Allowed

Ramkumar Dhobi v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC20 Jul 2026CRA/58/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Criminal appeals against convictions under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC and SC/ST Act for a murder based solely on circumstantial evidence. Finding motive unproved, last-seen testimony unreliable, recoveries lacking forensic nexus, and tracker dog evidence inadmissible, the High Court set aside the convictions and acquitted all appellants.

What did the court decide?

Convictions and sentences set aside; all appellants acquitted with benefit of doubt; custodial appellants to be released forthwith.

Ramkumar Dhobi Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Caste Atrocities | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

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Digitally CGHC010011562021 2026:CGHC:30853-DB signed by ANURADHA ANURADHATIWARI TIWARIDate: NAFR 2026.07.22 10:16:51 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 58 of 2021

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1 - Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi S/o Shri Jagarsai Dhobi Aged About 48 Years R/o Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Santan Dansena S/o Shri Ratan Dansena Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

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--- Appellants

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. of The Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

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--- Respondent

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CRA No. 63 of 2021

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Jeevanlal Dhobi S/o Shri Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, Aged About 28 Years R/o. Village - Aamapali, Police Station - Gharghoda, District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

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--- Appellant

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Versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through - S.H.O. Of The Police Station - Gharghoda, District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellants : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 21.07.2026

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1. Since both the criminal appeals arise out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2020, they were clubbed together, heard analogously, and are being decided by this common judgment.

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2. CRA No.58/2021 has been filed by two accused persons namely Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi and Santan Dansena and CRA No.63/2021 has been filed by accused Jeevanlal Dhobi challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2020 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case under Atrocities Act No. 07 of 2018, whereby learned Special Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellants Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi and Santan Dansena, as follows:-

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Conviction	Sentence
Under Section 302/34 of	: Life imprisonment and fine of
Indian Penal Code, 1860	Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for 1year
Under Section 201/34 of	: Rigorous imprisonment for 07
Indian Penal Code, 1860	years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine,
	additional imprisonment for 1year
Under Section 3(2)(v)of	---

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the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently)

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3. Likewise, appellant Jeevanlal Dhobi has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) as well as under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional imprisonment for 1 year.

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4. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that deceased Mehar Prasad Rathia, a member of the Scheduled Tribe (Kanwar) community and resident of Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh, was found dead in the morning of 20.10.2017 near the toilet constructed in the premises of the Government Primary School, Village Aamapali. The prosecution alleged that during the intervening night of 19.10.2017 and 20.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, in furtherance of his common intention with co-accused Santan Dansena, committed the murder of the deceased by strangulating him with a rope in the verandah situated adjoining the backyard of the house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi. It was further alleged that after committing the murder, accused Ramkumar Dhobi

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Dhobi and Santan Dansena, with the assistance of accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi, removed the dead body from the place of occurrence and abandoned it near the toilet of the Government Primary School with an intention to screen themselves from legal punishment and to cause disappearance of the evidence of the offence. Since the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe community and the accused persons did not belong either to the Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste community, offences under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 were also invoked.

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5. The prosecution further alleged that on the morning of 20.10.2017, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, who was then the UpSarpanch of Village Bahirkela, received information from his wife Krishna Bai that Barato Bai, the mother of the deceased, had informed her that the dead body of Mehar Prasad Rathia was lying near the toilet of the Primary School situated in Village Aamapali. Upon reaching the spot, PW-8 noticed that the deceased was lying in a supine position with visible injuries on his neck and left knee. Suspecting that the deceased had been strangulated to death and recalling that two days earlier the deceased had informed him that accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi had threatened to kill him because of the rape case instituted by his wife, PW-8 immediately proceeded to Police Station Gharghoda and lodged the merg intimation and

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information regarding the occurrence. On the basis of the said information, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/11A) and Dehati Merg Intimation (Ex.P/12) were recorded, which subsequently culminated into registration of FIR (Ex.P/16) for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

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6. During investigation, PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam, the Investigating Officer, immediately visited the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/13A). In the presence of witnesses, he issued notice under Section 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for preparation of the inquest proceedings and thereafter prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/2). The dead body was sent for post-mortem examination vide requisition (Ex.P/14). PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who conducted the autopsy, proved the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) and opined that the deceased had died on account of asphyxia caused by strangulation with a rope, approximately 15 to 17 hours prior to the examination. The Medical Officer categorically opined that the nature of death was homicidal.

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7. The prosecution further asserted that during investigation, a tracker dog named "Ruby" was requisitioned to assist the investigating agency. According to the prosecution, the tracker dog, after smelling the place where the dead body was found, proceeded towards the house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi. The proceedings relating to the tracker dog operation

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were reduced into writing vide Dog Running Panchnama (Ex.P/10). The prosecution relied upon this circumstance as one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence connecting accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi with the commission of the crime.

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8. The prosecution further relied upon the memoranda recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was alleged that while in police custody on 21.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi made a disclosure statement (Ex.P/3) stating that he had concealed the rope used for strangulating the deceased near the wooden structure adjacent to his verandah. Pursuant to the said memorandum, a green plastic rope measuring approximately 113 inches and containing four knots was allegedly recovered and seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/4). Likewise, accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi made a memorandum statement (Ex.P/5) leading to the recovery of a torch allegedly used while shifting the dead body during the night, which was seized vide Ex.P/6A. The prosecution also recorded the memorandum of accused Santan Dansena (Ex.P/6) during investigation.

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9. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer also seized the caste certificate of the son of the deceased vide seizure memo (Ex.P/7A) to establish that the deceased belonged to the Scheduled Tribe community. Subsequently, PW-10 Vandana Rathia, Patwari, prepared the spot map (Ex.P/12A) and

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spot inspection memorandum (Ex.P/9). Upon completion of investigation, all the three accused persons were arrested, their arrest memos (Ex.P/18, Ex.P/19 and Ex.P/20) were prepared, intimation of arrest was furnished to their relatives and, after recording the statements of the witnesses and collecting all documentary evidence, the investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet before the Court of the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raigarh.

