o Kushal Verma Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh 7 - Santosh Verma S/o Kushal Verma Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Kewanchhi, P.H. No. 15, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh.,

¶9

2

¶10

District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh

¶11

8 - Sahodra Bai D/o Kushal Verma Aged About 66 Years R/o Bhimpuri, Tehsil And District Bemetara Chhattisgarh., District : Bemetara, Chhattisgarh

¶12

9 - Board Of Revenue Bilaspur, Circuit Court Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

¶13

... Respondents

¶14

(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)

¶15

----------------------------------- For Petitioner :-	------------------------------------------------------------ Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Senior Advocate
	appears along with Ms. Kanchan Kalwani, Advocate appearing on behalf of Mr.
	Kanwaljit Singh Saini, Advocate
For State :-	Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, P.L.
For Respondent No. 1 :- -----------------------------------	Mr. Sanjay Patel, Advocate ------------------------------------------------------------

¶16

SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

¶17

Order On Board

¶18

09.04.2026

¶19

Present petition is directed against the order dated 27.05.2021 i.e. ANNEXURE-P/1, by which, the Board of Revenue has dismissed the revision filed by Late Bhukan Singh (Since Deceased) and affirmed the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Durg Division dated 07.11.2016.

¶20

Following reliefs have been prayed by way of this petition:-

¶21

“10.1. That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records pertaining to case of the petitioner.

¶22

3

¶23

10.2. That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 27.05.2021 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, and Circuit Bench Raipur (C.G.) (Annexure-P/1).

¶24

10.3. That any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

¶25

Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that, initially, respondent No.1, Kaushilya Bai, filed a civil suit for declaration, partition and possession before the Civil Judge Class-II, Bemetara, which was decreed on 23.07.1984 granting her 1/6th share in the suit land, and the said decree was ultimately affirmed by the Hon’ble High Court on 07.09.2011. Thereafter, respondent No.1 initiated partition proceedings under Section 178 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code before the Tehsildar, who, after directing preparation of Fard Batwara and considering the same, passed a final order dated 07.03.2014 directing partition and correction of land records. Aggrieved, the petitioner’s father preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bemetara, raising objections including an alleged compromise between respondent No.1 and other respondents, but the appeal was dismissed on 22.01.2015 affirming the Tehsildar’s order. A further appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Durg Division was also dismissed on 07.11.2016 on the ground of lack of evidence regarding the

¶26

4

¶27

alleged transactions. Subsequently, a revision was filed before the Board of Revenue wherein during pendency certain respondents filed no-objection and respondent No.1 placed reliance on a subsequent judgment and decree dated 28.11.2017 passed by the District Judge, Bemetara granting mesne profits in her favour. Ultimately, by impugned order dated 27.05.2021, the Board of Revenue, allegedly exceeding its jurisdiction, directed the petitioner and other respondents to pay Rs.4,27,500/- as mesne profits, ordered delivery of possession of 1/6th share to respondent No.1, and affirmed the orders of the authorities below, giving rise to the present petition.

¶28

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. It is contended that the respondent No. 9/Board of Revenue has clearly exceeded the scope of its revisional jurisdiction by granting reliefs which were neither prayed for nor permissible in law. It is submitted that the original proceedings arose out of a case under Section 178 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which is confined only to partition of holdings. However, the Board of Revenue, while exercising revisional powers, has travelled beyond the scope of such proceedings by directing grant of mesne profits and further directing payment of a decretal amount of ₹4,27,500/-, which is wholly impermissible. It is contended that revenue authorities do not have the jurisdiction to grant mesne profits or to direct execution or satisfaction of a civil Court decree,

¶29

5

¶30

as such powers vest exclusively with the competent civil Court executing the decree. Learned counsel further submits that while the order of partition passed by the Tehsildar, as affirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and other revenue authorities, may fall within their jurisdiction, the additional directions relating to payment of decretal amount and mesne profits are clearly beyond their authority and render the impugned order unsustainable. It is further submitted that the impugned order is nullity in the eyes of law, having been passed against a dead person, namely Late Bhukan Singh, who expired on 09.11.2019 during the pendency of the revision proceedings, and no steps were taken for substitution of his legal representatives. On this ground alone, the entire proceedings stand vitiated. It is also contended that the Board of Revenue has failed to consider material facts on record, inasmuch as respondent No. 1 had already alienated part of the disputed land bearing Khasra Nos. 225 and 227 in favour of Smt. Kamlarani, and despite a demarcation report clearly indicating possession of the petitioner, the Board has erroneously directed delivery of possession of 1/6th share, thereby rendering the order misconceived. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, as no adequate and effective opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner, particularly in view of the fact that the judgment and decree dated 28.11.2017, relied upon by the Board of Revenue, is itself under challenge in First Appeal

