Ramanand Gupta Vs Commissioner

¶1

1

¶2

2026:CGHC:17461

¶3

Digitally signed by YOGESH YOGESH TIWARI TIWARI Date:2026.04.16 18:20:28 +0530

¶4

NAFR

¶5

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶6

Order Reserved on : 16.03.2026 Order Delivered on : 16.04.2026

¶7

CR No. 57 of 2024

¶8

1 - Ramanand Gupta S/o Late Rameshwar Prasad Gupta, Aged About 57 Years Occupation Document Writer, R/o Village Parsa, Police Station And Tehsil Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.

¶9

2 - Manoj Gupta S/o Shivanth Gupta Aged About 48 Years

¶10

3 - Shivnath, S/o Late Sitaram Kesari Aged About 85 Years

¶11

4 - Pradeep Kumar Kesari, S/o Shivnath Kesari Aged About 48 Years

¶12

5 - Sanjay Kesari S/o Shivnath Kesari, Aged About 55 Years

¶13

6 - Vinod Kesari, S/o Shivnath Kesari Aged About 40 Years,

¶14

Petitoner No. 2 to 6 are R/o Gandhi Nagar, Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.

¶15

(Petitioner No. 1 to 6 were Respondent No. 3 to 8 before the Court below).

¶16

... Applicants

¶17

versus

¶18

1 - Commissioner, Nagar Palik Nigam Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.

¶19

(Respondent No.1 before the Court below)

¶20

2 - Smt. Premshila Gupta W/o Ramakant Gupta Aged About 59 Years

¶21

(Appellant before the Court below)

¶22

3 - Ramakant Gupta S/o Late Rameshwar Prasad Gupta Aged About 57 Years,

¶23

(Respondent No.2 before the Court below)

¶24

2

¶25

Respndent No. 2 and 3 are R/o Mayapur, Police Station And Tehsil Ambikapur District Surguja Chhattisgarh.

¶26

--- Non-applicants

¶27

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

¶28

For Applicants	: Mr. Aman Upadhyay, Advocate
For Non-applicant No.1	: Mr. Bhupendra Singh, Advocate
For Non-applicants No.2 & 3	: Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate

¶29

Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

¶30

CAV Order

¶31

1. Heard Mr. Aman Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the applicants as well as Mr. Bhupendra Singh, learned counsel appearing for non-applicant No.1 and Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, learned counsel appearing for non-applicants No.2 and 3.

¶32

2. The applicants have filed the present civil revision under Section 392 of the Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short ‘Act of 1956’), challenging the order dated 03.02.2024 passed by the learned 3^rd Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 04/2024 (Annexure A/1), whereby the learned appellate Court has partly allowed the appeal preferred by the private non-applicants against the notice issued by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur under Sections 293 and 307(3) of the Act of 1956. By the impugned order, the matter has been remanded to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur with a direction to decide the rights of non-applicant No.2 herein in respect of the

¶33

3

¶34

house in question in accordance with Sections 403(2)(a) and 403(3) of the Act of 1956, after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all the parties. It has further been observed that, upon such decision being rendered by the Municipal Corporation, the parties shall have the right to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Committee, and for that purpose, due opportunity is required to be granted to them. It has also been directed that the decision taken by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, as well as by the Appellate Committee, shall be reported to the Court. Further, till the final decision is taken by the Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur, the parties have been directed to maintain status quo in respect of the suit house. The operative portion of the impugned order reads as follows:-

¶35

“36. परि�णा�मतः�अप�ला�र्थी�द्वा��प्रस्तः�तःअप�ला ' आं�शि�करूप से�स्वी�क��किकया�जा�क�उत्त�वी�दी! क 1 द्वा��प्रस्तः�तःनस्तः� इसेकिनदी$�क�से�र्थीवी�पसेक% जा�तः�है' किकउत्त�वी�दी! क 1 उभयापक्षों* क+ पया�,प्तःसे�नवी�ईक�अवीसे�प्रदी�नक��गा�वी किनर् म ि1तःभवीनक�से�बं�धम4 अप�ला�र्थी�क% अधिधक��बं�वीतः6 किवीकिनश्चयाअधिधकिनयाम 1956 क% ध�� 403 (2) ( अ ) क� प्र�वीध�न* क�परि�प्र�क्ष्याम4 क��गा�एवी�अधिधकिनयाम 1956 क% ध�� 403(3) क�किवीकल्पउभयापक्षों*क+अप�लासेधिमकितःक� सेमक्षोंपक्षों�खन�क�अवीसे�प्रदी�नक��गा�।अप�लासेधिमकितःएवी� उत्त�वी�दी! क 1 नस्तः�क% से�नवी�ईक�सेमया��जास्वीम�डला छत्त�सेगाढ किबंला�सेप � क� ��जास्वी किनगा��न� /16/ आं� / अ - 21/109/2016 म4 प�रि�तःआंदी � दिदीन��क 07.12.2017 म4 प�रि�तःआंदी � क�पदिदीश्याम4नस्तः�क�किन��क�णाक�4गा�।जाबं तःक��जास्वीम�डलाकिबंला�सेप � आंदी � दिदीन��क 07.12.2017 क%किवीप��तःआंदी � वीरि�ष्ठ , न्या�या�लायाक�क+ईस्थगानआंदी �

