Abdul Khalik Vs State of Chhattisgarh

1 - Abdul Khalik S/o Abdul Salam Aged About 52 Years R/o In Front Of C.G. Diesel, K.K. Road, Moudhapara, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh Correct Address Mentioned Of Petitioner No. 4 As Per Annexure P/2 (Colly)

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2 - Abdul Bafhati S/o Abdul Salam Aged About 56 Years R/o In Front Of C.G. Diesel, K.K. Road, Moudhapara, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh Correct Address Mentioned Of Petitioner No. 4 As Per Annexure P/2 (Colly)

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3 - Aliya Shirin W/o Abdul Bafhati Aged About 53 Years R/o In Front Of C.G. Diesel, K.K. Road, Moudhapara, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh Correct Address Mentioned Of Petitioner No. 4 As Per Annexure P/2 (Colly)

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4 - Fhuteja Naaz @ Shahin D/o Abdul Salam, R/o In Front Of C.G. Diesel, K.K. Road, Moudhapara, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Corrent Address Mentioned Of Petitioner No. 4 As Per Annexure P/2 (Colly)

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. Mahila Thana, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh

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2 - Rubina Khan W/o Abdul Khalik Aged About 50 Years R/o Lane Infront Of Rizwi College, Moudhapara, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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	(cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s)	:Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate
For State	: Mr. S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate
For Respondent No. 2	: Mr. Ravi Bhagat, Advocate

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2

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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20.07.2026

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1. Heard Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the respondent/ State and Mr. Ravi Bhagat, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2.

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2. The present petition under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer :-

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“It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and quash the FIR final report, charge-sheet and Criminal Proceedings registered under Section 498-A, 34 of IPC in the interest of justice.”

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3. The complainant, wife of petitioner No. 1 and sister-in-law of petitioner Nos. 2 to 4, was married to petitioner No 1 on 20.12.2019. According to the complaint, matrimonial disputes arose shortly after the marriage, primarily because petitioner No. 4 (the married sister of petitioner No. 1) was residing in the matrimonial home along with her children. The complainant alleged that the petitioners misbehaved with her and intended to take possession of her parental house by compelling her to take them there. Thereafter, she left the matrimonial home on her own and, after about 16 months, lodged FIR No. 91/2021 at Mahila Thana, Raipur. Following investigation, a charge-sheet was filed and charges under Sections 498-A and 34 IPC were framed on 03.04.2024. The petitioners contend that the allegations are false and motivated, asserting that the FIR contains no specific allegation of dowry demand

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or cruelty in connection with dowry, but is merely an outcome of domestic discord arising from the complainant's unwillingness to reside with petitioner No. 4.

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4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the present prosecution is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, as the entire dispute arises out of matrimonial discord and not on account of any demand for dowry. The complainant was dissatisfied with petitioner No. 4, the married sister of petitioner No. 1, residing in the matrimonial home, which led to frequent domestic disagreements. The petitioners never demanded any dowry from the complainant or her family, and the allegations made in the FIR are vague, omnibus and devoid of any specific instances constituting the offence under Section 498-A IPC. Significantly, the complainant voluntarily left the matrimonial home and continued to reside separately at her parental house for nearly 16 months before lodging the FIR, which itself demonstrates the absence of any immediate act of cruelty or harassment. Even the written complaint primarily sought the removal of petitioner No. 4 from the matrimonial home and the complainant's restoration thereto, rather than disclosing any specific dowry-related cruelty. In these circumstances, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners, who are close relatives of the complainant, is wholly unwarranted and amounts to misuse of the criminal justice process, warranting interference in the interest of justice.

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5. He would rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters

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of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another1, Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and

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1 (2012) 10 SCC 741

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4

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another2, Swapnil v. State of Madhya Pradesh3, Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4 (Para-24) , Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another5, Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others v. State of Bihar and others6 and Abhishek 7 v. State of Madhya Pradesh .

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6. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submits that the allegations made in the FIR, the statements of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses recorded during investigation, and the material collected by the Investigating Officer prima facie disclose the commission of offences punishable under Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC. It is contended that the complainant has specifically alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the petitioners and was repeatedly pressurized to take them to her parental house with the intention of securing possession thereof. Merely because the complainant tolerated the harassment for some time and lodged the complaint after residing separately for several months cannot, by itself, render the prosecution case false or improbable, as delay in reporting matrimonial offences is not uncommon and may be attributable to efforts at reconciliation. It is further submitted that the defence raised by the petitioners regarding the complainant's objection to petitioner No. 4 residing in the matrimonial home and the absence of dowry demand are disputed questions of fact, which can only be

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2 (2010) 7 SCC 667

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3 (2014) 13 SCC 567

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4 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620

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5 (2018) 10 SCC 472

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6 (2022) 6 SCC 599

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7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083

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adjudicated upon after appreciation of evidence during trial. Since the investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge-sheet and the learned trial Court has found sufficient material to frame charges, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold by evaluating the defence of the petitioners, and the petition deserves to be dismissed.

