Mukesh Manchanda Vs State of Chhattisgarh

¶1

1

¶2

2026:CGHC:2093

¶3

NAFR

¶4

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

ORDER RESERVED ON 02.01.2026 ORDER DELIVERED ON 13.01.2026 ORDER RESERVED ON 13.01.2026

¶6

MCRC No. 8849 of 2025

¶7

1 - Mukesh Manchanda S/o Late Indra Kumar Manchanda Aged About 57 Years R/o Aishwariya Empire, House No. 108, Akanti Vihar, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)

¶8

... Applicant(s)

¶9

versus

¶10

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through ACB/EOW Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)

¶11

... Respondent(s)

¶12

MCRC No. 8857 of 2025

¶13

1 - Atul Singh S/o Late Shri Nag Narayan Singh Aged About 58 Years R/o 67/b, Street 12, Smriti Nagar, Motilal Nehru Nagar, District- Durg (C.G.)

¶14

--- Applicant(s)

¶15

Versus

¶16

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Eow Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)

¶17

--- Respondent(s)

¶18

2

¶19

For Applicant(s)	: Shri Anil Pillai assisted by Shri Achyut
	Tiwari and Shri Gendesh Dadsena, Advocates
For Respondent/State	: Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Dy.AG

¶20

(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR VERMA)

¶21

C A V Order

¶22

Since both the bail applications have arisen out of the same crime number, involve identical allegations, are founded upon a common set of facts, and the applicants Manish Manchanda and Atul Singh stand similarly situated, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the present applications by this common order.

¶23

These applications under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure/Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita have been preferred by the applicants seeking regular bail in connection with Crime No.04/2024 registered at Police Station Economic Wing/AntiCorruption Bureau, Raipur (C.G.) for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

¶24

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶25

The prosecution case, in brief, emanates from a confidential report submitted by the Enforcement Directorate bearing ECIR/RPZO/11/2022/279 dated 11.07.2023, on the basis of which Crime No.04/2024 came to be registered by the Economic Offence Wing/Anti-

¶26

3

¶27

Corruption Bureau, Raipur. It was alleged that during investigation conducted by the Enforcement Directorate, a criminal syndicate was found to be operating in the State of Chhattisgarh, which was allegedly involved in extorting illegal commissions in the sale of liquor and in unauthorized sale of unaccounted liquor through government liquor shops, thereby generating proceeds of crime to the tune of approximately ₹2161 crores.

¶28

On receipt of the said information, EOW/ACB, Raipur conducted secret verification and thereafter took up the matter for investigation. Initially, the Enforcement Directorate carried out investigation and provisional attachment orders were executed against certain accused persons.

¶29

The FIR, contains the names of about 70 persons as accused, including the present applicants. However, it is evident from the FIR itself that no specific overt act has been attributed to the applicants therein. The allegations, as reflected from the FIR and the material placed on record, are primarily founded upon the written information received from the Enforcement Directorate and broadly relate to formation of syndicates and payment of exorbitant commissions to facilitate liquor-related transactions.

¶30

Upon completion of investigation, the Economic Offence Wing filed the initial charge-sheet No.03/24 dated 29.06.2024 against four accused persons namely (i) Arunpati Tripathi, (ii) Arvind Singh, (iii)

¶31

4

¶32

Anwar Dhebar and (iv) Trilok Singh Dhillon . Subsequently, under further investigation, supplementary charge-sheets bearing Nos.3A/24, 3B/24, 3C/25, 3D/25 and 3E/25 were filed on different dates.

¶33

During the course of investigation, the applicants were repeatedly summoned, their premises were subjected to investigation,and they were questioned on multiple occasions. It is not disputed that the applicants cooperated with the investigation and responded to the summons issued by the investigating agency.

¶34

The applicants were thereafter arrested by the Jharkhand Police pursuant to registration of Crime No.09/2025 dated 07.07.2025 at Police Station Economic Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau, Raipur (C.G.) for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 107, 109 IPC read with Sections 7-C, 12 and 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the said case, bail has already been granted by the competent court in Jharkhand and the formalities for release have been complied with.

