Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:4344-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1502 of 2022

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Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu S/o Kalyan Das Dewangan Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Majhgawan - Mandalpara, Police Station Baikunthpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through - District Magistrate, Korea, Baikunthpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh.

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---Respondent

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(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant : Mr. Mahendra Dubey, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Saumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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27/01/2026

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VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.01.28 18:34:22 +0530

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This criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 18.08.2022, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) and Special Judge (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012),

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Baikunthpur, District Korea, in Special Criminal Case No. 21 of 2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:-

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CONVICTION	SENTENCE
U/s. 363 of Indian Penal Code	R.I. for 3 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for 15 days.
U/s. 376(3) of Indian Penal Code	No separate sentence has been awarded.
U/s. 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act,	R.I. for 20 years with fine of Rs.
2012	2000/-, in default of payment of fine further R.I. for one month.
All the sente	nces are directed to run concurrently.

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The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, on 23.05.2020, the victim went missing from her house and a missing report was lodged by her father and then the police has registered the FIR (exhibit P-9) under section 363 of IPC against unknown person. Spot map (exhibit P-10) was prepared by the police and the progress report card of class 5^th of the victim was seized by the police vide seizure memo (exhibit P-12). During the investigation, the victim was recovered on 24.05.2020 from village Budhar and recovery panchnama (exhibit P- 2) was prepared. She was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Baikunthpur, where she was medically examined by Dr. Kalawati Patel/PW-1. While medically examining the victim, the doctor has not noticed any external or internal injury on her body and gave her report (exhibit P-1). Two vaginal slides have been prepared,

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sealed and handed over to the police for its chemical examination. Spot map (exhibit P-7 and P-8) were prepared by the patwari and exhibit P-10 was prepared by the police. With respect to the age of the victim, the police has seized the school register vide seizure memo (exhibit P-15) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-20C), the original register was returned to the school. Based on the school register, a certificate (exhibit P-19) issued by the headmaster of the school has also been seized. According to the school record, the date of birth of the victim is 13.09.2007. The victim was also sent for USG report and her USG report is exhibit P-31. The clothes of the victim have also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-33). The appellant was arrested on 26.05.2020 and he too was sent for his medical examination to Government Hospital, Patna, where he was medically examined by Dr. Mohammad Wasid Asdak, who found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. The clothes of the appellant have also been seized. The vaginal slide of the victim, her clothes and semen slide of the appellant and his clothes have been sent for its chemical examination to Regional FSL Surguja, Ambikapur from where report (exhibit P-28) was received and according to the FSL report, except the top of the victim, semen and sperm were found on the other sent articles. Statement of the witnesses under section 161 of the CRPC and statement of the victim under section 164 of CRPC have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant before the learned trial Court for the offence under sections 363, 376(2) (i) (j) and (n), and 506 of IPC and sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act.

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The learned trial Court has framed charges against the appellant for the offence under sections 363, 376(3) of IPC and section 6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charges and claimed trial.

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In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under section 313 of CRPC have also been recorded, in which he denied the circumstances that appears against him, pleaded innocence and have submitted that, he has been falsely implicated in the offence.

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After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him, which has been mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal.

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Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The victim is a major girl and the prosecution could not prove that she was minor on the date of incident by producing sufficient reliable evidence. The school register has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law and there is no other evidence of date of birth or age. The victim being a major girl having love affair with the appellant had consensual physical relation with the appellant and she on her own will eloped with him without raising any objection or protest. There is no external injury on the body of the victim and the manner in which, she allegedly

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suffered with the offence, the injury must have been found on her body. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence suffers from illegality and perversity and the appellant is entitled for acquittal.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that, the case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of the victim, who suffered the alleged offence of rape by the appellant. But for minor omissions or contradictions her evidence is duly supported the prosecution’s case and it is not required for any corroboration. Even if no injury has been found on the body of the victim, it does not affect the prosecution’s case. In the FSL report, semen and sperms were found on the vaginal slides and underwear of the victim as well as the underwear and semen slide of the appellant. There is no reason for false implication of the appellant. There are sufficient evidence on record to hold that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident and the learned trial Court after appreciating the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, convicted the appellant, which does not suffer from any irregularity and perversity and the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein above and also gone through the records of the trial court with utmost circumspection.

