Allowed

Anil Tuteja v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC12 Jan 2026MCRC/8313/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Regular bail application under Section 483 BNSS by an applicant arrested in an alleged custom rice-milling extortion/corruption FIR after earlier arrests in unrelated liquor-scam cases. The Court found stereotyped witness statements, reliance solely on accomplice statements, no prosecution sanction, parity with bailed co-accused, and no flight risk or tampering, and allowed bail with conditions.

What did the court decide?

Applicant released on bail on personal bond of Rs.1,00,000 with two local sureties of like amount, subject to conditions including surrender of passport and non-interference with witnesses/evidence.

Anil Tuteja Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Corruption | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

2026:CGHC:2050

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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ORDER RESERVED ON 01.12.2025 ORDER DELIVERED ON 13.01.2026 ORDER UPLOADED ON 13.01.2026

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MCRC No. 8313 of 2025

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1 - Anil Tuteja S/o Late H.L. Tuteja Aged About 62 Years R/o House No.35/1396, Beside Farishta Nursing Home, Katora Talab, Civil Lines, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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... Applicant(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police Station Eow/acb, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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For Applicant (s)	: Arshdeep Singh Shrivastava and Advocates through Saurabh Dangi, Ad	Khurana, Shri Harsh Shri Chetan Nagpal VC assisted by Shri vocate
For Respondent/EOW	: Dr. Saurabh Pan respondent/State.	de, Dy. AG for the

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(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR VERMA)

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C A V Order

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The applicant has preferred the instant application under Section 483 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking grant of regular bail in FIR No. 01/2024 dated 17.01.2024 registered at police station EOW/ACB, Raipur (hereinafter referred to as “subject FIR” or “said FIR”) for offences under Sections 384,409,120-B of the IPC, 1860 read with Sections 11,13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pending before the learned Special Judge (PC Act) and First Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur.

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The applicant had earlier preferred a bail application under Section 483 of the BNSS dated 07.08.2025 before the learned Trial Court which was erroneously rejected vide order dated 22.08.2025. The applicant is therefore invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court against the said order impugned.

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BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE :

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The genesis of the instant case lies in the alleged “Custom Rice Milling Scam” in Chhattisgarh which traces its origin to Income Tax Department raids conducted on 21.08.2023 wherein a Prosecution Complaint was filed against 8 specific persons - conspicuously, the applicant was neither targeting eight persons notably, the applicant was never named. Acting on ED’s letter dated 09.01.2024 under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, Respondent No.2 registered the subject FIR on 16.01.2024 and the applicant has still not arraigned as accused. Subsequently vide letter dated 09.01.2024 under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the ED forwarded material to the respondent pursuant to which the subject FIR No. 01/2024 dated

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16.01.2024 came to be registered at PS EOW/ACB, Raipur initially under Sections 120-B and 409 IPC read with Sections 11, 13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the PC Act, shockingly the applicant was not named as an accused even in the FIR.

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Despite over 1.5 years of exhaustive investigation spanning from from 16.01.2024 to 09.07.2025, the respondent EOW/ACB never once summoned, questioned or interrogated the applicant in relation to the subject FIR thereby underscoring the complete absence of any perceived necessity or urgency for his arrest. On 01.02.2025, the respondent filed its first charge sheet under Section 173 BNSS exclusively against two principal co-accused namely Manoj Soni (MD, MARKFED and Roshan Chandrakar, (Treasurer, Rice Millers Association) wherein certain vague and unsubstantiated allegations were levelled against the applicant without formally arraigning him as an accused, strategically keeping the doors open for a future arrest. It was only on 6.10.2025 much after the applicant’s arrest that a supplementary charge sheet was filed naming the applicant and mechanically adding Section 384 IP?C to the array of offences thereby completing the investigation qua him.

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The applicant’s protracted incarceration however, predates the subject FIR and stems from a parallel and entirely distinct “liquor scam” investigation. The applicant was first arrested on 21.04.2024 by the Ed in relation to a separate ECIR pertaining to the alleged liquor scam, an arrest which the Hon’ble Apex Court deprecated as “disturbing” and “glaring”, reflecting gross abuse of process. Consequent thereto, the

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applicant faced arrests in the Chhattisgarh Liquor FIR (by the EOW/ACB) and UP Liquor FIR (by UP Police) with the latter being declared illegal by the Allahabad High Court. The applicant secured regular bail in two these three cases and his bail application in the third and final case (Chhattisgarh Liquor FIR) was listed for hearing before the Apex court on 18.07.2025. It is in this precarious context mere one week prior to the scheduled hearing, apprehending imminent release that the respondent effected a brazen “insurance arrest” of the applicant on 09.07.2025 in the subject FIR without any prior interrogation or questioning whatsoever over 1.5 years of probe, furnishing merely a vague, half page non speaking grounds of arrest memo which is a blatant violation of the sacrosanct safeguards under Article 22(1) of the Constitution.

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The calculated modus operandi of the respondent agencies in perpetuating the applicant’s custody through “ever-greening arrests” stands exposed through the following irrefutable chronology of events which this Court may graciously take notice of :

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Date	Event DemonstratingMala Fides
21.08.2023	IT Prosecution Complaint filed against 8 persons (applicant unnamed)
14.10.2023	ED registers Rice ECIR/RPZO/04/2023 (applicant unnamed.
16.01.2024	Subject FIR registered by ACB (applicant unnamed)
21.04.2024	Applicant first arrested in ED Liquor scam case (termed “disturbing” byApex Court).
28.06.2024	ED files Prosecution Complaint in Rice ECIR (applicant unnamed).
25.09.2024	Respondent files false affidavit before the Apex

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	Court falsely claiming applicant’s role in”scams” (no material annexed).
04.11.2024	Co-accused Manoj Soni and Roshan Chandrakar arrested in the subject ECIR
01.02.2025	First charge sheet filed (Applicant implicated vaguelybut unnamed).
09.05.2025	Manoj Soni granted regular bail by this Court (MCRC No. 2078/2025)
20.05.2025	Supreme Court grants ACB final 2 months to complete liquor FIR probe;matter listed on 18.07.2025
09.07.2025	Insurance arrest of applicant in subject FIR (no priorquestioningdespite 1.5yearsprobe.
18.07.2025	Roshan Chandrakar granted regular bail by this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 6581/2025
6.10.2025	Supplementary charge sheet filed against the applicant (investigation qua him complete).

