Disposed

Kamleshwar Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC7 Jan 2026WPC/4/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The petitioner challenged the rejection of his application for additional court fees as filed beyond the limitation period. The Single Judge held that despite Section 165(6) labeling the Collector's order as final, Section 44(1) provides an express right of appeal to the Commissioner. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the Court interpreted 'save as otherwise provided' as not expressly barring appea

What did the court decide?

The writ petition was dismissed on the ground of alternate efficacious remedy (appeal under Section 44(1)). The petitioner was directed to file an appeal within 30 days to condone the delay.

Kamleshwar Singh Thakur Vs State of… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

2026:CGHC:1128

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 4 of 2026

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Kamleshwar Singh Thakur S/o Late Shri Resham Singh Thakur Aged About 70 Years R/o Purani Basti Korba, Tahsil- Korba, District Korba C.G.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Revenue And Disaster Management, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur C.G.

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2 - Collector, Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.

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3 - Superintendent Of Land Records (Diversion Land Branch) Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.

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4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.

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5 - Tehsildar, Korba, Distt. Korba C.G.

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner : Mr. Sunil Sahu, Advocate For State : Mr. Rishabh Bisen, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

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Order on Board

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08.01.2026

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Heard on admission and also on the objection raised by the State with regard to availability of alternate and efficacious remedy to the petitioner.

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The petitioner has filed this petition assailing the order dated 05.10.2023 passed by the Collector, Korba by which the petitioner's

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Digitally signed by BHUMIKA BHUMIKA ANGARE ANGARE Date: 2026.01.13 11:24:02 +0530

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application for paying additional Court fees as per market rate prevailing at the relevant time has been rejected on the count that the application has been filed after lapse of 03 years.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that under Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue Code the order passed by the Collector is final, therefore, there is no alternate and efficacious remedy available to the petitioner under the Land Revenue Code as such the instant petition is very much maintainable before this Court.

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On the other hand learned counsel for the State would submit Section 44(1) of the Land Revenue Code provides that Save as otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie from every original order passed under this Code or rules made thereunder and Section 44(1)(f) provides that if such order is passed by the Collector to the Commissioner thereafter Section 50 also provides for filing of the revision petition, as such, various efficacious remedies are available to the petitioner, therefore, the instant writ petition is not maintainable.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of Section 165(6) it is quite vivid that the order passed by the Collector is final order, as such the appellate forums are not available, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable which was vehemently objected by learned counsel for the State.

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To consider the rival submission, it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 44(1) and Section 50 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 which reads as under:

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" Section 44- Appeal and appellate authorities . (1) Save

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where it has been otherwise provided, an appeal shall lie from every original order under this Code or the rules made thereunder-

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(a) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Officer, whether or not the officer passing the order is invested with the powers of the Collector-to the SubDivisional Officer;

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(b) if such order is passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, whether or not invested with the powers of the Collector-to the Collector; (c) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer subordinate to the Settlement Officer-to the Settlement Officer;

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(d) if such order is passed by any Revenue Officer in respect of whom a direction has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 12 or sub-section (2) of Section 21-to such Revenue Officer as the State Government may direct;

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(e) if such order is passed by a Collector whether exercising the powers of Collector or Settlement Officer, during the currency of the term of settlement-to the [Board of Revenue] [Substituted by Act No. 17 of 2008];

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(f) if such order is passed by a Settlement Officer, whether exercising the powers of Settlement Officer or the powers of a Collector in connection with any settlement operation unless otherwise expressly provided-to the Settlement Commissioner;

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(g) if such order is passed by the [Commissioner or the] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] Settlement Commissioner-to the Board.

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(2) [ Save as otherwise provided a second appeal shall lie against every order passed in first appeal under this Code or the rules made thereunder-

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(i) by the Sub-Divisional Officer or the Collector to the Commissioner;

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(ii) by the Settlement Officer to the Settlement Commissioner; (iii) by the Commissioner to the Board -

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(a) if the original order has in the first appeal been varied or reversed otherwise than in a matter of cost; or

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(b) on any of the following grounds and no other, namely, -

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(i) that the order is contrary to law or usage having the force of law; or

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(ii) that the order has failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having force of law; or

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(iii) that there has been a substantial error or defect in the procedure as prescribed by this Code, which may have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon merits.]