¶35

Subsequently, while the applicants were in custody in Jharkhand, they were produced before the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Raipur through production warrant, whereupon they were formally arrested in the present crime. Since the date of such arrest, the applicants continue to remain in judicial custody at Raipur Jail.

¶36

The bail applications filed by the applicants before the learned Special Court was rejected, compelling the applicants to approach this Court.

¶37

5

¶38

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

¶39

At the outset, it is submitted that the present applications deserve to be considered and allowed by this Court on the touchstone of constitutional liberty, settled principles governing grant of bail, absence of incriminating material, and parity, particularly when the entire prosecution case rests on conjectures, surmises and unsubstantiated inferences.

¶40

I. BACKGROUND AND UNIMPEACHABLE BONA FIDES OF THE APPLICANTS

¶41

The Applicants, who are facing identical allegations arising out of the same crime number, are engaged in the business of marketing, promotion and distribution of alcoholic beverages, including IMFL, FMFL and beer, for Indian and international manufacturers. It is alleged that prior to the year 2020, they were associated with each other in this line of business and operated as recognized trade intermediaries with established commercial relationships across the States of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, predominantly in Chhattisgarh. Upon the revision of the Excise Policy in the year 2020, the Applicants restructured their business operations in conformity with the altered regulatory framework and jointly incorporated M/s Om Sai Beverages Private Limited, which was duly granted a valid FL-10A licence for distribution and stocking of liquor.

¶42

The applicants stand on identical factual and legal footing, the

¶43

6

¶44

allegations against them arise out of the same charge sheet, same transaction, and same set of circumstances. The prosecution has failed to draw any intelligible distinction between the applicants and other similarly situated persons.

¶45

Prior to the change in Excise Policy in the year 2020, the applicants were operating as partners for over two decades. Pursuant to the change in policy, they lawfully incorporated M/s Om Sai Beverages Pvt. Ltd., obtained FL-10A licence, and commenced operations.

¶46

It emerges from the charge sheet itself that:

¶47

the applicants participated in the tender process;

¶48

no irregularity in the grant of licence has been alleged;

¶49

no violation of excise rules in procurement or supply has been attributed to them.

¶50

II. ABSENCE OF PRIMA FACIE OFFENCE OR CULPABLE INTENT

¶51

The gravamen of the prosecution case rests upon a vague and undefined concept of a so-called “Syndicate”. However, the charge sheet:

¶52

does not identify the constituents of such Syndicate with certainty;

¶53

does not attribute any specific overt act to the applicants;

¶54

does not demonstrate any meeting of minds, which is the sine qua non for criminal conspiracy.

¶55

It is trite law that criminal conspiracy cannot be inferred on the basis of suspicion alone. There must be clear, cogent and unequivocal evidence demonstrating conscious participation.

¶56

7

¶57

17. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 ,

¶58

the Supreme Court held that:

¶59

“Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Conspiracy has to be established by evidence which shows a prior meeting of minds.”

¶60

The entire material against the applicants, even if taken at face value, fails to satisfy this legal threshold.

¶61

III. CHARGE SHEET BASED ON SURMISES AND SELF-SERVING NARRATIVES

¶62

A careful reading of the charge sheet reveals that:

¶63

the narration is largely derivative, based on statements allegedly made by other accused persons;

¶64

there is no independent corroboration by documentary or forensic evidence;

¶65

no recovery of illegal proceeds has been made from the applicants.

¶66

The Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , has categorically held that “Suspicion, however grave, cannot be a substitute for legal proof.” The present cases, at its highest, raises suspicion, but falls woefully short of legal proof, even at a prima facie level.