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The applicant has already undergone over 134 days of incarceration in the subject FIR alone, with the charge sheet qua him stands filed; more than 350 witnesses cited alongside hundreds of documents and further investigation is still ongoing-rendering charge framing and trial commencement a remote possibility in the foreseeable future. Such indefinite pretrial detention without recovery of incriminating material from the applicant constitutes cruel and unusual punishment infringing the inviolable right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

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SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT

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Without prejudice to the above narration of the facts, learned counsel for the Applicant submits as under:

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Learned Senior Counsel submits that the present application deserves to be allowed as the continued incarceration of the applicant is

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manifestly illegal, unconstitutional, arbitrary and punitive, offending Articles 14,21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India, and contrary to the settled principles governing arrest and grant of bail. The applicant seeks enlargement on regular bail in FIR No. 01/2024 registered at police station EOW/ACB, Raipur for the alleged offences under Sections 3894,409,120-B IPC read with Sections 11,13(1)(a) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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I. Parity with Co-accused : It is submitted that the applicant's case stands on a far better footing as the bedrock of the prosecution case rests entirely on the principal co-accused, namely Manoj Soni (MD, MARKFED) and Roshan Chandrakar (Treasurer, Rice Millers Association) both of whom have been granted regular bail by this Court after enduring substantial periods of incarceration. Every single allegation against the applicant is derivative, stemming exclusively from statements of these co-accused whose own conviction this Court has categorically held to be “uncertain”. The entire prosecution narrative admittedly rests upon these two individuals. The allegations against the present applicant are purely derivative, flowing only from the statements of co-accused, whose conviction this Court itself has held to be “uncertain”. Parity is not a matter of discretion but a constitutional imperative flowing from Article 14. Denial of parity in identical factual circumstances amounts to hostile discrimination and shocks the judicial conscience.

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If the fountainhead is impure, the steam cannot be pristine. Parity is not discretionary but a mandate of Article 14 - denial thereof shocks

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judicial conscience ( State of Kerala Vs. Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC 78; Vijay Kumar Vs. State of UP 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1125; Chandrakeshwar Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1567 .

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II. The arrest of the Applicant is patently illegal and vitiated, malicious and in gross violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution: The so called grounds of arrest dated 09.07.2025 constitute a derisory half page, vague, non-speaking and boiler-plate document that discloses absolutely no specific necessity, urgency or material particulars justifying the arrest. Despite 1.5 years of exhaustive investigation, the applicant was :

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never summoned;

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never interrogated;

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never questioned prior to arrest.

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The so called “grounds of arrest” is a vague, half page, nonspeaking document, disclosing no material particulars or necessity for arrest rendering it constitutionally invalid. The Apex Court has categorically held that communication of grounds must be real, meaningful and complete, not ritualistic. Reliance is placed on

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Prabir Prukayastha Vs.State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254

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Vihan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269

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Ashish Kakkar Vs. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1318

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Mihir Rajesh Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra , Cr.A. No. 2195/2025.

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The timing of arrest-one week prior to the applicant's bail hearing before the Apex Court clearly exposes a brazen “insurance arrest”, deprecated by constitutional courts.

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III. No Necessity for Arrest-Investigation Already complete.

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There existed no statutory or investigative necessity to arrest the applicant. The investigation qua the applicant stands completed; Supplementary charge sheet filed on 06.10.2025; No recovery pending; Entire evidence is documentary and secured. Arrest merely to justify custody is impermissible. Reliance is placed on Gautam Navlakha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 99 and Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51.

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IV. Absence of Prosecution Sanction renders continued custody of the applicant legally Untenable and illegal: Respondent/EOW has categorically admitted that prosecution sanction stands sought but not yet obtained qua the Applicant. No cognizance of offence whatsoever can be taken by the learned Special Judge without a valid prosecution sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Int he absence of sanction :

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Cognizance is legally barred;

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Trial cannot commence;

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Continued incarceration becomes per se illegal.

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Reliance has been placed in the matters of (Arun Pati Tripathi

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Vs. ED SLP (Crl) No. 16219/2024; Anil Tuteja Vs. ED, SLP (Crl.) No. 3148/202; Manoj Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, MCRC 2078/2025

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“ Custody cannot continue in perpetuity when thelaw itself prohibits cognizance”.

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V. The applicant indisputably satisfies the Triple Test for grant of bail- No Subjective Discretion can Override Settled Law

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The bail is rule, jail is exception under out constitutional scheme (State of Rajasthan Vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308; Sushila Aggarwal Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; P. Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2020) 13 SCC 791 and Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273) . The Triple Test stands conclusively satisfied on impeachable facts and unimagined by prosecution:

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The applicant is not a flight risk- He is a Raipur resident of longstanding with deep familial, social and business roots and is a retired IAS Officer with 34 years of unblemished public service. There is no flight risk, all evidence documentary and secured . The Apex Court itself granted hims regular bail in the ED liquor ECIR (ECIR/RPZO/04/2024) on 15.04.2025, observing no flight risk despite prosecution’s objections (Sushila Aggarwal Vs. State (NCT Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC 440) para 10 “Roots in society determinative”.

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Witness tampering is a physical impossibility- Entire evidence is documentary-charge sheets filed; 350+ witness statements recorded under Section 180/183 BNSS; hundreds of documents exhibited. No pending witness examination requires applicant's presence. No allegation of threats to any witness across cases

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( P.Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13

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SCC 516) : “Documentary evidence eliminates tampering risk”). ensure trial delay; no recoveries; case rests on uncorroborated co-accused statements.

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Evidence Tampering-Physical impossibility - All seized material (devices, documents, digital records) lies in safe custody of learned trial court since charge sheet filing on 6.10.2025. Applicant never accessed premises post-arrest. Robust conditions (reporting, sureties,GPS) can safeguard (Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Abhishek Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC156.

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Prosecution cannot approbate and reprobate : Supreme Court granted bail post considering identical “antecedents” and material. Triple test pre-supposes satisfaction ( Arnesh Kumar

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Vs. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273).

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VI . Prolonged Pre -Trial Punishment violates Article 21 13. The applicant languishes in 134 days incarceration specifically qua subject FIR. Charge sheet stands filed hundreds of documents requiring formal proof; further investigation ongoing per prosecution reply dated 21.08.2025. No charge-framing possible till final report.

