Khusiram @ Bandu Rajak Vs State of Chhattisgarh

¶1

1

¶2

2026:CGHC:4642-DB

¶3

NAFR

¶4

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

CRA No. 284 of 2023

¶6

1 - Khusiram @ Bandu Rajak S/o Roop Kumar Rajak, Aged About 30 Years, R/o - Mouharpara, Ward No. 3, Police Station - Manendragarh, District - Koriya Chhattisgarh

¶7

versus

¶8

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through the District Magistrate, Koriya, District - Koriya Chhattisgarh

¶9

... Respondent

¶10

(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

¶11

For Appellant : Mr. Aditya Bhardwaj, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. N.K. Jaiswal, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

¶12

Judgment on Board

¶13

Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.

¶14

28-01-2026

¶15

The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 27.09.2022, passed by learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District Koriya in Sessions Case No. 13/2021, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced for R.I. for life with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month.

¶16

Digitally signed byMOHAMMEDAADIL KHAN Date: 2026.02.0415:57:57 +0530

¶17

2

¶18

The brief facts of the case are that, the deceased Aarti was married with appellant and both of them were residing at Mouharpara. Out of their wedlock two daughters and one son have been borne. Deceased Aarti was subjected to marpeet by the appellant on the apprehension that she is having illicit relation with others. On 22.11.2020 at about 8 a.m. the son-in-law of the complainant informed that the appellant has committed murder of the deceased in her house at about 12:30 in the night. When the father had gone there he saw injuries on her head and other parts of the body and lying dead inside the room. Merg intimation Ex.P/1 was lodged by Nemchandra, father of the deceased to the police. Inquest Ex.-P/8A of the dead body of the deceased was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The dead body was sent for its postmortem to District Hospital Baikunthpur where PW-9 Doctor Shweta Kesari conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased and gave her report Ex.-P/14. During her postmortem she noticed external injuries on her body and opined that the cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest or asphyxia due to throttling, homicidal in nature. The FIR Ex.-P/17 was registered against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Spot map Ex.-P/12 was prepared by the Patwari and Ex.-P/18 was prepared by the police. The appellant was arrested on 22.11.2020 and his memorandum statement Ex.-P/4 was recorded. Based on his memorandum statement one wooden belan has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/5. Blood stained

¶19

3

¶20

and plain soil were seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/9. The said belan was sent for its query report to the doctor, from where report Ex.-P/15 was received and the doctor opined that the injury present in the body of the patient can come from the object which is sealed by the Constable. The blood stained and plain soil, clothes of the deceased and belan were sent for its chemical examination to the regional FSL Surguja, Ambikapur from where report Ex.-P/27 was received and human blood of AB group has been found on the sent articles except the plain soil. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC have been recorded, and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh, District Koriya. The case was committed to the learned trial Court.

¶21

The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.

¶22

In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CrPC has also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances that appears against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence.

¶23

4

¶24

After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

¶25

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict him for the alleged offence. There is no eyewitness to the incident and the circumstances are very weak and did not corroborate with each other. The chain of circumstance has also not been completed and there are many components, which are missing in the case. The memorandum and seizure witnesses have not supported the prosecution’s case and the seizure of belan has also not been proved. There are other inmates in the house and therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant is the author of the crime. There is no motive to commit murder of the deceased, who was his wife. In absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, the appellant cannot be convicted for the alleged offence and he is entitled for acquittal.

¶26

On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions or contradictions the

¶27

5

¶28

evidence of prosecution witnesses are reliable and closely connected with each other. It is a case of murder inside the house and the deceased is wife of the appellant. The alleged incident is occurred at 12:30 in the night and the dead body of the deceased found inside the house in injured condition. The appellant has not explained as to how the deceased received injuries on her body and has died. He failed to give explanation as required under Section 106 of the of Evidence Act and thereby he has been held guilty for the offence of commission of murder of the deceased. There are evidence that he suspected her fidelity and there was regular quarrel with her. The belan seized on the instance of the accused is found to be stained with AB group of human blood which is also found in the clothes of the deceased and there are sufficient and overwhelming evidence against the appellant that he committed murder of the deceased and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted him in which there is no scope for interference and his appeal is liable to be dismissed.

