Dhanwanti Devi Vs Praveenchand Surana

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2026:CGHC:10854

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 346 of 2022

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SOURABH BHILWAR

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Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.03.03 15:21:57 +0530

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1 - Manohar Soni S/o Late Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 41 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar Infront Of Muncipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Gulabchand Soni S/o Late Dwarika Prasad Soni Aged About 36 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar Infront Of Muncipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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--- Appellant(s)

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versus

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1 - Pravin Chand Surana S/o Lt. Premchand Surana Aged About 53 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg District Durg (C.G.) ...(Address Wrongly Mentioned In The Impugned Order)

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2 - Tikam Chand Surana @ Sunil Surana S/o Lt. Premchand Surana Aged About 50 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg District Durg (C.G.) ... (Address Wrongly Mentioned In The Impugned Order)

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3 - Gulabchand @ Anil Kumar Surana S/o Lt. Premchand Surana Aged About 49 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg District Durg (C.G.) ...(Address Wrongly Mentioned In The Impugned Order)

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4 - Smt. Dhanwantin Devi Wd/o Late Dwarika Prasad Soni Aged About 67 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Infront Of Muncipal Corporation Garden Durg District Durg (C.G.) ..(Address Wrongly Mentioned In The Impugned Order)

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5 - Inderchand Soni S/o Late Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 39 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Infront Of Muncipal Corporation Garden Durg District Durg (C.G.) ..(Address Wrongly Mentioned In The Impugned Order)

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--- Respondent(s)

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with

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SA No. 348 of 2022

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1 - Inder Chand Soni S/o Lt Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 39 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar Infront Of Municipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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---Appellant (s)

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Versus

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1 - Praveen Chand Surana S/o Lt Premchand Surana Aged About 53 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Tikam Chand Surana @ Sunil Surana S/o Lt Premchand Surana Aged About 50 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Gulab Chand @ Anil Surana S/o Lt Premchand Surana Aged About 49 Years Jawahar Chowk Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Smt. Dhanwantin Bai Wd/o Lt Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 61 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, In Front Of Municipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Manohar Soni S/o Lt. Dwarika Prasad Soni S/o Lt Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 46 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, In Front Of Municipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Gulabchand Soni S/o Lt Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 36 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, In Front Of Municipal Corporation Garden Durg, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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with

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SA No. 291 of 2022

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1 - Dhanwanti Devi Wd/o Late Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 67 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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--- Appellant(s)

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Versus

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1 - Praveenchand Surana S/o Late Premchand Surana Aged About 32 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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2 - Tikamchand @ Sunil Kumar S/o Late Premchand Surana Aged About 30 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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3 - Gulabchand @ Anil Kumar Surana S/o Late Premchand Surana Aged About 29 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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4 - Manohar Soni S/o Late Dwarka Pradad Soni Aged About 46 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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5 - Inderchand Soni S/o Late Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 44 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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6 - Gulabchand Soni S/o Late Dwarka Prasad Soni Aged About 40 Years R/o Shikshak Nagar, Durg, Tahsil And District Durg (C.G.)

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…. Respondent(s)

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(Cause title is taken from CIS)

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For Appellant(s) : In SA No. 346 of 2022	: Ms. Juhi Pandey, Advocate
In SA No. 291 of 2022	: Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Senior Advocate alongwith Ms. Asha Nirmalkar, Advocate
In SA No. 348 of 2022	: Mr. Avinash Chand Sahu, Advocate alongwith Ms. Priya Sharma, Advocate
For Respondents	: Mr. Ashish Surana,Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board

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02/03/2026

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Since all the appeals arising out of common judgment and decree, they are being considered and decided by this common judgment.

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The present Appeals have been filed by the defendants under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the common impugned judgment and decree dated 16.12.2021 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Durg (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 04-A/2017 (plaintiff), civil appeal No.6-A/2017 (Defendant No.1), civil appeal No.12-A/2017 (Defendant No.2) and civil appeal No.16-A/2017 (Defendant

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No.4), whereby the civil appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed in part and the other three civil appeals filed by the defendants No.1, 2 & 4 separately were dismissed, affirming the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2016 passed by the learned 3^rd Civil Judge, Class-I, Durg (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 1-A/2012 ( Praveenchand Surana & Ors. vs. Smt. Dhanwantin Bai & Ors .), whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs has been allowed and the counter-claim filed by the defendants was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court.