¶36

4

¶37

या�अन्याक+ईआंदी � ��जास्वीम�डलाक�आंदी � क+ �Eन्याया� किन�स्तःक�न�बं�बंतःउत्त�वी�दी! क 1 या�अप�लासेधिमकितःक+ प्र�प्तःनहै+।

¶38

37. इसेम्या��या�यालाद्वा��दिदीया�गाया�दिदी��किनदी$�क�प�लानक� सेहैन�म4 उत्त�वी�दी! क।द्वा��उभयापक्षों* क�मध्याक% गाया� क�या,वी�हैवीप�रि�तःआंदी � से�एवी�अप�लासेधिमकितःक�सेमक्षोंक% गाया�क�या,वी�है�से�अ�कितःमप�लानप्रकितःवी�दीनक�म�ध्यामसे�इसे न्या�या�लायाक+ अवीगातःक��या�गा�।

¶39

38. उत्त�वी�दी! क० -1 द्वा��इसेन्या�या�लायाक�सेमक्षोंप�लान प्रकितःवी�दीनप्रस्तः�तःकिकएजा�न�तःकउभयापक्षोंकिनर् म ि1तःभवीनक� से�बं�धम4 याक्षों�स्थिस्थकितः , �ख4गा4।

¶40

39. उत्त�वी�दी! क 0-1 किनर् म ि1तःभवीनक�से�बं�धम4 अप�ला�र्थी�क+ छ०गा०नगा�प�शिलाकअधिधकिनयाम 1956 किकध�� 308 ( क ) ( ख ) क�किवीकल्पभ�उपलाब्धक��एगा�।

¶41

40. अप�ला�र्थी�द्वा��अधिधकिनयाम 1956 क�से�से�गातःप्र�वीध�न* क�उल्ला�घनअर्थीवी�इसेअधिधकिनयामद्वा��किनर् म ि1तःउपकिवीधिधया* क�लागा�तः��उल्ला�घनकिकएजा�न�प�उत्त�वी�दी! क 0-1 अधिधकिनयाम 1956 क%ध�� 307(5) क�प् र मभ�गाक�तःहैतः6 परि�वी�दी / आंवी�दीनजिजाला�न्या�या�लायाक�सेमक्षोंप्रस्तः�तःक�न�क� शिलाएस्वीतः�त्रहै'। ”

¶42

3. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that:

¶43

The private non-applicants therein claim ownership and possession over a residential house situated on land bearing Khasra No. 703/1, admeasuring 0.039 hectares, situated at Police Station Road, Mayapur, P.H. No. 15, R.N.M. Ambikapur-4. It is their case that the said property originally consisted of a kachcha house, which was subsequently reconstructed into a pakka house after its purchase through a registered sale deed dated

¶44

5

¶45

30.05.2008 from its previous owner, late Rameshwar Prasad. Since the date of purchase, the non-applicants therein claim to be in continuous possession of the property as owners and are residing therein along with their family members.

¶46

It is further their case that, in the year 2013, one Ramanand Gupta (the present applicant) lodged a complaint before the Collector, Surguja alleging that the land in question was diverted land and that its transfer was impermissible without prior permission of the competent authority. It was also alleged that a forged diversion certificate had been produced before the Collector. Acting upon the said complaint, a revenue case bearing No. 28/A-21/2013-14 was registered, and by order dated 31.12.2014, the Collector, Surguja declared the sale deed executed in favour of the non-applicants as null and void and directed correction of revenue entries in favour of the legal representatives of the original owner.

