Aarya Jayant Vs Principal Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh

1 - Principal Secretary, State Of Chhattisgarh (Representing Cabinet State Of Chhattisgarh) Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh

¶11

2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh

¶12

3 - Directorate Department Of Public Education, Chhattisgarh, Through Its Director, First Floor, C-Block, Indravati Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh

¶13

4 - District Education Officer Mungeli, Tehsil And District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶14

5 - Assistant District Project Officer Office Of District Education Officer, Mungeli, Tehsil And District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh

¶15

... Respondent(s)

¶16

(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

¶17

For Petitioner(s)	: M. Sumit Shrivastava, Advocate
For Respondent(s)/State	: Mr. Sabyasachi Choubey, Panel Lawyer

¶18

VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.10.06 17:50:51 +0530

¶19

2

¶20

Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal

¶21

C.A.V. Order

¶22

The petitioner has filed the present writ petition against the order dated 30.04.2025 (Annexure P/1), passed by the respondent No.2 and for quashing of the absorption proceeding initiated pursuant to the order dated 30.04.2025 and further direction to the authorities to fill up the posts of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) in accordance with the Rules of 2019, and prayed the following reliefs:-

¶23

“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions to quash the order dated 30.04.2025 (Annexure P/1) Colly. Passed by the respondent No.2, which is based on decision of cabinet and also declare the decision of cabinet is against the statutory Rules of 2019.

¶24

10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the entire proceeding of absorption initiated on the basis of impugned order dated 30/04/2025 and declaring the constitution of Committee for scrutinization. /absorption by order dated 09/06/2025 (Annexure P/2) as illegal.

¶25

10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions commanding the official respondent to fill up the vacancies of direct recruitment in the post of Assistant Teacher Science/Laboratory strictly in accordance with Rules of 2019 in a fair and transparent manner.

¶26

10.4 Any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the cost of the petition may be given.”

¶27

The facts in brief are that the State Government has framed the “Chhattisgarh School Education Services (Educational and

¶28

3

¶29

Administrative Cadre) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2019” (in short “Rules of 2019”) to control the recruitment and service conditions of the teachers in the School Education Department. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2019 provides the method of recruitment. Schedule-II of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2019 provides that the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) has to be filled up by 100% direct recruitment. The post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) is a Class-III post having pay matrix Level-06, and the minimum educational qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) is Higher Secondary with Biology/Mathematics, as provided in Schedule-I of Rule 5 of the Rules of 2019. On 30-04-2025, the State Government, in a Cabinet meeting, took a decision for the absorption of Assistant Teachers (B.Ed. qualification holder) whose services have been terminated by the order dated 02-04-2024, passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in WPS No. 3541/2023 ( Bhuneshwar Sahu v. Union of India and Others ). By virtue of said Cabinet decision, the State Government has started proceeding to absorb the 2621 terminated B.Ed. Qualification holder Assistant Teachers against the vacant 4,422 posts of Assistant Teacher Science/Laboratory by relaxing the educational qualification with the condition that they should pass the Higher Secondary examination in Maths/Science within 03 years. The petitioner has the requisite qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory), and by the action of the State Government, his chance of appointment to the said post would be hampered. Hence, this petition.

¶30

4

¶31

The issue raised in the present writ petition under the facts and circumstances was also raised in WPS No. 5039 of 2025 ( Sanjay Kumar and another v. Principal Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh and others ), which has been decided on 26.09.2025 by this Court. While deciding the said WPS No. 5039 of 2025, this Court has considered the facts and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court from Para 9 to 28, which are relevant in the present case also and quoted herein below:-

¶32

“9. The claim of the petitioner in the present petition that the recruitment on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) should be filled up by direct recruitment under the Rules of 2019 in a fair and transparent manner, however, in the garb of Cabinet decision the State Government is going to appoint the Assistant Teachers, who have been terminated by virtue of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, thereby the B.Ed. qualification holder candidates have been excluded for appointment on the post of Assistant Teachers. Virtually, the petitioner is challenging the Cabinet decision and the order dated 20.04.2025 (Annexure P/1), whereby the terminated Assistant Teachers are being directed to be adjusted on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) by relaxing the minimum qualification prescribed for Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) in the Rules of 2019 and also the method of recruitment