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In the first charge sheet filed on 01.02.2025, no cognizance was taken even after more than ten months. The sanction is pending against the applicant and cognizance barred. This Court in the matter of coaccused has noted that “Trial is unlikely to commence/conclude in near future” ( Manoj Soni, M.Cr.C. 2078/2025 and Roshan Chandrakar MCRC 6581/2025 ).

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Legal Position Crystal Clear: Binding precedents leave no manner of doubt- “Pre-trial detention cannot continue indefinitely- it transforms into punishment without trial, violating Article 21” ( Hussainara Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar (1979) 1 SCC 81 para 5 .

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“where trial is likely to take years, continued custody amounts to legal butchery.” (Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Vs. State of MP, 1994 Supp. (5) SCC 560 para 12.”

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“Where trial is likely to take years, continued custody amounts to legal butchery” (supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Vs. State of MP, 1994 Supp. (5) SCC 560 para 12.

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In yet another judgment Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjahb (2020) 19 SCC 273 para 15; and Ajay Kumar Ghose Vs. State of Jharkhand (2022) 12 SCC 472.

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There is no recovery from the applicant despite raids and that the co-accused have been enlarged on identical grounds. The impugned order is perverse and ignores binding precedents; mechanically recites prosecution reply sans analysis. Liberty paramount-Article 21 mandates immediate release ( Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.

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VII. Prosecution Case Collapses on Merits- No Prima Facie case disclosed :

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The prosecution's case against the applicant is bereft of any credible evidence, hinging entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of the co-accused, which renders it wholly unsustainable for purposes of

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denying bail. In the absence of any recovery of unaccounted cash assets or other incriminating material, the allegations fail to establish even a prima facie case. The purported evidence, comprising affidavits exposed as "cut-copy-paste" fabrications and unreliable statements from Roshan Chand, lacks the requisite corroboration mandated under Sections 133 and 114(b) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, rendering it inadmissible and unworthy of judicial reliance.

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Absence of Corroboration

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The testimony of an accomplice, such as the co-accused herein, is admissible under Section 133 of the Evidence Act but stands presumptively unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence connecting the accused to the crime, as per Illustration (b) to Section 114. The Supreme Court has consistently held it unsafe to convict solely on such uncorroborated evidence, emphasizing the need for cautious scrutiny given the accomplice's potential motive to falsely implicate others for personal gain or leniency. In the instant matter, the affidavits tendered by 47 rice millers, dismissed as inadmissible "cut-copy-paste text" fabrications, and the uncorroborated complaint of Roshan Chandrakar—a "no miller"—fail to meet this threshold, leaving the prosecution's edifice crumbling without substantive support.

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No Recovery of Assets

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No recovery of unaccounted cash assets has been effected from the applicant despite exhaustive searches, nor has any tangible evidence of misappropriation surfaced to substantiate the charges. The prosecution rests solely on the bald assertions of the co-accused,

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which, absent physical recovery or independent corroboration, cannot sustain restraint on the applicant's liberty. Such zero recovery scenarios underscore the infirmity of the case, aligning with judicial precedents where absence of material evidence militates against pre-trial incarceration.

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No Attributable Role

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The applicant neither posted in the Food Department nor held any association with MARKFED rice millers, disentitling the invocation of enhanced charges premised on a Cabinet decision embodying a collective policy that precludes individual culpability. Absent direct or attributable role in the alleged irregularities, the charges enhanced via governmental policy cannot be fastened upon the applicant, who stands exculpated from operational involvement. This lack of nexus fortifies the case for bail, as collective policy decisions do not impute vicarious liability without proof of personal complicity.

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Pick-and-Choose Investigation :

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The prosecution's case against the applicant is bereft of any credible evidence, hinging entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of the co-accused, which renders it wholly unsustainable for purposes of denying bail. In the absence of any recovery of unaccounted cash assets or other incriminating material, the allegations fail to establish even a prima facie case. The purported evidence, comprising affidavits exposed as "cut-copy-paste" fabrications and unreliable statements from Roshan Chand, lacks the requisite corroboration mandated under Sections 133 and 114(b) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, rendering it inadmissible and unworthy of judicial reliance.

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Absence of Corroboration: The testimony of an accomplice, such as the co-accused herein, is admissible under Section 133 of the Evidence Act but stands presumptively unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence connecting the accused to the crime, as per Illustration (b) to Section 114. The Supreme Court has consistently held it unsafe to convict solely on such uncorroborated evidence, emphasizing the need for cautious scrutiny given the accomplice's potential motive to falsely implicate others for personal gain or leniency. In the instant matter, the affidavits tendered by 47 rice millers, dismissed as inadmissible. "cut-copy-paste text" fabrications, and the uncorroborated complaint of Roshan Chand—a "no miller"—fail to meet this threshold, leaving the prosecution's edifice crumbling without substantive support.

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No Recovery of Assets : No recovery of unaccounted cash assets has been effected from the applicant despite exhaustive searches, nor has any tangible evidence of misappropriation surfaced to substantiate the charges. The prosecution rests solely on the bald assertions of the co-accused, which, absent physical recovery or independent corroboration, cannot sustain restraint on the applicant's liberty. Such zero recovery scenarios underscore the infirmity of the case, aligning with judicial precedents where absence of material evidence militates against pre-trial incarceration.

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No Attributable Role : The applicant neither posted in the Food Department nor held any association with MARKFED rice millers, disentitling the invocation of enhanced charges premised on a Cabinet decision embodying a collective policy that precludes individual

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culpability. Absent direct or attributable role in the alleged irregularities, the charges enhanced via governmental policy cannot be fastened upon the applicant, who stands exculpated from operational involvement. This lack of nexus fortifies the case for bail, as collective policy decisions do not impute vicarious liability without proof of personal complicity. Reliance has been placed on

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Haricharan Kurmi Vs.State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184

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Kashmira Singh Vs. State of MP, AIR 1952 SC 159

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Balveer Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC1367

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VIII. Post-Reply Introduction of material-impermissible in Bail Proceedings

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The respondent’s attempt to introduce new material through additional written submissions is illegally impermissible. False affidavit dated 25.09.2024 before the Apex Court fabricating Applicant’s role-no material annexed. Pattern of harassment: Liquor arrests deprecated by SC; UP arrest quashed by Allahabad High Court.

