Writ appeal against dismissal of a compassionate-appointment petition was filed with 637 days' delay attributed to financial hardship and arranging funds. Applying Supreme Court precedent on 'sufficient cause', the Division Bench found the explanation vague, lacking diligence, and rejected the delay-condonation application.
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NAFR
Digitally signed by ANURADHA ANURADHA TIWARI TIWARI Date: 2026.05.06 17:25:01 +0530
2026:CGHC:21099-DB
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 374 of 2026
Hem Kumar Kaiwarth S/o Late Shri Bahadur Singh Kaiwarth Aged About 34 Years R/o Village - Baradoli, Post-Patsendri, Saraipali, Distt. Mahasamund (Cg)
... Appellant
versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur (CG) 2 - The Superintendent of Police (Rail) Raipur, Office Situated At Near Raipur Railway Station, Distt. Raipur (CG)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
| For Appellant | : Mr. |
Rishabhdev, Advocate. |
|---|---|---|
| For Respondents | : Mr. |
Prasun Bhaduri, DeputyAdvocate General |
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
06.05.2026
1. Heard Mr. Rishabhdev, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents on I.A. No.01 of 2026, which is an
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application for condonation of delay of 637 days in preferring the present writ appeal.
2. Mr. Rishabhdev submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred against the order dated 03.05.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 2151/2024; however, there has occurred a delay of 637 days in filing the same. It is submitted that the appellant, who hails from a lower middle class family and whose father was serving as a Constable, has been facing acute financial hardship after the demise of his father, and although he had applied for compassionate appointment, the same was rejected, whereagainst he preferred a writ petition bearing WPS No. 2151/2025, which came to be dismissed by the impugned order dated 03.05.2024; thereafter, owing to severe financial constraints and lack of resources, the appellant could not file the present appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and some time was consumed in arranging the necessary funds for preferring the appeal, and thus, the delay so caused is neither intentional nor malafide but due to bona fide reasons beyond his control, which deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.
3. On the other hand, Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents opposes the prayer for condonation of delay and submits that the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing the present writ appeal. It is contended that the explanation offered by the appellant is vague and cannot be accepted as a valid ground for condonation of
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delay. It is further submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is well reasoned and does not call for any interference. Therefore, the application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed.
4. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona
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fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:
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“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the
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main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to
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condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of
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limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”
5. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few.
6. Upon considering the matter in its entirety and in light of the chronology placed on record, we find that the impugned judgment and
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order was passed on 03.05.2024, whereas the present writ appeal has been filed after a delay of about 637 days beyond the prescribed period of limitation of 45 days under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 . The explanation furnished by the appellants indicates that the delay has primarily been attributed to financial hardship, lack of resources, and the time allegedly consumed in arranging funds for preferring the appeal. However, on a careful consideration of the explanation so offered, we are not persuaded to accept the same as constituting a “sufficient cause” within the meaning of law. The appellants have failed to furnish any cogent, specific and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay, particularly the period within the prescribed limitation. The plea of financial constraints, bereft of supporting particulars and material, appears to be vague and general in nature and does not inspire confidence so as to justify condonation of such an inordinate delay.
7. It is well settled that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour and that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally construed in cases where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is evident. The appellants have not been able to demonstrate that they were prevented by any unavoidable or compelling circumstances from approaching this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. On the contrary, the record reflects a clear lack of due diligence on their part. The length of delay, being substantial, is also a relevant factor which cannot be ignored. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, condoning such delay would defeat the very object of the law of
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limitation and would amount to permitting a litigant to revive a stale claim at its own convenience, which is impermissible in law.
8. In view of the aforesaid and in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has miserably failed to make out any case for condonation of delay.
9. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay is rejected. As a result, the writ appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, without entering into the merits of the case.
Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice
Anu
1 issue framed by the court
Whether a delay of 637 days in filing a writ appeal against dismissal of a compassionate-appointment petition should be condoned on the plea of financial hardship.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar ChoudharyRelied on¶4
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Hem Kumar Kaiwarth
State of Chhattisgarh through The Secretary, Home Department
The Superintendent of Police (Rail) Raipur
Ramesh Sinha
Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