¶33

5

¶34

provided in it. The contention of the petitioner that, by the said action of the State Government, their right to be appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) would be frustrated. The contention of the respondents that, since the petitioner is not the aspirant and the adjustment of the terminated teachers are being made against unadvertised posts and it is the policy decision of the State to adjust them by relaxing the rules, cannot be questioned by them. It is the State prerogative to fill up the number of posts under the relevant rules. The respondents have also raised objection with respect to maintainability of the writ petition and non-joinder of the necessary parties, as the terminated candidates, for whom the Cabinet decision was taken, have not been made as a party respondent in the petition.

¶35

Another issue has also been raised by the petitioner that the order dated 30.04.2025 has been issued in the name of Governor, but it has been signed by the Under Secretary, which cannot be considered to be an order of the Hon’ble Governor. It is relevant here to quote the order dated 30.04.2025, which reads as under:-

¶36

“ कम ां ��क एफ 2-19/2024/20-त ी �न म ां �त ्रि �-पर ि �षद ् � द ्वा �� त ्रि नर�य ल ्ण ि �य� गय� त ्रि क स ी �ध ी � भत ी $ 2023 म& त ां ्रि नय'क ्त 2621 ब ी �.एड. अर�त ्ह ी �ध ी �� सर ी ्ह �यक त ्रि /क ्ष क ल ि 1नक2 स3व ी ा �ए� स ् क6� त ्रि /क ्ष � त ्रि व ा भ�ग द ्वा �� सम ी ां �प ्त क2 गई र ्ह 9, उनक< अ�त ी त ्रि व�भ�ग�य स ा त ी ्रि म ां त ्रि त ी क2 अन'/�स ी � क3 त ्रि बन ी ् द' कम ् ां ��क 1 स3 5- ी

¶37

6

¶38

1. रट ्ह ा �य3 गय3 ब ी � . एस ी . अर�त ्ह ी �ध ी �� 2621 सर ी ्ह �यक त ्रि /कक@ क< ्ष सर ी ्ह �यक त ्रि /क ्ष क त ्रि व ा ज ्ञा �न ( प ्र य<ग/�� ) क3 ��जय म ् & र ां ि �क ्त 4422 पद ् म& स ां ी म ां �य<ल ि 1त ी त ्रि कय� 1�न�।

¶39

2. सम ी ां �य<1न ग9� त ्रि व ा ज ्ञा �त ्रि पत पद ी ् @ प� त ्रि कय� 1�ए।

¶40

3. क�� / व ा �त ् र ि जय स ् �क�य स ी 3 ी 12 व ा E उत ्ती �र� स ्ण र ी ्ह �यक त ्रि /कक@ क< ्ष त ्रि नध ी ��र ि �त ी अर�त ्ह ी � (12 व ा E गत ् र ि त / ी त ्रि व ा ज ्ञा �न ) प6र� क�न3 र ्ण 3त ्ह ी ' त ी �न व ा ष� क2 अन'मत ां ्रि त ी द ् � 1�ए , स ी �थ र ्ह � इन अभ ् यल ि थ�य@ क< प ्र य<ग/�� क�य� क3 स�ब ी ी �ध ी म& एस ां . ी स ी � . ई . आ� . ट ा � . क3 म ां �ध ् यम ां स3 ी 02 म ां �र ्ह क� त ्रि व ा /3ष प ्र त ्रि /कर ्ष ्ण त ्रि दय� 1�ए। ्

¶41

4. अन ् य त ्रि पछड ़ा � व ा ग� क3 /3ष 355 अभ ् यल ि थ�य@ र3त ्ह ी ' स ी ��ख ् य3त� पद ्ती ् क� सO1न त ी ्रि कय� 1�ए।