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The first question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether she was minor on the date of incident and less than 18 years of age or not?

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PW-2, the victim has stated in her evidence that, her date of birth is 13.09.2007. In cross-examination, she stated that she disclosed her date of birth by her own knowledge. PW-3, mother of the victim has stated that, she could not remember the date of birth of the victim. In cross-examination, she admitted that she could not know the date of birth of the victim. PW-4, who is the father of the victim, has stated that the date of birth of the victim is 13.09.2007 and he got her admitted in the school. In cross-examination, he admitted that he produced the mark-sheet of the victim before the police. He did not know the date of birth of his elder daughter. He also did not know about date of birth of his other daughters, even he did not know his own date of birth. He admitted that, he disclosed the date of birth of the victim on the basis of the date of birth written in the school marksheet. He further admitted that, at the time of admission in the school, he recorded the date of birth of his daughters on assumption. He has not got registered the date of birth of the victim.

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The prosecution has further relied upon the school register (exhibit P- 20C) and certificate (exhibit P-19), which are sought to be proved by PW-5/Incharge Headmaster of the school. He stated in his evidence that, the police has seized the school register with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo (exhibit P-15). After retaining the attested true copy of the school register (exhibit P-20C), the original register was returned back. According to the entries of the

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school register, he issued a certificate (exhibit P-19), in which the date of birth fo the victim is mentioned as 13.09.2007. In crossexamination, he admitted that in the school register, on what basis the date of birth of the victim is recorded, is not mentioned. He voluntarily stated that, her date of birth is recorded on the basis of Anganbadi register. He also stated that he obtained the copy of Anganbadi register (exhibit P-21C) and in serial No.3 of that Anganbadi register, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned. He admitted that, in the school register (exhibit P-20), there is no reference of Anganbadi register (exhibit P-21) and there is no acknowledgment that the school has received the document (exhibit P-21). There was no supervisor in the Anganbadi center. He further admitted that in the documents (exhibit P-19 and P-21), there is no mention of nick name of the victim. He further admitted that, in the document (exhibit P-21), there is no signature or seal of any office or officer.

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Except these evidences, there is no other evidence produced by the prosecution to prove the age of the victim. There is no birth certificate, kotwari register or ossification test report of the victim.

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The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police , 2011(2) SCC 385. In Para 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

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"40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was

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15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.

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42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:-

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"The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.… Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi

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Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in Issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted."

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43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:-

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"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue".

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44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.

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48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-

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"The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have

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to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted."

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In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the 33 Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such

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acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper. technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, Inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 33 Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under:

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"14, Section 94 (2)(iii) of the 33 Act clearly Indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on

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the orders of the concerned authority, l.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been. fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in

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determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (1) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the

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same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(1) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.

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17. In Abuzar Hossain Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a threejudge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted In order of preference."

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From perusal of the entire evidence and in view of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the victim was minor and less than 18 years of age is not supported by any cogent and reliable evidence. When the

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evidence of the parents of the victim is not reliable with respect to her date of birth, the self served statement of the victim could not be said to be sufficient evidence to hold that, she is minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. There is no other evidence, like kotwari register, birth certificate or ossification test report of the victim. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that, the victim is less than 18 years of age on the date of incident is perverse to the evidence available on record.

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So far as the offence of rape is concerned, we again examined the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses available on record.