¶47

Aggrieved thereby, the non-applicants preferred a revision before the Commissioner, Surguja Division, Ambikapur, which came to be dismissed by order dated 12.04.2016. Thereafter, a further revision was filed before the Board of Revenue, Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, which was registered as Case No. R.N.16/R/A21/109/2016.

¶48

The Board of Revenue, by its order dated 07.12.2017, allowed the revision, holding that the authorities below had failed to consider

¶49

6

¶50

the core issues and legal questions involved, and remanded the matter back to the Collector with a direction to decide the case afresh after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties.

¶51

It is further stated that despite the order of the Board of Revenue, the legal representatives of late Rameshwar Prasad got their names recorded in the revenue records by concealing the said order, which compelled the non-applicants to prefer an appeal before the SDO (Revenue), Ambikapur, where the matter is stated to be still pending consideration.

¶52

Meanwhile, a complaint regarding alleged unauthorized construction over the suit property was made before the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur. Acting on the said complaint, notices were issued to Ramakant Gupta, whose name was reflected in the revenue records. Upon failure to furnish a satisfactory reply, proceedings were initiated under Sections 293 and 307 of the Act of 1956. Despite submission of replies along with documents, including the sale deed and the order of the Board of Revenue, the Municipal Corporation proceeded to issue further notices and ultimately passed an order dated 07.04.2022 directing removal of the alleged unauthorized construction within seven days.

¶53

Against the said order, an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Committee under Section 403 of the Act of 1956, which

¶54

7

¶55

initially granted interim protection. However, it was later communicated that appeal stood dismissed by order dated 14.10.2022. Thereafter, a fresh notice dated 09.01.2024 was issued directing removal of construction, failing which coercive action was to follow.

¶56

Being aggrieved, Premshila Gupta preferred an appeal before the Court of Third Additional District Judge, Surguja, Ambikapur under Sections 293(3) and 307(5) of the Act of 1956, contending inter alia that no proper opportunity of hearing had been afforded and that the action had been taken behind her back.

¶57

The learned Third Additional District Judge, Surguja, Ambikapur, by the impugned order dated 03.02.2024, partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Hence, the present civil revision.

¶58

4. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the impugned order dated 03.02.2024 passed by the learned Third Additional District Judge, Surguja, Ambikapur suffers from patent illegality, perversity and jurisdictional error, and therefore deserves to be set aside. It is contended that the learned Court below has failed to appreciate the true scope and ambit of Section 307(5) of the Act of 1956, while entertaining the application filed by non-applicant No.2. It is further submitted that non-applicant No.2, being the owner of the property and the person responsible for carrying out

¶59

8

¶60

the construction, cannot invoke the provisions of Section 307(5) of the Act of 1956. The said provision is specifically intended to confer a right upon the Municipal Corporation or upon a third party who is affected by an illegal or unauthorized construction, to approach the District Court for appropriate relief. The person who is allegedly violating the provisions of the Act and raising unauthorized construction cannot be permitted to take shelter under the said provision to stall lawful action initiated by the Municipal Corporation.

¶61

5. Learned counsel submits that the learned appellate Court has committed a grave error in law in holding that the Municipal Corporation is required to approach the District Court under Section 307(5) of the Act of 1956 before taking action for removal of unauthorized construction. Such an interpretation runs contrary to the scheme of Section 307, particularly sub-sections (1) to (3) of the Act of 1956, which clearly empower the Commissioner to issue notice, consider reply and, upon failure to show sufficient cause, to remove or demolish the unauthorized construction. The impugned finding, therefore, defeats the statutory powers vested in the Municipal Corporation and renders the enforcement mechanism under the Act otiose.

¶62

6. It is also contended that the proceedings initiated by non-applicant No.2 before the learned 3^rd Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh were wholly misconceived and not

¶63

9

¶64

maintainable in law, as the notices were issued to non-applicant No.3, who was admittedly carrying out the construction and whose name was reflected in the revenue records. Merely on the ground that the sale deed stands in the name of non-applicant No.2, she could not have invoked Section 307(5) of the Act of 1956, to challenge the demolition proceedings, particularly when the construction itself was found to be in violation of the statutory provisions.

