In Reference Vs Ilaram Sahu and Anr.

(Cause-titl	e taken from Case Information System)
For State	: Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Advocate
For Complainant	: Mr. Shantam Awasthi, Advocate
For Non-Applicant	: Mr. Sudhir Verma, Advocate

¶14

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

¶15

Order on Board

¶16

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

¶17

05.05.2026

¶18

1. This is an office reference.

¶19

2. Heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General

¶20

assisted by Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer

¶21

2

¶22

appearing for the State, Mr. Shantam Awasthi, learned counsel appearing for the complainant as well as Mr. Sudhir Verma, learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant.

¶23

3. The present criminal revision under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) has its genesis in, and is a direct consequence of, the directions issued by this Court in its common judgment dated 17.04.2014 rendered in a batch of connected criminal appeals led by Criminal Appeal No.883 of 2011 and other analogous matters. The said appeals arose out of the judgments dated 04.11.2011 passed by the Court of the Special Judge under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Raipur in Special Sessions Trial No.47/2008 and Special Sessions Trial No.83/2008, pertaining to the same incident.

¶24

4. While partly allowing the aforesaid appeals, this Court undertook a comprehensive reappreciation of the entire evidence on record and, in that process, noticed a significant and disquieting feature concerning the acquittal of one of the accused, namely Ilaram Sahu, who was arrayed as accused No.58 before the trial Court. Upon scrutiny, it was found that although his name did not find mention in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-1) and MergIntimation (Ex.P2), there existed consistent, cogent, and reliable ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses including that of an injured child witness, clearly attributing a specific and active role to him in the

¶25

3

¶26

commission of the offence. However, the learned trial Court proceeded to acquit the said accused, namely Illaram solely on the ground of non-mention of his name in the FIR and allied documents, disregarding the well-settled legal position that the FIR is not an encyclopedia of events and that mere omission of a name therein cannot, by itself, be a determinative factor for acquittal when substantive evidence on record establishes involvement. The approach of the trial Court, therefore, appeared to be legally unsustainable and indicative of a manifest error resulting in miscarriage of justice.

¶27

5. It is in compliance with the aforesaid directions contained in the judgment dated 17.04.2014 that the present criminal revision has been instituted, calling for an examination of the legality, propriety, and correctness of the acquittal recorded by the trial Court in Special Sessions Trial No.47/2008, in light of the evidence available on record and the settled principles governing interference in revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal.

¶28

6. Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State, submits that the present criminal revision arises out of the common judgment dated 17.04.2014 passed in a batch of criminal appeals led by Criminal Appeal No.883/2011 (Tijau Ram & others vs. State) and other connected matters. It is contended that the learned trial Court, vide judgment dated 04.11.2011

¶29

4

¶30

passed by the Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur in Special Sessions Trial No.47/2008, committed a manifest error in acquitting accused Ilaram Sahu (arrayed as accused No.58) solely on the ground that his name did not find place in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-1), MergIntimation (Ex.P-2) and FIR (Ex.P-18), despite there being clear and cogent evidence on record indicating his active participation in the offence.

¶31

7. It is further submitted by Mr. Shukla that the evidence of key prosecution witnesses, namely P.W.-1 Rajiv Kumar, P.W.-2 Usha Bai and P.W.-3 Kum. Chandni (injured child witness), consistently attributes a specific role to Ilaram Sahu, including causing injury to the child witness inside the house and cutting her hair. His name was also disclosed in the supplementary statement of P.W.-1 recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-2). The learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate this material evidence and erroneously discarded the same on a hyper-technical ground, ignoring settled principles that non-mention of an accused in the FIR is not fatal when reliable ocular testimony establishes his involvement. He further contends that this Court, while deciding the connected appeals, has already observed in paragraphs 99 to 102 of the judgment dated 17.04.2014 that such acquittal is legally unsustainable and contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Eqbal Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 476 as well as Goura Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P., (2003) 12 SCC 469 . It is thus contended that in

¶32

5

¶33

exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C., this Court has rightly taken suo motu cognizance, and the acquittal of Ilaram Sahu deserves to be set aside in light of the consistent, trustworthy and unimpeached evidence available on record.