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It is noteworthy to mention here that being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15.12.2016 passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs preferred Civil Appeal No. 04-A/2017 on the ground that the decree was not granted in terms of the reliefs claimed in the plaint and the same was not executable. On the other hand, the defendants No.1, 2 & 4 also challenged the said judgment and decree by filing separate Civil Appeals bearing Nos. 06-A/2017, 12-A/2017 and 16-A/2017, contending inter alia that their counter-claim based on adverse possession had wrongly been rejected by the Trial Court and the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs was contrary to law and evidence on record.

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The plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and damages, pleading inter alia that the house known as ‘Surana Bhawan’ situated at Jawahar Chowk, Durg,

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originally belonged to late Premchand Surana as joint Hindu family property and was partitioned vide sale deed dated 21.07.1966 (registered on 03.09.1966), pursuant to which the plaintiffs became owners and in possession thereof. It was pleaded that one shop situated on the eastern side, shown in the plaint map by letters A, B, C, D (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit shop’), was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.100/-, but rent from 01.07.1990 to 31.03.1995 amounting to Rs.5,600/remained unpaid despite notice dated 06.03.1995, rendering the defendant liable for eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of the Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act. The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that they have never executed any agreement to sell dated 10.05.1972 in favour of late Dwarka Prasad Soni and further alleged acts of nuisance and unlawful interference in August 1994, attracting Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. It was also pleaded that the defendant, being a tenant, is estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from challenging the plaintiffs’ title and that neither adverse possession nor lawful ownership was ever pleaded by the original defendant. Accordingly, decree for vacant possession, arrears of rent and mesne profits was sought.

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(a) Per contra , the original defendant Dwarka Prasad Soni, in his written statement, vehemently opposed the suit and contended that he was in possession of the suit shop as owner and not as tenant. He pleaded that the partition deed relied upon by the plaintiffs was forged and inadmissible, and the suit was bad

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for non-joinder of necessary parties, including the State, as the property formed part of Nazul land. It was further asserted that by virtue of an agreement dated 10.05.1972 executed by late Premchand Surana, the shop had been sold to him for a consideration of Rs.9,051/-, and since then he was in continuous possession as owner and holding the property in part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

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(b) After demise of the original defendant, his legal representatives also filed separate written statements and counter-claims reiterating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession since 10.05.1972 and were not tenants under the plaintiffs. They denied the existence of any landlordtenant relationship and contended that the agreement to sell was genuine, supported by expert evidence regarding signatures, and that the plaintiffs had suppressed material facts. It was further pleaded that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any rent receipts or documentary proof of tenancy. The defendant No.3, in his written statement, expressly adopted and affirmed the pleadings and contentions raised by the original defendant.

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(c) The defendants additionally claimed that even otherwise they had perfected title by adverse possession, having remained in uninterrupted possession for decades. They asserted that the plaintiffs were aware of the agreement since its execution and had remained silent for over 23 years. Hence, it was prayed that the

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suit be dismissed and that the counter-claim seeking declaration of ownership be allowed.

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After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit while dismissing the counter-claim of the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs have established their claim over the suit land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 15/12/2016, the defendants No.1, 2 & 4 preferred three separate First Appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court as well as the plaintiffs have also preferred the First Appeal. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court; the appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed in part and the appeals filed by the defendants were dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeals by the defendants.