¶65

7. Placing reliance upon the judgments in Laxmi Prasad Tamrakar v. Municipal Corporation, Raipur (1989 MPLJ 614) and Ramkaran v. Municipal Corporation, Korba (Civil Revision No. 35 of 2018) , it is submitted that it has been consistently held that the owner of an unauthorized construction cannot seek injunction under Section 307(5) of the Act of 1956 to restrain its demolition, and the expression “any other person” refers only to a person affected by such illegal construction. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned order, being an outcome of a proceeding which is itself not maintainable, is liable to be quashed.

¶66

8. On the other hand, learned counsel for non-applicant No.1 submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference in the present revision. It is contended that the Municipal Corporation had issued notices strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1956 after receiving complaint regarding unauthorized construction, and due

¶67

10

¶68

opportunity of hearing was afforded to the concerned parties. It is further submitted that the learned appellate Court has rightly remanded the matter for fresh consideration so as to ensure compliance with the principles of natural justice and proper adjudication of the rights of the parties in terms of Sections 403(2) (a) and 403(3) of the Act of 1956. The direction to decide the matter afresh cannot be said to prejudice the applicant in any manner. Thus, it is submitted that the present revision is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.

¶69

9. Learned counsel for non-applicants No.2 and 3, on the other hand, submits that the present revision is wholly misconceived and not maintainable, as the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is extremely limited and is confined only to jurisdictional errors. It is contended that the impugned order is merely an order of remand, which does not finally determine the rights of the parties and, therefore, does not occasion any failure of justice or irreparable injury to the applicant so as to warrant interference by this Court. It is further submitted that the learned 3^rd Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, Chhattisgarh has rightly appreciated the facts and law in its proper perspective and has passed the impugned order in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It is pointed out that admittedly, no notice was ever issued to non-applicant No.2, who is the recorded owner of the property by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 30.05.2008, and the entire proceedings were

¶70

11

¶71

conducted only against her husband, i.e., non-applicant No.3. In such circumstances, any action affecting valuable property rights, including demolition, without affording an opportunity of hearing to the actual owner, is vitiated in law.

¶72

10. Learned counsel further submits that the foundation of the applicant’s case, namely the order dated 31.12.2014 passed by the Collector, Surguja, has already been set aside by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur vide order dated 07.12.2017, and the matter has been remanded for fresh adjudication. Thus, the very basis on which the construction was alleged to be unauthorized no longer survives in the eyes of law. It is a settled principle that once an order is set aside by a superior authority, it becomes non-est and cannot be relied upon for any consequential action. It is also contended that the Municipal Corporation acted beyond its jurisdiction in proceeding on disputed questions of title and diversion, which are pending consideration before the competent revenue authorities. The Commissioner, being a quasi-judicial authority, failed to consider the relevant material, including the order of the Board of Revenue and the request for regularization, thereby vitiating the entire proceedings. Moreover, the action for demolition, initiated after an inordinate delay of nearly 13 years from the date of construction, is arbitrary and unreasonable.

¶73

11. Lastly, it is submitted that demolition of a residential house entails serious civil consequences and directly impacts the right to shelter

¶74

12

¶75

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Such drastic power must be exercised strictly in accordance with law and only after due compliance with statutory procedure. In the present case, the learned appellate Court has rightly remanded the matter to ensure a fair hearing and proper adjudication. Hence, the revision being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed.

¶76

12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the applicants as well as learned counsel appearing for the respective non-applicants and have perused the pleadings and documents placed on record.

¶77

13. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the controversy involved in the present case lies in a narrow compass, namely, whether the learned appellate Court was justified in remanding the matter to the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur for fresh adjudication, and whether any interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is warranted.

¶78

14. It is trite that the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is supervisory in nature and is confined to cases involving jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or patent illegality resulting in miscarriage of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers and others, (2003) 6 SCC 659 has

¶79

13

¶80

authoritatively held that revisional power cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction and cannot be invoked merely because another view is possible and held as follows :-

¶81

“19. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74)) The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely

¶82

14

¶83

necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors. (AIR 1962 SC 847). ”

¶84

15. Similarly, in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh

¶85

(2014) 9 SCC 78 , it has been reiterated that interference in revision is permissible only when the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, by observing as follows :-

¶86

“28. ……. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not viceversa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of

¶87

15

¶88

appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. ”

¶89

16. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid judicial precedents, it is quite clear that the impugned order is essentially one of remand, whereby the learned 3rd Additional District Judge has directed the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur to undertake a fresh adjudication in accordance with the statutory mandate contained in Sections 403(2)(a) and 403(3) of the Act of 1956, after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. The said order neither adjudicates the rights of the parties finally nor determines any substantive issue conclusively, but rather seeks to cure the procedural deficiencies and ensure a comprehensive and lawful determination of the controversy. In view of the settled legal position that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate

¶90

16

¶91

in nature, such an order of remand, passed to subserve the ends of justice and to secure compliance with principles of natural justice, does not warrant interference unless it is shown to be perverse or wholly without jurisdiction, which is not the case herein.