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IX. Response to Anticipated Prosecution Objections:

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Chats/Interrogation : Pre-scam (2020); irrelevant (co-accused statement inadmissible) as has been held in Tarun Kumar Vs. ED, 2023 INSC 1006-PMLA, Section 45 rigor absent; petitioner was later granted bail by the Delhi High Court. Antecedents; the Supreme Court has granted bail post consideration as the applicant has been unnamed throughout in the ED/IT cases. Bail adjudication must confine itself to material placed at the relevant stage. Reliance is placed in the matter of Hansabhai Vakilbhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat (2004) 5 SCC 347

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and State of Maharashtra Vs.Suresh (1997) 11 SCC 378 .

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The impugned order dated 22.08.2025 is perverse, suffering from non-application of mind-ignores binding precedents on parity, illegal arrest, sanction and triple test. No purpose served by continued incarceration of a retired public servant. Through these additional submissions, respondent/EOW/ACB has desperately attempted to introduce statements recorded under Section 161 BNSS of certain rice millers and Section 164 BNSS statements of Ankur Paliwal and Suraj Pawar dated 29.11.2024. These material are inadmissible, fabricated and legally infirm, warranting their outright exclusion from bail adjudication.

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Statements under Section 161 BNSS of Rice Millers-tutored, inadmissible and Post-Hoc Fabrication: The statements under the said Section are wholly inadmissible in evidence and cannot constitute the basis for denying bail. Such statements are meant exclusively for contradistinction at trial and carry no evidentiary value at the interlocutory stage .

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28 . These statements of 47 rice millers are evidently tutored and coerced, as demonstrated by the identical “cut-copy-paste” final paragraphs across all statements-a glaring hallmark of fabrication. These statements were suddenly recorded post facto only after this Court’s categorical observation in MCRC No. 6581 of 2025 (Roshan Chandrakar Vs. State) decided on 18.07.2025 wherein it was noted: “No rice miller or any related person has filed any complaint before

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EOW that the applicant has extorted money”. The agencies manufacturing evidence post judicial reprimand merits severe deprecation (Roshan Chandrakar Vs. State of CG, MCRC NO. 6581 of 2025).

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Statements of co-accused/accomplices Ankur Paliwal and Suraj Pawar under Section 164 BNSS cannot form the sole basis for prosecution as it is legally incompetent and Quit Pro Quo fabrication. They are only admissible for corroborative purposes after independent corroboration as has been held in Haricharan Kurmi Vs.State of Bihar, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 28; Somasundaram Vs, State (2020) 7 SCC 722; Kashmira Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159).

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He submits that neither Ankur Paliwal nor Suraj Pawar names the applicant anywhere in their statements dated 29.11.2024 nor do they claim the alleged money was intended for the applicant. These statements are pure hearsay, lacking any direct linkage to the applicant and thus devoid of probative value at bail stage (Balveer Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1367 ). Next submission of the learned Senior counsel for the applicant is that the pick and choose policy has been exposed- Despite admitting involvement in the alleged offences, neither Ankur Paliwal nor Suraj Pawar has been arrested or subjected to any coercive actin. This selective non-prosecution screams quid pro quo for falsely implicating the applicant- modus operandi already judicially noted by this Court in Manoj soni Vs. State and

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Roshan Chandrakar Vs. State.

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The aforesaid allegations are wholly misconceived, factually incorrect, and bereft of any legal or evidentiary foundation. At the outset, it is categorically denied that the Applicant ever convened, participated in, or influenced any meeting at Udyog Bhavan, Raipur, or elsewhere, for the purpose alleged by the prosecution. The assertion that the Applicant instructed the Food Secretary to seek enhancement of the Central Rice Quota is entirely imaginary and unsupported by record. It is significant to note that no document, correspondence, file noting, cabinet memorandum, or approval order has been placed on record by the prosecution to substantiate:

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the existence of any such instruction by the Applicant,

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the date or manner in which the alleged proposal was initiated,

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the authority under which such proposal was approved, or

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the identity of any officer who allegedly acted at the behest of the Applicant.

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On the contrary, as per the complaints and charge-sheets filed by the Income Tax Department, the Enforcement Directorate, and the Respondent Agency itself, the increase in milling charges and incentives was publicly announced by the then Chief Minister, and that too in the context of an Abhinandan Samaroh organized by the Rice Millers. Nowhere in any of these statutory proceedings is the Applicant attributed with any role, direct or indirect, in either the decision-making process or its implementation.

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Notably, the prosecution’s own records are conspicuously silent regarding:

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any participation of the Applicant in cabinet deliberations,

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any influence over policy formulation,

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any benefit derived by the Applicant from the alleged increase in milling charges, or

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any linkage between the Applicant and the administrative process governing Central quota allocation.

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The decision relating to Central rice allocation is taken at the level of the Government of India, involving multiple layers of scrutiny by senior officers of the Central Government. The allegation, if accepted even hypothetically, would lead to the absurd and untenable inference that senior IAS officers of the Central Government acted under the influence of the Applicant—an inference which is not only unsupported by material but is patently untenable in law.

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It is further relevant to emphasize that no allegation whatsoever has been levelled against the Food Secretary or any Central Government official, nor has the prosecution explained why, if such a proposal was allegedly illegal, no action has been initiated against the approving authorities. This selective attribution clearly exposes the targeted and baseless nature of the accusation.

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In sum, the allegation is a post-facto narrative, constructed without corroboration, contradicted by the prosecution’s own documents, and founded on conjecture rather than evidence. The Applicant has been falsely sought to be implicated in a policy decision taken at the

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highest executive level, without any material to demonstrate mens rea, participation, or benefit. The allegation, therefore, does not withstand judicial scrutiny and deserves to be rejected at the threshold.

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Learned counsel for the applicant therefore submits that the respondent/EOW cannot impose case post filing reply as they are tutored statements and non prosecution of alleged accomplices and illegal recording collectively demolish prosecution narrative. The impugned order dated 22.08.2025 suffers from non-application of mind, ignores binding precedents and perpetuates illegal custody. Lastly, it is submitted that the investigation is complete qua applicant, the coaccused are granted bail, the applicant has satisfied the triple test and the delay in trial is inevitable. Continued custody is punitive and violation of Article 21 of the Constitution as it serves no investigational or societal purpose and therefore, the instant application may be allowed and enlarge the applicant on regular bail in FIR No. 01/2024 (Trial No. 01/2025) on terms as this Court deems fit.