¶31

6

¶32

No. 406/2019, which is pending consideration before the competent Court. It is lastly submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the Board of Revenue is confined to examining the legality, propriety or regularity of the orders passed by subordinate authorities and cannot grant substantive reliefs beyond the scope of the original proceedings or act as an executing Court. However, in the present case, the Board has exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively executing a civil Court decree and granting monetary relief, thereby rendering the impugned order liable to be set aside.

¶33

Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that respondents No. 2 to 7 are the sons and legal heirs of Late Kushal Verma, who were defendants in the original civil suit bearing No. B/1/2017. It is submitted that in the said suit, a decree has been passed by the competent civil Court granting partition to the extent of 1/6th share along with mesne profits quantified at the rate of ₹4,27,500/- per annum. It is further submitted that the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was assailed in appeal; however, the same has been affirmed by the appellate Court and has thus attained finality and is binding upon the parties. Learned counsel submits that in pursuance of the said decree, appropriate proceedings were initiated before the competent revenue authorities. The Tehsildar, upon due consideration, passed an order effecting partition to the extent of 1/6th share in accordance with the decree of the civil Court. It is further submitted that the

¶34

7

¶35

said order was challenged by the petitioner before the SubDivisional Officer, who, after due consideration, affirmed the order of the Tehsildar. Thereafter, the matter was carried before the Additional Commissioner, who also confirmed the order passed by the subordinate authorities. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner, thereafter, preferred a revision before the Board of Revenue, and the Board of Revenue, while affirming the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities regarding partition, has also directed payment of the decretal amount of ₹4,27,500/in pursuance of the decree passed by the competent civil Court. It is contended that the Board of Revenue has merely given effect to the binding decree passed by the civil Court, and no illegality or jurisdictional error has been committed in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court.

¶36

Upon this, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tehsildar does not have the power or authority to pass such an order. It is contended that such an order can only be passed by the competent executing Court. The Board of Revenue, being a revenue authority, also does not have the jurisdiction to pass such an order.

¶37

Learned counsel for the respondent–State also affirms the said position and submits that the impugned order, insofar as it directs payment of the amount, is not maintainable in law. Learned State counsel submits that such a direction could not have been issued

¶38

8

¶39

by the revenue authorities, as they lack the jurisdiction to pass orders relating to execution or recovery of decretal amounts.

¶40

Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present case is limited to the extent of jurisdiction exercised by the Board of Revenue.

¶41

From a perusal of the impugned order dated 27.05.2021 (Annexure P/1), it is evident that the Board of Revenue, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, has exceeded the scope of its authority by directing payment of mesne profits/decretal amount of ₹4,27,500/-. The proceedings before the revenue authorities arose under Section 178 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, which are confined to partition of holdings. The jurisdiction of the revenue authorities, including the Board of Revenue, is thus limited to effecting partition and related ancillary matters.

¶42

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3845, Abdul Rejak Laskar vs. Mafizur Rahman and Others particularly in paragraphs 53 and 54, has categorically held that statutory authorities must operate strictly within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the governing statute, and cannot assume powers which are otherwise vested in civil courts. It has further been reiterated that where a statute confers limited jurisdiction, any order passed beyond such jurisdiction is without

¶43

9

¶44

authority of law and liable to be set aside. The relevant paras are quoted hereinbelow:-

