State Of Chhattisgarh Vs Rajesh Yadav And Ors.

This acquittal appeal preferred by the Appellant/State arises out of the judgment dated 14.05.2012 passed in Special Criminal Case No.41/2010 by the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.), whereby the accused persons/respondents were acquitted of the charges under Sections 342, 365, 376(2)(g), 376(2)(g) and 506 of Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “the Act, 1989”), by granting them the benefit of doubt.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that, on 20.07.2010, at about 10:00 PM, complainant/PW-2-Ganesh Mandavi along with his wife/victim, sister/PW-5 Manisha and children, after alighting at Bilha Railway Station, proceeded on foot towards Village Pounsari. Near Dodkibhatha pond, five persons allegedly intercepted them. Three accused persons forcibly took victim/PW1 towards the field and committed gang rape, while the remaining accused persons restrained the complainant/PW-2 by threatening him. After that, a boy who had joined them earlier allegedly dragged PW-5 Manisha towards the fields. It is alleged that after the incident, PW-5 Manisha could not be found and the complainant along with his wife/victim spent the night near a shop in the village. On the following morning, i.e., 21.07.2010 at about 10:30 AM, an FIR (Ex.P-6) was registered at Police Station Bilha against unknown persons.

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During the course of investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-5 and the caste certificate of the victim was seized vide Ex.P-2. After obtaining her consent, the victim was sent for medical examination, whereupon PW-9 Dr. Smt. Geeta Pradhan examined her and did not notice any injury on the person of the victim either externally or internally. She also did not give any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse and gave her MLC report vide Ex.P-18. Vaginal slides of the victim were seized vide Ex.P-11. The accused persons were taken into custody vide Exs.P-26 to P-30. A test identification parade was conducted vide Ex.P-4. The seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination and, as per the FSL report (Ex.P-46-A), no spermatozoa were found on the seized slides.

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After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused persons before the concerned trial Court. The accused persons abjured their guilt and claimed to be tried.

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The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons of the aforesaid charges levelled against them.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court is unjustified in acquitting the accused persons by recording perverse findings. He further submits that the learned trial Court erred in disbelieving the testimony of the victim, which

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was reliable and sufficient to sustain conviction. He also submits that the identity of the accused persons stood duly proved through the testimony of the victim as well as the test identification parade. Despite there being cogent and clinching evidence on record, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons without appreciating the evidence in its correct perspective. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is liable to be set aside.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents No.1, 4 & 5 supports the impugned judgment and submits that the incident is alleged to have occurred at night in complete darkness, that the accused persons were strangers to the witnesses, and that the test identification parade was wholly vitiated as the accused persons were shown to the witnesses at the police station prior to the parade. He further submits that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and that the essential ingredients of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 were not established. Thus, the view taken by learned trial court is a reasonable and possible view and does not warrant interference.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The Supreme Court has considered the scope of interference in cases of acquittal in several matters and has passed several

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guidelines for considering the appeals arising out of acquittal of accused persons in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala¹ has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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In the matter of Kali Ram vs State of H.P.² , the Supreme Court has held in para 25 which reads as under:-

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“25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is

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1 (2022) 8 SCC 440

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2 (1973) 2 SCC 808

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favorable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence.”

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The Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka reported in 2024 (3) SCC 544 has held in para 36 as under:-

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"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.

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Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand³ , whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:

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“ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka , (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar

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3 (2025) 5 SCC 433

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[Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 48283, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149

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“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42

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42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,

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etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ”

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40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further

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strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material

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evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines/ dictums laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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Upon careful examination of the evidence on record, it is apparent that the incident is alleged to have occurred at about 10:00 PM. Both PW-1 victim and PW-2 her husband/Ganesh Mandavi have admitted that it was dark at the place of occurrence. The prosecution has failed to establish any source of light at the spot. It

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is also admitted by both witnesses that they were not acquainted with the accused persons prior to the incident.