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PW-2, is the victim of the offence. She stated in her evidence that, at the time of incident, she had regular talk with the appellant through mobile phone. On the date of incident, on being call of the appellant, she had gone to back side of her house and the appellant took her near shrubs and after removing her clothes committed rape upon her. In the morning at about 7 AM, he took her at Mandal para by walking, where they had their meals. They stayed there till evening and when one lady and police persons reached there, the appellant fled away. The police persons took her with them and medically examined her. In cross-examination by the prosecution, she admitted that before the incident, she met with the appellant two times. He called her through mobile phone. She further admitted that, when the appellant taking her by walking, near the canal, he again committed rape upon her. By continuous walking up to 6 AM, both of them were asleep. After sometime, a villager came there, then she awoke. She informed the incident to that person. He took them to his house and gave food. In

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cross-examination, she admitted that, only one mobile is there in her house and all the family members are using it. She admitted that, she had not made any complaint to anyone about the fact that, the appellant has called her. She also admitted that, the fact of earlier coming of the appellant to her house to meet her, has not been disclosed to anyone. She further admitted that, her house is adjoining to the houses of others. She further admitted that, on the way, where she had gone by walking, number of houses are situated. From the evidence of the victim, it does not come on record that, she protested or raised any alarm at the time when she was being taken by the appellant or making physical relation with her. There is no evidence that, she shouted for help or struggled to save herself. Even when she was going by walking, she has not raised any alarm, particularly when she bypassing the houses of others. It further appears that, the person who gave them food in the morning, had also did nothing, even after disclosing the incident by the victim, as has been stated by her. The conduct of the victim clearly demonstrate that she was the consenting party in making physical relation with the appellant. No external or internal injury or any sign of protest have been found on her body. Even it is not the case of the victim that at the time making physical relation, she protested or gave teeth bite or nail scratch mark on the body of the appellant. Therefore, in the facts of the case that, the victim could not be proved to be minor, she made consensual physical relation with the appellant and eloped with him without raising any objection, the allegation of kidnapping or rape is doubtful.

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PW-3, is the mother of the victim, who stated in her evidence that, when the victim went missing and could not be traced out, they lodged the missing report. During her search, the police persons and her husband take her back from Budhar. The victim informed her that, the appellant took her to Budhar and committed rape upon her. In cross-examination, she stated that, police has recorded her statement before recovery of her daughter.

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PW-4, is the father of the victim, who too has stated that, when the victim went missing and her whereabouts could not be found, they lodged missing report to the police. He came to know that the victim is at Budhar, he informed it to the police and took her from there. The victim initially has not informed about the incident and the police informed him that she suffered the offence of rape. When he declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution, he admitted that, the victim informed him that the appellant has committed rape upon her near shrubs and near canal. He denied by giving his police statement (exhibit P-16). In cross-examination, he admitted that, when she was being taken back from Budhar, she has not informed about the incident.

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From the evidence available on record, it clearly reveals that the victim has not disclosed the incident to her parents, but it is the police persons, who disclosed them about the offence. The entire sequence of events would create a situation that, the victim on her own eloped with the appellant and engaged in making consensual physical relation.

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PW-7 is the person, who met with the victim and the appellant in the morning, when they were near the Peepal tree. When he asked from the victim, what they are doing here, she did not disclose about any incident and then he left the place. At about 11-11:30 AM, when he again came to that place, he found them there and then, he asked for mobile number of her father, but she did not give it. Somehow, he got the number of her father and informed one of his known person about their presence in the village. In cross-examination also, nothing could be extracted from this witness that the victim informed him about the incident suffered by her.

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PW-1, Dr. Kalawati Patel, who medically examined the victim, has not found any external or internal injuries over her body and there is no any sign of protest or struggle.

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From all these evidences, the prosecution could not establish the offence against the appellant that, on the date of incident he kidnapped the victim and committed rape upon her.

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The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the

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victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case.

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Having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, we are of the opinion that, the prosecution could not established the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt.

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Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from the alleged offences.

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The appellant is reported to be in jail since 26.05.2020. He shall released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

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Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned, which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a copy of this order to the Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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ved

Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Rajesh Kumar @ Chhotu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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