Dismissed¶44

Smt. Rajkumari v. Premu @ Premlal

Chhattisgarh HC19 Feb 2026SA/165/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Section 100 CPC; second appeal; substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact; perversity; permanent injunction; declaration of title; unregistered agreement to sell dated 01.03.1986 (Ex. D/1); consent letter Ex. D/2; possession admitted since 1986; Order 41 Rule 27 CPC additional evidence; Khasra No. 373 (0.045 ha), Village Champa, Balodabazar; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637 relied on; High Court of Chhattisgarh; Bibhu Datta Guru; appeal dismissed.

What did the court decide?

The appellant herself admitted in cross-examination that the defendant has been in possession of the disputed land since 1986; it therefore cannot be said that the defendant is interfering with the appellant's possession. ¶31

Smt. Rajkumari Vs Premu @ Premlal — Chhattisgarh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶44

Issue for consideration

Whether the plaintiff established that the defendant interfered with her possession of the suit land so as to justify a decree of permanent injunction, given the defendant's plea of possession under the agreement dated 01.03.1986 (Exhibit D/1). +2 more

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Court's answer

¶31

Ratio / Principle

The agreement dated 01.03.1986 (Exhibit D/01) and consent letter (Exhibit D/02) under which the defendant claims possession are not a registered sale deed; the proper remedy for the plaintiff was a suit for declaration of title, which she never filed, and she failed to prove her case before both courts below.

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Key takeaways

The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC is extremely limited: interference is permissible only where a substantial question of law is involved, and concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.ratio¶34
The questions sought to be raised in the Second Appeal relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact; they are essentially questions of fact, do not satisfy the test of a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC, and the appeal involved no such question, so no case was made out by the appellant.ratio¶43

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Second Appeal (SA No. 165 of 2018, High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur) — dismissed. The plaintiff had sought a permanent injunction over Khasra No. 373 (0.045 hectares), Village Champa, claiming ancestral ownership and alleging that the defendant, taking advantage of her being a woman, induced her deceased brothers Harvansh and Deepak to sign blank papers and that they never executed a valid sale. The defendant pleaded purchase of the land on 01.03.1986 for Rs. 7470 via agreement Exhibit D/01 and consent letter Exhibit D/02, and possession since 1986 with a house built in 1987. Both the Civil Judge Class-II, Simga (decree dated 04/02/2009) and the First Additional District Judge, Balodabazar (decree dated 16/02/2018, Civil Appeal No.26A/2013) concurrently found that the plaintiff admitted in cross-examination the defendant's possession since 1986 and had failed to prove her case. The High Court held that with possession admitted in the defendant's favour there was no interference to enjoin; since the 1986 agreement was unregistered and conveyed no title, the plaintiff's proper remedy was a suit for declaration of title, which was never brought. Interference under Section 100 CPC being confined to substantial questions of law, and concurrent findings of fact being immune from disturbance unless perverse, based on no evidence or contrary to law — relying on State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, (2019) 8 SCC 637 — the appellant's proposed questions were deemed questions of fact, not substantial questions of law, and the appeal was dismissed.

2026:CGHC:9123

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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Digitally signed by AMARDEEP AMARDEEP CHOUBEY CHOUBEY Date: 2026.02.23 14:53:09 +0530

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SA No. 165 of 2018

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Smt. Rajkumari S/o Babulal Vishnoi Aged About 61 Years R/o Village Champa, Tahsil Balodabazar, District BalodabazarBhatapara, Chhattisgarh, At Present R/o Sadar Bazar, Balodabazar District Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh (Plaintiff), District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Premu @ Premlal S/o Khemu Aged About 61 Years R/o Village Champa, Tahsil Balodabazar, District BalodabazarBhatapara, Chhattisgarh (defendant No.1)

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2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Raipur District Raipur, Now Balodabazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh (defendant No.2)

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---- Respondents

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For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate.

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For Respondent/State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy.G.A.