¶45

“53. A reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Musstt. Rukeya Banu v. Musstt. Nazira Banu, AIR 1928 Cal 130, where it was pointed out that a partition, whether perfect or imperfect, of revenuepaying properties must be made by the Revenue authorities. This follows from a conjoint reading of Sections 96 and 154(1)(e) of the Regulation, 1886 respectively. However, the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine the right of the parties to the property in dispute as well as shares to which they are entitled has not been taken away by the Regulation in question, and it is for the civil court to decide whether the property is or is not liable to partition. The same view applies to other clauses of Section 154. The parties to a suit are entitled to obtain a declaration from the civil court that they have got the right to obtain from the revenue authorities a separation and allotment of their shares in the estate according to their proportionate rights. It is the civil court which will decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek partition and to what extent. If it is found by the court that revenue paying properties have to be partitioned among the parties, the court may declare the share of each of the parties and leave them to go to the revenue authorities for making the necessary performance. The relevant observations from the said decision are reproduced hereinbelow:

¶46

“Lastly, the question of jurisdiction under the Assam Land Revenue Regulation may be dealt with. It is quite true that under sec. 154(1)(e) read with sec. 96 of the Act, partition, whether perfect or imperfect, of revenue-paying properties must be made by the revenue authorities. But the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the rights of the parties to the property in dispute as well as the shares to

¶47

10

¶48

which they are entitled have not been taken away by the regulation in question and the Civil Court must also decide whether the property is liable to partition or not; as in this case, whether there is a valid wakf which prevents the parties from seeking a partition of the property. The Plaintiff as well as the appealing Defendants are entitled to obtain a declaration from the Civil Court that they have got the right to obtain from the revenue authorities a separation and allotment of their shares in the estate according to their proportionate rights. It is further pointed out by the Appellants that all the properties in suit are not revenue-paying properties. These must be partitioned by the Civil Court. It is also alleged that the parties are in possession of separate parcels of lands being only shares in certain revenue-paying estates. These do not fall within the provisions of the Assam Regulation. The moveable properties should also be partitioned and the Court should also give an opportunity to the Plaintiff for finding out whether there are any other properties which are capable of being partitioned. The actual partition of revenue-paying estates must necessarily be made according to the provisions of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶49

54. The position of law on the issue has been explained by the High Court of Gauhati itself in the case of Thanda Bala Choudhury v. Birendra Kumar Choudhury, 2002 SCC OnLine Gau 26 wherein the issue was regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit property when the case for perfect partition had already been disposed of by the Deputy Commissioner. The Court therein while elaborating on of the Regulation, 1886, held the following:

¶50

a. First, in cases where the distribution of land has been decided by way of partition, civil courts have the

¶51

11

¶52

jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the title to the land. This is in consonance with various rulings that conclude that Section 154 cannot deprive a man of his title to the land. The Court held that mere partition of property in dispute by the Revenue authorities does not confer any title on them and it is open to civil courts to determine the right of the parties to the property.

¶53

b. Secondly, civil courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over matters of perfect partition; only revenue courts are vested with the power to decide on the same. The legal position pursuant to Section 154 as well as Section 62 is that no bar exists over civil courts to declare the rights over a suit property. Additionally, Section 62 specifically vests a right upon parties to approach civil courts for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit property. The relevant paragraphs from the said decision are reproduced hereinbelow:

¶54

“7. A catena of judicial decisions has been referred by Mr. Katakey to drive home his submission. In Dandiram Nath and v. Mihiram Nath Chamua decided on 13.11.1953 reported in 1 Unreported cases (Assam) 255 this Court speaking through Justice Sarjoo Prasad, C.J, categorically ruled that Section 154 cannot deprive a man of his title to the land. The mere fact that the lands have been distributed or revenue allotted will not confer any title on them and it would be always to the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the question of title irrespective of the provisions of Section 154. Dealing with a case where the Plaintiffs instituted suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or in the alternative recovery of possession, the Court in paragraph-3 of the said ruling observed as follows:—

¶55

“3. On behalf of the appellants, however, it has been argued that Section 154(1)(f) of the Assam Land and

¶56

12

¶57

Revenue Regulation is a bar to the institution of the suit. Section 154 says that except where otherwise expressly provided in this Regulation or in Rules framed thereunder, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction in any of the matters enumerated in the various clauses of the section, one of them being Clause (f) which relates to the distribution of land or the allotment of the revenue on partition. The distribution of land or the allotment of the revenue may very well stand, but I do not see how Section 154 can deprive a man of his title to the land. If the defendants had no title thereto, then the mere fact that the