¶67

IV. APPLICANTS THEMSELVES EMERGE AS VICTIMS OF COERCION

¶68

Strikingly, the charge sheet itself indicates that:

¶69

8

¶70

the applicants’ firm was pressurized and coerced into making commission payments;

¶71

the applicants refused to pay cash and insisted on accounted transactions;

¶72

coercive tactics involving influence and intimidation were allegedly exercised by co-accused persons.

¶73

The applicants, therefore, cannot be treated as willing participants, but rather appear as victims compelled to comply under duress. In R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 , the Apex Court observed that “Mens rea is an essential ingredient of economic offences and must be demonstrable from the material on record.” The material on record does not disclose any mens rea, much less criminal intent, on the part of the applicants.

¶74

V. TOTAL ABSENCE OF FINANCIAL TRAIL OR UNACCOUNTED

¶75

GAIN

¶76

It is an admitted position that all transactions of the applicants’ firm were through banking channels, the income tax returns were furnished; no authority, including the Income Tax Department, has found any unaccounted income.

¶77

The Apex Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, held that “In economic offences, the existence of a money trail is a crucial factor while considering bail.”

¶78

In the present matters, no money trail whatsoever links the applicants to the alleged proceeds of crime.

¶79

VI. DISPROPORTIONATE TARGETING AND SELECTIVE

¶80

9

¶81

INVESTIGATION

¶82

The charge sheet itself acknowledges allegations against certain Excise Officers; however, none of them have been arrested or subjected to custodial interrogation, while private businessmen like the applicants have been sought to be implicated. Such selective prosecution raises serious doubts about the fairness of the investigation , which cannot be ignored at the stage of bail.

¶83

VII. PARITY AND SETTLED BAIL JURISPRUDENCE

¶84

He submits that the applicants’ case stands on absolute parity with similarly placed accused persons. Denial of bail in such circumstances would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22 , reiterated that “Grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. Every accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.” Further, in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 , it was held that “Pre-trial incarceration should not be resorted to as a measure of punishment.”

¶85

VIII. NO REQUIREMENT OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

¶86

He next submits that the investigation is complete. Charge sheet has been filed. All documents are in possession of the prosecution. Continued custody of the applicants would serve no useful purpose and would amount to punitive detention, impermissible in law.

¶87

In the light of the aforesaid factual and legal analysis of the charge sheet, it is most respectfully submitted that by no stretch of

¶88

10

¶89

imagination can the alleged involvement of the applicants be termed incriminating. The charge sheet does not disclose a single circumstance indicative of willful participation, conscious intent, or culpable mens rea on the part of the applicant in the commission of the alleged offence. Mere association, commercial engagement, or regulatory participation, absent criminal intent, cannot be elevated to criminal liability.

¶90

It is further submitted that upon an overall conspectus of the charge sheet, except for the narrative or script woven by the Investigating Officer—bereft of any legally admissible or independent evidence—certain striking and revealing features emerge, which fundamentally erode the prosecution’s case:

¶91

(i) The charge sheet itself demonstrates the active participation of one Sanjay Diwan in the execution and facilitation of the alleged offence. Despite his prominent and decisive role emerging from the prosecution’s own record, the Investigating Agency has, with conspicuous convenience, chosen to project him as a prosecution witness, thereby shielding him from criminal liability.

¶92

(ii) The illegal activities attributed to Sanjay Diwan, as per the Investigating Officer’s own narration, are demonstrably more grave and direct than those attributed to the present applicants. Yet, paradoxically, Sanjay Diwan enjoys the status of a prosecution witness, while the applicant is sought to be incarcerated, which exposes the selective and discriminatory approach of the investigation.

¶93

(iii) It is further relevant that Vijay Bhatia, against whom the charge

¶94

11

¶95

sheet attributes a far greater and controlling role in the management and orchestration of the alleged illegal activities, has already been granted bail by this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 5601/2025 vide order dated 25.09.2025. The acts attributed to Vijay Bhatia are of a significantly higher degree of gravity than those alleged against the present applicants. Denial of bail to the applicants, therefore, would offend the settled principle of parity.

