Pravin Sahu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:21622-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1373 of 2025

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Pravin Sahu S/o Shri Rajesh Sahu, Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Dulna, P.S. Gobra Nawapara District Raipur Chhattisgarh At Present Yash Vihar Colony, Moti Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh

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---- Appellant(s)

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versus

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Digitally signed by JYOTI JHA Date: 2026.05.12 10:54:45 +0530

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House OfÏcer, Police Station Tiikarapara, Disrict Raipur Chhattisgarh

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---- Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. A.G.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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08/05/2026

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The criminal appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.07.2025 passed by the Special Judge under SC & ST (P.A.) Act, Raipur, District Raipur in Special Criminal Case No.05/2024, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner :

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Sl. No.	Conviction	Sentence
1.	Under Section 376(2)	RI for 10 years and fine of
	(n) of the Indian Panel	Rs.2000/-, in default of payment
	Code	of fine to further undergo RI for 2 months.
2.	Under Section 3(2)(v)	Imprisonment for life and fine of
	of the Scheduled	Rs.2000/-, in default of payment
	Castes and Scheduled	of fine to further undergo RI for
	Tribes (Prevention of	2 months.
	Atrocities)Act, 1989

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The prosecution story, in brief, is that on 01.11.2023, the prosecutrix appeared before Police Station Tikrapara, Raipur and submitted a written complaint stating that she was working at City Honda, where she came into contact with the accused Pravin Sahu. Since both of them worked at the same place, they used to talk in connection with work. Gradually, the behaviour of the accused changed and he started harassing the prosecutrix by expressing that he loved her. Initially, the prosecutrix refused and ignored him, but when he did not stop, she informed the wife of the accused about his conduct and requested her to control him, so that in the event of any untoward incident in future, her name should not be involved. Despite this, the conduct of the accused did not change and he repeatedly told the prosecutrix that he could not live without her and would die otherwise. The prosecutrix continued to refuse

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him for nearly one year, yet the accused did not mend his behaviour. The accused further told the prosecutrix that his relationship with his wife was not cordial, that his wife did not provide him food and used to make him sleep outside the house during the night. The accused continuously professed his love for the prosecutrix and used to stand for hours near the place where she lived. Even then, the prosecutrix did not believe him and clearly told him that whatever issues existed between him and his wife were their personal matters. Thereafter, the accused forcibly applied vermilion (sindoor) in the parting of the prosecutrix’s hair and assured her that he would marry her and publicly accept her as his wife. On the basis of such false promise and assurance, the accused for the first time established forcible physical relations with the prosecutrix on 02.04.2023 at about 2:30 PM at her rented house situated at Lalpur, where she was residing. As a consequence thereof, the prosecutrix became pregnant. During this period, the accused continuously assured her that he was going to divorce his wife and, under that pretext, continued to establish physical relations with her. When the prosecutrix informed the accused about her pregnancy, the accused brought certain medicines from a medical store and gave them to her, stating that they were medicines for headache. Later, the prosecutrix came to know that the accused had in fact administered abortion pills to her. After the abortion, the health

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of the prosecutrix deteriorated, but the accused abandoned her in that condition and left for Pune, returning only on 05.07.2023.After returning, the accused told the prosecutrix that he had rights over her and that she was his wife. Thereafter, the accused allegedly continued to establish physical relations with the prosecutrix against her will till 20.10.2023. On the basis of the aforesaid written complaint of the prosecutrix, Crime No. 574/2024 was duly registered against the accused at Police Station Tikrapara, Raipur, and after completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was presented before the competent Court.

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The accused / appellant was charged under Section 376 (2) (n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as “IPC) and Section 3(2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter called as “Atrocities Act”), read out to him and explained to him. He denied the commission of the offence and when he was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he pleaded not guilty.

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In this case, the prosecution presented in support of its case prosecution witnesses Jharna Sonwani (P.W.-01), Sandeep Kumar Sinha (P.W.-02), Dr. Varsha (P.W.-03), Pushpalata Paraste (P.W.-04), Saroj Kujur (P.W.-05), Shashi Paikra (P.W.06), Umesh Kumar Sahu (P.W.-07), the prosecutrix (P.W.-08),

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Savita Gaur (P.W.-09), Rajesh Chaudhary (P.W.-10) and Mohammad Sajid Khan (P.W.-11), have recorded their statements in the Court, whereas the defence has not presented any evidence in support of its side.