¶58

lands have been distributed or revenue allotted, will not confer any title on them, and it would be always open to the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the question of title irrespective of the provisions of Section 154. A reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in “Mt. Rukeya Banu v. Mt. Nazira Banu (1928 Cal. 130) where it was pointed out that a partition, whether perfect or imperfect, of revenue-paying properties must be made by the Revenue authorities. This follows from a perusal of Section 96 with Section 154(1)(e)

¶59

of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. But the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the right of the parties to the property in dispute as well as shares to which they are entitled has not been taken away by the Regulation in question, and it is for the Civil Court to decide whether the property is or is not liable to partition. The same view applies to other clauses of Section 154. In the circumstances, I find no substance in the point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. In my opinion, the appeal is without any merit and must be dismissed with costs and the decision of the Court of Appeal below should be maintained.”

¶60

8. In the case of “The State of Assam v. Sifat Ali”, AIR 1967 Assam 3, a Division Bench of this Court also held

¶61

13

¶62

that Section 154(1)(a) of the Regulation does not debar the civil court from entertaining the suit based on title to property.

¶63

Xxxxxxxxx

¶64

19. Keeping in view the above cited authorities relating to the jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 154 of the Regulation and also on ordinary reading of the provisions of Section 154 as well as Section 62 which is also a saving clause as noted above, it can be safely said that the legal position is well settled that Civil Court has the jurisdiction to agitate upon the matter relating to title over the property. It is correct that if any claim is made as regards perfect partition, no Civil Court shall exercise its jurisdiction as envisaged under Section 154(1)(d) of the Regulation. Section 154 of the Regulation provides that except where otherwise expressly provided in this Regulation or in Rule framed thereunder, no civil court shall exercise the jurisdiction in any matter mentioned in the various clauses under the Section including Clause (d) which relates to claim of person to perfect partition. Revenue Court has been vested with the power to effect the partition whether perfect or imperfect, of the revenue paying properties. But at the same time, jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the right of the parties to the properties in dispute as well as the shares of which they are entitled to has not been taken away by the Regulation. In the instant case though the matter was earlier agitated before the Revenue Court for effecting perfect partition, the Petitioners, having failed to get adequate relief, approached the Civil Court by filing suit in question for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land. In such premises I do not find any reason how this Section 154 can debar the Petitioners claiming to the title of the land in question from approaching the Civil Court. Section

¶65

14

¶66

62 also clearly vests a right upon the person to prefer a suit to the Civil Court for declaration of his right to any property. Therefore, I find sufficient force in the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner and accordingly, I am disinclined to approve the views expressed by the learned Civil Judge in the Impugned orders, I am of the considered view that the Civil Court is the absolute authority to adjudicate a dispute relating to the title and interest over the immovable property.”

¶67

(Emphasis supplied)

¶68

Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the direction for payment of mesne profits or execution of a decree passed by a competent civil Court falls exclusively within the domain of the executing civil Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revenue authorities cannot assume the role of an executing Court and enforce monetary decrees.

¶69

In the present case, while the Board of Revenue has rightly affirmed the concurrent findings of the authorities below with regard to partition, it has clearly travelled beyond its jurisdiction in directing payment of the decretal amount. Such exercise of power is impermissible in law and cannot be sustained.

¶70

Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 27.05.2021 passed by the Board of Revenue is set aside to the extent it directs payment of mesne profits/decretal amount of ₹4,27,500/-. However, the impugned order insofar as it affirms the orders of the revenue authorities

¶71

15

¶72

regarding partition of the land to the extent of 1/6th share in favour of respondent No. 1 is upheld.

¶73

It is made clear that respondent No. 1 shall be at liberty to seek execution of the civil Court decree for mesne profits before the competent executing Court, in accordance with law.

¶74

sd/-

¶75

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge

¶76

Vishakha

Bhukhan Singh (Since Deceased) through Ramavtar v. Kaushilya Bai

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Bhukhan Singh (Since Deceased) through Ramavtar v. Kaushilya Bai

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Cholamandalam M.S. General Insurance Company Limited Vs Leela Bai Patel

Icici Lombard General Insurance Company Limited Vs Sukhsai Nag

S.B.I. General Insurance Company Limited Vs Dinesh Chauhan

Chandrashekhar Ratnakar Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Icici Lombard General Insurance Company Limited Vs Roop Kumar Sahu

Badri Prasad More, Vs State of Chhattisgarh