¶34

8. A pointed query was put by this Court to Mr. Shantam Awasthi, learned counsel appearing for the complainant, as to whether any appeal or revision had been preferred assailing the acquittal of the 28 accused persons by the learned trial Court. In response, it was fairly stated that no such appeal or revision has been filed. This omission assumes considerable significance, particularly in the backdrop of the statutory scheme which expressly provides for a remedy of appeal against acquittal. The conscious failure to avail such remedy lends further weight to the conclusion that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot now be invoked to indirectly challenge or unsettle the said acquittal.

¶35

9. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhir Verma, learned counsel appearing for the sole non-applicant Ilaram, opposes the submissions and submits that the present suo motu revision is wholly misconceived and not maintainable in law. It is contended that the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur, in Special Sessions Trial No.47/2008 vide judgment dated 04.11.2011, has rightly acquitted the non-applicant after due appreciation of evidence, granting benefit of doubt in light of material contradictions and omissions. It is further submitted that

¶36

6

¶37

the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or conversion of acquittal into conviction, particularly when neither the State nor the complainant has preferred any appeal against acquittal. The High Court, while hearing appeals against conviction, could not have invoked suo motu revisional powers to unsettle a well-reasoned acquittal. He also submits that the name of Ilaram does not find place in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-1), MergIntimation (Ex.P-2) and FIR (Ex.P-18), and his implication in the subsequent statement is clearly an afterthought. The testimony of Ushal Bai (PW-2) and Kumari Chandni (injured child witness) (PW-3), suffers from material contradictions regarding the manner of assault, and the medical evidence does not support the alleged injuries, particularly absence of any head injury or cutting of hair. No weapon has been seized from the nonapplicant and there is no reliable evidence to establish his presence or participation so as to attract Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

¶38

10. Placing strong reliance on settled law, it is submitted that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or conversion of acquittal into conviction. Reliance is placed on Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 , wherein it has been held that the High Court cannot act as an appellate Court in revision and reassess evidence minutely.

¶39

7

¶40

Further reliance is placed on Dulichand vs. Delhi Administration, (1975) 4 SCC 649 , reiterating that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and cannot be exercised to re-evaluate evidence.

¶41

11. It is further contended, placing reliance on Chaganti Kotaiah vs. Venkateshwara Rao, (1973) 2 SCC 249, that interference in revision against acquittal is permissible only in exceptional cases involving manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. Similarly, in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 , it has been held that the High Court cannot convert an acquittal into conviction directly or indirectly by reappreciating evidence. He also relies upon the recent judgment in Nagarajan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 8 SCC 331 , to contend that in view of Section 401(4) Cr.P.C., where an appeal lies and has not been filed, revision cannot be entertained at the instance of such party. Further reliance is placed on Mahabir & Ors. vs. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 120 , reiterating that the High Court cannot, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, convert acquittal into conviction.

¶42

12. Lastly, placing reliance on Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it is submitted that where two views are possible, the view favouring the accused must prevail and an acquittal based on a plausible view ought not to be disturbed. As such, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position

¶43

8

¶44

and the absence of any perversity or illegality in the impugned acquittal, it is prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

¶45

13. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and have perused the entire record with due care and circumspection.

¶46

14. Before adverting to the scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction, a brief reference to the factual matrix emerging from the record would be apposite. From the perusal of the record, it transpires that a total of 77 accused persons were put to trial before the learned Court of Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur. Out of them, 28 accused persons, including the present non-applicant Ilaram Sahu, came to be acquitted by the trial Court, while 49 accused persons were convicted. Challenging their conviction, the said 49 accused persons preferred criminal appeals before this Court.

¶47

15. Upon consideration, this Court maintained the conviction of 5 accused persons under Section 302 of the IPC, whereas in respect of the remaining 44 accused persons, the conviction was altered to one under Section 304 Part-I of the IPC, and they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of eight years.