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Learned Special Judge after appreciating the evidence available on record, vide its judgment dated 04.07.2025 convicted the appellant for offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act and sentenced him as mentioned in para 2 of the said judgment. Hence, this appeal.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment dated 04.07.2025 is contrary to law, facts, and circumstances of the case and is therefore liable to be set aside. Learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that the alleged incident occurred in the course of a voluntary and consensual relationship between the parties, and the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 375 of the IPC are not made out. The prosecutrix remained in contact and was allegedly involved in a relationship with the appellant for a considerable period, and the FIR came to be lodged on 01.11.2023 after disputes arose between them and the appellant allegedly refused to fulfil his assurance of marrying the prosecutrix, with no satisfactory explanation for the delay. A perusal of the FIR itself indicates a consensual relationship, as

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both parties were well acquainted for several years, had exchanged mobile numbers, and remained in continuous contact. The victim is an educated adult who was fully aware of the nature and consequences of such a relationship and entered into it voluntarily. He further submits that learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the cross-examination of the victim, wherein she admitted awareness that physical relations without marriage are not socially acceptable. No complaint was ever made by the victim during the subsistence of the relationship alleging any forceful physical intercourse. There are material omissions and contradictions in the statements of the victim under Sections 161 CrPC, 164 CrPC, and her deposition before the trial Court, which have been overlooked by the trial Court. Even in her written complaint, the victim did not allege any instance of forceful physical relations. The entirety of the cross-examination reflects a long-standing relationship of love and mutual affection. The victim admitted that they were in regular contact over the phone and had developed a romantic relationship, which negates the allegation of inducement on a false promise of marriage. In her statement, the victim stated that she agreed to establish physical relations but did not allege that the same was forceful. She further admitted that her written complaint contains no allegation of force. The victim was aware of the appellant’s marriage and did not raise any objection or lodge any complaint at that time.

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Learned counsel also submits that the allegations under the relevant provisions of the Atrocities Act are not made out in the absence of specific averments attracting the said provisions. The mere fact that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community does not, by itself, attract the provisions of the Atrocities Act, particularly when the relationship was consensual and based on mutual affection. Learned trial Court erred in convicting the appellant under Section 376(2)(n) IPC without the prosecution having proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside. The learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and documents on record in their correct perspective. He contended that learned trial Court failed to consider settled legal principles laid down in judicial precedents, wherein it has been held that if a promise to marry was not false at inception and was not made solely to induce consent, the offence of rape is not made out. In the present case, the victim consented to the relationship out of love and affection, and not solely on account of any alleged misrepresentation by the appellant. It is well settled that to establish an offence based on false promise of marriage, it must be shown that the accused had no intention to marry from the very beginning. A mere failure to fulfil a promise, due to unforeseen or unavoidable circumstances,

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does not amount to a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC. In the present case, the evidence does not establish any such initial fraudulent intent on the part of the appellant. As such, criminal appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside.

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Learned State counsel submits that the victim has consistently and credibly narrated the sequence of events, and her testimony is fully supported by the surrounding circumstances. It is argued that the appellant continuously exploited the victim’s trust by giving repeated assurances of marriage and used this deception to establish physical relations over a prolonged period, which clearly attracts the offence alleged. The delay in lodging the FIR has been satisfactorily explained by the prosecutrix, as she approached the police authorities only after the appellant allegedly failed to honour his assurance of marriage and continued to subject her to exploitation despite repeated promises and assurances. The investigation is complete, the material witnesses support the prosecution case, and no plausible defence has been raised. Hence, the conviction is justified and deserves to be upheld.

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We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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Since the victim was a major, the question that would arise for consideration is whether the appellant forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her or whether the acts were consensual in nature.

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P.W.-3, Dr. Varsha, Medical Officer, Urban PHC, Bhatagaon, Raipur, deposed that on 04.11.2023, the victim was brought for medical examination by a female constable from Police Station Tikrapara, Raipur. During examination, she found a black mole below the victim’s lower lip as an identification mark, noted that her secondary sexual characteristics were developed, and found her hymen to be torn. The victim informed her that she and the accused, Praveen Sahu, worked together at City Honda Car Showroom and that the accused had established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage from 02.04.2023 to 20.10.2023. The witness prepared and sealed two vaginal slides for chemical examination and stated that without such examination no definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse could be given. In cross-examination, she admitted that no external or internal injuries were found on the victim’s private parts and that the victim had not alleged forcible physical relations before her, but had stated that the accused established relations with her on the assurance of marriage.

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The prosecutrix (P.W.-8) stated that she belongs to the Satnami caste, a Scheduled Caste community, whereas the accused

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belongs to the Sahu caste, which falls under the Other Backward Class category, and that the accused was aware of her caste. She deposed that while working at City Honda, Raipur, she came into contact with the accused, who was employed in the finance department while she worked in the sales department. During the course of work, the accused started expressing his love for her and repeatedly harassed her despite her refusal. She even informed the wife of the accused about his conduct, but his behaviour continued. The accused allegedly told her that he was unhappy with his wife, would divorce her, and could not live without the prosecutrix. Thereafter, he forcibly applied sindoor in her hair partition and promised to marry and publicly accept her as his wife. On such assurance, he took her to her rented house at Lalpur and, on 02.04.2023, forcibly established physical relations with her, as a result of which she became pregnant. She further stated that the accused continued to establish physical relations with her on the assurance that he would divorce his wife. When she informed him about her pregnancy, he gave her certain medicines, falsely stating that they were for headache, but later she discovered that the medicines caused abortion, following which her health deteriorated. She further alleged that the accused left for Pune and, after returning on 05.07.2023, continued to forcibly establish physical relations with her till 20.10.2023 without marrying or accepting her as his wife.