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7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2/complainant opposes the petition and submits that, pursuant to the order dated 20.09.2024, both the parties appeared before the Mediation Centre and made sincere efforts to resolve their matrimonial dispute, however, the mediation proceedings ultimately failed as no amicable settlement could be arrived at between them. It is submitted that despite adequate opportunity, the parties could not reconcile their differences and, therefore, the matter has to be adjudicated in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the failure of mediation itself demonstrates that the matrimonial discord remains unresolved and the allegations levelled by the complainant require a full-fledged trial. Since the Investigating Agency has already filed the charge-sheet and the learned trial Court has found sufficient material to frame charges against the petitioners, there exists a prima facie case for proceeding with the trial. Accordingly, the complainant prays that the interim protection granted to the petitioners be vacated, the stay on further criminal proceedings be recalled, and the petition seeking quashment of the FIR and consequential proceedings be dismissed.

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8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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6

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9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS/ 482 of the CrPC.

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10. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others8 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him.

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11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others9 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: -

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"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

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8 (1998) 5 SCC 749

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9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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7

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precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is a instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

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12. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India

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Private Limited v. Visaka Industries10 , Ahmad Ali Quraishi and

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another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another11 and Dr Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar. v. State of Maharashtra and others12 ". The Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and "that too in the rarest of rare cases" as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report.

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13. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34 of the IPC.

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10 (2020) 4 SCC 162

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11 (2020) 13 SCC 435

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12 (2019) 18 SCC 191

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9

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14. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:-

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"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means-

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(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand."

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15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish,

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(i) That, woman must be married:

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(ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband.

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16. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or

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to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security.

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17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai13 considered the issue of delay in lodging

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the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:-

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"8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken.

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Further, it appears that in the complaint petition. apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1."

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13 (2008) 8 SCC 232

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18. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu14 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed.

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19. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 304- B of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

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20. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others15 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

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21. Recently, in the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings

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14 (2009) 14 SCC 244

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15 (2018) 14 SCC 452

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can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:-

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"24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

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There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. "they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore" and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother's sister and husband of mother's sister have

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been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants....."

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22. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR and chargesheet, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR and charge-sheet as it is, offence under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners?

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23. In the complaint so made, the complainant has only made omnibus and general allegations against the petitioners without being full particulars about date and place that all the petitioners including the husband treated her with cruelty for not bringing sufficient dowry at the time of marriage. There is no specific allegation regarding anyone of the petitioners except common and general allegations against all the petitioners that they have demanded cash amount and household articles.

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24. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no specific allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus allegations have been made against the petitioners, we are of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offence under Section 498 A/34 of IPC is made out for prosecuting petitioner Nos. 2 Abdul Bafhati, petitioner No. 3 Aliya Shirin and petitioner No. 4 Fhuteja Naaz @ Shahin for the above-stated offences and the prosecution against them for the aforesaid offence is covered by Category 1, 3 & 7 of para-102 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and as such, liable to be quashed.

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25. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis and also in the facts and circumstances of the case, the FIR No. 91/2021 registered at Police Station, Mahila Thana Raipur against the petitioners for the offence under Section 498-A/34 of IPC and charge sheet No. 109/2021 and the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 14672/2021 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur are hereby quashed to the extent of Petitioner No. 2 (Abdul Bafhati) , Petitioner No. 3 (Aliya Shirin) and petitioner No. 3 (Fhuteja Naaz @ Shahin). The prosecution against her husband i.e. petitioner No. 1- Abdul Khalik, S/o Abdul Salam shall continue.

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26. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners hereinabove and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter and concerned trial Court will decide criminal case pending against Petitioner No. 1 (Abdul Khalik) strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any of these observations made hereinabove.

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27. The petition under Section 528 of BNSS is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

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(Ramesh Sinha)

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Chief Justice

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sagrika

Abdul Khalik v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Abdul Khalik v. State of Chhattisgarh

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