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SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

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Learned counsel for the State submits that following arguments opposing the bail application:

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The applicant has preferred the present bail application under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 seeking enlargement on bail in connection with Crime No. 01/2024 registered at police station ACB/EOW,Raipur for commission of offences punishable under Sections 384, 409.120-B of the IPC and Sections 11 , 13(1)(a) and 13(2)

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of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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Learned State counsel opposes bail for the reasons stated below: (a) the allegations disclose grave and organized criminality involving public servants and systematically-collected extortion/diversion of funds; (b) there is voluminous incriminating material-documentary, digital and cash-seized during lawful searches;(c) the offences charges are scheduled predicate offences for the PMLA and therefore engage money-laundering investigation and seizure regimes; and (d) recent jurisprudence and the statutory regime require close scrutiny of bail where the nature of the offence and the stage of investigation indicate a real risk to the integrity of the investigation and to public interest.

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STATUTORY FRAMEWORK- BNSS, PMLA, PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT : Section 483 BNSS preserves the Court’s special power to order bail in appropriate cases and frames the high court’s jurisdiction to pass protective and conditional orders in furtherance of liberty. The applicant proceeds under that provision.

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The present crime is not a standalone or isolated incident. The investigation has its origin in information and material shared by the Enforcement Directorate and the Income Tax Department (Investigation) which had unearthed large scale irregularities during investigation into the Custom Rice Milling Operations in the State of Chhattisgarh.

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A prosecution complaint dated 21.08.2023 was filed by the Income Tax Department before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur. During investigation under the Prevention of Money

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Laundering Act, 2002, the Enforcement Directorate discovered multiple predicate offences falling within the jurisdiction of the ACB/EOW Chhattisgarh.

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Pursuant thereto, information was forwarded to the State authorities, leading to registration of the present FIR. The registration of the FIR is strictly in accordance with law and the mandate laid down by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari Vs. State of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1, which makes registration of FIR mandatory where cognizable offences are disclosed.

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The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended criminalizes” criminal misconduct” by public servants and provides penal consequences for misuse of office (Section 13). The offences originally invoked against the applicant and co-accused fall squarely within the scope of that Act and of the scheduled offences concept for PMLA consequences.

¶148

The investigation conducted os far has revealed a well orchestrated conspiracy involving office bearers of the Chhattisgarh State Rice Millers Association, officials of MARKFED and district level officers. The modus operandi as disclosed from seized documents, digital devices and recorded statements, was that rice millers were compelled to apply illegal gratification at fixed rates per quintal of paddy milled for clearance of their legitimate bills. Searches conduced by the Income Tax Department and Enforcement Directorate resulted in :

¶149

Seizure of incriminating documents and loose sheets containing

¶150

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coded entries;

¶152

Recovery of digital evidence from mobile phones and other devices.

¶153

Seizure of unaccounted cash amounting to approximately 1.06 crores;

¶154

Recording of statements under statutory provisions which corroborate the prosecution case.

¶155

Statements of key persons, including public servants, clearly indicate that the payment of illegal gratification was a precondition for bill clearance and that the conspiracy operated in a systematic and organized manner.

¶156

The material collected during investigation prima facie discloses the involvement of the applicant in the larger conspiracy. The role attributed to the applicant is not peripheral or incident, but forms part of the decision making and facilitation mechanism through which illegal collections were made.

¶157

It is submitted that the at this stage, the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. It is sufficient that the prosecution has placed credible material showing the applicant’s nexus with the alleged offences.

¶158

The Economic offences involving corruption by public servants stand on a distinct footing. Such offences are committed with deliberation, affect public institutions and have serious ramifications on governance and public confidence. The Apex court has consistently held

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that economic offences and corruption cases require a cautious approach while considering bail, particularly when the investigation is ongoing and involves complex financial trails and multiple accused. The present case concerns:

¶161

Abuse of public office;

¶162

Criminal breach of trust in respect of public funds;

¶163

Systematic extortion affecting statutory procurement and distribution systems.

¶164

The magnitude and nature of the allegations clearly militate against grant of bail at this stage.

¶165

Next submission is that the investigation is at a crucial stage. Analysis of seized digital data, examination of money trails and further recording of statements are still in progress. There exists a reals and reasonable apprehension that if released on bail at this stage, the applicant may influence or intimate witnesses many of whom are public servants or associated with statutory bodies; interfere with or tamper with documentary and digital evidence; hamper the ongoing investigation which involves multiple agencies and accused.

¶166

The apprehension of the prosecution is not speculative but is based on the nature of the offence; the position held by the accused and the manner in which the conspiracy was allegedly executed.

¶167

While personal liberty is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional right, it is equally well settled that liberty of an individual must be balanced against the interest of society and the need for a fair and effective investigation. In cases involving corruption and economic

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offences of this nature, premature grant of bail is likely to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

¶170

At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the present bail application is wholly misconceived devoid of merits and deserves outright rejection in view of the gravity of allegations, the depth of conspiracy involved, the magnitude of public money siphoned and the dominant role played by the applicant/accused Anil Tuteja in orchestrating a systematic extortion and corruption racket under the garb of policy decisions.

¶171

Investigations conducted by the Directorate of Enforcement under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002 has revealed that an amount of approximately 140 Crores was illegally collected from rice millers across State of Chhattisgarh under the guise of “special incentive” for custom milling.

¶172

It has surfaced during investigation that the special incentive payable to ricemillers for custom milling of paddy was artificially enhanced to Rs. 120 per quintal, pursuant to a concerted criminal conspiracy between the then political dispensation, senior bureaucrats and office bearers of the Chhattisgarh State Rice Millers Association with the ulterior motive of recovering kickbacks of Rs. 40 per quintal from the ricemillers.

¶173

Investigation further discloses that Roshan Chandrakar, Treasurer of the State Rice Millers Association was entrusted with the responsibility of collecting these illegal kickbacks from rice millers

¶174

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throughout the State and channelizing the same for the benefit of political and bureaucratic patrons. The said illegal collection was carried out with active connivance of co-accused Manoj Soni the then Managing Director, MARKFED, Who was the competent authority for clearance of milling bills. He issued instructions to District Marketing Officers to forward only those bills which were “cleared” by the District Rice Millers Associations, thereby institutionalizing extortion. District Marketing Officers also played an active role by facilitating the clearance of bills only of those millers who paid the demanded kickbacks, thus becoming complicit in the offence. These acts, prima facie, constitute offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 384,417,418 and 420 IPC, 1860 besides offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. On the basis of disclosures made by the Directorate of Enforcement, an FIR was duly registered by EOW/ACB and investigation commenced in accordance with law.