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10. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the prosecution examined twelve witnesses, namely PW-1 Dileshwar Rathia, PW-2 Uttara Kumar, PW-3 Chandan Singh, PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia, PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-7 Doleram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia (informant), PW-9 Ramesh, PW-10 Vandana Rathia (Patwari), PW-11 DSP Neha Verma and PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam (Investigating Officer), besides exhibiting documentary evidence including Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/21. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Special Judge convicted accused Ramkumar Dhobi for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST Act, convicted accused Santan Dansena under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, and convicted accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi under Section 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST Act, by the

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impugned judgment dated 24.12.2020, which is under challenge in the present criminal appeals.

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11. Mr. Abhishek Saraf, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would vehemently submit that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge is contrary to the evidence available on record, suffers from patent illegality and perversity and is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the entire evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded the conviction merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures without there being a complete chain of incriminating circumstances. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has utterly failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt, yet the learned trial Court has erroneously convicted them by ignoring the settled principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence. He would submit that the entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence and none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution has been proved in accordance with law. It is argued that the prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the appellants and excludes every hypothesis consistent with their innocence. According to learned counsel, each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution suffers from serious infirmities,

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material contradictions and omissions, rendering the entire prosecution story highly doubtful. It is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate these glaring deficiencies and has recorded the conviction on wholly insufficient evidence.

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12. Learned counsel would further submit that the alleged recoveries made pursuant to the memorandum statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act have no evidentiary value. Inviting the attention of this Court to the testimony of PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses, it is argued that he has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. In the absence of independent corroboration, the alleged recovery of the plastic rope and torch cannot be relied upon. It is further submitted that the rope and torch are ordinary household articles commonly available in every village household and their alleged recovery from the open backyard or courtyard of the accused persons does not constitute an incriminating circumstance. Learned counsel would contend that the prosecution has not produced any scientific or forensic evidence connecting the seized rope with the alleged strangulation. Neither the rope was subjected to forensic examination nor was any medical opinion obtained from the autopsy surgeon regarding whether the injuries found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by the seized rope. In these circumstances, according to learned counsel, the alleged recoveries lose all evidentiary significance.

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13. Learned counsel would next contend that the medical evidence completely belies the prosecution story. Drawing the attention of this Court to the testimony of PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who conducted the post-mortem examination and proved Ex.P/8, it is argued that in his cross-examination the doctor admitted that in cases of strangulation the tongue and eyes generally protrude and a distinct ligature mark is ordinarily found around the neck. It is submitted that the doctor has not specified the dimensions or characteristics of any ligature mark found on the neck of the deceased. Learned counsel further submits that the doctor has categorically admitted that if a person is forcibly overpowered by sitting on his body while strangulating him, corresponding injuries would normally be found on the back and other parts of the body, whereas no such injuries were noticed during the post-mortem examination. It is further contended that PW-5 has also admitted that the seized rope was never shown to him for obtaining any medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the injuries sustained by the deceased. According to learned counsel, these admissions create a serious dent in the prosecution case and completely demolish the theory that the deceased was strangulated by using the rope allegedly recovered from the possession of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi.

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14. Learned counsel would further submit that the evidence relating to the alleged motive is equally weak and inconclusive. Merely

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because an earlier criminal case under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi at the instance of the wife of the deceased, the same by itself cannot constitute proof of guilt. It is argued that motive, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and in the absence of reliable substantive evidence connecting the appellants with the commission of the crime, the alleged motive loses all significance. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish any immediate provocation or surrounding circumstances showing that the appellants acted upon such alleged motive.

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15. Learned counsel would further contend that the so-called "last seen" circumstance projected by the prosecution is wholly unreliable. Attention has been invited to the evidence of PW-9 Ramesh, who is alleged to have seen the appellants carrying a heavy object during the intervening night. Learned counsel submits that PW-9 has categorically admitted in paragraph 6 of his cross-examination that neither he nor PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia was carrying any torch while returning during the night. He has further admitted that he did not enquire from the appellants as to what they were carrying and that he merely noticed some heavy article being carried by them. He nowhere stated that he had actually seen the dead body of the deceased being carried by the appellants. According to learned counsel, in the absence

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of any source of light and in view of these admissions, the alleged identification of the appellants during the dark hours of the night becomes wholly doubtful and cannot safely be relied upon.

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16. It is further contended that the testimony of PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia also does not inspire confidence. Learned counsel submits that during his deposition before the Court, PW-6 for the first time stated that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had informed the police that they had seen the appellants carrying the dead body towards the school. This fact was admittedly never stated by him during investigation under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such material improvement made for the first time before the Court, according to learned counsel, materially affects the credibility of the witness and renders his testimony wholly unreliable. The learned trial Court, however, failed to notice these significant omissions and improvements while recording the conviction. He would also submit that the testimony of the complainant PW-8 Thandaram Rathia suffers from serious infirmities. It is argued that during cross-examination he admitted that before lodging the report he had discussions with the villagers in the society and thereafter made the allegations against the appellants. According to learned counsel, this admission clearly demonstrates that the witness was a tutored witness and his testimony was the result of collective deliberation rather than his own personal knowledge. Such evidence, it is

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contended, ought to have been scrutinized with great caution, but the learned trial Court has accepted the same without any independent corroboration.

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17. Learned counsel would next submit that the investigation itself suffers from serious lapses. Inviting the attention of this Court to the testimony of PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam, the Investigating Officer, it is argued that he has admitted during crossexamination that the rope allegedly recovered pursuant to the memorandum statement of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi was never sent for forensic examination. He further admitted that no opinion was sought from the doctor regarding whether the injuries found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by the seized rope. The investigating officer also failed to collect nail scrapings or other scientific evidence which could have connected the appellants with the commission of the offence. He submits that these omissions strike at the very root of the prosecution case and make the investigation wholly unreliable.

