Manoj Thakur Vs Abdul Rahmaan

¶1

1

¶2

2026:CGHC:1375-DB

¶3

NAFR

¶4

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

¶5

ACQA No. 464 of 2018

¶6

Manoj Thakur S/o Ram Ayodhya Thakur Aged About 42 Years Occupation Business, R/o House No. LIG- 115, R.P. Nagar, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶7

... Appellant

¶8

versus

¶9

1 - Abdul Rahmaan S/o Md. Sulemann Aged About 41 Years R/o M I G- 1/56, Rabishankar Nagar, Korba, Purana Chowk, Maanikpur, Police Station- Kotwali, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶10

Digitally signed by VASANT VASANT KUMARDate: KUMAR 2026.01.12 18:13:00 +0530

¶11

2 - Yogesh Suryavanshi S/o Gajanand Suryavanshi R/o L I G -86, Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Korba, Purani Chowk, Rampur, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶12

3 - Abdul Sultan S/o Md. Sulemaan Aged About 35 Years R/o Ravishankar Shukla Nagar, M I G-1/56, Purani Chowk, Maanikpur, Police Station - Kotwali, District - Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶13

4 - Shekh Imraan S/o Abdul Majid R/o House No. 286, Subash Block, S E C L , Korba, Purani Chowk, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶14

5 - Manish Singh S/o Krishna Kumar Chatri Aged About 41 Years R/o M I G 1/143, Maharana Pratap Nagar, Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶15

6 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station- Korba , District - Korba, Chhattisgarh, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

¶16

2

¶17

--- Respondents (Cause title is taken from the CIS)

¶18

For Appellant : Shri Divyanand Patel, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr. Rishikant Mahibia, Advocate For Respondent No.6/State : Shri Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy, GA

¶19

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

¶20

Order on Board

¶21

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

¶22

09.01.2026

¶23

Heard Shri Divyanand Patel, Advocate appears on behalf of Mr. Rishikant Mahibia, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Shri Nitansh Jaiswal, Dy. Government Advocate for the State/Respondent No.6.

¶24

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the impugned order dated 18.02.2016 has been assailed by way of the present acquittal appeal. It is contended that the appellant could not approach this Court within the period of limitation and that there is a delay of about one year in filing the appeal. Explaining the delay, it is argued that the appellant was not having knowledge about passing of the judgment of acquittal as the same has not informed to him. In the month of February, 2017, he came to know about judgment of acquittal then he has

¶25

3

¶26

moved application on 14.02.2017 for getting certified copy of the judgment and other documents which he received on 25.02.2017. He would further submit that the appellant wants to engage a senior counsel to argue the present appeal on behalf of the appellant. Thus, his inability to file the acquittal appeal within time cannot be attributed to deliberate negligence or malafide conduct, but is the result of unavoidable circumstances coupled with poverty and ignorance of legal remedy. The delay, therefore, is bona fide and stands sufficiently explained. Accordingly, he prays for condoning the delay in the interest of justice and proceed to hear the appeal on merits.

¶27

On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Staterespondent No.6 opposes the prayer for condonation of delay and submits that the appellant has failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed statutory period. It is contended that a delay of about one year is inordinate and cannot be brushed aside lightly, as condonation of such prolonged delay defeats the very object of the law of limitation, which is to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. It is further argued that the reasons assigned by the appellant, namely financial hardship, lack of guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, do not constitute sufficient cause in the eye of law. Poverty or ignorance of law, it is submitted, cannot be

¶28

4

¶29

pleaded as a justification for circumventing statutory provisions. Learned counsel stresses that the appellant has not acted with due diligence and has failed to show that he was prevented by circumstances beyond her control. It is also urged that the explanation furnished is vague and does not satisfactorily account for the long period of delay. Therefore, it is prayed that the application for condonation of delay be rejected, and consequently the acquittal appeal itself be dismissed as barred by limitation.

¶30

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties as also perused the application for condonation of delay in preferring the instant acquittal appeal.

¶31

The primary question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the delay of about one year in preferring the present acquittal appeal deserves to be condoned or not ?