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PW-1 victim, although, stated that on the date of incident, five persons came at the spot, out of whom, three took her towards the field and committed sexual intercourse with her, however, in crossexamination, she admitted that it was dark at the time of incident and that she did not know the accused persons prior to the incident. She further admitted that before the identification parade, the police had shown the accused persons to her at the police station and that she came to know their names only during the said process. She also admitted that due to darkness she could not see where the accused persons went after the incident. These admissions materially affect the reliability of her identification of the accused persons.

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Further, PW-2 complainant/husband of the victim also admitted that it was dark at the spot and that there were fields on both sides of the road. He categorically admitted that he had never seen the accused persons prior to the incident and that the police had shown him the accused persons at the police station before the identification parade. He could not explain as to what was the source of light by which he identified the accused persons. In a case where the witnesses were strangers to the accused and the incident occurred in darkness, such identification without establishing the source of light becomes highly doubtful.

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Moreover, PW-5 Manisha, the second alleged victim, has made highly inconsistent and contradictory statements. In her examination-in-chief, she stated that the accused persons did nothing to her. However, in cross-examination, she stated that accused/respondent No.4 Rohit had committed rape upon her, but simultaneously admitted that due to darkness she could not identify him at the time of the incident. She further introduced a new person named Shatrughan, stating that he had taken her away from the spot, assaulted her and kept her with him for about one month. Her statement was recorded after a delay of about one and a half months from the date of incident. These material contradictions and unexplained delay render her testimony wholly unreliable.

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This apart, PW-3 Ashok Kumar Upadhyay, Naib Tahsildar who conducted the test identification parade, admitted that the accused persons and the identifying witnesses were brought by the police and that the identification parade was conducted prior to the formal arrest of the accused persons. He further admitted that the persons mixed with the accused persons were not of similar age and appearance. The evidence on record further establishes that the accused persons had already been shown to the witnesses at the police station prior to the parade. In these circumstances, the test identification parade loses its evidentiary value and cannot be relied upon.

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Besides above, the medical evidence also does not lend conclusive support to the prosecution case. PW-9 Dr. Geeta

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Pradhan, who examined the victim did not notice any injury over the person of the victim and also did not give any definite opinion regarding forcible sexual intercourse. Further, as per the FSL report (Ex.P-46A), no human spermatozoa were found on the seized vaginal slides of the victim. These circumstances clearly demolish the prosecution version and create serious doubt about the alleged incident, thereby rendering the prosecution case wholly unreliable.

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A significant lacuna in the prosecution case is the complete absence of investigation against the person named Shatrughan, who, according to PW-5 Manisha, played a crucial role in taking her away from the spot and keeping her confined for about a month. The Investigating Officer admitted that no investigation was conducted in respect of the said person. Non-investigation of such a crucial link seriously weakens the prosecution case and raises doubt about the fairness of the investigation.

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Thus, from a cumulative appreciation of the evidence discussed hereinabove, it is quite vivid that the prosecution case suffers from serious infirmities, material contradictions, and glaring lapses in investigation. The testimony of the victim and other material witnesses does not inspire confidence, particularly with regard to the identity of the accused persons, as the incident admittedly occurred in darkness and the witnesses were strangers to the accused. The test identification parade stands vitiated and loses all evidentiary value due to prior exposure of the accused persons to the witnesses and procedural irregularities. The medical and

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forensic evidence also fails to corroborate the prosecution version. Further, the contradictory and belated statements of PW-5 Manisha, coupled with the complete non-investigation of a crucial named person, render the prosecution case wholly unreliable.

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So far as the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 is concerned, although it stands proved that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Tribe, but there is no evidence on record to establish that the accused persons had knowledge of her caste or that the alleged offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Mere proof of the caste of the victim is not sufficient to attract the said provision. In view of the aforesaid deficiencies, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons.

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After considering the material available on record as well as the elaborated impugned judgment passed by the trial Court and being very much conscious of the existing legal position that in an appeal against acquittal if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution and the trial Court taking one view favouring the accused, reversal of the findings of acquittal by the Appellate Court taking the other possible view into consideration, is not permissible in law, we are of considered opinion that the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of evidence and represent a plausible and reasonable view. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court

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are neither perverse nor contrary to the material available on record.

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