Sahasram Bharadwaj Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:12033-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 1041 of 2018

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Sahasram Bharadwaj S/o Cherkaram, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Patharri, Police Out Post Hardibazar P.S. Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

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Smt. Budhwarbai, W/o Sahasram, Aged About 44 Years R/o Village Patharri, Police Out Post Hardibazar P.S. Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s)

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Kusmunda, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ...Respondent(s)

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For appellants : Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. A.G.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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13.03 .2026

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1. Heard Mr. Akhtar Hussain, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Ashish Shukla, learned Addl. A.G., appearing for the

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respondent/State.

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2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.06.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora District Korba (C.G.) in Session Trial No. 100/2016, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction under Section	Sentence
Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’)	Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for life (for all the appellants) and fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month additional R.I.

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3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 28.09.2016 at about 12:00 noon, the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was present in front of his house. At that time, the accused Sahasram, Smt. Budhwarabai and the child in conflict with law came there and started abusing him in filthy language and threatening to kill him. Thereafter, the accused persons pushed Narayan Prasad Tandon to the ground and started assaulting him with fists and kicks. When Narayan Prasad fell on the ground, Smt. Budhwarabai caught hold of him and her husband Sahasram kicked him on his testicles. Meanwhile, the child in conflict with law assaulted him on the head with a stone. Hearing the commotion, Smt. Chhannibai came out of her house and, on hearing her cries, Jankaram, Darsaram Tandon, Chandramani Patle and Hemant Kumar Miri also reached the spot and intervened. Due to the assault by the accused persons, blood started

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oozing from the head of Narayan Prasad Tandon and he fell on the ground. Thereafter, the 108 ambulance was called and he was taken to the Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar, where the doctor, after examination, declared him dead. Thus, the accused Sahasram, Smt. Budhwarabai and the child in conflict with law committed the murder of Narayan Prasad Tandon by assaulting him with fists, kicks and a stone. On the same day, Smt. Chhannibai lodged a report of the incident at Police Outpost Hardibazar. Inspector Man Singh Rathia registered the First Information Report at Police Outpost Hardibazar on the basis of the report lodged by Smt. Chhannibai under Section 302/34 of the IPC as Crime No. 0/2016, and on the same day a merg intimation No. 0/2016 was also registered. Thereafter, the said First Information Report and merg were transmitted to Police Station Kusmunda, where Head Constable Ishwari Prasad Lahre registered Crime No. 115/2016 under Section 302/34 of the IPC and also registered Merg No. 52/2016.

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4. During the course of investigation, on 02.08.2016, Inspector Man Singh Rathia visited the Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar and issued notices to the witnesses for the preparation of the inquest over the dead body. On the same day, in the presence of the witnesses, the inquest proceedings over the dead body of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon were conducted and the inquest report was prepared (Ex.P/2). Thereafter, the post-mortem examination of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was conducted at the Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar by Dr. A.N. Kanwar (Ex.P/7). On the same day, Inspector Man Singh Rathia visited the place of occurrence at village Pathri and prepared the spot map of the place of incident on the basis of the statements of the

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witnesses.

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5. During investigation, on 02.08.2016, Inspector Man Singh Rathia recorded the statements of Smt. Chhannibai, Darsaram Tandon, Kriparam, Arvind, Binayak Kant and Jankaram as per their versions. Thereafter, on 03.08.2016, the accused Sahasram, Smt. Budhwarabai and the child in conflict with law were arrested and their arrest memos were prepared. On the same day, the memorandum statement of the child in conflict with law was recorded in the presence of witnesses and, pursuant to his disclosure statement, a blood-stained sando baniyan was seized from him in the presence of witnesses and a seizure memo was prepared. Further, a muddy stone weighing about 500 grams was also seized from the said child in conflict with law in the presence of witnesses and the seizure memo was prepared accordingly.

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6. Further during the course of investigation, on 04.08.2016, a bloodstained towel (gamcha) was seized from Smt. Chhannibai, the wife of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon, in the presence of witnesses. Thereafter, on 30.08.2016, the statements of Hemant Kumar Giri and Chandramani Patle were recorded. On 03.09.2016, the statement of Jagdish Prasad was recorded, and on 15.09.2016, the statements of Santoshi Kurre and Kirtanbai were recorded as per their versions. The seized stone was sent to the Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar on 12.09.2016 for medical query, and Dr. A.N. Kanwar furnished the query report. Further, on 03.09.2016, an application was submitted to the NaibTahsildar, Hardibazar for preparation of the map of the place of occurrence through the Patwari. Pursuant to the directions of the NaibTahsildar, Patwari Manjulata Kanwar prepared the spot map and

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panchnama of the place of occurrence in the presence of witnesses. The seized articles were also sent for chemical examination to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bilaspur through the Superintendent of Police, Korba.