¶29

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court.

¶30

So, far as the homicidal death of the deceased Aarti is concerned, the learned trial Court has relied upon the evidence of PW-9 Doctor Shweta Kesari, who conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased. She has stated in her evidence that, on 22.11.2020 the dead body of deceased Aarti was brought

¶31

6

¶32

before her for postmortem while conducting the postmortem she noticed following injuries on her body:-

¶33

(1) Bruise (diffused) red or black in colour present all over left hand anteriorly swelling present over left wrist and hand 30 cm x 5 cm.

¶34

(2) Bruise present around left side of eye and face 3 x 2 cm. (red or black in colour)

¶35

(3) Bruise present over right side of face (red or black in colour) 2 x 2 cm.

¶36

(4) Bruise present over right side of hand and palm 5 x 2 cm and 3 x 2 cm, 1 x 2 cm (multiple wounds) red and black in colour.

¶37

(5) Bruise present over right side of leg (diffused) present all over the leg anteriorly & postiriorly. red or black in colour 40 x 8 cm.

¶38

(6) Bruise present all over the back multiple bruises Que there of different sizes such as. 5 x 2 cm, 7 x 3 cm, 4 x 2 cm., 10 x 5 cm. and multiple small wounds are present

¶39

(7) Bruise (multiple) present over the gluetus region 3 x 2 cm, 8 x 5 cm., 3 x 2 cm.

¶40

(8) contusion wound from hard and blunt object are present in gleutaus region 2 x 1x .5 cm.

¶41

7

¶42

(9) Signs at throttling is also present thumb impression and abrasion of 2 x .5 cm present right side of neck. and impression of four finger are present in left side of neck.

¶43

She opined that the cause of death was in my opinion cardio respiratory arrest or asphyxia due to throttling, homicidal in nature. She proved the postmortem report Ex.-P/14. She also gave query report Ex.-P/15 and opined that the injuries found on the body of the deceased could have been caused by the said belan. In cross-examination though she admitted that the injury received by the deceased on lung could have been caused by falling on the floor by force if it would be the hard surface. She also stated that the number of injuries found on the body of the deceased which could not have been caused by falling. The defence could not abstract any material so that evidence of the doctor could be disbelieved that the death of the deceased was not homicidal but for some other reason.

¶44

The injuries found on the body of the deceased was also supported by the witnesses PW-1 Nemchandra, PW-2 Keshav Vishwakarma, PW-3 Suraj, PW-5 Sanju Das Vaishnao, PW-7 Jyoti, PW-7 Roop Kumar who all have corroboratively stated that when they reached on the spot they saw that the dead body of the deceased was lying inside the house, blood was oozed out and number of injuries over the body of the deceased. Further from the weapon of offence, i.e., belan AB group of blood was found in

¶45

8

¶46

the FSL examination and thus, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court after considering the evidence led by the prosecution that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, is based on proper appreciation of evidence which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record.

¶47

So far as the involvement of the appellant in the offence in question is concerned, the case of the prosecution is based on the circumstantial evidence that at the relevant point of time, the appellant and the deceased were in the house, the time of incident is 12:30 in the night and the deceased is wife of the appellant. PW-1 is father of the deceased who stated in his evidence that the appellant used to raise quarrel with the deceased and they convinced him many times not to raise quarrel with her.

¶48

PW-2 Keshav Vishwakarma is brother-in-law of the deceased, he too has stated that on being received information he had gone to the house of the deceased and saw her dead body. He turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case.

¶49

PW-3 Suraj has also stated that the appellant used to quarrel with his wife Aarti and beat her. He and other family members tried to convince him, but he did not convinced.

¶50

PW-5 Sanju Das Vaishnao is one of the relative of the deceased, he has stated in his evidence that on the date of incident at about 8 a.m. when he was in his house the appellant came there and

¶51

9

¶52

informed about the incident that there was a quarrel with her in the night and she could not speak. Thereafter, he fled away from the place. When he had gone to the house of the deceased they saw her dead body inside the house. They informed the police and the police investigation was started.

