Chandrashekhar Ratnakar Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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RAGHVENDRAJAT Digitally signedbyRAGHVENDRA JAT

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPS No. 9323 of 2023

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Order Reserved on: 6.2.2026

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Order Delivered on: 9.4.2026

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1 - Chandrashekhar Ratnakar S/o Shri Ramnihor Ratnakar Aged About 36 Years R/o Village- Gotoura, Tahsil- Masturi, District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Home/police, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Police Station And PostRakhi, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Director General (Jail) Jail And Corrective Services, Chhattisgarh, Headquarters, Sector- 19, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - Jail Superintendent Central Jail, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh.

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4 - Enquiry Officer / Jail Superintendent District Jail, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Pratibha Sahu, Advocate. For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Hrishikesh Sharma, Panel Lawyer.

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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CAV Order

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By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:-

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“10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records of the petitioner's case from the possession of the concerned authorities.

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10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the impugned orders dated 14.9.2017 (Annexure P/5) and 8.2.2018 (Annexure P/7) and direct the respondent authorities to grant him all the consequential benefits.

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10.3 Any other relief or relief(s) which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit or proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be granted along with cost of the petition.”

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Brief facts of the case, is that, the petitioner was working as Chief Guard (Gatekeeper) at Central Jail, Jagdalpur. On 13.09.2016, certain alleged prohibited items, namely one currency note of Rs. 500 denomination and three currency notes of Rs. 100 denomination each, were seized from his possession, and by order dated 13.09.2016, issued by the Superintendent, Central

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Jail, Jagdalpur, he was placed under suspension with immediate effect. Thereafter, on 01.10.2016, the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Jagdalpur, issued a charge-sheet against the petitioner containing three charges and directed him to submit his reply within 15 days from the date of receipt thereof. The petitioner submitted his detailed reply to the said charge-sheet on 17.10.2016 explaining the charges levelled against him. Being dissatisfied with the reply, the authorities conducted a departmental enquiry, and upon its conclusion, the Enquiry Officer/Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Dantewada, submitted an enquiry report dated 13.07.2017 wherein, except Charge No. 2, Charges No. 1 and 3 were held to be proved. A copy of the enquiry report was thereafter supplied to the petitioner with a direction to submit his representation, which he accordingly submitted on 22.08.2017, however, the disciplinary authority found the same unsatisfactory and, upon consideration of the enquiry report, the petitioner’s representation, and the evidence on record, passed order dated 14.09.2017 imposing the penalty of withholding one annual increment with cumulative effect. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal on 08.10.2017 before the Director General (Jail), Jail and Correctional Services, Raipur. The Director General (Jail), Jail and Correctional Services, Raipur, vide order dated 08.02.2018, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order dated

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14.09.2017 passed by the disciplinary authority. Hence, the present petition.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders dated 14.09.2017 and 08.02.2018 are ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and unsustainable in the eyes of law, inasmuch as the charges framed against the petitioner are not in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. It is contended that no case is made out under Rule 252(B) or Rule 570 of the relevant rules, and even with regard to Charge No. 2, the competent disciplinary authority itself has recorded a finding that the said charge has not been proved. As regards the alleged violation of Rule 3(1) of the C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, it is submitted that in the absence of applicability of Rule 570, the invocation of Rule 3(1) is also misconceived and untenable in the petitioner’s case. It is further argued that the punishment of stoppage of one annual increment with cumulative effect amounts to a major penalty, which cannot be imposed unless the charges are established by cogent and convincing evidence; in the present case, no such legally admissible evidence exists. Learned counsel contends that when the very foundation of the charges is legally unsustainable, the imposition of penalty amounts to a miscarriage of justice, and therefore the petitioner deserves to be exonerated of all charges and the impugned punishment order is liable to be quashed. On merits, it is further submitted that a total sum of Rs. 800/- (one note of Rs. 500/- and three notes of Rs. 100/- each) was found in