¶176

It is next submitted that from the material collected during investigation, it has clearly emerged that the present applicant, a highly influential bureaucrat during the then regime of the government, was not a peripheral actor, but the principal architect and controller of the custom milling illegal collection mechanism.

¶177

Digital evidence, including Whatsapp chats and documents seized by the Income Tax Department conclusively demonstrates that no significant administrative or policy decision across departments was implemented without the applicant’s approval. His influence extended to allocation of contracts, implementation of schemes, posting of officials

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and protection of illegal operations.

¶180

It has been further revealed that the applicant in criminal conspiracy with Roshan Chandrakar, engineered the enhancement of special incentive from Rs. 40 per quintal to Rs. 120 per quintal with the malicious intent of illegality recovering Rs. 20 per quintal per installment from ricemillers. The applicant, acting through Anwar Dhebar and Roshan Chandrakar received approximately Rs. 20-22 crores as illegal gratification from rice millers. Anwar Dhebar functioned as a conduct and shield for the applicant, providing political and administrative cover for the illegal collections. Without the patronage and backing of the applicant, Roshan Chandrakar would have been incapable of exerting pressure on rice millers or influencing officials of MARKFED and the Food Department.

¶181

It is further revealed that Roshan Chandrakar did not originally hold any key position in the State Ricemillers Association. The Applicant, by exerting pressure, ensured the removal of the then Treasurer Naresh Somani and facilitated the appointment of Roshan Chandrakar as Treasurer, solely to deploy him as an instrument of extortion across the State. The applicant deliberately chose Roshan Chandrakar due to his in depth knowledge of the custom milling business and vulnerabilities of ricemillers, enabling systematic exploitation through threats of departmental action and financial coercion. Thus, the increase in special incentive was not a bona fide policy decision but a calculated device to create a parallel illegal fund. The applicant stood at the apex of the conspiracy, while Anwar

¶182

¶183

Dhebar and Roshan Chandrakar operated as trusted intermediaries.

¶184

Digital evidence further established sustained and contiguous communication between the applicant and Roshan Chandrakar since at least 2020 times, on matters relating to paddy procurement, custom milling and government schemes clearly rebutting any claim of a casual or incidental association. Though these chats may not directly pertain to the precise transaction in the present FIR, they are highly relevant to demonstrate the nature of relationship, control and trust thereby strengthening the prosecution case of conspiracy. To substantiate the facts, the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C have been filed and the applicant has been arrested strictly in accordance with law and is presently in judicial custody. Upon completion of investigation charge sheet has already been filed and investigation against the remaining accused is ongoing. From the FIR and material available in the case diary, a strong prima facie case under the Prevention of Corruption Act is clearly made out. The offence is an economic offence of grave nature, involving deep rooted conspiracy and large scale loss to public exchequer. The Apex Court in the matter of P. Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24 , has held that economic offences committed with deliberate design require a strict approach in bail matters.

¶185

Reliance is further placed on State of Gujarat Vs. Mohanlal Jtamalji Powal (1987) 2 SCC 364, Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 439; Tamesh Bhavan Rathod Vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai

¶186

¶187

Makwana (2021) 6 SCC 230 and Tarun Kumar Vs. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement , wherein it has been consistently held that economic offences constitute a class apart and prose a serious threat to the financial health of the State. In the matter of Tarun Kumar (supra), it has been held as under:

¶188

The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co-accused who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.

¶189

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

¶190

Lastly, it may be noted that as held in catena of decisions, the economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. Undoubtedly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. To cite a few judgments in this regard are Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 7 SCC 439, Nimmagadda Prasad vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013) 7 SCC 466, Gautam Kundu vs. Directorate of Enforcement (supra), State of Bihar and Another vs. Amit Kumar alias Bachcha Rai

¶191

¶192

(2017) 13 SCC 751. This court taking a serious note with regard to the economic offences had observed as back as in 1987 in case of State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Another (1987) 2 SCC 364 as under:-

¶193

“5… The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to books. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community. A disregard for the interest of the community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the community in the system to administer justice in an even-handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest…”

¶194

The plea of parity raised by the applicant is wholly untenable as parity is not a rule of law and the Court is required to examine the specific role of the accused seeking bail. The applicant herein stands on a distinctly higher footing as the mastermind and controller of the conspiracy.

¶195

He therefore submits that in view of the aforesaid facts, evidence, seriousness of allegations, the influential postilion of the applicant, likelihood of tampering with evidence and ongoing investigation, it is respectfully submitted that the applicant has failed to make out any a

¶196

¶197

ground for grant of bail under Section 483 of the BNSS. The present application is false, frivolous and an abuse of the process of law. Grant of bail at this stage would seriously prejudice the investigation and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

¶198

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:

¶199

The Court has bestowed its anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length. I have also carefully perused the FIR, the charge sheet filed till date, the case diary, the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the digital material collected during investigation and the documents placed on record. I have also considered the rival submissions advanced and the precedents cited by both the sides.

¶200

According to the prosecution case, the so called Custom Milling Scam had its genesis in a meeting purportedly held between the applicant and one Roshan Chandrakar at Udyog Bhavan, Raipur wherein the applicant acting in concert and criminal conspiracy with the aforesaid individual is stated to have instructed the Food Secretary to forward a proposal to the government of India seeking enhancement of the Central Rice Quota for the Kharif Marketing Year 2012-22. The allegation further proceeds on the premise that such proposal was allegedly made in anticipation of an unusually high procurement of approximately 10.4 million metric tonnes of paddy and that enhancement of the Central quota was engineered to facilitate the illegal gains under the guise of custom milling operations. The prosecution

¶201

¶202

seeks to attribute a central and controlling role to the applicant in the alleged conspiracy without delineating the precise manner, authority or process through which such influence was allegedly exercised.

¶203

The prosecution has sought to rely upon statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC of certain rice millers, as well as statements under Section 164 CrPC of Ankur Paliwal and Suraj Pawar, to oppose the prayer for bail.