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board

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20.02.2026

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By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 16/02/2018 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Balodabazar C.G. in Civil Appeal No.26A/2013 (Smt.

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Rajkumari Vs. Prem @ Premlal & Anr) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 04/02/2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-II, Simga, Raipur, C.G. in Civil Suit No.54A/01 (Smt. Rajkumari Vs. Prem @ Premlal & Anr). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.

¶20

The plaintiffs preferred a suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the plaintiff is the owner of land situated at Village Champa, bearing Khasra No. 373, area 0.045 hectares. The said land is her ancestral property, and she has been taking care of and managing it. It was further alleged that the defendant attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s ancestral property by taking undue advantage of her being a woman. The plaintiff also stated that her brothers, Harvansh and Deepak (both now deceased), were induced by the defendant and his associates, who allegedly gave them money for liquor and fraudulently obtained their signatures on blank papers/stamp papers. The plaintiff contended that her brothers Harvansh and Deepak had never executed any valid sale of the suit property in favor of the defendant.

¶21

The defendants No.1 in his written statement, denied all the plaint averments made by the plaintiff. He submitted that on 01.03.1986, Harvansh and Deepak sold the disputed land for ₹7470, and since the date of purchase, the defendant has been

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in possession of the property and residing there. The defendant constructed a house on the disputed land in 1987, and the plaintiff did not raise any objections at that time.

¶24

The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the material available on record, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The Court observed that the plaintiff herself stated in her cross-examination that since 1986, the defendant has been in possession of the disputed land. The plaintiff has not provided any explanation as to why she did not make a claim for possession until 12 years later. It is certain that during the construction of the house, the plaintiff must have been aware that someone else was building a house on their land. However, the plaintiff did not raise any objection at that time, nor did the plaintiff file any immediate claim in court for redress.

¶25

Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff filed the Civil Appeal before the learned Appellate Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellant/plaintiff.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the learned Trial Court failed to carefully examine the documentary evidence as well as the oral evidence adduced in the matter. He submits that the findings of the learned trial Court that the plaintiff

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has failed to prove the defendant's interference with possession appears to be perverse, as it is contrary to the evidence available on record. Learned counsel further submits that the consideration of the learned Trial Court with respect to the alleged agreement dated 01.03.1986 (Exhibit D/1) in a suit for permanent injunction is legally improper, as such agreements, in the absence of valid title or possession, do not create any enforceable rights. The learned Appellate Court erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which had the potential to substantially alter the case.

¶29

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record.

¶30

In the present case, the plaintiff in her examination-in-chief stated that the possession of the disputed land is with her and the defendant has never constructed any house on it. He further deposed that the defendant is unlawfully attempting to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession over the disputed land. However, during cross-examination, the witness admitted that the care and supervision of the disputed land were carried out by Babulal, father of plaintiff, during his lifetime. The plaintiff/appellant further admitted that since 1986, the defendant has been in possession of the disputed land.

¶31

Thus, the appellant herself has admitted that the defendant is in possession of the disputed land; therefore, it cannot be said that

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the defendant is interfering with the appellant’s possession. The defendant, Premlal, has stated that he purchased the said land and obtained possession on the basis of the agreement dated 01.03.1986 (Exhibit D/01) and the consent letter dated 01.03.1986 (Exhibit D/02). Although the said agreement is not a registered sale deed, the proper remedy available to the plaintiff was to file a suit for declaration of title in respect of the disputed land. However, no such suit for declaration was filed before the Trial Court. It is also a settled principle of law that the burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove their case on the strength of their own evidence, however, the appellant/plaintiff has failed to prove her case before the learned Trial Court as well as before the learned first appellate Court.

¶34

Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

¶35

In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/plaintiff failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material.

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The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

¶38

The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

¶39

It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

¶40

In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

¶41

Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The

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appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby

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dismissed . SD/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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Gowri/ Amardeep

Smt. Rajkumari v. Premu @ Premlal

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt. Rajkumari v. Premu @ Premlal

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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