¶48

16. It is further brought to the notice of this Court by learned counsel for the non-applicant that the aforesaid 5 accused persons, whose conviction under Section 302 IPC was maintained by this Court,

¶49

9

¶50

carried the matter in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which affirmed their conviction and sentence. It is also not in dispute that all the accused persons have since undergone their respective sentences and stand released.

¶51

17. It was further noticed that neither the State nor the complainant nor the victim chose to assail the acquittal of the 28 accused persons by preferring an appeal, despite the availability of such a statutory remedy. In these peculiar circumstances, and in order to prevent failure of justice, this Court deemed it appropriate to exercise its revisional jurisdiction suo motu under Section 401 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, a specific direction was issued to the Registry to register a separate criminal revision against the acquittal of Ilaram Sahu, S/o Tijauram Sahu, impleading him as a nonapplicant and also arraying the victim Kum. Chandni (PW-3), daughter of deceased Dhakendra, as a party to the proceedings.

¶52

18. At this juncture, Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 assumes pivotal relevance and is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-

¶53

“ 401. High Court’s powers of revision.— (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by Section 307; and where the

¶54

10

¶55

Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392.

¶56

(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.

¶57

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.

¶58

(4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.

¶59

(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto, and it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.”

¶60

19. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it manifestly clear that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is supervisory in nature, circumscribed by well-defined limitations and is to be exercised sparingly. Though sub-section (1) confers wide powers, the same are controlled and curtailed by sub-sections (3) and (4), which expressly prohibit conversion of an acquittal into conviction

¶61

11

¶62

and bar invocation of revisional jurisdiction in cases where a statutory right of appeal has not been availed. The legislative intent is thus unequivocal that the High Court, while exercising revisional powers, cannot assume the role of an appellate Court and undertake a fresh re-appreciation of the entire evidence to arrive at a different conclusion merely because another view is possible.

¶63

20. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid statutory framework and the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra), Dulichand (supra), Chaganti Kotaiah (supra), Bindeshwari Prasad Singh (supra), Nagarajan (supra) and Mahabir (supra), it becomes abundantly clear that interference in revision against an order of acquittal is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, namely where there exists a patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or manifest miscarriage of justice. Even in such cases, the High Court cannot directly or indirectly convert an acquittal into conviction, nor can it re-evaluate the evidence as if sitting in appeal.

¶64

21. In the present case, the acquittal of the non-applicant Ilaram Sahu by the learned trial Court is founded upon appreciation of evidence, particularly the omissions in the earliest version, namely Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-1), Merg Intimation (Ex.P-2) as well as FIR (Ex.P-18), coupled with material contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PW-2 Usha Bai and PW-3 Kumari

¶65

12

¶66

Chandni (injured witness), and lack of corroboration from medical evidence. The trial Court, upon a holistic evaluation, extended the benefit of doubt, which is a plausible and legally permissible view on the evidence available on record.

¶67

22. It is also apposite to advert to the broader factual backdrop of the case. Out of a total of 77 accused persons who faced trial before the learned Trial Court, 28 were acquitted, while 49 were convicted. Challenging their conviction, the said 49 accused preferred appeals before this Court, wherein the conviction of 5 accused persons under Section 302 IPC was affirmed, whereas in respect of the remaining 44 accused, the conviction was modified to one under Section 304 Part-I IPC and they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of eight years. Significantly, against the acquittal of the aforesaid 28 persons, no appeal or revision was preferred either by the State, the complainant, or the victim, despite availability of such remedy under law. It is further noteworthy that the conviction and sentence of the 5 accused under Section 302 IPC, as affirmed by this Court, have also been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby imparting finality to the adjudication arising out of the same incident.

¶68

23. It is not in dispute that all the accused persons have since undergone their respective sentences and stand released. This aspect further reinforces the finality attached to the adjudication

¶69

13

¶70

arising out of the same occurrence and lends weight to the view that no interference is warranted in present revisional jurisdiction.