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the front pocket of the petitioner’s trousers, and if the petitioner had intended to conceal or clandestinely use the said amount for any improper purpose, he would not have kept it openly in the front pocket. The fact that the amount was found there indicates that it was inadvertently left in his pocket from the previous day, as duly explained in his written explanation, however, the respondent authorities have failed to consider this bona fide explanation while passing the impugned orders. She has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Sher Bhadur vs. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 142, Union of India vs. H.C. Goel, (1963) SCC Online SC 16, Moni Shankar vs. Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 and Union of India & Ors. vs. Gyanchand Chatter, (2009) 12 SCC 78.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has supported the impugned punishment order passed by the competent respondent authorities, contending that the misconduct alleged against the petitioner is of a serious nature. It is submitted that the petitioner was serving as a Jail Guard and, therefore, was expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity, vigilance, and discipline. However, during checking prior to his entry into the jail premises, currency notes were found in the front pocket of his trousers, which, in the sensitive environment of a correctional institution, constitutes a grave lapse. It is further argued that in view of the said incident, the initiation of departmental enquiry proceedings was fully justified and in accordance with law, and

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upon due consideration of the evidence on record, the competent authority has imposed an appropriate penalty. Learned counsel submits that in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not sit as an appellate authority over departmental proceedings, and no meticulous reappreciation of evidence is warranted unless there is patent illegality, perversity, or procedural impropriety. According to the State, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such perversity, jurisdictional error, or non-applicability of the relevant provisions as alleged by him. It is thus contended that the impugned orders have been passed after due application of mind and proper consideration of the material available on record, and therefore, the same do not call for any interference by this Court.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sher Bahadur vs. Union of India & others, (2002) 7 SCC 142, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

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“7. It may be observed that the expression “sufficiency of evidence” postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct

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and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, “in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry”, would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence. Though, the disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist, Ex. CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the charges, he was not examined. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. The statement of the appellant recorded by the enquiry officer shows no more than his working earlier to his re-engagement during the period between May 1978 and November 1979 in different phases. Indeed, his statement was not relied upon by the enquiry officer. The finding of the enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, the charge against the appellant for securing the fraudulent appointment letter duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was proved, is, in the light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view, this is clearly a case of finding the appellant guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the appellant

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with the alleged misconduct. The High Court did not consider this aspect in its proper perspective as such the judgment and order of the High Court and the order of the disciplinary authority, under challenge, cannot be sustained, they are accordingly set aside.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Moni Shankar vs.

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Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

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“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial

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one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has

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not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India & others vs. Gyanchand Chatter, (2009) 12 SCC 78, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

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“34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(1986) 3 SCC 454 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 662 : AIR 1986 SC 995] this Court held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.

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35. In view of the above, law can be summarised that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiry can be sustained on vague

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charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not be perverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based on conjectures and surmises. There is a distinction in proof and suspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquent cannot be a misconduct. The authority must record reasons for arriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statute defining the misconduct.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Department of Panchayati Raj, Lucknow vs. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC Online SC 891, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

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“14. What follows from a conjoint reading of the above two decisions is and what applies here is that, ‘materials brought on record by the parties' (to which consideration in the enquiry ought to be confined) mean only such materials can be considered which are brought on record in a manner known to law. Such materials can then be considered legal evidence, which can be acted upon. Though the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not strictly applicable to departmental enquiries, which are not judicial proceedings, nevertheless, the principles flowing therefrom can be applied in specific cases. Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence

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of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In such light, the documents referred to in the list of documents forming part of the annexures to the chargesheet, on which the department seeks to rely in the enquiry, cannot be treated as legal evidence worthy of forming the basis for a finding of guilt if the contents of such documents are not spoken to by persons competent to speak about them. A document does not prove itself. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity. In the present case, no such exercise was undertaken by producing any witness.

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29. At paragraph 18 of the judgment, this Court after examining the decision in Kailash Chander Asthana (supra), Union of India v. E. Bashyan38 and Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) found no conflict between Kailash Chander Asthana (supra) and the two others.