¶96

(iv) The facility of non-arrest extended to the Excise Officers, though named as accused in the charge sheet, is also a circumstance that warrants serious judicial consideration. The Investigating Officer has justified such non-arrest by relying upon cooperation during investigation, drawing sustenance from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh , Criminal Appeal No. 838 of 2021 , wherein it has been categorically held that custodial arrest is not mandatory where the accused has cooperated in the investigation. The same standard, however, has been selectively denied to the applicant, despite his undisputed cooperation for over a year.

¶97

It is further submitted that the applicant has cooperated fully and unconditionally with the Investigating Agency since 11.04.2024, has appeared pursuant to summons, and has furnished every conceivable detail including financial records, bank statements, and income tax returns. The charge sheet itself reflects that it is predominantly based on statements and disclosures, rather than any independent, cogent, or

¶98

12

¶99

tangible evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that arrest cannot be used as a tool of punishment or coercion, particularly after completion of investigation.

¶100

The more disturbing question that arises for consideration is as to what compelling circumstance necessitated the custodial arrest of the applicant, despite his prompt and sustained cooperation, and why the Investigating Agency adopted a pick-and-choose policy while effecting arrests. Such an approach not only undermines the fairness of investigation but also strikes at the root of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

¶101

It is submitted that the entire charge sheet does not contain even a solitary fact which may indicate that the applicants were a willing or voluntary participant in earning wrongful gains. On the contrary, the charge sheet itself reveals the coercive environment under which the applicants were compelled to function, thereby constituting a significant mitigating circumstance in favour of the applicants. The applicants are in judicial custody since 07.07.2025, including detention in Jharkhand Jail. The investigation stands concluded, the charge sheet is voluminous, and the list of prosecution witnesses is extensive. It is thus evident that the trial is likely to be protracted, and continued incarceration of the applicant, in the absence of substantive evidence, would amount to pretrial punishment, which is impermissible in law.

¶102

It is further submitted that accused persons namely, Vijay Bhatia,

¶103

13

¶104

whose role is far more dominant and Abhishek Singh , who stands on parity with the present applicants, have already been granted bail by this Court. Denial of bail to the present applicants in such circumstances would be manifestly arbitrary and contrary to settled bail jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 , has held that deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment unless it is required to ensure the presence of accused at trial. Similarly, in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22, it has been reiterated that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

¶105

Nature and gravity of the offence

¶106

The present matters pertain to a deep-rooted, multi-layered economic conspiracy which has caused colossal loss to the State exchequer and has systematically subverted the Excise administration of Chhattisgarh. The offence is not a simple financial irregularity but an institutionalized criminal syndicate that manipulated liquor policy, licensing, procurement, pricing and retail distribution for illegal enrichment. The Supreme Court has consistently held that economic offences corrode the fabric of governance and public trust and must be treated as grave crimes. In Gulabrao Baburao Deokar v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 16 SCC 190 , the Apex Court held that the seriousness of economic offences and their impact on society are crucial considerations while dealing with bail. He submits that between the financial year 2019-20 to financial year 2022-23, the syndicate earned approximately ₹3,200 crore, directly depriving the public

¶107

14

¶108

exchequer of lawful revenue.

¶109

II. Role of the applicant is central and not peripheral

¶110

The applicant Atul Singh was not a passive license holder. He was selected by the syndicate as a trusted intermediary for implementing the FL-10A license mechanism.

¶111

The evidence on record shows that the applicant and his partner Mukesh Manchanda were pre-selected by the syndicate before the February 2020 tender. They were informed in advance that 60% of the profits of their FL-10A company would be paid to the syndicate and only 40% retained by them. Om Sai Beverages was incorporated specifically for this purpose and was granted FL-10A licenses for three consecutive financial years. The company earned about ₹68 crore (₹41 crore post-tax) and ₹41 crore (60%) was earmarked for the syndicate. This shows a pre-designed criminal profit-sharing arrangement, which squarely attracts Sections 120-B, 420 IPC and Sections 7, 12 of the PC Act.