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18. Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecution has placed reliance upon the alleged tracker dog evidence; however, the dog handler was not examined before the trial Court and no material was brought on record to establish the training, capability or reliability of the tracker dog. It is argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the dog tracking proceedings in accordance

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with law and, therefore, no reliance could have been placed upon such evidence while recording the conviction.

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19. Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the prosecution evidence is replete with material contradictions, omissions and improvements, particularly in the statements of the prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-à-vis their depositions before the Court. The independent witnesses have either not supported the prosecution or have made substantial improvements during trial. It is contended that the cumulative effect of these infirmities completely demolishes the prosecution case and creates more than a reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of the appellants. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to prove the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error in recording the conviction. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of all the charges by extending to them the benefit of doubt.

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20. On the other hand, Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants and supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire oral as well as

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documentary evidence available on record and has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that the present case is based on circumstantial evidence, and each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution has been duly proved and forms a complete and unbroken chain pointing only towards the guilt of the appellants, leaving no room for any hypothesis consistent with their innocence. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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21. Learned State counsel would further submit that the prosecution has successfully established the motive behind the commission of the offence. It is argued that the evidence on record clearly demonstrates that a criminal case under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi on the complaint lodged by the wife of the deceased, and the deceased had refused to enter into any compromise despite repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. According to the prosecution, the deceased had even disclosed to PW-8 Thandaram Rathia that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had threatened to kill him if he did not settle the rape case. It is submitted that the testimony of PW-8, coupled with the

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surrounding circumstances, sufficiently establishes the motive for the crime. Learned State counsel would further contend that the evidence of PW-9 Ramesh, who saw the appellants carrying a heavy object during the intervening night and thereafter returning empty-handed, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance. The recovery of the rope at the instance of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi and the torch at the instance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi pursuant to their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act further lends corroboration to the prosecution case.

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22. It is further submitted that the medical evidence adduced through PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra fully corroborates the prosecution case. The post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) unequivocally establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal and was caused by asphyxia due to strangulation. Learned State counsel submits that the alleged omissions or contradictions highlighted by the appellants are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. Similarly, the fact that one of the seizure witnesses turned hostile would not render the recovery proceedings illegal, particularly when the testimony of the Investigating Officer PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam inspires confidence and there is no reason to disbelieve the official acts performed during investigation. It is contended that the evidence relating to the tracker dog, the recoveries made pursuant to the

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memorandum statements, the medical evidence, the motive and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses constitute a complete chain of circumstances which has been rightly relied upon by the learned trial Court.

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23. Learned State counsel lastly submits that the appellants have failed to point out any material contradiction, omission or infirmity which would render the prosecution case doubtful or make the findings of the learned trial Court unsustainable. It is argued that the prosecution has proved each link in the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the defence has not been able to probabilise any plausible alternative hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The learned trial Court has assigned cogent and convincing reasons while convicting the appellants for the offences charged and the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal or factual infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the present criminal appeals, being devoid of merit, deserve to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge be affirmed.

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24. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants and learned State counsel at considerable length, bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the Bar and carefully gone through the entire record of the case,

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including the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the statements of the witnesses, the exhibits proved during trial, the memorandum and seizure proceedings, the medical evidence, as well as the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. We have also examined the grounds urged in the present appeals and the legal principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence in criminal jurisprudence.

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25. In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and the evidence available on record, the following questions arise for consideration in these criminal appeals:

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(i) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the death of Mehar Prasad Rathia was homicidal in nature?

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(ii) Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the prosecution, including the alleged motive, last seen circumstance, recovery pursuant to the memoranda under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, tracker dog evidence and other attending circumstances, forms a complete chain pointing unerringly towards the guilt of accused Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena, excluding every hypothesis consistent with their innocence?

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(iii) Whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared the common intention of the principal accused or knowingly caused disappearance of evidence of the offence so as to attract the offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC?

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Point No.(i)

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26. Since the conviction of the appellants rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the first and foremost question that falls for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death of Mehar Prasad Rathia was homicidal in nature. Unless the prosecution first proves the homicidal nature of death by cogent, reliable and unimpeachable evidence, the subsequent circumstances relied upon to connect the appellants with the alleged crime lose much of their significance. The burden to establish this foundational fact squarely rests upon the prosecution and can never be shifted upon the accused.

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27. The learned Special Judge has answered the aforesaid issue in the affirmative primarily relying upon the testimony of Dr. S.R. Painkara (PW-5), the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8), and the statements of certain prosecution witnesses who noticed injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. Having independently re-

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appreciated the entire evidence available on record, this Court finds that the conclusion so recorded by the learned trial Court does not inspire complete confidence and suffers from material omissions and infirmities, which assume considerable significance in a case resting solely upon circumstantial evidence.

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28. PW-1 Dileshwar Rathia, who is the Sarpanch of the village and a witness to the inquest proceedings (Ex.P/2), merely deposed that on the morning following the incident he saw the dead body lying near the toilet of the Primary School, Aamapali, and noticed certain injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. His evidence is confined only to the factum of recovery of the dead body and preparation of the inquest. He neither witnessed the occurrence nor stated anything regarding the manner in which the injuries could have been caused. His testimony, therefore, is of a formal nature and does not advance the prosecution case on the crucial issue whether the death was homicidal.