¶71

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 8 SCC 331 , has recently reiterated that revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C. is strictly supervisory and cannot be invoked as a substitute for an appeal against acquittal. It was held that in view of the bar under Section 401(4) Cr.P.C., where an appeal lies and has not been preferred, interference in revision is impermissible except in cases of manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice, by observing as under :-

¶72

“15. That a right of appeal is an invaluable right, particularly for an accused who cannot be condemned eternally by a trial judge, without having a right to seek a re-look of the Trial Court’s judgment by a superior or appellate court. The right to prefer an appeal is not only a statutory right but also a constitutional right in the case of an accused. This is because an accused has a right to not only challenge a judgment on its merits, namely, with respect to the conviction and sentence being imposed on him, but also on the procedural aspects of the trial.

¶73

16. An accused can question procedural flaws, impropriety and lapses that may have been committed by the Trial Court in arriving at the judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence in an appeal filed against the same. It then becomes the duty of the appellate court to

¶74

14

¶75

consider the appeal from the perspective of the accused-appellant therein to see if he has a good case on merits, and to set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and acquit the accused, or to remand the matter for a re-trial in accordance with law, or to reduce the sentence while maintaining the conviction or, in the alternative, to dismiss the appeal.

¶76

17. In our considered view, the appellate court in an appeal filed by the accused cannot while maintaining the conviction enhance the sentence. While exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly, when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused.

¶77

18. In the aforesaid judgement, we have analysed Section 386 of CrPC which deals with the right of a party including an accused to file an appeal, we may peruse Section 401 of CrPC which deals with the revisional powers of the High Court and which is extracted as under:

¶78

“401. High Court's powers of revision.—(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307, and, when the Judges composing the Court of Revision

¶79

15

¶80

are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 392.

¶81

(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.

¶82

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one conviction.

¶83

(4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.

¶84

(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of Justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.”

¶85

19. Sub-section (4) of Section 401 of CrPC states that where under the CrPC an appeal could have been filed and has not been filed, then no proceeding by way of revision could be entertained at the instance of the party who

¶86

16

¶87

could have appealed. This means if a State, complainant or the victim who have the right to file an appeal do not opt to do so, then the High Court cannot entertain a revision at its behest. Also, if an appeal lies under the CrPC but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person under an erroneous belief, then the High Court can treat the application for revision as petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.

¶88

20. What is pertinent is that under Section 401 of CrPC, the High Court is not authorised to convert the findings of acquittal into one of conviction by exercise of revisional jurisdiction. This salutary principle can be extended to also mean that the High Court cannot enhance the sentence imposed by a Trial Court on conviction in an appeal filed by the accused/convict. Thus, in sum and substance, it can be observed that in an appeal filed by the accused seeking setting aside of the conviction of sentence, the High Court cannot exercise its revisional powers and while affirming the conviction direct for enhancement of sentence, when actually appeal could have been filed by the State, complainant or the victim and has not been filed.

¶89

21. Therefore, where an appeal has been filed by the accused challenging the conviction and the sentence, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the High Court so as to remand the matter to the Trial Court for the

¶90

17

¶91

purpose of enhancement of the sentence.

¶92

22. However, in this case, our focus of attention is whether, in the absence of any appeal or revision filed by the State, a complainant or a victim in a particular case and when the appeal has been filed only by the accused/ convict assailing the judgment of conviction and sentence, the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction to enhance the sentence. In other words, when an accused is seeking setting-aside of a judgment of conviction and sentence, can the High Court, in the absence of there being any challenge to the same from any other quarter, suo motu exercise its revisional power and thereby condemn the accused by awarding an enhancement in his sentence.

¶93

23. Even if an opportunity of hearing is given to such an accused/convict, we do not think that the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of CrPC while exercising its appellate jurisdiction in an appeal filed by the accused/convict in the High Court. All that the High Court can do is to set-aside the judgment of conviction and sentence and acquit the accused, or while doing so, order for a retrial, or in the alternative, while maintaining the conviction, reduce the sentence. In other words, in an appeal filed only by the accused/convict, the High Court cannot suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction and enhance the sentence against the accused

¶94

18

¶95

while maintaining the conviction.