¶112

It is borne out from the record that the company of the applicant Atul Singh, namely M/s Om Sai Beverages , in partnership with Mukesh Manchanda, was granted the FL-10A licence for three consecutive financial years pursuant to the design of the criminal syndicate. During this period, the said company generated a total profit of approximately ₹68 crores, out of which about ₹41 crores represented post-tax profits. In accordance with the pre-arranged understanding with the syndicate, 60% of these profits, amounting to approximately ₹41 crores, was

¶113

15

¶114

contractually earmarked to be paid to the syndicate as illegal commission, leaving only 40% to be retained by the company.

¶115

Since payment of such a substantial amount in cash posed practical difficulties, a large portion of the syndicate’s share, approximately ₹23 crores, was systematically routed and parked in the form of unsecured loans in entities controlled by syndicate associates, including Dhillon City Mall, owned by Trilok Singh Dhillon, and Sai Prasanna Developers, owned by Gautam Manik . The remaining portion of the syndicate’s share continues to remain outstanding, thereby reflecting the continuing financial nexus between the applicant and the syndicate.

¶116

It is further revealed that from the 40% retained share of the profits of Om Sai Beverages, 52% was held by Vijay Bhatia, a close associate of the syndicate, who received approximately ₹5.5 crores, while the balance of about ₹13 crores was secured and channelled by him through unsecured loans to his own firms and allied entities, thereby layering and concealing the true character of the proceeds of crime.

¶117

III. Financial trail and laundering through unsecured loans

¶118

The applicants adopted a structured method to conceal their retained 40% share by routing profits as “unsecured loans” to third parties Specifically ₹4 crore was routed via Manav Saxena → Chandan Jha, with interest returned to the applicant. The FY 2022-23 books of Om Sai Beverages show ₹21.27 crore in unsecured loans to

¶119

16

¶120

multiple shell-like entities including Nilai Syndicates, Samanvaya Iron & Steel, New Era Enterprises, Maruti Nandan Construction, Jai Gurudev Infrastructure etc.

¶121

These entries are not commercial loans but layering and placement designed to conceal illicit profits.

¶122

Additionally, commission-related funds for FY 2023-24 were found parked in DSNR, another company of the applicants. Such conduct demonstrates money-laundering-like layering, which can be witnessed only when the accused remains in control of corporate structures and financial channels.

¶123

V. Investigation is still ongoing and custodial necessity continues

¶124

It is further submitted that the record shows that there are Multiple supplementary charge sheets (up to 03(E)/2025) have been filed, 29 Excise officials and multiple associates are still under investigation. Further investigation into money trail, layering, shell companies and syndicate routing is actively in progress. The Supreme Court in Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, has held that bail can be cancelled or denied if the High Court fails to consider the seriousness of allegations and the necessity of custodial presence in complex conspiracies. In economic conspiracies, custody is not merely for interrogation but for preventing further concealment and manipulation of evidence.

¶125

V. Real risk of tampering, intimidation and destruction of evidence

¶126

The applicants Controlled the companies and its financial

¶127

17

¶128

accounts, has deep links with co-accused, promoters, shell entities, and syndicate beneficiaries. He is therefore eminently capable of destroying or fabricating digital and financial records Influencing witnesses Obstructing money-trail tracing.

¶129

In State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, the Supreme Court held that likelihood of tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses and evasion of justice are decisive grounds to deny bail. The present matters squarely satisfies all three.

¶130

VI. Length of custody does not entitle bail in grave economic crime

¶131

The applicants may seek bail citing period of incarceration. However, the Supreme Court has categorically held that custody duration alone is not decisive. In State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (supra) and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280 , it was held that where gravity of offence, likelihood of tampering, and seriousness of allegations exist, custody cannot be the basis of bail. In the present matters, the applicants are charged with being an architect of a revenue-diverting mechanism, not a minor participant.