¶204

In the present case, the material placed before this Court prima facie indicates that the statements of the rice millers are stereotyped and mechanically recorded. The Applicant has placed on record a comparative chart demonstrating that the concluding portions of as many as 47 statements of witness numbers 46, 40, 44, 45, 131, 130, 132, 118, 114, 113, 112, 111,110,109,108,106,105,115,126,128,129,160, 165,163,159,162, 54, 63, 96, 154,122,121,120,119,123, 201 and 203 namely, Sohan Lal Sahu, Shyam Sundar Agarwal, Saurabh Chandrakar, Vinay Kumar Agrawal, Amit Kumar Goyal, Aakash Panjwani, Arun Agarwal, Abhishek Agarwal, Deepak Kumar Jain, Dinesh Agarwal, Hotaram Chaudhary, Indar mittal, Kishan Agarwal, ManishAgarwal, Naresh Kumar Jain, Sanjay Agarwal, Sumit Agarwal, Aayush Agarwal, Deepak Kumar Agarwal, Shiv Kumar Agarwal, Yogesh Kumar Agarwal, Manish Kumar Agarwal, Vikas Kumar Agarwal, Prakhar Agarwal, Hemant Kumar Patel, Pawan Goyal, Dongermal Jain, Ganesh Rangatta, Lavlesh Chandravanshi, Vivek Singh Tomar, Dilip Agarwal, Danesh Memon, Chandrashekhar Agarwal, Chandan Agarwal, Manoj Agarwal, Mandeep Singh Arora and Vijay Goyal respectively are verbatim

¶205

¶206

reproductions of each other. It has been reproduced as under:

¶207

“jks’ku panzkdj dks iz’kklfud ,oa jktuhfrd laj{k.k Fkk] ftl otg ls og voS/k olwyh dj ik jgk FkkA bu izHkko dh otg ls og ekdZQsM] [kk| foHkkx ,oa I;kZoj.k foHkkx ds vf/kdkfj;ksa dks izHkkfor dj jgk FkkA tks vf/kdkjh deZpkjkh mldk fojks/k djrs Fks mldk og VªkaLQj djk nsrk FkkA ;g leLr dk;Zokgh og ljdkj ds laj{k.k esa dj jgk FkkA mls ljdkj ds izHkko’kkyh O;fDr;ksa vfuy VqVstk ,oa jkexksiky vxzoky dk izR;{k laj{k.k izkIr FkkA”

¶208

This, coupled with the fact that these statements are verbatim reproductions of each other. This, coupled with the fact that these statements were recorded only after the observations made by this Court in its order dated 18.07.2025 granting bail to co-accused Roshan Chandrakar in MCRC No. 2836 of 2025—wherein it was noted that no rice miller had lodged any complaint of extortion.

¶209

As regards the statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC of Ankur Paliwal and Suraj Pawar, the legal position is no longer res integra that the statement of a co-accused or accomplice cannot be the sole basis for implicating another accused and can be relied upon only for corroboration. This principle has been authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 28 and reiterated in Somasundaram v. State, (2020) 7 SCC 722. A perusal of the said statements reveals that neither Ankur Paliwal nor SurajPawar, the legal position is no longer res integra that the statement of a co-accused or accomplice cannot be the sole basis for implicating another accused and can be relied upon only for

¶210

¶211

corroboration. This principle has been authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 28 and reiterated in Somasundaram v. State, (2020) 7 SCC 722. A perusal of the said statements reveals that neither Ankur Paliwal nor Suraj Pawar has named the present Applicant nor has any allegation been made that the alleged money was intended for or received by him.

¶212

On the contrary, as per their own statements, both the said persons appear to be directly involved in the alleged transactions. Yet, neither has been arrested nor subjected to any coercive action, which lends weight to the Applicant’s contention that the investigation has proceeded in a selective manner. Such a pick-and-choose approach has already been taken note of by this Court in MCRC No. 2078 of 2025 and MCRC No. 2836 of 2025.

¶213

Further, in law, the statement of an accused person cannot be recorded under Section 164 CrPC unless such person has been tendered pardon and made an approver, which admittedly has not been done in the present case.

¶214

It is also not in dispute that after filing of the main charge-sheet, the prosecution proceeded to collect further material and to file a supplementary charge-sheet without obtaining prior leave of the competent Court as mandated under Section 173(8) CrPC. The material so collected cannot, at this stage, be permitted to prejudice the liberty of the Applicant.

¶215

¶216

Additionally, though a supplementary charge-sheet has been filed against the present Applicant, no valid prosecution sanction has been obtained till date. In the absence of such sanction, the learned Special Court is legally barred from taking cognizance, with the inevitable consequence that the commencement of trial stands indefinitely deferred.

¶217

The Applicant also stands on parity with co-accused Manoj Soni and RoshanChandrakar, who have already been enlarged on bail. The role attributed to the Applicant is not distinguishable in any material respect, and denial of bail in such circumstances would offend the principle of parity and equal treatment. Having regard to the nature of the evidence, the settled legal position governing Sections 161 and 164 CrPC, the lack of sanction, the likelihood of a protracted trial, and the principle of parity, this Court is of the considered view that further incarceration of the Applicant is not warranted.

¶218

The settled position of law is that while considering bail, the Court must assess whether there exists a prima facie case, the nature and gravity of accusation, the role attributed to the accused, the possibility of the accused absconding, tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses and the larger interests of justice. The presumption of innocence continues to operate until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt in a full fledged trial. In the present case,upon careful scrutiny of the material placed on record, it emerges that the prosecution case against the applicant rests largely on documentary

¶219

¶220

material, digital evidence and statements of witnesses, all of which

¶221

are already in custody of the investigating agency. The applicant is no longer in a position to influence the collection of such evidence. The apprehension expressed by the State regarding tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses remains general in nature and is not supported by any specific material showing an attempt on the part of the applicant after his arrest.

¶222

It is also relevant to note that the applicant has been in judicial custody for a considerable period. Investigation, in so far as the applicant is concerned, the charge sheet has already been filed. Continued incarceration of the applicant at this stage would therefore partake the character of pre-trial punishment which is impermissible in law,.

¶223

The argument advanced by learned State counsel that economic offences constitute a class apart and require a strict approach is well founded as a principle of law,. However, the Apex court has consistently held that seriousness of the offence alone cannot be the sole ground for denial of bail, particularly where investigation is substantially complete and the presence of the accused at trial can be secured by imposing appropriate conditions.