¶32

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-

¶33

“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an

¶34

5

¶35

adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

¶36

"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

¶37

“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be

¶38

6

¶39

decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

¶40

Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

¶41

Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

¶42

5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted

¶43

7

¶44

below:

¶45

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

¶46

It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

¶47

The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the

¶48

8

¶49

proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

¶50

We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

¶51

xxx xxx xxx

¶52

In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no

¶53

9

¶54

error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

¶55

In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

¶56

For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

¶57

Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

¶58

At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government

¶59

10

¶60

adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

¶61

There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation

¶62

11

¶63

has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

¶64

From the order-sheets of the case, it transpires that the present appeal was filed and came up before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 18.05.2017 and the present appeal was reported to be suffering from certain defaults and the appellant counsel was given time again to remove the default, but ultimately on

¶65

12

¶66

22.11.2018, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court found that as the appeal has been preferred by the victim, hence, in view of the pronouncement of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representavives Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. decided on 12.10.2018 , the victim in the present case is not required to seek leave to appeal. Hence, the said appeal default was carved out and the appeal was directed to be registered listed for admission. Today, the same has been listed for admission.

¶67

From the perusal of the memo of appeal and documents annexed with the present appeal, it transpires that the present appeal is beyond time by one year and the application filed for condonation of delay goes to show that a vague averment has been made in para No.3 that the appellant was not having knowledge about passing of the judgment of acquittal as the same has not informed to him. In the month of February, 2017, he came to know about judgment of acquittal then he has moved application on 14.02.2017 for getting certified copy of the judgment and other documents which he received on 25.02.2017.

¶68

It is very surprising that the appellant who was one of the injured person has did not have knowledge about the passing of the

¶69

13

¶70

order passed by the trial Court acquitting the accused/respondents and when the same was confronted with the counsel for the appellant, he initially submitted that because of financial hardship, the appellant could not file his appeal and the said argument and the ground which was argued by the counsel for the appellant initially is not averred in the delay condonation application and the prayer which has been made today for adjourning the matter for engaging a senior counsel appears to be also unfounded as the appeal has been pending before this Court and was directed to be listed for admission since 2018. Hence, the prayer for engaging a senior counsel is accordingly rejected.

¶71

Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the aforementioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that the discretion to condone delay has to be exercised with great caution and only upon a clear and satisfactory demonstration of “sufficient cause.” The law is well-settled that poverty or ignorance of law, by themselves, do not constitute such sufficient cause, and that negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be overlooked under the guise of advancing substantial justice.

¶72

14

¶73

In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal principles and upon careful consideration of the rival submissions, this Court finds that the delay of about one year in filing the present acquittal appeal is grossly inordinate. The explanation offered by the appellant, namely financial constraints, lack of legal guidance, and ignorance of the remedy, though invoking sympathy, cannot be treated as “sufficient cause” in the eye of law. It is now wellsettled that poverty or ignorance of law by themselves do not constitute adequate justification for condoning delay, nor can the valuable right that accrues to the opposite party by virtue of the law of limitation be lightly taken away.

¶74

The doctrine of limitation is founded upon public policy that seeks to ensure certainty and finality in litigation. Once the statutory period has expired, a litigant seeking indulgence of the Court must show diligence and bona fides, and must explain satisfactorily the circumstances which prevented timely action. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to point out any circumstance arising within the period of limitation which disabled his from approaching this Court. On the contrary, the record reveals that he remained inactive for a long period. Such explanation cannot be construed as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, particularly when the delay is prolonged and unexplained for a substantial period.

¶75

15

¶76

Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that no case for condonation of delay is made out. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly rejected. As a consequence, the instant acquittal appeal, being hopelessly barred by limitation, also stands dismissed on the ground of delay and

¶77

laches .

¶78

Sd/Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶79

Vasant

Manoj Thakur v. Abdul Rahmaan

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Manoj Thakur v. Abdul Rahmaan

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Ritik Sahu Alias Pintu Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Badri Prasad Chandrakar ( Died) Thorugh Legal Heir, Smt. Chandrika Chandrakar Vs the State of Chhattisgarh

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Komal Ram

Mr. Sumanth Subhash Jinagouda Vs State of Chhattisgarh

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Dr. G.K Dubey

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Sandeep Kumar Tiwari