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7. After completion of the entire investigation, the Police filed chargesheet against the appellants before the trial Court. The trial Court has framed charges against the appellants for the offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC and proceeded on trial. The appellants abjured the guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

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8. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 31 documents. The appellants/accused examined none in his defence and in their defence, Hemant Kumar Miri and Sarpanch Smt. Kantibai were examined.

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9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 28.06.2018, convicted the accused/appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC and sentenced them as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.

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10. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that there are three accused in this case and one accused child in conflict with law was separately tried and in CRA No.1039 of 2018 which is filed as Annexure D-1, wherein by order dated 08.02.2019 his conviction has been converted from 302 IPC to 304 Part-1 IPC. He would further submit that the main allegation of assault was on child with conflict in

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law that he assaulted on the head of the deceased by way of stone and cause of death was head injury. He would further submit that since aspect of the overtact has been considered by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the allegation against the present appellants cannot exceed such limit. Moreover, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted on the face of it, then also the appellants is said to have caused injuries to deceased on the spur of the moment. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellants to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellants caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellants is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Further, the appellants were in custody from 03.08.2016 to 06.02.2017 and in jail from 28.06.2018 to 09.12.2021 they have completed near about 03 years, 9 months and 16 days, therefore, considering the period he had already undergone, they be awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by them. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.

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11. Per contra, learned State counsel, opposing the appeal, submits that the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court is well-founded and based on proper appreciation of the evidence available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt through the consistent and reliable testimony of the eyewitnesses, namely Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW5), who were present at the place of occurrence and have clearly narrated the manner in which the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was assaulted. It is further submitted that the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution fully corroborates the ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses and establishes that the death of the deceased occurred due to the head injury sustained during the assault. therefore, in view of the statements of the prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC. It has been contended that appellants have committed heinous crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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13. The first question for consideration would be, whether death of deceased was homicidal in nature ?

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14. In this regard, the prosecution has examined Dr. A.N. Kanwar (PW9), who conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased at Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar on 02.08.2016 and proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/7). The said witness has categorically stated that during the post-mortem examination he found clotted blood above and below the left eye of the deceased, swelling and redness on the testicles and also found that there was intracranial hemorrhage and clotting of blood in the brain. According to the doctor, the death of the deceased occurred due to head injury resulting in brain hemorrhage. The doctor has further opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and the death was homicidal in nature.

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15. The medical evidence adduced by the prosecution fully corroborates the ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses, namely Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW5), who have consistently stated that the accused persons assaulted the deceased with fists, kicks and a stone, and the child in conflict with law hit the deceased on his head with a stone. Their statements clearly establish that the deceased sustained injuries during the assault made by the accused persons.

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16. In view of the clear and cogent testimony of Dr. A.N. Kanwar (PW - 9) coupled with the post-mortem report (Ex.P/7), and the corroborating ocular evidence of the eyewitnesses, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the death of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was homicidal in nature and we accordingly affirm it.

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17. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the case of the child in conflict with law arising out of the same incident has already been decided by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1039 of 2018, wherein the conviction of the said child in conflict with law was altered from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Since the said appeal has already attained finality, the present appeal is required to be considered only in respect of the present appellants namely Sahasram Bharadwaj and Smt. Budhwarabai , on the basis of the evidence available on record and the role attributed to them in the incident.

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18. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the accused/appellants herein are the perpetrator of the crime in question ?

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19. In order to ascertain the involvement of the present appellants in the commission of the offence, it would be appropriate to examine the testimony of the eyewitnesses relied upon by the prosecution. The prosecution has examined Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW-5) as eyewitnesses to the incident.

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20. Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2), who is the wife of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon, has deposed that on the date of the incident at about 12:00 noon her husband was sitting in front of their house when the appellants Sahasram Bharadwaj and Smt. Budhwarabai along with the child in conflict with law came there and started abusing him. She has further stated that the appellants started assaulting her husband by fists and kicks. According to her testimony, when the deceased fell down on the ground, Smt. Budhwarabai caught hold of him while appellant

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Sahasram kicked him on his testicles and the child in conflict with law struck the deceased on the head with a stone. She has further stated that upon hearing the commotion, Jagdish Tandon and Jankaram Tandon reached the spot and intervened in the matter. Thereafter, the injured was taken to the Primary Health Centre, Hardibazar, where he was declared dead by the doctor.