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In her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that she was a well-educated girl pursuing B.A. First Year at the relevant time and was capable of understanding the difference between right and wrong. She admitted that she had been working at City Honda since July 2022 and that CCTV cameras were installed throughout the showroom. She stated that she came to know in the year 2022 itself that the accused was a married man after seeing calls on his mobile phone labelled as “wife”. She admitted that despite this knowledge, they continued to talk in connection with work, though she clarified that the accused used to send messages professing love to her. She further admitted that she had informed the network manager of the showroom and also the wife of the accused regarding his conduct. She also denied that the accused used to visit her rented house with her consent, stating instead that he used to come when the landlord was away and forcibly establish physical relations with her. She admitted that she did not lodge any report immediately after the first alleged incident because the accused threatened to commit suicide and had allegedly recorded videos of their physical relations and threatened to make them viral.

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It is an admitted position from the deposition of the prosecutrix (P.W.-8) that she was a major throughout the period of the alleged relationship. She categorically admitted in her crossexamination that she was a well-educated girl pursuing B.A.

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First Year at the relevant time and was capable of understanding the difference between right and wrong and of taking decisions relating to her life independently. She further admitted that she had been working at City Honda since July 2022 and had come to know in the year 2022 itself that the accused was a married man. She also admitted that despite such knowledge, she continued to talk to the accused in connection with work, though according to her, the accused used to send messages expressing love towards her. She further admitted that she did not lodge any report immediately after the first alleged incident dated 02.04.2023. These admissions prima facie indicate that the parties remained in continuous contact over a considerable period and that no immediate complaint regarding the alleged acts was made at the initial stage. These admissions strongly reflect voluntary participation and negate the allegation of any immediate coercion, force, or deception at the initial stage.

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Regarding the allegation of forcible intercourse in the year 2023, the victim did not lodge any report. There is no medical evidence, contemporaneous record, or independent witness to support this allegation. The long and unexplained delay seriously erodes the credibility of this allegation. The medical evidence also does not support the prosecution. Dr. Varsha (PW-3) found no injuries.

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It is the trite law that a conviction for rape can be sustained solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that her evidence inspires confidence in the mind of the Court and appears to be natural and truthful. However, if the version given by the victim is inconsistent, unsupported by any medical evidence, or the whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable and believable in the case set up by the victim, the Court shall not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix. (See: Birka

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Shiva v The State of Telangana decided on 16-7-2025 in SLP (Cr.) No.1445 of 2025).

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In view of these material contradictions, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, absence of medical or ocular corroboration, and the complete lack of proof of any threat or force exerted upon the vicitm, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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The Supreme Court has consistently held that a consensual relationship between adults, even if based on a promise to marry which later fails, does not amount to rape unless the promise was false from the very beginning and made solely to obtain sexual consent. Nothing on record in the present case establishes that the appellant entertained any dishonest intention from the inception. The prosecution has failed to prove

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the essential ingredients required for conviction under Sections 376 or 417 IPC.

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From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the statement of the victim who has categorically stated that the appellant has done sexual intercourse with her on the pretext of marriage and whenever the appellant has done the sexual intercourse she has not raised any objection and also did not make any noise to escape from the hands of the appellant on the count that the appellant will marry with her. She has also stated that she knew the accused. The evidence of the victim would clearly demonstrate that there was consensual sexual inter course. Since the vicitm was not below the age 16 years and the evidence brought on record would demonstrate that she is a consenting party, therefore, on the pretext of marriage, sexual intercourse committed by the appellant will fall within the ambit of rape or not, has been examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Maheshwar Tigga v State of Jharkhand, (2020)10 SCC 108 wherein the Supreme Court has held paragraph 17,18, 19 and 20 which is as under:-

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This court recently in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 2019 SC 327 and in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2019) 9 SCC 608 arising out of an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in similar circumstances where the relationship originated in a love affair, developed over a period of

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time accompanied by physical relations, consensual in nature, but the marriage could not fructify because the parties belonged to different castes and communities, quashed the proceedings.

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We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the Church or in a Temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her.

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The appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 420 and 504 IPC. No appeal has been preferred against the acquittal. There is no medical evidence on record to sustain the conviction under Section 323 I.P.C. No offence is made out against the appellant under Section 341 I.P.C. considering the statement of prosecutrix that she had gone to live with the appellant for 15 days of her own volition.

