Dismissed¶15

Krishna Mirjapuriha (Kasera) v. Nidhi Gupta

Chhattisgarh HC19 Feb 2026SA/387/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Second appeal; Section 100 CPC; substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact; perversity; declaration of title; permanent injunction; Sections 34 and 38 Specific Relief Act; Section 250 Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code; registered sale deed dated 22.07.2013; Khasra Nos. 734/2 and 734/3; Sakti, Janjgir-Champa; dismissal in limine; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637.

What did the court decide?

None to the appellant; the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court stand upheld. ¶15

Krishna Mirjapuriha (Kasera) Vs Nidhi Gupta — Specific Performance | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None to the appellant; the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court stand upheld.

¶15

Issue for consideration

Whether the questions sought to be raised in the Second Appeal constitute substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure warranting interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below. +1 more

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Court's answer

The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is extremely limited: interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law, and concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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Ratio / Principle

Both courts below concurrently held that the suit land bearing Khasra Nos. 734/2 and 734/3 was validly purchased by the plaintiff through registered sale deed dated 22.07.2013 and her title and possession stand duly established by documentary evidence (sale deed Ex.P-5, revenue records Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2, mutation entries); no perversity, misreading of evidence or legal infirmity is demonstrated warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

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Key takeaways

The questions sought to be raised essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact and do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 CPC; accordingly no case for interference is made out.ratio¶10

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Second Appeal (High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur) dismissed in limine by a Single Judge. Respondent/plaintiff had sued for declaration of title and permanent injunction over Khasra Nos. 734/2 and 734/3 (0.10 acre total), Village/Tahsil Sakti, pleading purchase from Firatram by registered sale deed dated 22.07.2013 for Rs.5,00,000/-, mutation on 24.08.2013 and diversion to residential use; she alleged encroachment by the appellant/defendant No.1. The Trial Court (Civil Judge, Class-II, Sakti, Civil Suit No. 30-A/2019) decreed the suit on 15.12.2023; the First Appeal (S.96 CPC) was dismissed by the District Judge (F.T.C.), Sakti on 05.05.2025. Before the High Court the appellant urged long possession (18-19 years), purchase in the names of his sons, limitation, valuation, court fees, demarcation and Section 34 Specific Relief Act. Holding that concurrent findings of title and possession rested on the sale deed (Ex.P-5), revenue records (Ex.P-1, Ex.P-2) and mutation entries, that no perversity or legal infirmity was shown, and that the grounds raised only questions of fact, not a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC (following State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637), the Court upheld both decrees and dismissed the appeal in limine.

2026:CGHC:9172

SOURABH BHILWAR

Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.02.23 10:31:47 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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NAFR

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SA No. 387 of 2025

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Krishna Mirjapuriha (Kasera) S/o Late Mahaveer Aged About 70 Years R/o Ward No. 2, Tehsil Sakti, District Sakti, Chhattisgarh, Pin 495689

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Nidhi Gupta W/o Nitish Gupta Aged About 44 Years R/o Ward No. 7, Tehsil Sakti, District Sakti, Chhattisgarh, Pin 495689

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2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Sakti, Chhattisgarh.

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…. Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Alok Nigam, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Lekhram Dhruw, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru

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Judgment on Board

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20/02/2026

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The present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/ defendant No.1 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.05.2025 passed by the learned District Judge (F.T.C.), Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 36-A/2044 (Krishna Mirjapuriha vs. Nidhi Gupta & Anr.), affirming the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2023 passed by the learned

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Civil Judge, Class-II, Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 30-A/2019, whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/ defendant No.1 was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

¶22

The plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the suit land situated at Village Sakti, P.H. No. 11, R.N.M. Sakti, Tahsil Sakti, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), bearing Khasra Nos. 734/2 and 734/3, admeasuring 0.05 acre each (total 0.10 acre), was purchased by her from Firatram by a registered sale deed dated 22.07.2013 for a consideration of Rs.5,00,000/-, and she is in possession thereof. The land was duly mutated in her name on 24.08.2013 and diverted for residential purposes by order dated 30.09.2013. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff had constructed a boundary wall and erected a gate; however, defendant No.1 unlawfully broke the lock, claimed the land as his own, and attempted to raise construction so as to dispossess her. Thereafter proceedings initiated before the Tahsildar under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code were dismissed on 04.10.2019 for want of jurisdiction, compelling the plaintiff to institute the civil suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction against interference with her possession.

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Per contra , the defendant No.1 filed his written statement

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contending that the suit land was never sold by Firatram to the plaintiff and the property was, in fact, purchased in the names of his sons, namely Sunil, Raja and Lal, who have not executed any sale in favour of the plaintiff. It is pleaded that the defendant and his family are residing over the suit land since 08.06.2021 after constructing a house thereon, and the plaintiff was never in possession of the same. According to the defendant, the land within the described boundaries belongs to the plaintiff separately, over which she has been residing for the last 18–19 years, and she has no concern with the suit land. It is further contended that the plaintiff has initiated false proceedings behind the back of the defendant and is now interfering with his peaceful possession, while he is merely carrying out repairs of his old and dilapidated house situated on the suit land.

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After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff has established her claim over the suit land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 15/12/2023, the defendant No.1 preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the learned Courts are contrary to facts and law and liable to be set aside. He submits that the plaintiff/respondent No.1 failed to establish lawful title and possession over the suit land, whereas the appellant has been in long-standing, continuous possession for the last 18–19 years and is residing thereon. The learned Courts failed to properly appreciate the evidence regarding the purchase of the land in the names of the sons of the appellant and overlooked material aspects including limitation, proper valuation, court fees, identification and demarcation of the suit property, and the applicability of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. He further submits that the findings regarding alleged encroachment are perverse and not supported by evidence. Hence, the appeal involves substantial questions of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the suit land bearing Khasra

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Nos. 734/2 and 734/3, admeasuring 0.05 acre each, was validly purchased by the plaintiff through registered sale deed dated 22.07.2013 and her title and possession stand duly established by documentary evidence including the sale deed (Ex.P-5), revenue records (Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2) and mutation entries. The Courts have recorded a categorical finding that the defendant unlawfully encroached upon the suit land despite the plaintiff’s proven ownership. The plaintiff was thus held entitled to declaration of title under Section 34 and permanent injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or legal infirmity is demonstrated so as to warrant interference with the concurrent findings in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ defendant No.1 failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient

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material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

¶39

In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions,

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in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

¶43

Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they do not call for any interference.

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Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.

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Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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$. Bhilwar

Krishna Mirjapuriha (Kasera) v. Nidhi Gupta

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Krishna Mirjapuriha (Kasera) v. Nidhi Gupta

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

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