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21. The testimony of Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2) finds due corroboration from the statements of Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW-5). Both these witnesses have categorically stated that they were present near the place of occurrence and witnessed the incident. They have supported the version of Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2) and have clearly deposed that the appellants were assaulting the deceased with fists and kicks and the child in conflict with law assaulted the deceased with a stone on his head, as a result of which the deceased sustained serious injuries and fell unconscious.

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22. In the present case, the Investigating Officer Man Singh Rathia (PW-11) has stated that during the course of investigation he recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., prepared the inquest over the dead body of the deceased, got the post-mortem examination conducted and also prepared the spot map of the place of occurrence. He has further deposed that the accused persons were arrested during the investigation and on the basis of the memorandum statement of the child in conflict with law, a stone alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence and a blood-stained sando baniyan were seized in the presence of witnesses. The seized articles were thereafter sent for medical query and forensic examination. Nothing

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material has been elicited in the cross-examination of this witness so as to discredit the investigation conducted by him.

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23. In the present case, the Constable Ishwari Prasad Lahre (PW-8) has deposed that the First Information Report which was initially registered at Police Outpost Hardibazar in zero number was thereafter transmitted to Police Station Kusmunda, where it was registered as Crime No.115/2016 under Section 302/34 of the IPC. He has further stated that the merg intimation registered at the outpost was also transmitted to the concerned police station and was duly recorded. The testimony of this witness establishes the procedural steps taken in registration of the offence and transmission of the case to the competent police station for investigation. Nothing material has been brought in his cross-examination to disbelieve his testimony.

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24. On the basis of the seizure memo (Ex.P-16) prepared during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer seized the stone alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence along with other articles from the place of occurrence in the presence of independent witnesses. The seizure witnesses have supported the prosecution case regarding preparation of the seizure memo and recovery of the said articles. The seized articles were duly sealed and taken into possession and thereafter sent for further examination.

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25. In the present case, the evidence of the witnesses, who were naturally present at the place of occurrence, supports the prosecution version that the accused persons assaulted the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon during the course of a sudden quarrel and the child in

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conflict with law inflicted a blow on the head of the deceased with a stone. Chhannibai (PW-2) is the wife of the deceased, while Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW-5) are residents of the same locality and were present at the spot at the time of the incident. The record establishes that the incident occurred in front of the house of the deceased and these witnesses reached the spot immediately and witnessed the occurrence. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW-5) that the appellants along with the child in conflict with law assaulted the deceased and that the child in conflict with law struck the deceased on the head with a stone, which ultimately resulted in his death.

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26. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellants is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and their conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellants ?

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27. The distinction between intention and knowledge in the context of Section 299 and Section 300 IPC is crucial in determining the culpability of the appellant. Intention denotes a conscious desire to bring about a particular result, whereas knowledge implies awareness that a particular consequence is likely to ensue.

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28. In the present case, while the appellants' actions were undoubtedly culpable, the circumstances suggest that the incident occurred all of a sudden in the course of a quarrel between the parties and without any

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premeditation. The evidence on record indicates that the appellants assaulted the deceased with fists and kicks during the altercation, whereas the fatal blow on the head of the deceased was inflicted by the child in conflict with law by means of a stone picked up from the spot. There is nothing to show that the appellants had the intention to cause the death of the deceased; however, it can reasonably be inferred that they had the knowledge that such acts were likely to cause death.

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29. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the following facts are salient:

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The incident occurred all of a sudden in front of the house of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon when a quarrel erupted between the parties and there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellants had any prior intention or premeditation to cause the death of the deceased.

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The evidence of the eyewitnesses, namely Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW-5), clearly establishes that the appellants assaulted the deceased with fists and kicks during the altercation, whereas the fatal injury on the head of the deceased was inflicted by the child in conflict with law with a stone picked up from the spot.

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The material on record does not indicate that the appellants were armed with any deadly weapon or that they acted in a cruel or unusual manner during the incident.

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The entire occurrence appears to have taken place in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the appellants taking undue advantage of the situation.

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30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. The State Rep. By The Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 INSC 632 , readily held when a case would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC rather

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than Section 302 of the IPC, emphasizing that Part II applies where “murder is never established” and only knowledge (not intention) is attributable; it also surveys classic “single blow” cases altering Section 302 to Section 304 Part II (e.g., Jawahar Lal, Camilo Vaz, Jai Prakash, Kulwant Rai, Hem Raj, Pulicherla Nagaraju) and ultimately converts the conviction to Section 304 Part II. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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“20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man.

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21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-

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1. The nature of the weapon used.

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2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.

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3. The nature of the injuries caused.

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4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.

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22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word 'intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:-

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"The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desiredbut rather connotes the one object for which the efort is madef -and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive,

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without which, the action would not have been taken.”