¶96

24. In this regard, we find that the expression “but not so as to enhance the same” in subclause (iii) of clause (b) of Section 386 of CrPC throws some light on the view we have taken, which reads as under:

¶97

“386. Powers of the Appellate Court.— xxx

¶98

(b) in an appeal from a conviction— xxx

¶99

(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same”

¶100

25. Although the said expression “but not so as to enhance the same” is in the context of subclause (iii) of clause (b) of Section 386 of CrPC, the spirit of the said provision must be understood, inasmuch as while maintaining the finding of conviction, the High Court cannot exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of CrPC and enhance sentence awarded to the accused/appellant.

¶101

26. In this context, we also observe that the Trial Court should also be very careful while passing an order of sentence inasmuch as the sentence imposed must be concomitant with the charge(s) framed and the findings arrived at while arriving at a judgment of conviction. If the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt against an accused, then the sentence following a finding and judgment of conviction must be appropriate to the nature of the

¶102

19

¶103

charge(s) which are proved by the prosecution.

¶104

27. In this regard, it must be noted that for exercise of powers of the appellate court for enhancement of sentence in an appeal filed either by the State or the complainant or the victim, the CrPC provides that the appellate court can reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court competent to try the offence, or alter the finding by maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, of the sentence so as to enhance or reduce the same. Thus, the power to enhance the sentence can be exercised by the appellate court only in an appeal filed by the State, victim or complainant, provided the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement.

¶105

28. It is further provided that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the court passing the order of sentence under appeal. Therefore, in an appeal for enhancement of sentence filed by the State etc., unless the conditions prescribed in the form of provisos to Section 386 of CrPC are complied with by the appellate court, there cannot be an enhancement of sentence.

¶106

29. Obviously in such an appeal for enhancement of sentence, the convict or the accused is the respondent and therefore there

¶107

20

¶108

cannot be enhancement of sentence unless the accused or convict has been heard. However, under the scheme of Section 386 of CrPC visà- vis in an appeal for enhancement of sentence, there can also be an acquittal of the accused as per sub-clause (i) of clause (c) of Section 386 of CrPC. But, on the other hand, in an appeal from a conviction, it has been expressly stated that there cannot be enhancement of the sentence. Therefore, while in an appeal for enhancement of sentence filed by the State, the accused can make out a case for acquittal or discharge or retrial, in the case of an appeal from conviction, the respondent in such an appeal, namely the State or the victim or the complainant, cannot seek enhancement of the sentence than what has been awarded by the Trial Court in the absence of filing any appeal or revision.

¶109

30. The above distinction can be explained by way of a latin maxim which has been discussed by Ujjal Bhuyan, J., while in Bombay High Court, in Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and Ors., 2020 OnLine Bom 2276, in the following words:

¶110

“40. In this connection we may refer to the maxim reformatio in peius. It is a latin phrase meaning a change towards the worse i.e., a change for the worse. As a legal expression it means that a lower court judgment is amended by a higher court into a worse one for those appealing it. In many jurisdictions,

¶111

21

¶112

this practice is forbidden ensuring that an appellant cannot be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. When the above phrase is prefixed by the words ‘no’ or ‘prohibition’, which would render the maxim as no reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius, it would denote a principle of procedure as per which using a remedy available in law should not aggravate the situation of the person who avails the remedy. In other words, a person should not be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. No reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius is a part of fair procedure and thus by extension can also be construed as part of natural justice. It is not only a procedural guarantee but is also a principle of equity.” (emphasis supplied)

¶113

31. The rationale of the above can be explained in simple language by stating that no appellant by filing an appeal can be worse-off than what he was. That is exactly what we are seeking to reiterate in our judgment having regard to the facts of the present case. ”

¶114

25. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand in the light of the authoritative pronouncement in Nagarajan (supra) , this Court finds that the present revision does not meet the stringent and well-settled parameters governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in unequivocal terms, reiterated that where a statutory

¶115

22

¶116

remedy of appeal is available and has not been availed by the State, the complainant, or the victim, the High Court ought not to entertain a revision at their instance, save and except in cases disclosing manifest illegality or gross miscarriage of justice. In the present case, despite the availability of such an efficacious remedy, neither the State nor the complainant has chosen to assail the order of acquittal by way of appeal. This omission assumes considerable significance and squarely attracts the embargo contained in Section 401(4) Cr.P.C., thereby restricting the scope of interference in the present proceedings.