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30. In view of the above, ordinarily, the Constitution Bench might not have proceeded further; however, it

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found it necessary to do so in light of the observations recorded in paragraph 19:

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19. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan case the question squarely fell for consideration before a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, viz., that although on account of the Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution, it was no longer necessary to issue a notice to the delinquent employee to show cause against the punishment proposed and, therefore, to furnish a copy of the enquiry officer's report along with the notice to make representation against the penalty, whether it was still necessary to furnish a copy of the report to him to enable him to make representation against the findings recorded against him in the report before the disciplinary authority took its own decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee by taking into consideration the said report. The Court held that whenever the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority and the report of the enquiry officer holds the employee guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any punishment or not, the delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the report to enable him to make a representation to the disciplinary authority

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against it and the non-furnishing of the report amounts to a violation of the rules of natural justice. However, after taking this view, the Court directed that the law laid down there shall have prospective application and the punishment which is already imposed shall not be open to challenge on that ground. Unfortunately, the Court by mistake allowed all the appeals which were before it and thus set aside the disciplinary action in every case, by failing to notice that the actions in those cases were prior to the said decision. This anomaly was noticed at a later stage but before the final order could be reviewed and rectified, the present reference was already made, as stated above, by a Bench of three learned Judges. The anomaly has thus lent another dimension to the question to be resolved in the present case.”

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33. Resting on the aforesaid reasoning, the answer to the basic question (majority view) in B. Karunakar (supra) is found in paragraph 29 reading as follows:

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“29. Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions

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with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”

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From a bare perusal of the record, it emerges that when the petitioner was at the checkpoint prior to entering the jail premises, he was subjected to routine checking, during which a sum of Rs. 800/- comprising one note of Rs. 500/- and three notes of Rs. 100/- each was found in the front pocket of his trousers. Upon being questioned, the petitioner explained that on the previous day he had gone to the market for certain purchases and had inadvertently left the remaining amount in his trouser pocket, having forgotten to remove it thereafter. He categorically stated that the said amount was not carried for any improper or unauthorized purpose. The material on record does not indicate any clear violation of Rule 570 or Rule 252(B) of the C.G. Prison Rules, 1968. During the course of the departmental enquiry, the petitioner reiterated this explanation in his deposition, and the concerned checking official, who was examined as a witness, also

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confirmed that the currency notes were found in the front pocket of the petitioner’s trousers. It is noteworthy that had the petitioner intended to indulge in any illegal or mala fide act, he would reasonably have concealed the money in a hidden place to avoid detection, particularly as he was a long-serving Jail Guard well aware of the mandatory checking procedure before entry into the prison premises. The fact that the money was kept in an easily detectable place lends credence to the petitioner’s explanation, which appears plausible and bona fide. However, this vital aspect has not been duly considered in the departmental proceedings. Furthermore, since Rule 570 of the C.G. Prison Rules, 1968 is not directly attracted to the facts of the present case, the invocation of Rule 3(1) of the C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, premised upon the alleged violation of Rule 570, also appears unsustainable. The Enquiry Officer as well as the Appellate Authority failed to properly examine the applicability of the relevant provisions and proceeded to impose punishment without cogent material substantiating the charges in accordance with law. Although the scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters of departmental enquiry is limited, judicial intervention is warranted where there is manifest injustice or patent illegality. In the present case, this Court finds that the charges framed under Rule 570 of the C.G. Prison Rules, 1968 and Rule 3(1) of the C.G. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965

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were neither applicable nor proved in accordance with law, and

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therefore the impugned action cannot be sustained.

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Accordingly, for the reasons stated hereinabove and in view of the findings recorded, the impugned orders dated 14.09.2017 and 08.02.2018 are hereby set aside and quashed. As a consequence thereof, the writ petition stands allowed , and the petitioner shall be entitled to all consequential benefits arising therefrom, in accordance with law.

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Sd/-

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(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

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Judge

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The date when	The date when	The date when	the	judgment is
the judgment is	the judgment is	uploaded on the we	bsite
reserved	pronounced
		Operative		Full
6.2.2026	9.4.2026	-		9.4.2026

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Raghu Jat

Chandrashekhar Ratnakar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Chandrashekhar Ratnakar v. State of Chhattisgarh

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