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29. Likewise, PW-2 Uttara Kumar deposed that after receiving information he reached the spot and noticed swelling and scratches on the neck, injury on the left knee and certain marks on the feet of the deceased. PW-3 Chandan Singh also stated that he saw injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. Similar statements have been made by PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW7 Doleram and PW-8 Thandaram Rathia. None of these witnesses possesses any medical expertise. Their observations

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are confined only to noticing external injuries after the body had already been discovered. Their evidence, therefore, cannot by itself establish the exact cause or nature of death.

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30. The principal reliance of the prosecution is upon the testimony of PW-5 Dr. S.R. Painkara, who conducted the post-mortem examination and proved the report (Ex.P/8). According to the doctor, multiple abrasions were present over the neck, a ligature mark was noticed around the neck, scratches were present over different parts of the body and fractures of the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage were detected during internal examination. On that basis, he opined that death occurred due to asphyxia caused by strangulation.

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31. Ordinarily, the opinion of a medical expert deserves due weight. However, it is equally well settled that the opinion of an expert is only advisory in nature and cannot be accepted mechanically, particularly where the medical evidence itself suffers from inherent inconsistencies or is unsupported by scientific examination. The Court is under an obligation to test such opinion on the touchstone of surrounding circumstances and the evidence available on record.

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32. During an elaborate cross-examination, PW-5 made several admissions which substantially dilute the certainty of his opinion. In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, he admitted that in

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cases of strangulation, the eyes ordinarily protrude, the tongue usually protrudes outside the mouth and a distinct ligature mark is generally found around the neck. Surprisingly, while the doctor opined that the deceased had been strangulated, neither the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) nor his deposition mentions the dimensions, width, depth or complete description of the alleged ligature mark. Such particulars assume considerable importance because the prosecution specifically alleged that the deceased was strangulated with a rope recovered during investigation. Equally significant is the admission of PW-5 that although a rope had allegedly been seized during investigation, the same was never shown to him for examination. Consequently, the doctor could not express any opinion whether the alleged ligature mark corresponded to the width, texture or characteristics of the seized rope. In a prosecution founded upon circumstantial evidence, where the alleged weapon of offence is a rope, the failure to obtain a medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the injuries assumes serious significance.

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33. The doctor further admitted that if a person is forcibly pinned down and strangulated while another person sits upon his chest or abdomen, corresponding pressure injuries or abrasions would ordinarily be expected on the back or heel depending upon the surface. He candidly admitted that no such injuries were noticed on the back or heel of the deceased. The learned trial Court

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brushed aside this admission by observing that such injuries may vary depending upon the place of occurrence. In the opinion of this Court, such reasoning amounts to conjecture rather than judicial appreciation of evidence. Criminal conviction cannot rest upon assumptions intended to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case.

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34. It is further noteworthy that the prosecution did not obtain any forensic examination of the alleged rope. PW-12 Arun Netam, the Investigating Officer, unequivocally admitted during crossexamination that the seized rope was neither sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory nor subjected to any scientific examination. He further admitted that no query was made to the doctor regarding the compatibility of the rope with the injuries found on the neck of the deceased. Thus, one of the most vital links sought to be relied upon by the prosecution remained wholly unestablished.

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35. Modern criminal jurisprudence increasingly emphasizes the importance of scientific investigation. Where the prosecution alleges death by ligature strangulation and claims recovery of the very rope used in the commission of the offence, failure to subject such article to forensic examination creates a significant gap in the chain of evidence. The omission becomes more glaring when the prosecution seeks conviction solely on circumstantial evidence.

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36. Another important aspect which escaped the attention of the learned Special Judge is that the prosecution has not produced any biological, serological or forensic evidence connecting the alleged rope with the deceased. There is no report indicating the presence of blood, skin tissues, fibres, epithelial cells or any other biological material on the seized article. The alleged weapon, therefore, remained nothing more than an ordinary rope commonly available in rural households.

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37. The evidence of PW-5, read as a whole, undoubtedly suggests that the deceased sustained injuries before death. However, the medical evidence falls short of conclusively establishing, beyond every reasonable doubt, the precise mechanism by which those injuries were inflicted. The admissions made during crossexamination create substantial uncertainty regarding the prosecution theory that the deceased was strangulated with the seized rope in the manner alleged.

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38. The learned Special Judge has extensively referred to passages from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Cox's Medical Jurisprudence while affirming the prosecution case. In the considered opinion of this Court, medical literature undoubtedly furnishes valuable guidance to understand scientific principles. Nevertheless, authoritative textbooks cannot substitute legal proof. Criminal Courts are required to decide cases on legally admissible evidence adduced before them and not merely upon

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theoretical propositions contained in medical treatises. Where the prosecution evidence itself suffers from material deficiencies, reference to medical literature cannot cure those defects.

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39. The Supreme Court has consistently held that expert opinion is advisory and must be evaluated along with the entire body of evidence. In Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 10 SCC 166 , the Court observed that though medical evidence is an important piece of evidence, it cannot be read in isolation and must be tested against the surrounding circumstances. Similarly, in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2022) 8 SCC 536 , the Supreme Court reiterated that where material inconsistencies exist between medical evidence and the prosecution case, the accused is entitled to the benefit arising therefrom.

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40. Equally instructive is the principle reiterated in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 , wherein the Supreme Court observed that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof and that every link forming the foundation of a criminal conviction must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Where two possible views emerge from the evidence, the one favourable to the accused must necessarily prevail.

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41. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that although the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the

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deceased suffered ante-mortem injuries and died an unnatural death, the evidence led by it falls short of conclusively proving, beyond all reasonable doubt, the precise homicidal manner alleged by the prosecution. The absence of forensic corroboration, failure to correlate the seized rope with the injuries, material admissions of PW-5 during cross-examination and significant investigative omissions introduce a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution version.

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42. This Court is conscious that every omission in investigation may not necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused. However, where the entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence and the prosecution seeks conviction for the gravest offence known to criminal law, every foundational circumstance must be proved with certainty. The deficiencies noticed herein are not minor irregularities but strike at very substratum of prosecution case.