¶53

PW-7 Jyoti is sister of the deceased. She has stated in her evidence that the deceased had performed love marriage with the appellant 8-9 years back. She is having three children. She was residing happily in her matrimonial house, but also having quarrel with her husband. In the morning she came to know that the appellant committed murder of her sister. When she had gone to her house she saw her dead body lying inside her house. Thereafter, the report has been lodged. In cross-examination she remained firm in saying that both of them were having quarrel with each other and she denied that the deceased received injuries by falling on the floor.

¶54

PW-8 Roop Kumar is father-in-law of the deceased, but he has not supported the prosecution case and turned hostile.

¶55

From all these evidence it clearly reveals that the appellant and the deceased were residing together in the same house where the dead body of the deceased was found in injured condition. The appellant could not explain about the injuries found on the body of the deceased that too inside the house and in the night at about 12:30. When he informed the witness PW-5 Sanju Das

¶56

10

¶57

Vaishnao in the morning that he was having quarrel with his wife in the night and thereafter he fled away from the place clearly demonstrates his conduct that he is culprit of the offence.

¶58

18. In the case of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2023) 16

¶59

SCC 575, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 34 to 40 has held as under:

¶60

“34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, states as under:

¶61

“106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket, The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.

¶62

35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to

¶63

11

¶64

establish the facts which are, “especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience.

¶65

36. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer reported in AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:

¶66

“11. … The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p. 49 (B).”

¶67

37. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under:

¶68

“22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.

¶69

23. When a case is resting on circumstantial

¶70

12

¶71

evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶72

38. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Another v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under:

¶73

“23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special

¶74

13

¶75

knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38)

¶76

“38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: (AIR p. 406, para 11)

¶77

‘9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience.

¶78

The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’”” (Emphasis supplied)

¶79

39. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681, this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations are considered relevant in the facts of the present case:

¶80

“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be

¶81

14

¶82

extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads:

¶83

“(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.”

¶84

15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed.

¶85

15

¶86

The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.

¶87

xxx xxx xxx

¶88

22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. …” (Emphasis supplied)

¶89

40. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused, was examined by this Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Others reported in (2000) 8 SCC 382. In this case, the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused, and took him away at about 2:30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 364, read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced them to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the charge of murder. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to the deceased after he was abducted by them. The Sessions Judge, after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence, had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with

¶90

16

¶91

the accused persons, and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital, and concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down the following principles in paras 31 to 34 of the report:

¶92

“31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty.

¶93

32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this.

¶94

33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have

¶95

17

¶96

happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.

¶97

34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” (Emphasis supplied) ”.

¶98

From the evidence, it has been proved by the prosecution that in

¶99

the night the appellant and the deceased were there in the house on the date of incident and in the morning the dead body of the deceased was found by the witnesses having number of injuries on her body. The appellant could not explain as to how the dead body of the decease was found inside his house in injured condition. The belan seized on the instance of the appellant was found to be stained with AB group of human blood which is also the blood found on the clothes of the deceased as has been proved by the FSL report Ex.-P/27. All these goes to show and establish that the appellant is guilty for the offence of commission of the murder of deceased Aarti, who was his wife. From the evidence of the witnesses as well as medical evidence, the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the appellant that he is the author of crime and committed the murder of the deceased by

¶100

18

¶101

causing injuries on all over the body of the deceased, which leads to her homicidal death. Therefore, we do not find any reason to differ with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court and hereby uphold the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court.

¶102

The appeal filed by the appellant is devoid of merits, liable to be and is hereby dismissed . The appellant shall undergo the entire sentence awarded by the learned trial Court.

¶103

Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing her that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

¶104

Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

¶105

Sd/Sd/-

¶106

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶107

Aadil

Khusiram @ Bandu Rajak v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Khusiram @ Bandu Rajak v. State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Chaitanya Modi Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Ashish Agrawal Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Shahzade Ahmed Vs Vasudev Keshwani

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Nandshyam Sahu

Manharan Kariyare Vs State of Chhattisgarh