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23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-

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"6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote diferent things. Even in somef English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:-

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"The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fre it ofi . withoutf intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?"

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25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and 'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that 'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent.

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26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly explained. It is as under:-

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"Knowledge and intention must not be confused.

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17. …… Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec. 300, I.P.C.

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18. …..A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of quilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention.

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19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death' but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of quilt is presumed."

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It has been further observed therein as under:-

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"26. ... Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under the second part of sec. 304. I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable."

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27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40).

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28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it

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clear by referring to two passages from leading textbooks on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-

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"To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed......... Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it."

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29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:-

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"In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............ Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word "recklessness". In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds(a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur."

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30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299

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it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

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31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death.

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32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC?

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SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:-

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33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of 'culpable homicide' and 'murder', respectively. In terms of Section 299, 'culpable homicide' is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon 'knowledge'. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in 'culpable homicide', that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would be 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with 'murder', although there is no clear definition of 'murder' in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' is its species and all 'murders' are 'culpable homicides' but all 'culpable homicides' are not 'murders'. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289)

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34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:-

¶113

"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' is species. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304."

¶114

35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. 'Culpable homicide' may or may not amount to 'murder', in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a 'culpable homicide is murder', the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail.

¶115

36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. 'culpable homicide' and 'murder' respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight

¶116

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of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections. This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these sections.

¶118

37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:-

¶119

*Section 299*	*Section 300*
A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done-	Subject to certain culpable homicide is murder if the exceptions act by which the death is caused is done-
IN	*TENTION*
(a) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of such causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or	(1) with the intention of causing death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

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KNOWLEDGE

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(c) with the knowledge	(4) with the knowledge that the
that the act is likely to	act is so imminently dangerous
cause death	that it must in all probability
	cause death or such bodily
	injury as is likely to cause death,

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and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.

¶124

31. Recently, in Velthepu Srinivas v. State of A.P., reported in 2024

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SCC OnLine SC 107 , the Supreme Court converted a Section 302 of the IPC conviction to Section 304 Part II for one accused, sentencing him to 10 years, where the role and circumstances evidenced lack of intention but knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

¶126

“28. Even though, A-3 might not have had the common intention to commit the murder, nevertheless, his participation in the assault and the wielding of the stone certainly makes him culpable for the offence that he has committed. While we acquit A-3 of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he is liable for the offence under 304 Part II IPC. The law on Section 304 Part II has been succinctly laid down in Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1, where it was held that:

¶127

14. This section is in two parts. If analysed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused….

¶128

29. In the past, this Court has considered factors such as lack of medical evidence to prove whether the act/injury was individually sufficient to cause death 1, a single blow on head with a hammer2 and lack of cogent evidence of the eye-witnesses that the accused shared a common intention to commit murder 3 as some factors to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC.

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30. Returning back to the facts of the case, there is certainly no escape from coming to the conclusion that A-3 should have had the knowledge that the use of a stone to hit the head of the deceased is likely to cause death. However, as demonstrated 1 Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 754. 2 Sarup Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 16 SCC 479. 3 Ghana Pradhan & Ors. v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 451. before, the evidence is insufficient to deduce a conclusion that he shared a common intention with the other accused to commit the murder of the deceased. Considering the role that A-3 has played, we hold him guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.

¶131

31. The perusal of the evidence would reveal that it is not the case of the prosecution that A-3 was along with the other accused while the deceased was dragged to the house. The deposition would reveal that after the other accused assaulted the deceased with sword, A-3 came thereafter and assaulted the deceased with stone lying there. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has not been in a position to establish that A-3 shared the common intention with the other accused to cause the murder of the deceased.

¶132

32. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the conviction and sentence of A-1, A-2 and A-4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and dismiss their Criminal Appeal No. 2852 of 2023 against the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 2005 dated 26.04.2022. We acquit A-3 of the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and convict him under Section 304 Part II and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for 10 years. To this extent, the appeal of A-3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. ”

¶133

32. A grievous injury on a vital part i.e. the head is undoubtedly sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But the question is not merely the capacity of the injury; rather, it is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, it can safely be inferred that the appellants intended to cause the death of the deceased or intended to inflict that very particular injury. In the present case, the evidence on record indicates that the incident occurred all of a sudden in front of the house of the deceased

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Narayan Prasad Tandon during the course of a quarrel. The appellants assaulted the deceased with fists and kicks, whereas the fatal blow on the head of the deceased was inflicted by the child in conflict with law with a stone picked up from the spot. Considering the sudden quarrel, lack of pre-planning and the manner in which the incident occurred, we are not persuaded that the prosecution has crossed the threshold to prove intention to cause death beyond reasonable doubt.