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43. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that although the prosecution has established that the death of Mehar Prasad Rathia was unnatural and accompanied by ante-mortem injuries, it has failed to establish, with the degree of certainty required in criminal law, that the prosecution version regarding homicidal death by ligature strangulation stands proved beyond reasonable doubt.

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Point No. (ii)

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44. Having held while answering Point No.(i) that the prosecution has not established with complete certainty the precise homicidal manner of death alleged by it, this Court now proceeds to examine whether the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution independently constitute an unbroken chain leading only to the hypothesis of the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena. Since admittedly there is no ocular account of the occurrence, the conviction rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence. The settled principles governing appreciation of such evidence are too well entrenched to require elaborate reiteration, yet their application to the facts of the present case assumes paramount importance.

¶120

45. The law is now firmly settled by the Constitution Bench decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , that before a conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, each incriminating circumstance must be firmly established; the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; they must exclude every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence; and the chain must be so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that in all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. These principles have consistently been reaffirmed in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10

¶121

¶122

SCC 725, Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 and Ravi Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2022) 8 SCC 536 . The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that suspicion, however grave, can never substitute legal proof and that every missing link in the chain necessarily enures to the benefit of the accused.

¶123

46. The learned Special Judge has founded the conviction principally upon the following circumstances: (i) motive arising out of the earlier rape case allegedly lodged against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi; (ii) the testimony of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9 Ramesh Rathia regarding the appellants allegedly carrying a heavy object during the night; (iii) recovery of rope and torch pursuant to memoranda under Section 27 of the Evidence Act; (iv) tracker dog evidence; and (v) the conduct of the accused coupled with other surrounding circumstances. This Court shall examine each of these circumstances independently and thereafter cumulatively.

¶124

47. The prosecution has projected motive on the premise that the wife of the deceased had earlier lodged a criminal case alleging commission of rape against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, and that the deceased had refused to compromise the said criminal case despite repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. It is true that certain prosecution witnesses have made a general reference to the existence of such a criminal case and the alleged refusal of

¶125

¶126

the deceased to enter into a compromise. However, it is equally well settled that motive, however strong, can never take the place of proof and assumes significance only when the prosecution has otherwise succeeded in establishing a complete chain of incriminating circumstances. In Anwar Ali (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that motive by itself cannot sustain a conviction where the remaining circumstances are not conclusively established. Likewise, in Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 , it was held that although motive may lend support to the prosecution case, its existence cannot compensate for the absence of reliable evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

¶127

48. Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive in accordance with law. Though an assertion has been made that a rape case was earlier instituted against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, the prosecution has not produced any documentary evidence whatsoever relating to the said criminal proceedings. Neither the First Information Report, nor the chargesheet, nor the judgment of conviction, if any, nor the order of sentence allegedly imposed upon appellant Ramkumar Dhobi has been brought on record. There is absolutely no material to indicate whether the said prosecution culminated in conviction or acquittal, whether the case was pending on the date of occurrence, what was the stage of the proceedings, or whether

¶128

¶129

appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had actually undergone any sentence. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish that the alleged criminal case had assumed such seriousness as to furnish a compelling motive for the commission of the present offence. Mere oral assertions by interested witnesses regarding the existence of an earlier criminal case cannot be treated as proof of motive, particularly when the best documentary evidence was admittedly available but deliberately withheld.

¶130

49. Furthermore, none of the prosecution witnesses has deposed with certainty regarding the date, time, place or specific circumstances in which the alleged threat was administered by appellant Ramkumar Dhobi to the deceased for effecting a compromise. No independent witness has been examined to corroborate the allegation that any demand for compromise was ever made or that the deceased had categorically refused the same. Even the Investigating Officer has not collected any material during investigation demonstrating that such compromise talks had actually taken place or that any immediate dispute had arisen shortly before the occurrence.

¶131

50. The evidence, therefore, merely establishes the existence of a prior dispute, if at all, but falls far short of proving a motive so immediate, proximate and compelling as to irresistibly point towards the guilt of the appellants. The learned trial Court, in the

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¶133

considered opinion of this Court, has elevated suspicion into proof while appreciating this circumstance, which approach is wholly impermissible in a criminal trial founded exclusively upon circumstantial evidence.

¶134

51. The prosecution next relies upon the so-called "last seen" evidence of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. At the outset, it deserves notice that the evidence of PW-4 remained incomplete as his examination-in-chief was not concluded owing to his unfortunate demise before crossexamination. Such testimony, having remained untested by cross-examination, could not have been relied upon as substantive evidence against the appellants. The learned Special Judge committed a manifest error in placing reliance upon such incomplete testimony.

¶135

52. The entire prosecution case, therefore, substantially rests upon the evidence of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. According to him, while he and Parmeshwar were proceeding to catch fish at about 3.00 a.m. on the night of Deepawali, he noticed two persons carrying a heavy object and thereafter saw three persons, namely Ramkumar Dhobi, Santan Dansena and Jeevan Lal Dhobi, returning empty-handed from the direction of the school. The testimony of PW-9, when carefully scrutinized, does not inspire the confidence necessary for recording a conviction for murder. During cross-examination, PW-9 categorically admitted that

¶136

¶137

neither he nor Parmeshwar was carrying any torch. He further admitted that he did not ask the appellants where they were going nor did he notice what article they were allegedly carrying. Significantly, he stated that he merely saw "some heavy object". He never identified the object as a human body. He did not depose that any limb, clothing or other feature of a human body was visible. Thus, the entire inference drawn by the learned Special Judge that the object carried by the appellants was the body of the deceased is purely speculative.