¶92

17. From the record, it is evident that serious disputes exist between the parties with regard to title, validity of the sale deed, and the nature of the construction in question. It is also not in dispute that the order dated 31.12.2014 passed by the Collector, Surguja, forming the basis of the allegation of illegality has already been set aside by the Board of Revenue by order dated 07.12.2017, and the matter stands remanded for fresh consideration. In such circumstances, any action predicated upon the said order, without taking into account its subsequent annulment, would be legally unsustainable.

¶93

18. Furthermore, it emerges that the proceedings before the Municipal Corporation were primarily conducted against non-applicant No.3, whereas non-applicant No.2, who claims to be the recorded owner by virtue of a registered sale deed, was not afforded a meaningful opportunity of hearing. The requirement of adherence to the principles of natural justice, particularly in matters entailing civil consequences such as demolition of a residential structure, cannot be overstated.

¶94

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dipak Kumar Mukherjee v.

¶95

17

¶96

Kolkata Municipal Corporation (2013) 5 SCC 336 , has held that while unauthorized constructions cannot be condoned as a matter of course, the statutory authorities are nonetheless bound to act strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law.

¶97

20. Also, in Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association (2021) 10 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court has reiterated that rule of law must prevail in matters of construction and development, and any deviation must be addressed through lawful means, by observing as follows :-

¶98

“161. The judgments of this Court spanning the last four decades emphasize the duty of planning bodies, while sanctioning building plans and enforcing building regulations and bye-laws to conform to the norms by which they are governed. A breach by the planning authority of its obligation to ensure compliance with building regulations is actionable at the instance of residents whose rights are infringed by the violation of law. Their quality of life is directly affected by the failure of the planning authority to enforce compliance. Unfortunately, the diverse and unseen group of flat buyers suffers the impact of the unholy nexus between builders and planners. Their quality of life is affected the most. Yet, confronted with the economic might of developers and the might of legal authority wielded by planning bodies, the few who raise their voices have to pursue a long and expensive battle for rights with little

¶99

18

¶100

certainty of outcomes. As this case demonstrates, they are denied access to information and are victims of misinformation. Hence, the law must step in to protect their legitimate concerns.

¶101

162. In K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council (1974) 2 SCC 506, Chief Justice AN Ray speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court observed that the municipality functions for public benefit and when it “acts in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or abuses those powers then in those cases it is not exercising its jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not possess”. This Court also held:

¶102

“27…The right to build on his own land is a right incidental to the ownership of that land. Within the Municipality the exercise of that right has been regulated in the interest of the community residing within the limits of the Municipal Committee. If under pretence of any authority which the law does give to the Municipality it goes beyond the line of its authority, and infringes or violates the rights of others, it becomes like all other individuals amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts. If sanction is given to build by contravening a bye-law the jurisdiction of the courts will be invoked on the ground that the approval by an authority of building plans which contravene the bye-laws made by that

¶103

19

¶104

authority is illegal and inoperative. (See Yabbicom v. King [(1899) 1 QB 444]).”

¶105

This Court held that an unregulated construction materially affects the right of enjoyment of property by persons residing in a residential area, and hence, it is the duty of the municipal authority to ensure that the area is not adversely affected by unauthorized construction.

¶106

163. These principles were re-affirmed by a two judge Bench in Dr G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority, (1995) 5 SCC 762, where this Court held that it was not open to the Delhi Development Authority to carve out a space, which was meant for a park for a nursery school. Justice BL Hansaria, speaking for the Court, observed:

¶107

“10. Before parting, we have an observation to make. The same is that a feeling is gathering ground that where unauthorised constructions are demolished on the force of the order of courts, the illegality is not taken care of fully inasmuch as the officers of the statutory body who had allowed the unauthorised construction to be made or make illegal allotments go scot free. This should not, however, have happened for two reasons. First, it is the illegal action/order of the officer which lies at the root of the unlawful act of the citizen concerned, because of which the officer is more to be blamed than the recipient of the illegal

¶108

20

¶109

benefit. It is thus imperative, according to us, that while undoing the mischief which would require the demolition of the unauthorised construction, the delinquent officer has also to be punished in accordance with law. This, however, seldom happens. Secondly, to take care of the injustice completely, the officer who had misused his power has also to be properly punished. Otherwise, what happens is that the officer, who made the hay when the sun shined (sic), retains the hay, which tempts others to do the same. This really gives fillip to the commission of tainted acts, whereas the aim should be opposite.”