¶132

VII. Bail jurisprudence mandates refusal in such structured conspiracies

¶133

In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, the Supreme Court held that bail must not be granted unless the Court records prima facie satisfaction regarding the absence of serious involvement. Here in the instance case, prima facie, the applicants

¶134

18

¶135

entered into a 60-40 profit-sharing criminal contract and earned crores from an illegal licensing framework, concealed profits through loan layering and actively facilitated diversion of public revenue. This is not a case of regulatory breach but of organized economic crime.

¶136

VIII. Statements under Section 161 CrPC are admissible at bail

¶137

In Indresh Kumar v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 938 of 2022 , the Supreme Court held that Section 161 statements can be considered while deciding bail. The prosecution relies on such statements to demonstrate:

¶138

Pre-selection of Atul Singh

¶139

Knowledge of the 60-40 split

¶140

Routing of profits

¶141

Syndicate linkage

¶142

These materials cannot be ignored at the bail stage.

¶143

IX. Legal Grounds for Rejection of Bail

¶144

It is submitted that the law governing grant or refusal of bail has been consistently and authoritatively settled by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court. At the stage of consideration of the applications for bail, the Court is required to undertake a careful judicial evaluation of well-recognized parameters, namely:

¶145

the likelihood of the accused absconding or fleeing from justice;

¶146

the possibility of the accused tampering with evidence; and

¶147

the likelihood of the accused influencing or intimidating witnesses.

¶148

These principles have been lucidly laid own by the Supreme Court

¶149

19

¶150

in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 (paras 16–19 & 21), which continue to hold the field. In the said decision, the Apex Court held that while considering an application for bail, the Court must be satisfied, inter alia, on the following aspects:

¶151

(i) whether there exists a prima facie case or reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed the offence;

¶152

(ii) the nature and gravity of the accusation;

¶153

(iii) the severity of punishment in the event of conviction;

¶154

(iv) the danger of the accused absconding or fleeing from justice if released on bail;

¶155

(v) the character, conduct, position and standing of the accused;

¶156

(vi) the likelihood of the offence being repeated;

¶157

(vii) the reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; and

¶158

(viii) the larger interest of justice, including the possibility of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

¶159

It has been further held by the Apex Court further held that mere long incarceration by itself is not a determinative factor for grant of bail, particularly where the allegations are serious and supported by material on record.

¶160

The above principles were further reinforced in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349, wherein the Apex Court emphasized that rejection of bail at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted operate on different footings, and that interference

¶161

20

¶162

with the course of justice, evasion of justice, or abuse of the concession of bail constitute strong grounds to refuse or cancel bail.

¶163

Thus, where the material on record discloses a strong prima facie case, involvement of the accused in a serious and organized economic offence, and the real likelihood of tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses or subverting the administration of justice, the discretion to grant bail must be exercised with utmost circumspection.

¶164

In the present matter, the allegations disclose a systematic, wellorganized and financially massive criminal conspiracy, involving diversion of public revenue and generation of illegal proceeds through layered financial transactions. Having regard to the nature of accusations, the magnitude of the offence, the continuing investigation and the applicants’ position within the syndicate, the parameters laid down in Amarmani Tripathi (supra) and allied judgments squarely operate against the grant of bail.

¶165

Lastly, he submits that the applicants are not innocent businessmen but core beneficiaries and facilitators of a criminal revenue-diversion syndicate that operated within the Excise Department. The scale, sophistication, money-trail, continuing investigation and influence of the applicants make them wholly disentitled to bail. He submits that Grant of bail at this stage would:

¶166

Endanger the investigation

¶167

Enable destruction of financial evidence

¶168

21

¶169

Allow intimidation of witnesses

¶170

Undermine public confidence in the justice system

¶171

The application therefore deserves to be rejected in the interests of justice.

¶172

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION :

¶173

Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and having perused the voluminous material placed on record, including the chargesheets, supplementary reports, statements, financial documents and digital records and proceeds to evaluate the rival submissions in the light of the settled principles governing grant of bail.