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Section 50- Revision- The Board [or the Commissioner] or the [Commissioner, Land Records] or the Collector or the [District

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Survey Officer] may at any time on its/his motion or on the application made by any party for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to legality or propriety of any order passed by or as to the regularity of the proceedings of any Revenue Officer subordinate to it/him call for, and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by such officer, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit: Provided that-

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(i) no application for revision shall be entertained-

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(a)against an order appealable under this Code;

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(b)against an order of the Settlement Commissioner under Section 210;

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(c)against an order passed in revision by the [Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner in respect of cases under Section 170-B, nor shall any such order be revised by the Board on its own motion;

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(ii)no such application shall be entertained unless presented within sixty days to the [Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or within ninety days to the Board of Revenue from the date of the order and in computing the period aforesaid, time requisite for obtaining a copy of the said order shall be excluded;

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(iii)no order shall be varied or reversed in revision unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them of being heard.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)-

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(i) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the Board under sub-section (1) no action shall be taken by the [Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof;

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(ii) where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the [Commissioner] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner under sub-section (1), no action shall be taken by the Collector or the Settlement Officer in respect thereof;

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(iii) where proceedings in respect of any such case have been commenced by the [Commissioner] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008], Settlement Commissioner, Collector or Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Board may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by [Commissioner] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Commissioner or the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem

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fit;

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(iv)where proceedings in respect of any such case have been commenced by the [the Commissioner or] [Inserted by Act No. 17 of 2008] the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1), the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner may either refrain from taking any action under this section in respect of such case until the final disposal of such proceedings by the Collector or the Settlement Officer, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceedings and pass such order as it may deem fit."

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The word "save as otherwise provided under this code or clause in the statute or act", is always subject matter of examination in various legal forum including Hon’ble the Supreme Court. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Noor Mohammad reported in 1972 (2) SCC 454 has examined the expression “save as otherwise provided by or under the Act” and has held at paragraph 8 as under:-

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"8. This power under clause (b) , however, is subject to certain limitations. Sub-section (3) begins with the words "A State Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under Section 43, and subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided by or under this Act shall exercise and discharge throughout the State the following powers and functions, including those in sub-clause (b) . It is clear, therefore, that the functions under sub-clause (b) could be discharged by the State Transport Authority subject to directions given to it under Section 43 of the Act and save as otherwise provided by or under the Act. In the present case it is urged that directions have been issued by the State Government under Section 43. We shall deal with this point in another place. The other limitation is that the State Transport Authority could perform the duties of the Regional Transport Authority under sub-clause (b) save as otherwise provided by or under this Act. It was contended that the Regional Transport Authority is a separate authority on which the duties referred to in clause (b) have been imposed by other provisions in Chapter IV, and since the State Transport Authority is required to act "save as otherwise provided by or under the Act" it would be disentitled to take over the functions under sub-clause (b) . Such an interpretation would obviously lead to grave incongruity. Subclause (b) , as we have already seen, provides for the exercise of the powers of the Regional Transport Authority by the State Transport Authority in certain contingencies. If the expression "save as otherwise provided by or under the Act" is construed in a

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manner to negative the functions permitted to be performed under sub-clause (b) , the very object with which sub-clause (b) has been enacted will be frustrated. We have, therefore, to construe the expression "save as otherwise provided by or under the Act" in a harmonious manner so that sub-clause (b) is not reduced to a nullity. In our opinion the expression "save as otherwise provided by or under the Act" would in the context mean, "save as otherwise expressly barred by or under the Act". If there is a provision which expressly debars the exercise of the power under sub-clause (b) in any case then only the State Transport Authority will not be able to exercise the powers and discharge the functions given in sub-clause (b) . Otherwise there would be no such bar. It is not shown to us that there is any express provision which bars the performance by the State Transport Authority of the duties referred to in sub-clause (b) and, therefore, we are of the view that the State Transport Authority in this particular case would not be barred from performing the duties under sub-clause (b) ."

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From the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Noor Mohammad (supra) , it is quite vivid that “save as otherwise provided by or under the Act” cannot be taken in restrictive manner otherwise it will defeat the the very object of the Section 44 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 and it has to be construed in a harmonic manner so that the sub-clause (e) of Section 44 of the Land Revenue Code, 1959 will not be frustrated and it cannot be reduced to nullity. As such, it means “save as otherwise provided by or under the Act” would in the contest mean “save as otherwise expressly barred by or under the Act”, therefore, if there is a provision which expressly debar the exercise of power under sub-clause (e) of Section 44, in any case then only there will be no appeal before the Commissioner and he will not be able to exercise his power and discharge the function given in sub-clause (e) of Section 44.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to show this Court that there any express provision which bars the performance by the

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Commissioner to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, therefore, I am of the view that the appeal against the order under Section 165 (6) of the Land Revenue Code, the appeal is maintainable before the Commissioner (Revenue) and thereafter the revision. As such, the writ petition is not maintainable, deserves to be dismissed on account of alternate and efficacious remedy of filing of an appeal and thereafter revision.

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However, if the petitioner prefers an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order, the appellate authority or respondents will not take a plea of limitation as this Court has condoned the delay in preferring the appeal and will decide the case on its own merit.

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With aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition is disposed of.

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Sd/-

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(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

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Judge

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Bhumika

Kamleshwar Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

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Kamleshwar Singh Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh

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