Dismissed¶14

State of Chhattisgarh v. Dr. G.K Dubey

Chhattisgarh HC8 Jan 2026WA/974/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

condonation of delay; 298 days delay; writ appeal dismissed; delay and laches; government department delay; departmental procedure not sufficient cause; bureaucratic process; Section 5 Limitation Act 1908; Postmaster General v. Living Media India (2012) 3 SCC 563; State of MP v. Ramkumar Choudhary 2024 INSC 932; Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board 2025 INSC 1104; SLP dismissed on delay 07.11.2025; W.P.(S) No. 7749/2024; I.A. No.01 of 2025; Higher Education Department Chhattisgarh; dismissal at threshold; no costs.

What did the court decide?

Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment; condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. ¶8

State of Chhattisgarh Vs Dr. G.K Dubey — Writ and Judicial Review | Chhattisgarh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act 9 of 1908, the old Limitation Act) apply to an application for condonation of delay, as framed by the Court at paragraph 5 of the order. +1 more

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Ratio / Principle

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Key takeaways

Mere departmental formalities or bureaucratic processes cannot constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay.ratio¶11
No sufficient cause is made out for condonation of the delay of 298 days in preferring the present appeal; the Court declined to exercise its discretionary power to condone such an extraordinary delay.ratio¶12
Since the State's earlier Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.51637/2024 already stood dismissed on the ground of delay, the present writ appeal was likewise liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, Division Bench (Ramesh Sinha, CJ and Arvind Kumar Verma, J), order dated 09.01.2026 in WA No. 974 of 2025, State of Chhattisgarh (Department of Higher Education) v. Dr. G.K Dubey and 9 others. The application (I.A. No.01 of 2025) seeking condonation of a 298-day delay in filing the writ appeal against the learned Single Judge's order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.(S) No. 7749/2024 was rejected. Drawing on Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, State of MP v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, and Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104, the Court held that departmental procedure and bureaucratic steps do not amount to 'sufficient cause'; condonation of delay is an exception, not a rule, and government litigants enjoy no privileged treatment. Noting that the State's earlier SLP (Civil) Diary No.51637/2024 was dismissed on the ground of delay on 07.11.2025, the Court dismissed the writ appeal at the threshold on grounds of delay and laches, with no order as to costs.

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2026:CGHC:1329-DB

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Digitally signed by BABLU BABLU RAJENDRA RAJENDRA BHANARKAR BHANARKAR Date: 2026.01.09 17:55:41 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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NAFR

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WA No. 974 of 2025

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary To The Government Of Chhattisgarh, Department Of Higher Education Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhavan Naya Raipur, Ps- Rakhi, Raipur Chhattisgarh

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2 - The Commissioner Department Of Higher Education Directorate Block- 3, Third Floor Indrawati Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh

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... Appellants

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versus

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1 - Dr. G.K Dubey S/o Shri B.L. Dubey Aged About 77 Years R/o Kashyap Colony, Gali No. 5 Bilaspur, Distt.- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dr. Ramadhar Prasad Pandey S/o Shri K.P. Pandey Aged About 68 Years R/o 16/217, Near Krishna Vihar Ward No. 28, Vidya Nagar, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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3 - Smt. Manjuli Acharya W/o Shri S.K Acharya Aged About 77 Years R/o Senior Mig- 24, Nehru Nahar Korba, District- Korba Chhattisgarh 4 – B.S. Thakur S/o Shri Ram Singh Thakur Aged About 73 Years R/o Samta Vihar Colony, Tikrapara, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Smt. L.B John W/o Shri Benny John Aged About 78 Years R/o M.I.G.- 40, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Hudco, Phase- Nagar, Korba, District- Korba Chhattisgarh

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6 - Dr. Ramnarayan Pandey S/o Shri V.P. Pandey Aged About 75 Years R/o Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Phase-2, Kosabadi Prasad Nagar, Korba, District- Korba Chhattisgarh

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7 - Dr. Bhuvan Lal Sahu S/o Shri Brijlal Sahu Aged About 78 Years R/o M.I.G.- 37, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Phase- 2, Kosabadi, Korba, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh

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8 - Satish Kumar Sharma S/o Shri R.K. Sharma Aged About 65 Years R/o M.I.G.- 53, Housing Board Colony, Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Phase2, Neeharika, Korba, Distt.- Korba Chhattisgarh

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9 - Smt. Durgavati Yadav Wd/o Shri R.G. Yadav Aged About 72 Years R/o R-8, State Bank Colony, Vinoba Nagar, Bilaspur, Distt.- Bilaspur (C.G.)