¶174

The task before the Court is to strike a judicious balance between the imperatives of a fair and effective investigation on the one hand and the inviolable right to personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution on the other. Despite the filing of the main charge-sheet and multiple supplementary charge-sheets, the record does not reveal any allegation that the applicants exercised coercive authority, decisionmaking control over public officials, or operational command over the alleged policy framework. The accusations against the applicants are essentially founded upon financial linkages and business transactions, which, at this stage, remain matters requiring full-fledged trial and cannot be conclusively adjudicated in bail proceedings.

¶175

The very magnitude of the present case underscores the utter futility of subjecting the applicants to prolonged pre-trial incarceration.

¶176

22

¶177

As per the prosecution's own averments, the matter implicates as many as 51 accused persons, with a staggering 1110 witnesses proposed to be examined and approximately 990 documents comprising thousands of pages of material. Notably, charges remain unframed against several accused, and the investigation is stated to be ongoing. In such circumstances, any prospect of an early culmination of the trial is, at best, illusory and, at worst, non-existent. It is trite law that prolonged detention in a case of this complexity and dimension would tantamount to imposing punishment prior to conviction, which is impermissible in our constitutional jurisprudence. Furthermore, it would constitute a gross violation of the applicant's fundamental right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India—a right repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578, inter alia. The rigours of Article 21 demand that pre-trial detention must be the exception, not the rule, particularly where trial progression is demonstrably protracted.

¶178

It is equally material that the investigation remains open-ended and continuing, even after a considerable lapse of time. While the prosecution asserts the necessity of custodial detention for effective investigation, this Court is guided by the consistent position of law that custody cannot be used as a substitute for investigation nor as a tool for extracting confessions or compelling cooperation. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI and Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI has

¶179

23

¶180

unequivocally held that pre-trial incarceration must not be permitted to assume the character of punishment, particularly when the evidence is largely documentary and already in the custody of the investigating agency.

¶181

The prosecution’s principal objection is founded upon the seriousness of the economic offence and the alleged magnitude of financial diversion. While the gravity of the offence is undoubtedly a relevant factor, the Supreme Court has consistently clarified that gravity alone cannot eclipse the constitutional mandate of liberty, especially when the accused is not a flight risk and when investigation has substantially progressed (Nikesh Tarachand Shah, P. Chidambaram) .

¶182

The apprehension of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, though strenuously urged, remains general and unsupported by any concrete material. The evidence in the present cases are primarily financial, documentary and electronic, which is already in the possession of the investigating agency. Such evidence is inherently less vulnerable to manipulation, and any residual apprehension can be sufficiently addressed by imposing stringent conditions of bail.

¶183

This Court finds that the plea of parity raised by the Applicants is not merely attractive but constitutionally compelling. The doctrine of parity flows directly from Article 14 of the Constitution, which mandates that similarly situated persons must receive similar treatment in matters of personal liberty. In a prosecution of this magnitude, involving 51

¶184

24

¶185

accused spread across six charge-sheets, the selective incarceration of a few while the rest — including those with demonstrably graver roles — enjoy liberty, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

¶186

From the material placed on record, it is evident that several coaccused, who have been specifically alleged to be kingpins, cash aggregators, departmental facilitators and major beneficiaries of the alleged liquor syndicate, have already been granted bail by the Supreme Court. These include Arun Pati Tripathi (A-1), alleged to be the mastermind of the syndicate; Trilok Singh Dhillon (A-5) and Anurag Dwivedi (A-5) , described as principal beneficiaries and handlers of illicit proceeds; Arvind Singh (A-2) , having direct Excise Department linkage; as many as 29 Excise Officials who are alleged to have been involved in the very same liquor scam and against whom serious allegations were levelled by the prosecution, have already been enlarged on bail by the Apex Court, who stand on a footing far graver than the present Applicants, yet they have been enlarged on bail by superior court and the co-accused namely Sanjay Kumar Mishra (A-4) , coordinating between distillers and political beneficiaries; and V ijay Bhatia (A-41) and Sunil Dutt (A-10) have been granted bail by this Court.