¶138

53. The circumstance becomes even more doubtful when viewed in the backdrop of the admitted fact that the incident occurred on the night of Deepawali, during the early hours of the morning. PW-9 admitted that there was no torch with him. Although the learned trial Court presumed that the appellants could be identified in starlight because they belonged to the same village, such reasoning overlooks the fundamental principle that criminal conviction cannot rest upon presumptions. Identification under difficult lighting conditions without any independent corroboration necessarily calls for cautious scrutiny.

¶139

54. It is equally significant that PW-9 admitted that he did not disclose certain material facts to the police during investigation. PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia admitted in paragraph 22 of his deposition that the fact that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had allegedly seen the appellants carrying the dead body was disclosed for the first

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¶141

time before the Court and had not been stated to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such material improvement strikes at the root of the prosecution case. The Supreme Court in Jafarudheen (supra) has held that material improvements touching the core of the prosecution story render the testimony unsafe for sustaining conviction in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

¶142

55. Another circumstance heavily relied upon by the prosecution is the recovery of a rope and torch pursuant to the memoranda allegedly recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The evidentiary value of such recovery is, however, extremely limited. It is well settled that for a discovery under Section 27 to acquire incriminating significance, the recovered article must have a direct nexus with the commission of the offence. In the present case, PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses, did not support the prosecution and was declared hostile. His evidence completely demolishes the prosecution version regarding the recoveries. The remaining seizure witnesses are either interested witnesses or formal witnesses. More importantly, PW-12 Arun Netam admitted that neither the rope nor the torch was sent for forensic examination. The rope was not shown to PW-5 Dr. S.R. Painkara for obtaining an opinion whether it could have caused the alleged ligature mark. No blood, hair, skin tissue, fibre or DNA was detected on the rope. The torch likewise yielded no incriminating material. Thus, the recovered articles remain

¶143

¶144

ordinary household articles commonly available in every rural dwelling.

¶145

56. In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11 SCC 724 , and subsequently reiterated in Ravi Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court has held that mere recovery of ordinary articles without establishing their nexus with the crime does not constitute an incriminating circumstance. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court finds that the alleged recoveries in the present case are wholly innocuous and incapable of connecting the appellants with the alleged offence.

¶146

57. Equally untenable is the reliance placed by the learned Special Judge upon the tracker dog evidence. According to PW-7 Doleram, PW-6 Ashok Kumar and PW-2 Uttara Kumar, the tracker dog allegedly proceeded from the place where the dead body was found to the house of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi. However, the prosecution failed to examine the dog handler, who alone could have proved the manner in which the tracking was conducted. PW-12 Investigating Officer admitted that there was no order deputing the dog squad, no station diary entry, no contemporaneous record regarding the deployment of the tracker dog and even the breed and characteristics of the dog were not mentioned in Ex.P/10.

¶147

¶148

58. It is a settled principle that tracker dog evidence is merely corroborative and cannot form substantive evidence of guilt. In Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v. State of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCC 593 , the Supreme Court held that evidence relating to police dogs is inherently weak and unsafe to form the basis of conviction unless independently corroborated. The same principle has consistently been followed in subsequent decisions. In the present case, the tracker dog evidence is unsupported by the testimony of the dog handler and suffers from glaring procedural deficiencies. Consequently, the same deserves to be excluded from consideration.

¶149

59. The learned Special Judge has further relied upon the conduct of the appellants and certain surrounding circumstances. However, none of these circumstances possesses any definite incriminating character. Suspicion generated by the conduct of an accused cannot substitute proof. Criminal Courts are concerned not with probabilities or conjectures but with legal evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

¶150

60. Another serious infirmity which has escaped the notice of the learned trial Court is the cumulative effect of the investigative lapses. The prosecution failed to seize or scientifically examine any biological material connecting the appellants with the alleged occurrence. No fingerprints, footprints, DNA, bloodstains or fibre analysis has been produced. The place where the prosecution

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¶152

alleges the murder to have occurred was never scientifically linked with the deceased. The alleged rope remained unexamined. The torch yielded nothing incriminating. Even the tracker dog evidence remains legally inadmissible in the absence of the handler's testimony. Each of these omissions assumes greater significance in a case entirely dependent upon circumstantial evidence.

¶153

61. It is true that every lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer does not necessarily entitle the accused to acquittal. Nevertheless, where such lapses destroy the evidentiary value of the principal incriminating circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, the Court cannot ignore them. The burden of proving every link of the chain beyond reasonable doubt always remains upon the prosecution and cannot be diluted by deficiencies in investigation.

¶154

62. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-6, PW-7, PW-9 and PW-12, read together with Ex.P/8, Ex.P/10 and the memoranda and seizure proceedings, this Court is unable to hold that the prosecution has established a complete chain of circumstances consistent only with the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena. Each of the principal circumstances suffers either from evidentiary weakness, material improvement, lack of scientific corroboration or legal

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¶156

inadmissibility. The chain is not merely incomplete; several links are altogether missing.

¶157

63. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), the Supreme Court emphatically held that if any one of the essential links in the chain of circumstantial evidence is not proved, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The same principle has been reiterated in Nagendra Sah (supra) and Jafarudheen (supra). Applying these well-settled principles, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not exclude every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants.

¶158

64. Consequently, Point No.(ii) is answered in the negative. The prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, a complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing unerringly towards the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena.

¶159

Point No. (iii)

¶160

65. Having held while answering Point No.(ii) that the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances against the principal accused, this Court now proceeds to examine whether the independent conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC can nevertheless be sustained. The prosecution was under a legal obligation to establish, beyond all reasonable doubt, either (i) that

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¶162

appellant Jeevan Lal shared the common intention with the principal offenders in commission of the alleged offence, or (ii) that after having knowledge or reason to believe that an offence of murder had been committed, he intentionally caused disappearance of evidence with the object of screening the offenders from legal punishment. Unless these essential ingredients are affirmatively established by reliable evidence, conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot legally stand.