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10 - Smt. Saroj Upadhyay Wd/o Shri I.P. Upadhyay Aged About 72 Years R/o Mig-38, Rajendra Prasad Nagar, Phase-2, Kosabadi, Korba, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellants	: Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy Advocate General
For Respondents	: Mr. Manish Upadhyay, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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09.01.2026

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1. Heard Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants/State on I.A. No.01 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay of 298 days in preferring the writ appeal. Also heard Mr. Manish Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondents.

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2. Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy Advocate General,

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appearing for the State/appellants, submits that the impugned order has been passed by learned Single Judge on 29.11.2024. Thereafter, the department initiated proceeding to file writ appeal against the impugned order before the Division Bench of this Court. Office of the Advocate General has given opinion to prefer writ appeal before Division Bench of this Court on 14.08.2025. Thereafter, on 24.09.2025 Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh has granted permission for filing aforesaid writ appeal.

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3. He further submits that the Under Secretary, Law & Legislature Department, Government of Chhattisgarh directed to file writ appeal against the impugned order before the Division Bench of this Court and Assistant Professor (Law), Legal cell was appointed as Officer-in-Charge of the case and the relevant documents have been received by the concerned Officer-inCharge on 24.09.2025 and then the process for filing aforesaid writ appeal was initiated by the Officer-in-Charge and writ appeal has been prepared and filed before the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court. He also submits that the aforesaid delay has been caused due to departmental procedure, which is bonafide and not intentional and therefore, the same is liable to be condoned.

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4. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently argued and pointed out that

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challenging the order of learned Single Judge in the other similar matters, a batch of writ appeals was filed and the same was dismissed by this Court, against which the State has preferred an SLP before the Supreme Court which too was dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2025 on the ground of delay.

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5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay.

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6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-

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“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no

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gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

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30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably

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failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

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7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932 , while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-

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“5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:

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"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:

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“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a

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case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

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14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."

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Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

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5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

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“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

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25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation

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between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

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26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other

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side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

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xxx xxx xxx

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34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.

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36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There

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shall be no order as to costs.”

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Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.

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6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix

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the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously.

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7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the

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expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

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8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few.

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9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (dead) by LRS v. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a Stateauthority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the

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apathy and pangs of a private litigant.

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10. Upon due consideration of the submissions made by Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State/appellants, and Mr. Manish Upadhyay, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents, this Court finds that the instant writ appeal against the order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.(S) No. 7749/2024 suffers from inordinate delay of 298 days.

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11. While the appellants have attributed the delay to routine administrative and procedural steps, the explanation offered is neither sufficient nor convincing. In light of the consistent legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), and other subsequent judgments, mere departmental formalities or bureaucratic processes cannot constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay.

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12. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and in the absence of any plausible, satisfactory, or bona fide explanation for the inordinate delay, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discretionary power to condone such an extraordinary delay. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/State has failed to place on record any convincing or bona fide reason justifying the delay. Consequently, no sufficient cause is made out for condonation of the delay of 298 days in preferring the present appeal.

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13. In view of the aforesaid and taking note of the fact that the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.51637/2024 preferred by the State before the Hon’ble Supreme Court already stands dismissed vide order dated 07.11.2025 on the ground of delay, the present writ appeal is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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14. Accordingly, the instant writ appeal is dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay and laches . There shall be no order as to costs.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Arvind Kumar Verma) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Bablu

State of Chhattisgarh v. Dr. G.K Dubey

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State of Chhattisgarh v. Dr. G.K Dubey

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

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