¶187

This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the continued detention of the Applicants, in the face of liberty granted to co-accused with greater and more direct culpability, cannot be sustained on the touchstone of constitutional equality and fairness, and their claim for bail

¶188

25

¶189

on the ground of parity deserves to be upheld

¶190

This Court also takes note of the fact that there is no material to suggest that they have ever attempted to evade investigation or flee from justice. The trial, considering the volume of material and number of accused, is likely to take considerable time, and continued incarceration would amount to pre-trial punishment, which is alien to criminal jurisprudence.

¶191

The law laid down in Amarmani Tripathi, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar, Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar and Sanjay Chandra makes it clear that bail is to be refused only when the triple test of flight risk, tampering with evidence, or likelihood of influencing witnesses is satisfied. On a cumulative assessment of the material before this Court, none of these conditions is attracted against the applicant.

¶192

CONCLUSION :

¶193

In the considered opinion of this Court, continued detention of the applicants is neither necessary for the purposes of investigation nor justified on the touchstone of constitutional proportionality. The presumption of innocence, the principle of parity, the documentary nature of evidence, and the absence of any demonstrated risk of absconding or interference with justice all tilt the balance in favour of liberty. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the material placed on record and having evaluated the rival submissions in the light of the governing principles of bail, this Court finds that the continued incarceration of the Applicants is no longer justified.

¶194

26

¶195

In the absence of any material demonstrating that the role attributed to the present Applicants is graver, distinguishable or exceptional vis-à-vis those co-accused who are already on bail, the selective continuation of their custody would amount to hostile discrimination and would be contrary to the settled principles governing the grant of bail. Liberty cannot be denied on the basis of pick-andchoose enforcement, particularly when the alleged conspirators, facilitators and beneficiaries of the same transaction have been granted freedom by superior courts. This Court is also mindful of the settled position that pre-trial incarceration is not punitive and that detention must be justified by compelling reasons such as the likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. No such exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated against the Applicants so as to warrant their continued confinement, especially when the investigation has been completed against the present applicants and charge sheet has already been filed before the trial court and the case now rests on documentary and electronic material already in the custody of the prosecution.

¶196

Without venturing into the merits of the allegations and confining the present consideration strictly to the question of bail, this Court is of the considered opinion that no compelling or justifiable reason now survives for further curtailment of the Applicants’ liberty. The ends of justice would be sufficiently safeguarded by enlarging them on bail, subject to appropriate conditions.

¶197

27

¶198

Accordingly, the present bail applications are allowed. It is directed that each of the Applicants shall be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) along with two local sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, subject to the following conditions:

¶199

(i) they shall surrender his passport, if any, before the Trial Court;

¶200

(b) the applicants must cooperate with the investigation and the trial proceedings;

¶201

(c) they shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case;

¶202

(d) they shall commit no offence whatsoever during the period they are on bail; and

¶203

(e) in case of change of residential address and/or mobile number, the same shall be intimated to the Court concerned by way of an affidavit.

¶204

(f) any stringent conditions as may be imposed by the trial court.

¶205

Any violation of the above conditions will entitle the prosecution to move application for cancellation of bail which shall be considered promptly and on merits.

¶206

It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined solely

¶207

to the adjudication of the present bail applications and shall not be

¶208

28

¶209

construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The Trial Court shall proceed independently and uninfluenced by any observation contained in this order.

¶210

Sd/-

¶211

(Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge

¶212

Digitally signed by SUGUNA SUGUNA DUBEY DUBEY Date: 2026.01.14 17:08:38 +0530

Mukesh Manchanda v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Mukesh Manchanda v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Taufan Singh Pav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

G. Saroj Rao Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Smt. Sunita Jain Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Laxman Nirmalkar Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Mukesh Yadav Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Anil Tuteja Vs State of Chhattisgarh