¶163

66. It is settled law that the offence under Section 201 IPC is not attracted merely because an accused is related to the principal offender or is present near the place of occurrence. The prosecution must prove conscious knowledge of commission of the principal offence coupled with a positive act intended to cause disappearance of evidence. Suspicion, conjectures or moral probabilities can never substitute proof. The Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), V.L. Tresa v. State of Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549, Suresh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18 SCC 654, and recently in Jumail Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1259 , has reiterated that before recording conviction under Section 201 IPC, the prosecution must establish conscious knowledge of commission of the principal offence and deliberate acts designed to obliterate evidence. Mere suspicion or post-occurrence presence is legally insufficient.

¶164

¶165

67. In the present case, the learned trial Court has convicted appellant Jeevan Lal principally on the reasoning that since he was allegedly seen accompanying the other accused persons after the occurrence and was present when the dead body was allegedly shifted, he must have known about the murder and therefore shared the common intention to cause disappearance of evidence. This reasoning, in the opinion of this Court, is legally unsustainable and contrary to the settled principles governing criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, the learned trial Court appears to have been influenced by the alleged motive attributed to appellant Ramkumar Dhobi. However, once the prosecution has failed to prove, by legally admissible evidence, the very existence and outcome of the alleged rape case said to constitute the motive, no inference of shared common intention can be drawn against appellant Jeevan Lal on the basis of an unproved circumstance.

¶166

68. The principal circumstance relied upon by the prosecution against appellant Jeevan Lal is the testimony of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. A careful reading of his deposition shows that he merely stated that while he and deceased witness Parmeshwar were proceeding for fishing at about 3.00 a.m., they allegedly noticed two persons carrying a heavy object and after a short while noticed three persons returning from the direction of the school. Even if this testimony is accepted in its entirety, the witness nowhere states

¶167

¶168

that the heavy article being carried was the dead body of Mehar Prasad Rathia. Equally significant is the fact that the witness nowhere deposed that he actually saw appellant Jeevan Lal carrying the body, assisting in shifting the body or participating in concealment of evidence.

¶169

69. On the contrary, PW-9 categorically admitted during crossexamination that he neither questioned the appellants regarding the article being carried nor could he identify what exactly was being transported. He further admitted that he and deceased witness Parmeshwar were not carrying any torch and that because of darkness they merely noticed some heavy article being carried. These admissions substantially dilute the evidentiary value of his testimony. In criminal jurisprudence, when the witness himself is unable to identify the alleged object being carried, it would be wholly unsafe to infer that it was necessarily the dead body of the deceased.

¶170

70. More importantly, the prosecution itself admits that the alleged eye witness PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia expired before completion of his evidence. His cross-examination could never be conducted. Consequently, his incomplete examination cannot be treated as substantive evidence against any of the appellants. Therefore, the only surviving witness regarding the alleged movement during the night is PW-9 whose testimony, as discussed hereinabove, is itself inconclusive.

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¶172

71. The prosecution further attempted to connect appellant Jeevan Lal through the alleged recovery of torch under memorandum. However, the seizure witnesses themselves do not inspire confidence. PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses, did not support the prosecution and was declared hostile. The seized articles namely rope and torch are ordinary household articles commonly available in every rural household. The Investigating Officer PW-12 Arun Netam has candidly admitted that neither the rope nor the torch was ever sent for any scientific or forensic examination. No fingerprint examination, no biological examination, no fibre comparison, no blood analysis and no DNA profiling were undertaken.

¶173

72. The absence of forensic linkage assumes great significance because the prosecution sought to connect appellant Jeevan Lal only through these recoveries. In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen (supra), the Supreme Court has categorically held that recovery of common household articles without scientific corroboration cannot become an incriminating circumstance. Similarly, in Pattu Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2019) 4 SCC 771 , it has been held that recoveries under Section 27 lose much of their evidentiary value where the recovered articles are common articles and no scientific evidence connects them with the offence.

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¶175

73. The learned trial Court further relied upon the alleged conduct of appellant Jeevan Lal after the incident. The Court observed that since he reached the spot after discovery of the dead body and did not disclose the alleged murder to police, an inference should be drawn that he had knowledge of commission of the offence. Such reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, directly offends the settled principles governing criminal trials.

¶176

74. Silence or failure to volunteer information to police cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt. Every accused enjoys the constitutional protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and cannot be compelled to become a witness against himself. Unless there exists independent evidence proving conscious participation in concealment of evidence, adverse inference cannot be drawn merely because the accused remained silent. The Supreme Court in Nizam & Another v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550, observed that conduct of an accused can constitute an incriminating circumstance only when it is clearly established and incapable of any innocent explanation.

¶177

75. Equally important is the complete absence of any independent witness proving that appellant Jeevan Lal actually assisted in shifting the dead body. Neither PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-7 Dole Ram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, nor any other prosecution witness has deposed that appellant Jeevan Lal physically participated in transporting the body. Even according to the

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prosecution, nobody witnessed the alleged murder or subsequent concealment. The finding recorded by the learned Special Judge is therefore founded upon assumptions rather than legal evidence.

¶180

76. The prosecution has also failed to establish any motive whatsoever against appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The only motive projected throughout the prosecution case relates to the allegation that the deceased had refused to compromise an earlier rape case allegedly registered against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi. Even this alleged motive has not been legally established. Apart from vague oral assertions made by certain witnesses, no documentary evidence whatsoever has been produced to prove the registration, pendency or ultimate outcome of the alleged rape case. The prosecution has neither brought on record the FIR, charge-sheet, judgment of conviction, nor any other judicial record to demonstrate that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi was ever convicted in the said case or had undergone any sentence. Significantly, the only reference to the alleged rape case appears in the memorandum statement of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi recorded during investigation, which, being hit by Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act except to the limited extent permissible under Section 27, cannot be treated as substantive evidence to establish motive. In the complete absence of any legally admissible evidence proving the existence

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and outcome of the alleged rape case, the prosecution has failed to establish the very foundation of the alleged motive.

