The State of Chhattisgarh Vs Abhijeet Das Gupta

Abhijeet Das Gupta, S/o Parimal Das Gupta, aged about 45 Years, R/o Sector-06, Street No. 79, House No. 1-B, Bhilainagar, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent

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For Appellant : Mr. Krishnagopal Yadav, Deputy Government Advocate. For Respondent : None.

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey and Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal

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Judgment on Board

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12.01.2026

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Per Radhakishan Agrawal, J.

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Heard on admission.

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This acquittal appeal filed by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 11.03.2015 passed by the Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg, C.G. in Sessions Case No.07/2014, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charge under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) on the basis of benefit of doubt.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 29.09.2013, PW-3 Sunita Das Gupta, daughter of the deceased- Smt. Anjali Pal and wife of accused/respondent, lodged a written report (Ex.P-5) at Police Station Bhilai Nagar, stating that she was residing with her husband/respondent and children at her mother’s house (deceased’s house) situated at

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Sector-06, Bhilai Nagar. On the date of the incident, she had gone to Rajnandgaon, leaving her mother/deceased alone at home. At about 4:15–4:30 p.m., she received information from neighbour (PW-4 Varsha Goswami) that her mother/deceased was lying injured inside the house. On reaching there, she found her mother/deceased lying in a pool of blood. She expressed suspicion against her husband/respondentAbhijeet Das Gupta, alleging prior incidents of assault and threats. On the basis of the said report, FIR (Ex.P-6) was registered against the accused/respondent.

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During the course of investigation, merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P-7. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-9 and the dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination. PW-1 Dr. Vipin Jain conducted the post-mortem examination and opined that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage resulting from head and chest injuries and that the nature of death was homicidal and gave postmortem report vide Ex.P-1. Vide Ex.P-12, memorandum statement of the accused/respondent was recorded, pursuant to which, one cane stick having blood-like stains was seized vide Ex.P-13. Vide Ex.P-14, full pant of the accused/respondent was seized. From the spot, plain and bloodstained soil were seized vide Ex.P-15. Seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination, and the FSL report was brought on record vide Ex.P-20. Accused/respondent was arrested vide Ex.P-16.

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After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the concerned trial Court. The accused/respondent abjured the guilt and prayed for trial.

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The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of said charge leveled against him.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, erroneous and contrary to the evidence available on record. He further submits that the accused/respondent had a clear motive to commit the murder of his mother-in-law/deceased owing to prior quarrels and assaults on PW-3 Sunita Das Gupta and the deceased, which aspect was not properly appreciated by the trial Court. He also submits that the prosecution relied upon circumstantial evidence, including the last-seen presence near the deceased’s house, recovery of the cane stick at the accused’s instance and blood on his clothing, which cumulatively pointed to his guilt. He also submits that the trial Court gave undue benefit of doubt and failed to appreciate the consistency of the circumstantial evidence and medical findings. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside.

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We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant and perused the material available on record.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala¹ has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the

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1 (2022) 8 SCC 440

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accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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The question that now arises for consideration is whether the respondent is the perpetrator of the crime in question.

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Admittedly, the present case rests on circumstantial evidence as there is no direct evidence available on record. The homicidal death of deceased is also not in dispute. The five golden principles, which constitute the panchsheel of proof in a case based on circumstantial evidence, have been laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra² , wherein it was observed in

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paragraph 153 as under:

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“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established :

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(1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

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It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra³ where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

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Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

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(2)the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

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(3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,

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(4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

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(5 )there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.”

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The learned trial Court has relied upon the evidence of PW-3 Sunita Das

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3 (1973) 2 SCC 793

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Gupta, daughter of the deceased and wife of accused/respondent and held 2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

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that although she alleged prior quarrels, assaults, and threats by the accused/respondent towards herself and the deceased, but she admitted that she was not present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time and had lodged the FIR on suspicion. Her testimony was therefore found insufficient to directly connect the accused/respondent with the commission of the offence. Further, the learned Trial Court has relied upon the circumstance of motive and held that though strained relations between the accused/respondent and his wife/PW-3 were established, but motive alone cannot be the basis of conviction in the absence of corroborative evidence completing the chain of circumstances.

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This apart, the learned trial Court relied upon the evidence pertaining to the “last-seen theory” and held that PW-4 Varsha Goswami merely stated that the deceased was alive and alone at about 2:10 p.m., but did not depose that the accused/respondent was present with the deceased at the relevant time. Further, PW-6 Ganesh Prasad Tiwari admitted in his crossexamination that he had not seen the accused/respondent going to the house of the deceased. Consequently, the circumstance of “last seen together” was held to be not proved.

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As regards the recovery of the alleged weapon of offence, the prosecution claims that a cane stick was seized at the instance of the accused/respondent. However, the FSL report (Ex.P-20) categorically reveals that no blood, much less human blood, was found on the seized cane stick. In the absence of any bloodstains, the alleged recovery of the cane stick does not advance the case of the prosecution in any manner. Further, Dr. Vipin Jain (PW-1) has clearly opined that the fatal head injuries sustained by the deceased were incised wounds caused by a sharp-edged weapon and that such injuries could not have been caused by the seized cane stick. Admittedly, the prosecution failed to recover or identify any

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sharp-edged weapon allegedly used in the commission of the offence. That apart, although blood was found on the trousers/pants seized from the accused/respondent, but the prosecution failed to determine the blood group or establish any nexus between the said bloodstains and the deceased. Consequently, this circumstance cannot be treated as incriminating against the accused/respondent.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh and another⁴ held that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood and held in Para-24 as under:

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“24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.”

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In view of the aforesaid discussion, the alleged recovery of the cane stick and trousers/pants from the accused/respondent is of no evidentiary value and does not constitute incriminating material against him. There is no other cogent evidence on record connecting the accused/respondent with the commission of the offence. If the case of the prosecution is taken as it is, then it appears that the entire case of the prosecution was made on the basis of mere suspicion, but, suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof.

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4 (2019) 7 SCC 781

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The learned trial Court has elaborately discussed the evidence led by the prosecution and after analyzing the entire evidence led by the prosecution, came to the conclusion that there is no cogent and clinching evidence on record to show that accused/respondent is the perpetrator of the crime in question and as such, acquitted the accused/respondent of the said charge, extending the benefit of doubt, as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

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After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborate judgment impugned passed by the trial Court, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the five golden principles constituting the ‘ panchsheel’ for proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). Consequently, the impugned judgment acquitting the accused/respondent of the said charge is just and proper and does not call for any interference.

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Accordingly, the acquittal appeal filed by the appellant against the acquittal of the accused / respondent is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.

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Sd/Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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Akhilesh

The State of Chhattisgarh v. Abhijeet Das Gupta

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The State of Chhattisgarh v. Abhijeet Das Gupta

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