¶110

164. In Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa, (2004) 8 SCC 733, this Court dealt with a case where the builder had exceeded the permissible construction under the sanctioned plan and had constructed an additional floor on the building, which was unauthorized. Chief Justice RC Lahoti, speaking for a two judge Bench, observed:

¶111

“24. Structural and lot area regulations authorise the municipal authorities to regulate and restrict the height, number of storeys and other structures; the percentage of a plot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts and open spaces; the density of population; and the location and use of buildings and structures. All these have in our view and do achieve the larger purpose

¶112

21

¶113

of the public health, safety or general welfare. So are front setback provisions, average alignments and structural alterations. Any violation of zoning and regulation laws takes the toll in terms of public welfare and convenience being sacrificed apart from the risk, inconvenience and hardship which is posed to the occupants of the building.”

¶114

Noting that the private interest of land owners stands subordinate to the public good while enforcing building and municipal regulations, the Court issued a caution against the tendency to compound violations of building regulations:

¶115

“25…The cases of professional builders stand on a different footing from an individual constructing his own building. A professional builder is supposed to understand the laws better and deviations by such builders can safely be assumed to be deliberate and done with the intention of earning profits and hence deserve to be dealt with sternly so as to act as a deterrent for future. It is common knowledge that the builders enter into underhand dealings. Be that as it may, the State Governments should think of levying heavy penalties on such builders and therefrom develop a welfare fund which can be utilised for compensating and rehabilitating such innocent or unwary buyers who are displaced on account of demolition

¶116

22

¶117

of illegal constructions.”

¶118

165. In Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. v. State of Assam, (2010) 2 SCC 27, Justice Deepak Verma, speaking for a two judge Bench, observed:

¶119

“55. It is a matter of common knowledge that illegal and unauthorised constructions beyond the sanctioned plans are on rise, may be due to paucity of land in big cities. Such activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands otherwise builders/colonisers would continue to build or construct beyond the sanctioned and approved plans and would still go scot-free. Ultimately, it is the flat owners who fall prey to such activities as the ultimate desire of a common man is to have a shelter of his own. Such unlawful constructions are definitely against the public interest and hazardous to the safety of occupiers and residents of multistoreyed buildings. To some extent both parties can be said to be equally responsible for this. Still the greater loss would be of those flat owners whose flats are to be demolished as compared to the builder.”

¶120

The Court lamented that the earlier decisions on the subject had not resulted in enhancing compliance by developers with building regulations. Further, the Court noted that if unauthorized constructions were allowed to stand or are “given a seal of approval by Court”, it was bound to affect the public at

¶121

23

¶122

large. It also noted that the jurisdiction and power of Courts to indemnify citizens who are affected by an unauthorized construction erected by a developer could be utilized to compensate ordinary citizens.

¶123

166. In Esha Ekta Apartments Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Mumbai, (2013) 5 SCC 357, Justice GS Singhvi, writing for a two judge Bench, reiterated the earlier decisions on this subject and observed:

¶124

“8. At the outset, we would like to observe that by rejecting the prayer for regularisation of the floors constructed in wanton violation of the sanctioned plan, the Deputy Chief Engineer and the appellate authority have demonstrated their determination to ensure planned development of the commercial capital of the country and the orders passed by them have given a hope to the lawabiding citizens that someone in the hierarchy of administration will not allow unscrupulous developers/builders to take law into their hands and get away with it.”

