Appellant sought condonation of a 3398-day delay in filing a first appeal against a 2016 decree, claiming he had no knowledge of it while away for livelihood. Finding no sufficient cause or supporting evidence, the court rejected the Section 5 application and dismissed the appeal.
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2026:CGHC:15445
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed by JYOTI JYOTI SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2026.04.07 10:50:48 +0530
FA No. 71 of 2026
Ganpatram S/o Late Runga Sao Aged About 54 Years R/o Village And Post Kashigarh, Tahsil Jaijepur District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
1. Kanhaiya S/o Chheduram Aged About 53 Years R/o Village And Post Kashigarh, Tahsil Jaijepur District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Janjgir-Champa, DistrictJanjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(The cause title is as per the Memo of Appeal)
| For Appellant (s) | : Mr. F.S. Khare, Advocate |
|---|---|
| For Respondent/ State |
: Mr. Lekhram Dhruv, P.L. |
Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Order on Board
06/04/2026
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"APPLICATION FOR UNDER SECTION 5 OF
LIMITATION ACT”
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impugned judgment and decree, which is supplied on 31.01.2026, and this instant appeal is filed before this Hon'ble Court.
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inordinate delay of 3398 days (9 years, 6 months and 20 days) in filing the present appeal. The only explanation offered by the appellant is that he had gone to Jammu and Kashmir along with his family in search of livelihood and therefore had no knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2016. However, the appellant has not placed on record any material to substantiate such claim nor has he explained the long period of delay by assigning sufficient and cogent reasons. The explanation furnished appears to be vague and does not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
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Limitation Act, the Supreme Court held that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. It further held that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application of condonation of delay. Para’s 12 & 15 of the said decision read as under :-
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evil. A what is considers a distress resulting from it operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
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(vi) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
JUDGE
Jyoti
1 issue framed by the court
Whether a delay of 3398 days in filing the first appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act given the appellant's claimed lack of knowledge while working in Jammu and Kashmir.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Basawaraj and anothers Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition OfficerRelied on¶8
2013 (14) SCC 81 · Who else cites this
Pathpati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. And Ors Vs. Special Deputy CollectorRelied on¶9
{2024 SCC OnLine SC 513} · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Ganpatram S/o Late Runga Sao
Kanhaiya S/o Chheduram
State of Chhattisgarh through Collector Janjgir-Champa
Bibhu Datta Guru
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