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Learned counsel for the respective appellants submit that both the learned Courts have committed grave errors of law in dismissing the counter-claim of the defendants despite cogent evidence establishing their uninterrupted and continuous possession over the suit shop since 10.05.1972 on the basis of Agreement to Sell (Ex. D/12). Learned counsel submit that the said document, being more than 30 years old and produced from proper custody, was entitled to presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act,

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particularly when supported by expert opinion regarding signatures, and could not have been discarded merely for nonexamination of attesting witnesses. Learned counsel further submit that the signatures appearing on the said agreement were duly examined by a handwriting expert, who opined that the same were that of late Premchand Surana, and despite there being no specific challenge to the genuineness of the signatures during his lifetime, the learned Courts erred in discarding the document without assigning cogent reasons. Learned counsel also contend that the defendants were entitled to protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, as possession was delivered in part performance and consideration was paid, and that in absence of any action during the lifetime of Premchand Surana to cancel the agreement, the plaintiffs cannot take advantage of their own wrong subsequently. According to the appellants, both the Courts failed to appreciate that the appellants had perfected their title even by adverse possession, and therefore, the impugned judgments dismissing their counter-claim and their respective appeals are liable to be set aside.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.

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In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the

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learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the suit shop situated in Surana Bhawan, Jawahar Chowk, Durg. Both the Courts noted that the shop forms part of the undivided property of late Premchand Surana, which was partitioned by registered deed dated 21.07.1966, pursuant to which the plaintiffs became owners. While the defendants contended that the said partition deed was forged and that an agreement dated 10.05.1972 (Ex. D/12) purportedly sold the shop to late Dwarka Prasad Soni for Rs.9,051/-, the Courts, after careful consideration of the evidence and the material available on record passed the judgment and decrees impugned herein.

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As far as the submission of the counsel for the appellants regarding the genuineness of the signatures on Agreement dated 10.05.1972 (Ex. D/12) is concerned, it was brought to the notice of the Court that during cross-examination of DW-2/ Dr. Sunanda Dhenge, the handwriting expert, she admitted that her examination of the signatures was conducted with reference to the signatures contained in the registered partition deed (Ex. D/48) provided to her by Defendant No.2 however, the original document of Ex. D/48 was not produced before her. The expert opinion was therefore rendered solely by comparing the signatures with those in Ex. D/48 and the notebook marked Ex. D/10. While the appellants argued that this evidence

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demonstrated the genuineness of the signatures, the Courts held that the document could not conclusively establish transfer of ownership to the defendants. Furthermore, electricity and property tax records indicate that the plaintiffs have maintained ownership, and the defendants have only held the shop as tenants.

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The Courts also held that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover rent from the defendants at the rate of Rs.21/- per month from 01.07.1992 to 31.03.1995, along with mesne profits at the same rate from 01.04.1995 till the date of possession, and are entitled to vacant possession of the suit shop. It was further held that the defendants cannot claim permanent injunction against the plaintiffs to prevent interference, as the plaintiffs are the rightful owners and the defendants do not have any adverse or legal claim of ownership.

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As far as contention of the defendants that as per the counter-suit, they claimed adverse possession over the property in question on the basis of agreement to sale dated 10/05/1972 (Ex. D/12) is concerned, it is well settled that possession flowing from a permissive arrangement does not ripen into adverse possession unless there is a clear, hostile assertion of title to the knowledge of the true owner. In fact, the document Ex. D/12 is merely an agreement to sale and the said document is not an exclusive evidence which shows the transfer of ownership to the defendants.

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Accordingly, the concurrent findings of both the learned Courts concluded that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit shop, and the defendants are merely tenants, liable to pay rent and yield vacant possession. The counter-claims of the defendants seeking declaration of ownership and injunction were rightly dismissed, while the plaintiffs’ suit for declaration, rent, mesne profits, and vacant possession has been accepted, in accordance with settled principles of evidence and property law.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ defendants No.1 & 2 failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to

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concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants

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herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.

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Accordingly, all the Second Appeals fail and are hereby dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.

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Since, according to the learned counsel, the defendants are in possession of the suit shop, they are directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit shop to the plaintiffs within a period of three months from the date of this judgment.

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A decree be drawn accordingly.

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SD/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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$. Bhilwar

Dhanwanti Devi v. Praveenchand Surana

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Dhanwanti Devi v. Praveenchand Surana

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