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We have no hesitation in concluding that the

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consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary action or denial and which opportunity was available to her, because of her deep-seated love for the appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties with her body, which according to normal human behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom one is deeply in love. The observations in this regard in Uday (supra) are considered relevant:

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"25...It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a promise on more than one occasion. In such circumstances the promise loses all significance, particularly when they are overcome with emotions and passion and find themselves in situations and circumstances where they, in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. This is what appears to have happened in this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to desired In marry her, but because she also it. circumstances it would be very these difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise. In any event, it was not possible for the appellant to know what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she consented, because there were more reasons than one for her to consent."

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Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2024) 11 SCC 398 , held thus at para 34:

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“34. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical relationship between the partners without protest and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.”

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Deepak Gualti v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 has held as under at paras 21, 26 & 27:-

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"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after

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wholly, understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.

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XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX

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To conclude, the prosecutrix had left her home voluntarily, of her own free will to get married to the appellant. She was 19 years of age at the relevant time and was, hence, capable of understanding the complications and issues surrounding her marriage to the appellant. According to the version of events provided by her, the prosecutrix had called the appellant on a number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time, and when he finally arrived she went with him to the Karna lake where they indulged in sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at this stage and made no complaints to any one. Thereafter, she also went to Kurukshetra with the appellant, where she lived with his relatives. Here

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to, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate with the appellant. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra University illegally, and once again came into contact with the appellant at the Birla Mandir. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the appellant to the old bus-stand in Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married in court at Ambala. However, here they were apprehended by the police.

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If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to marry the appellant, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, we fail to understand on what basis the allegation of "false promise of marriage" has been raised by the prosecutrix. We also fail to comprehend the circumstances in which a charge of deceit/rape can be leveled against the appellant, in light of the afore-mentioned fact situation."

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In light of evidence brought on record and on above stated legal position, it is quite clear that on the pretext of marriage sexual intercourse is not a rape, therefore, appellant deserves to be acquitted of the charges framed under Section 376 (2)(n) IPC.

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Upon careful consideration of the evidence on record, particularly the deposition and cross-examination of the victim (PW-8), this Court finds that the victim was a major at the relevant time and had been in a long-standing relationship with the appellant since 2022. Her own admissions reveal that the

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parties were in regular contact, met voluntarily, and maintained a relationship over years. She has further admitted that she was aware of the nature and consequences of such a relationship.

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The material on record indicates that the relationship between the parties developed gradually and was accompanied by continued interaction and mutual association. The victim did not raise any complaint at the initial stage of the alleged physical relations in 2023, nor is there any contemporaneous evidence or medical corroboration supporting allegations of force. The delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with material inconsistencies in her statements, creates doubt regarding the prosecution’s version.

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In light of the settled legal position, a consensual relationship between adults would not constitute an offence of rape unless it is established that the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained on the basis of a false promise of marriage which the accused never intended to fulfill from the very inception. In the present case, from the evidence of the prosecutrix (P.W.-8), it is apparent that she was a major, educated, and fully conscious of the consequences of her actions. She admitted in her crossexamination that she was aware since the year 2022 that the appellant was already a married man, yet she continued to remain in contact with him. She also admitted that no

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immediate report was lodged after the first alleged incident dated 02.04.2023, and that the parties remained in continuous association for a considerable period thereafter. The material available on record, therefore, prima facie reflects a prolonged relationship between the parties arising out of acquaintance and emotional involvement, which subsequently did not culminate in marriage. Further, except for the allegation that the appellant was aware that the prosecutrix belonged to the Scheduled Caste community, there is no material to indicate that the alleged acts were committed on the ground of her caste or with the intention of humiliating or exploiting her because of her caste status. Mere knowledge of the caste of the prosecutrix, in absence of evidence showing caste-based intention or targeting, would not by itself attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

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In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix or induced her into a physical relationship on the basis of a false promise of marriage made with dishonest intention from the very inception. The material available on record rather reflects that the parties remained in continuous association for a considerable period despite the prosecutrix being aware that the appellant was a married man.

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Further, the prosecution has also failed to establish that the alleged acts were committed on account of the prosecutrix belonging to the Satnami caste or with any caste-based intention so as to attract the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

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Consequently, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 376 (2)(n) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

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For the foregoing reasons, the present criminal appeal is allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.07.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raipur, District Raipur District in Special Criminal Case No. 05/2024 is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act by extending him the benefit of doubt. The appellant is reported to be in jail; therefore, he shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.

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Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bonds in terms of from No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of

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sum of Rs.25000/- with 2 reliable sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The Trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action.

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Sd/-

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Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Jyoti

Pravin Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Pravin Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh

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