¶224

The reliance placed by the State on judgments such as P. Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, Y.S.Jaganmohan Reddy Vs. CBI and other precedents does not lay down an absolute bar on grant of bail in economic offences. On the contrary, the said

¶225

¶226

judgments reiterate that each case must be decided on its own facts, balancing the gravity of offence with the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

¶227

At the outset, it is well settled that policy decisions taken by the Government, particularly those involving economic or administrative matters, do not ipso facto attract criminal liability unless a clear, specific and overt act demonstrating mens rea and criminal conspiracy is established by cogent material. The Apex Court has consistently held that courts must exercise great circumspection before criminalizing policy decisions, lest the criminal process itself becomes an instrument of harassment. In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa , ( 1996 ( 4 ) SCC 659 ) the Apex Court has authoritatively held that for an offence of criminal conspiracy, there must exist prima facie material showing a meeting of minds to commit an illegal act, and that mere suspicion, conjecture, or inference cannot substitute proof even at the threshold stage. It has been observed as follows:

¶228

“Let us note the meaning of the word ‘presume’. In Black’s Law Dictionary it has been defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”. (emphasis ours). In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law ‘presume’ means “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. Stroud’s Legal dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which “A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged”. (Emphasis supplied). In Law Lexicon by P.Ramanath Aiyar the same quotation finds place at p.1007 of 1987 Edn. 32. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of

¶229

¶230

materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence; a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.”

¶231

Similarly, in CBI Vs. K. Narayana Rao (2012) 9 SCC512 , the Apex Court has cautioned that officers or persons cannot be prosecuted merely because a decision taken by them, or in which they are alleged to have been involved, later turns out to be questionable, unless there is material to show abuse of position for personal gain. It was held as under:-

¶232

“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in

¶233

¶234

pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.”

¶235

Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the core allegation against the Applicant—that he orchestrated or influenced the enhancement of the Central Rice Quota or milling charges—is entirely unsupported by contemporaneous documentary material. No file noting, cabinet record, correspondence, approval order, or statutory document has been produced to demonstrate that the Applicant had any role, direct or indirect, in the policy-making process.

¶236

Although a supplementary charge-sheet has been filed against the present Applicant, no prosecution sanction, as required in law, has been obtained till date. In the absence of a valid sanction, the learned Special Court is legally precluded from taking cognizance of the alleged offences. Consequently, the trial has not even commenced and is bound to be protracted. Continued incarceration of the Applicant in such circumstances would amount to punitive detention without trial, which is impermissible in law and violative of the Applicant’s fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

¶237

This Court also finds substance in the submission that the

¶238

¶239

allocation of Central Rice Quota is a decision taken by the Government.

¶240

The Apex Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has categorically held that bail cannot be denied as a matter of punishment, and that in economic offences as well, custody must be justified by compelling reasons such as flight risk, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses. None of these circumstances have been demonstrated in the present case.

¶241

Further, in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (supra), the Apex Court has observed that pre-trial incarceration should not be resorted to merely because allegations are grave, and that the object of bail is to secure the presence of the accused at trial, not to inflict punishment before conviction.

¶242

It is also relevant to note that no recovery of unaccounted money, movable or immovable assets has been effected from the Applicant, despite searches conducted by multiple agencies.

¶243

The Court must now assess whether continued incarceration of the Applicant is necessary having regard to: the nature of allegations, the stage of investigation, the nature of evidence,

¶244

the likelihood of the Applicant fleeing justice, and

¶245

the possibility of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.

¶246

The prosecution has not demonstrated that:

¶247

the Applicant is a flight risk;

¶248

¶249

the Applicant has attempted to interfere with the investigation;

¶250

any recovery remains to be effected from the Applicant; or

¶251

custodial interrogation is presently required.

¶252

It is also significant that the trial in the present matter is likely to take considerable time, having regard to the number of accused persons, volume of documents and nature of evidence. Prolonged incarceration, pending trial in such circumstances, would offend the principles of fairness and reasonableness embedded in criminal jurisprudence.

¶253

The Apex Court has consistently held that gravity of offence alone cannot be the basis for denial of bail. Courts are required to strike a balance between the interest of the State in investigation and the fundamental right of the accused to personal liberty. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration, particularly in cases involving voluminous records and multiple accused, offends the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution, when the trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. This Court is conscious that bail proceedings are not to be converted into a mini trial. At the same time, mere allegations, however serious, cannot justify indefinite custody in the absence of compelling reasons.

¶254

Having regard to the nature of the allegations, the stage of investigation, the period of custody already undergone, the volume of evidence involved, this Court is also conscious that the trial is likely to take considerable time. The object of bail being to secure the presence

¶255

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of the accused at trial and not to impose punishment prior to conviction and in the absence of any specific material indicating a likelihood of misuse of liberty, this Court is of the considered view that the ends of justice can be adequately safeguarded by imposing stringent conditions ensuring the applicant’s presence during trial and preventing any misuse of liberty. The object of bail is to secure attendance of the accused at trial and not to inflict punishment before conviction. Thus, balancing the gravity of the allegations with the fundamental right to personal liberty, the stage of investigation, the nature of evidence, the period of custody already undergone and the absence of specific material indicating likelihood of misuse of liberty, this Court is satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for grant of bail.

¶257

Accordingly, the bail application filed by the applicant under Section 483 of the BNSS is allowed . The applicant shall be released on bail upon his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹1,00,000/(Rupees One Lakh only) along with two local sureties of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court, subject to the following stringent conditions, so as to ensure the fair, smooth and expeditious conduct of the trial:

¶258

The Applicant shall surrender his passport, if any, before the learned Trial Court forthwith. In case he does not possess a passport, an affidavit to that effect shall be filed.

¶259

The Applicant shall cooperate fully with the investigation and the trial proceedings, and shall make himself available before the Court or the Investigating Agency as and when required, in accordance with law.

¶260

¶261

The Applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case, nor shall he attempt to influence any witness or tamper with the evidence in any manner whatsoever.

¶262

The Applicant shall not commit any offence of a similar nature or otherwise during the period he remains on bail.

¶263

In the event of any change in residential address and/or mobile number, the Applicant shall intimate the same to the learned Trial Court by way of a sworn affidavit within a reasonable time.

¶264

The Applicant shall comply with any other condition that may be imposed by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.

¶265

It is made abundantly clear that the observations made hereinabove are confined strictly to the adjudication of the present bail application. Nothing stated in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter independently and uninfluenced by any of the observations contained in this order.

¶266

Violation of any of the aforesaid conditions shall entail cancellation of bail in accordance with law.

¶267

(Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge

¶268

Digitally signed by SUGUNA SUGUNA DUBEY DUBEY Date: 2026.01.13 19:14:19 +0530

Anil Tuteja v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Anil Tuteja v. State of Chhattisgarh

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