¶183

77. Once the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive even against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, there is absolutely no material on record to infer that appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared any grievance, animosity or common object arising therefrom. No prosecution witness has stated that appellant Jeevan Lal had any dispute with the deceased or that he participated in any earlier incident relating to the alleged rape case. There is not even a suggestion that appellant Jeevan Lal stood to gain by the death of the deceased. In a prosecution resting exclusively upon circumstantial evidence, failure to establish motive assumes considerable importance, particularly where the prosecution seeks to invoke Section 34 IPC by alleging common intention. The absence of any independent motive against appellant Jeevan Lal constitutes yet another missing link in the chain of circumstances.

¶184

78. Section 34 IPC postulates existence of prior meeting of minds resulting in common intention. Such common intention may undoubtedly develop on the spot; however, there must be cogent evidence demonstrating participation in furtherance of such common intention. Mere presence at the place of occurrence or relationship with another accused is wholly insufficient. In Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (1996) 10 SCC 508, Pandurang v.

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¶186

State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216, and recently Rohtas v. State of Haryana, (2020) 18 SCC 290 , the Supreme Court reiterated that common intention cannot be inferred merely from association or presence unless supported by clear overt acts and surrounding circumstances.

¶187

79. The learned trial Court proceeded on the assumption that because appellant Jeevan Lal allegedly accompanied the other accused while returning from the school, he necessarily shared their criminal intention. Such inference overlooks the settled principle that every incriminating circumstance must be proved independently before cumulative inference can be drawn. Since the prosecution has itself failed to establish that the alleged heavy article was the dead body or that appellant Jeevan Lal participated in shifting the body, the foundational facts necessary for invoking Section 34 IPC are completely absent.

¶188

80. Another significant circumstance ignored by the learned trial Court is that the prosecution has failed to establish the exact place of occurrence. According to the prosecution, the murder occurred in the courtyard of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi and thereafter the body was shifted near the school. However, no blood stains, drag marks, biological material, fingerprints or other forensic evidence were recovered from the alleged place of murder. Even the Investigating Officer admitted that no scientific examination was conducted to establish that the murder had

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¶190

actually taken place at the alleged spot. Once the alleged place of occurrence itself remains doubtful, the theory regarding shifting of the body with assistance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi becomes equally doubtful.

¶191

81. The evidence regarding tracker dog has already been held inadmissible and unreliable while considering Point No.(ii). Therefore, no corroboration is available from that circumstance either. Likewise, the recoveries under Section 27 have also been found incapable of connecting appellant Jeevan Lal with the offence.

¶192

82. The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is that the prosecution has failed to establish any positive act attributable to appellant Jeevan Lal constituting disappearance of evidence. At best, the material creates suspicion that he may have been present in the vicinity of the occurrence. However, suspicion, however grave, can never take the place of legal proof. Criminal courts cannot sustain conviction on assumptions or probabilities where two views are reasonably possible.

¶193

83. The settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that where the foundational facts themselves remain unproved, every consequential inference necessarily falls to the ground. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive, has failed to establish the place of occurrence, has failed

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¶195

to prove that the object allegedly carried by the accused was the dead body of the deceased, has failed to connect the recovered articles through any scientific evidence, and has failed to prove any overt act attributable to appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The prosecution having failed to establish the foundational circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such failure must necessarily enure to the appellant.

¶196

84. Consequently, this Court answers Point No.(iii) in the negative by holding that the conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC is wholly unsustainable in law. The evidence led by the prosecution falls far short of the standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence and appellant Jeevan Lal is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

¶197

Conclusion

¶198

85. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon an independent reappreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Though the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the death of deceased Mehar Prasad Rathia was homicidal in nature, it has failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the appellants. The prosecution

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has failed even to establish the alleged motive, as no legally admissible evidence has been produced to prove the alleged earlier rape case, its outcome, or that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had suffered any conviction or sentence therein. The only reference to such alleged case is found in the memorandum of the accused, which is not substantive evidence and is wholly insufficient to establish motive. Likewise, the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily prove the last seen circumstance, the recoveries made pursuant to the memoranda under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tracker dog evidence, and the other attendant circumstances in a manner which excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The material contradictions, omissions and investigative lapses noticed hereinabove create substantial doubt regarding the prosecution case. It is trite that however grave the suspicion may be, the same cannot take the place of legal proof. Where two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record, the one favourable to the accused must necessarily be adopted.

¶201

86. Consequently, this Court holds that the learned Special Judge has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants by relying upon circumstances which do not satisfy the well-settled principles governing conviction in a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Court further committed an error in treating an unproved allegation of motive as an

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incriminating circumstance despite the absence of any documentary or legally admissible evidence establishing the alleged earlier criminal case or its result. The findings recorded by the trial Court are not supported by legally admissible and reliable evidence and, therefore, cannot be sustained. The appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

¶204

87. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2021 preferred by appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena, and Criminal Appeal No.63 of 2021 preferred by appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi, deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2021 passed by the learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Raigarh, in Special Sessions Trial No.07 of 2018, convicting and sentencing the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi), as applicable, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby set aside.

¶205

88. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges by extending to them the benefit of doubt.

¶206

89. It is brought on record that the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2021, namely Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena, have remained in custody for more than eight years. Since their conviction has been set aside by this judgment, they shall be

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released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.63 of 2021, namely Jeevan Lal Dhobi, is already on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged, subject to compliance with the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, if applicable).

¶209

90. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the accused-appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶210

91. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

¶211

Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶212

Anu

Ramkumar Dhobi v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Ramkumar Dhobi v. State of Chhattisgarh

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