¶136

33. At the very least, it can safely be attributed that the accused persons had the knowledge that such assault was likely to cause death. The act of the child in conflict with law in striking the head of the deceased with a stone during the course of the altercation, coupled with the participation of the present appellants in the assault, would therefore attract the provisions of Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC.

¶137

34. The record also satisfies the four-fold test necessary for attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC , namely: (i) the incident arose out of a sudden quarrel; (ii) there was no premeditation on the part of the accused persons; (iii) the act was committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) there is no evidence to suggest that the accused persons took any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The assault appears to have been momentary and the stone used in the incident was picked up from the spot itself. Thus, the case squarely falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC , and consequently the offence committed by the appellants cannot be termed as murder.

¶138

35. So far as the recovery and medical consistency are concerned, the

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¶140

recovery of the stone on the disclosure statement of the child in conflict with law and the medical opinion (Ex.P/7) that the said stone could have caused the injuries sustained by the deceased undoubtedly fortify the prosecution case and connect the accused persons with the assault. These circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution version regarding the manner in which the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was assaulted. However, such factors by themselves cannot automatically elevate the offence to murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, particularly when the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel between the parties.

¶141

36. On careful consideration of the ocular and medical evidence, it becomes evident that the occurrence was not a premeditated or preplanned act. From the evidence of the eyewitnesses, namely Smt. Chhannibai (PW-2), Jagdish Tandon (PW-4) and Jankaram Tandon (PW5), it stands established that the appellants assaulted the deceased with fists and kicks during the altercation, whereas the fatal blow on the head of the deceased was inflicted by the child in conflict with law with a stone picked up from the spot. The prosecution evidence does not reveal any prior enmity or pre-arranged plan to commit the offence. The incident appears to have taken place in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. Although the injury was caused on a vital part of the body, namely the head, the material on record indicates that the assault was momentary. Therefore, while intention to cause death is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, knowledge that such an act was likely to cause death can reasonably be attributed. The case thus falls within the ambit of Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC .

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¶143

37. It is also pertinent to note that the role of the child in conflict with law arising out of the same incident has already been considered by this Court in CRA No.1039 of 2018, wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court, after appreciation of the ocular as well as medical evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the fatal blow on the head of the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon was inflicted by the said child in conflict with law by means of a stone and, considering the circumstances of the case, altered his conviction from Section 302 of the IPC to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo three years’ simple imprisonment. The present appeal arises out of the same occurrence and the evidence against the present appellants Sahasram Bharadwaj and Smt. Budhwarabai forms part of the same prosecution case.

¶144

38. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the appellants are guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC. Their culpability is evident from the fact that during the course of the altercation they participated in the assault upon the deceased Narayan Prasad Tandon; however, the appellants herein had used only hands and fists in the assault, whereas the child in conflict with law inflicted the fatal blow on the head of the deceased with a stone, which ultimately resulted in his death. Nonetheless, the surrounding circumstances—namely the absence of premeditation, the occurrence having taken place during the course of a sudden quarrel in front of the house of the deceased, and the assault having been made in the heat of passion—justify alteration of the conviction of the appellants from Section 302/34 of the IPC to Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC .

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39. As regards the sentence, this Court is mindful of the principle that the punishment must be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the role attributed to the accused persons. In the present case, the appellants have already remained in custody from 03.08.2016 to 06.02.2017 and thereafter from 28.06.2018 to 09.12.2021, and thus have undergone incarceration for a period of about 03 years, 09 months and 16 days. It is also to be noted that the appellants were not armed with any deadly weapon and had only assaulted the deceased with fists and kicks during the sudden quarrel, whereas the fatal injury was caused by the child in conflict with law by means of a stone. Considering the totality of the circumstances of the case, the nature of the incident, the role attributed to the present appellants and the period of incarceration already undergone by them, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be met if the appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by them, while maintaining the fine amount imposed by the learned trial Court.

¶147

40. Consequently, the conviction of the appellants under Section 302/34 of the IPC is altered to one under Section 304 Part-II read with Section 34 of the IPC . The appellants are sentenced to the period already undergone by them. The fine amount imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. The appellants are on bail.

¶148

41. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned

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which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶151

42. The criminal appeal is allowed in part to the extent indicated herein-above.

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43. Let a copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the concerned trial Court for information and necessary compliance.cessary compliance.

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Sd/-

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Sd/-

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(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Jyoti

Sahasram Bharadwaj v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Sahasram Bharadwaj v. State of Chhattisgarh

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