Vinay Kumar Tiwari Vs Swati

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1

NIRMALA RAO

2026:CGHC:9329

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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MAC No. 2375 of 2025

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1 - Vinay Kumar Tiwari S/o Shri Uday Narayan Tiwari, Aged About 28 Years R/o Shankar Nagar, Ward No. 37, In Front Of Gudakhu Factory, Police Station- Torwa, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Appellant(s)

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versus

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1 - Swati D/o Late Shri Vijay Kumar Sahu, Aged About 32 Years R/o Vijayapuram Colony, B-50, Near Science College, Seepat Road, Police Station- Sarkanda, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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2 - Anurag Kumar Sahu, S/o Late Shri Vijay Kumar Sahu, Aged About 35 Years R/o Vijayapuram Colony, B-50, Near Science College, Seepat Road, Police StationSarkanda, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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3 - Balram Prasad Sahu, S/o Late Shri Malikram Sahu, Died Through Lrs-

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3.1 - (A) Sumitra Sahu Wd/o. Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 35 Years R/o. Ward No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Present Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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3.2 - (B) Simran Sahu, D/o Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 14 Years Minor Through Natural Guardian (Mother) Respondent No. 3a Sumitra Sahu, R/o. Ward No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Present Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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3.3 - (C) Khushi Sahu, D/o. Late Shri Balram Sahu, Aged About 13 Years Minor

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2

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Through Natural Guardian (Mother) Respondent No. 3(A) Sumitra Sahu, R/o. Ward No. 6, Darrighat, Police Station And Tahsil- Masturi, District Bilaspur (C.G.) Present Address- Near Jairam Nagar Railway Crossing, Kotmi Sonar Road, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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4 - Branch Manager, Iffco Tokiyo Insurance Company Limited, Branch Office- Shop No.- 205, Second Floor, M.M. Silver Bhawan, Udyog Bhawan, Ring Road No. 1, Mahavir Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)

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... Respondent(s)

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For Appellant	:	Shri Akash Shrivastava, Advocate.
For Respondents No.1 & 2	:	Shri Mohd. Ruhul Ameen, Advocate.
For Respondent No.4	:	Shri P.R. Patankar, Advocate alongwith Shri Swapnil Thawaney, Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board

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23.02.2026

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Heard on I.A. No.1 of 2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal.

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The appellant/ owner of the offending vehicle has filed this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award dated 2.3.2023, passed by the learned Eighth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur in Claim Case No.839 of 2018 whereby the learned Tribunal passed an award to the tune of Rs.80,47,451/- alongwith interest @ 9% per annum on account of death of Vijay Kumar Sahu and fastened liability with the owner of the vehicle with a stipulation that the Insurance Company shall indemnify the compensation and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.

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Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that there is a delay of 880 days in filing the present appeal. He would contend that an ex parte award was passed against the owner of the offending vehicle on 2.3.2023. He would submit that on 10.9.2025, the appellant herein received execution notice and thereafter, he collected the documents and approached his counsel to prefer this appeal. He would submit that delay part has properly been explained by the appellant and same may be condoned.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/ Insurance Company would oppose. He would submit that the owner of the vehicle appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed its reply and subsequently, failed to appear, therefore, he was proceeded ex parte. He would submit that the appellant had knowledge of pending claim case before the learned Tribunal but failed to participate in the proceedings and, therefore, the reasons assigned in the application for condonation of delay are not available to the appellant. They would submit that the appellant failed to explain the cause of delay properly and therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents present on record.

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Admittedly, the award was passed on 2.3.2023, whereas the present appeal has been preferred on 28.10.2025. In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that the appellant received notice of the execution proceedings on 10.9.2025 and thereafter, collected the documents and filed this appeal. It appears that initially the appellant appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed reply and thereafter,

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failed to appear and was proceeded ex parte. This fact has not been disclosed by the appellant in the application for condonation of delay.

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1. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba

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Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:-

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“ 10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below:

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3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

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11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned. ”

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The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85 , it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

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20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50 , wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has

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obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.

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21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363 , where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

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22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927 , that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

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23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 , this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds . ”

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In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to

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remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision. ”

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In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:-

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“ 30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned

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merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra). ”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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Considering the contents of the application for condonation of delay and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, I do not find any sufficient ground to allow the application. Accordingly, I.A. No.1 is hereby rejected and subsequently, the appeal is also dismissed .

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Sd/-

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(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge

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Nimmi

Vinay Kumar Tiwari v. Swati

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Vinay Kumar Tiwari v. Swati

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