¶125

167. The Court further observed that an unauthorized construction destroys the concept of planned development, and places an unbearable burden on basic amenities provided by public authorities. The Court held that it was imperative for the public authority to not only demolish such constructions but also to impose a penalty on the wrongdoers involved. This lament of this Court, over the brazen violation

¶126

24

¶127

of building regulations by developers acting in collusion with planning bodies, was brought to the fore-front when the Court prefaced its judgment with the following observations:

¶128

“1. In the last five decades, the provisions contained in various municipal laws for planned development of the areas to which such laws are applicable have been violated with impunity in all the cities, big or small, and those entrusted with the task of ensuring implementation of the master plan, etc. have miserably failed to perform their duties. It is highly regrettable that this is so despite the fact that this Court has, keeping in view the imperatives of preserving the ecology and environment of the area and protecting the rights of the citizens, repeatedly cautioned the authorities concerned against arbitrary regularisation of illegal constructions by way of compounding and otherwise.”

¶129

168. Finally, the Court also observed that no case has been made out for directing the municipal corporation to regularize a construction which has been made in violation of the sanctioned plan and cautioned against doing so. In that context, it held:

¶130

“56…We would like to reiterate that no authority administering municipal laws and other similar laws can encourage violation of the sanctioned plan. The courts are also expected to refrain from exercising equitable jurisdiction for regularisation of illegal and

¶131

25

¶132

unauthorised constructions else it would encourage violators of the planning laws and destroy the very idea and concept of planned development of urban as well as rural areas.”

¶133

169. These concerns have been reiterated in the more recent decisions of this Court in Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. State of Kerala, (2019) 7 SCC 248, Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. Maradu Municipality, Maradu, (2021) 16 SCC 822 and Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India, (2019) 19 SCC 161. ”

¶134

21. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

¶135

in the aforementioned case-laws, it is apparent that the scope of interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and cannot be invoked to substitute a plausible view taken by the subordinate Court with another view merely because it may appear more acceptable. In the present case, the learned appellate Court, upon due consideration of the material available on record, has deemed it appropriate to remand the matter for fresh adjudication so as to ensure adherence to statutory requirements and the principles of natural justice. Such an approach is not only legally permissible but is, in fact, in furtherance of fair procedure and proper administration of justice. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be said to suffer from any jurisdictional error, material irregularity, or patent illegality warranting interference under Section 115 of CPC.

¶136

26

¶137

22. At the same time, it is also evident from the record that the construction in question has been in existence for a considerable period, and the applicants have expressed their willingness to seek regularization in accordance with law. As consistently held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while unauthorized constructions cannot be condoned in a routine manner, the statutory framework governing municipal administration does contemplate, in appropriate cases, the possibility of regularization, subject to compliance with the applicable provisions and building bye-laws. The object of such enactments is not merely punitive but also regulatory, aiming to balance enforcement with fairness, wherever legally permissible.

¶138

23. In that view of the matter, while upholding the impugned order of remand as being just and proper, this Court deems it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to reserve liberty in favour of the applicants to avail the remedy of seeking regularization of the construction in question, in accordance with law. Such a course would ensure that the rights of the parties are adjudicated comprehensively by the competent authority, without this Court expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival claims.

¶139

24. Consequently, the present civil revision is disposed of with the following directions:

¶140

(i) The applicants shall be at liberty to file an appropriate application/representation before the Commissioner,

¶141

27

¶142

Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur within a period of 04 weeks from the date of this order, seeking regularization of the construction in question, if so permissible under the provisions of the Act of 1956 and the applicable building byelaws;

¶143

(ii) Upon such application being filed, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Ambikapur shall consider and decide the same strictly in accordance with law, by passing a reasoned and speaking order, within a period of 60 days from the date of its submission;

¶144

(iii) While deciding the said application, the Commissioner shall also take into consideration the observations made in the impugned order dated 03.02.2024, as well as the directions issued hereinabove, and shall afford due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties;

¶145

(iv) It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the parties, and all issues are left open to be adjudicated by the competent authority in accordance with law.

¶146

25. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant civil

¶147

revision stands disposed of . No order as to costs.

¶148

Yogesh

¶149

		(Amitendr	Sd/- a Kishore Prasad) Judge
The date when the judgment is	The date when the judgment is	The date wh uploaded	en the judgment is on the website
reserved	pronounced
		Operative	Full
16.03.2026	16.04.2026	------	16.04.2026

Ramanand Gupta v. Commissioner

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ramanand Gupta v. Commissioner

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Ramesh Kumar Kamar Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Daman Kumar Luniya Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Shiv Kumar Patel Vs State of Chhattisgarh

A. K. Banjare Vs Union of India

Salik Ram Vs Union of India

Hitesh Agrawal Vs State of Chhattisgarh