¶117

26. From another angle, permitting interference in such circumstances would amount to allowing the revisional jurisdiction to be invoked as a substitute for an appellate remedy, which is clearly impermissible in the scheme of the Code. The revisional power of the High Court is supervisory and discretionary in nature, intended to correct jurisdictional errors, patent illegality, or instances of grave miscarriage of justice. It is not designed to enable a litigant to indirectly achieve what could not be pursued directly by way of an appeal. Any attempt to re-open findings of fact or to seek a fresh evaluation of evidence under the guise of revision would be contrary to the legislative intent and settled judicial discipline.

¶118

27. Examined on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court does not disclose any infirmity warranting interference. The

¶119

23

¶120

acquittal is founded upon a comprehensive and reasoned appreciation of the evidence on record, including the material omissions in the earliest version of the prosecution case, namely Dehati Nalishi, Merg Intimation and FIR, as well as significant contradictions in the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses. The trial Court has meticulously evaluated the entire evidence and, upon finding that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, extended the benefit of doubt to the accused. Such a view is not only plausible but is also in consonance with the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.

¶121

28. Moreover, it is of considerable significance that, against the acquittal of the aforesaid 28 accused persons by the learned trial Court, no appeal or revision was preferred either by the State, the complainant, or the victim, notwithstanding the availability of an efficacious statutory remedy under the Code. This inaction assumes great legal importance in the context of the present proceedings, as it reflects a conscious omission to invoke the appellate jurisdiction against acquittal. In such circumstances, the embargo contained in Section 401(4) Cr.P.C. squarely comes into play, precluding the invocation of revisional jurisdiction as a substitute for an appeal. The legislative scheme clearly mandates that where a remedy of appeal lies and has not been availed, the revisional power cannot be exercised at the instance of a party who had the right to prefer such appeal. Thus, the failure to challenge the acquittal through the appropriate statutory

¶122

24

¶123

mechanism further fortifies the conclusion that interference in the present revision would be legally impermissible.

¶124

29. It is trite that where two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the one favouring the accused must be adopted. The view taken by the trial Court in the present case cannot be characterized as perverse, arbitrary, or wholly unsupported by evidence. On the contrary, it reflects a balanced and judicious assessment of the material available on record. Interference in such a case would necessarily entail reappreciation and re-evaluation of evidence, which is beyond the permissible scope of revisional jurisdiction. Furthermore, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 Cr.P.C. is circumscribed by express statutory limitations, including the prohibition against conversion of an acquittal into conviction, either directly or indirectly. The exercise of such jurisdiction to unsettle a well-reasoned acquittal, in the absence of glaring perversity or manifest illegality, would amount to transgressing these limitations and effectively converting the revisional forum into an appellate one, which is impermissible in law.

¶125

30. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances, when viewed in the backdrop of the settled legal position, clearly indicates that the present case does not fall within the narrow and exceptional category warranting interference in revision. The

¶126

25

¶127

impugned judgment does not suffer from any jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, or miscarriage of justice so as to call for the exercise of supervisory powers by this Court.

¶128

31. Accordingly, placing due reliance on the limitations engrafted under Section 401(1) read with sub-sections (3) and (4) of the Cr.P.C., and in the absence of any compelling or exceptional ground to warrant interference, this Court declines to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. The present criminal revision, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed .

¶129

32. There shall be no order as to costs.

¶130

Sd/Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶131

Anu

In Reference v. Ilaram Sahu and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

In Reference v. Ilaram Sahu and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Agrawal Structure Mills Ltd. Vs Union of India

Xyz Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Kamta Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Hitesh Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Kamal Kishor Shondilya Vs Food Corporation of India

Sanjay @ Sanju Verma Vs State of Chhattisgarh