¶42

5. सम ी ां �य<1न क3 ल ि �य3 ल ि 1�@ क2 प ्र �थत ्रि म ां कत ी � इस ी पक�� र ्र ्ह <ग� :-

¶43

I. ��जय क3 अन'स ् 6त ी ्रि Pत ी क3�@ क3 ल ्ष ि 1�@ म& र ां ि �क ्त पद ् @ प�।

¶44

II. स ी �म ां �व ा त ी $ ल ि 1�@ क3 र ि �क ्त पद ् @ प�।

¶45

III. त ी तपश ् ् P�त ी � अन ् य ल ि 1�@ म& , ां त ्रि कय� 1�ए।

¶46

अन'स ी �� सर ी ्ह �यक त ्रि /क ्ष क त ्रि व ा ज ्ञा �न ( प ्र य<ग/�� ) क3 मद ां ् @ प� स ी म ां �य<1न क2 आग�म ां � क�य�व ा �र ्ह � त ्रि कय� 1�ए। ”

¶47

Along with the order dated 30.04.2025, the Cabinet decision has also been annexed, which is also made as a part of the writ petition.

¶48

Pursuant to the order passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, total 2621 Assistant Teachers, who are having B.Ed. qualifications, have been terminated from their services by the State Government and they have made multiple representations to the State Government for redressal

¶49

7

¶50

of their grievances, saying that they were not at any fault, and because of the fault in the Rules of 2019 made by the State Government, they have been terminated and then the State Government constituted a committee to examine the grievances of the terminated Assistant Teachers. On the recommendation and proposal made by the said committee, the Cabinet took a policy decision on 30.04.2025 that all the 2621 candidates shall be accommodated against total 4422 sanctioned vacant posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). It is worthy to mention here that the total sanctioned posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is 8927. The requisite qualification of the Assistant Teacher (Science/ Laboratory) is prescribed in Entry No. 2 of Schedule-III of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2019, which reads as under:-

¶51

S.No.	Name of Service/Post	Minimum Age Limit	Maximum Age Limit	Minimum Educational/ Technical Qualifications	Name of the Members of Selection Committee	Remarks
2.	Assistant Teacher (Science/ Laboratory)	21 years	35 years	Passed Higher Secondary Examination with Biology/Mathem atics subject	(1) District Education Officer-Chairman (2) Principal, DIET- Member (3) Block Education Officer- Member (4) Assistant Director/Equivalent- Member Secretary (5) Principal, Government, Higher Secondary School- Member	-

¶52

The method of recruitment is provided under Rule 6 of Rules of 2019, which reads as under:-

¶53

8

¶54

“ 6. Method of recruitment.- (1) Recruitment to the service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be made by the following methods, namely:-

¶55

(a) By direct recruitment through selection (competitive examination /interview) and Limited Departmental Examination;

¶56

(b) By promotion of members of the service;

¶57

(c) By transfer/deputation of persons who hold in a substantive capacity such posts in such services as may be specified in this behalf,

¶58

(d) By absorption of person/persons who hold in such services and serve on any equivalent salary/post in any Government service.

¶59

(2) The number of persons recruited under clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) of sub-rule (1) shall not at any time exceed the percentage shown in Schedule- II of the number of duty posts, as specified in Schedule-I.

¶60

(3) Subject to the provisions of these rules, the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of filling any particular vacancy or vacancies in the service, as may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment and the number of persons to be recruited by such methods, shall be determined on each occasion by the Appointing Authority in consultation with the Commission/Government.

¶61

(4) At the time of recruitment to the service the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994 (No. 21 of 1994) and instructions issued from time to time, under this Act by the General Administration Department of the Government shall apply.

¶62

(5) The newly appointed teachers will be included in E- (LB)/T-(LB) cadre seniority list on direct recruitment to the service.”

¶63

As per the Schedule-II of Rule 6 of the Rules of

¶64

2019, the posts of Assistant Teacher (Science/ Laboratory) are 100% direct recruitment posts.

¶65

Rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of 2019 talks about interpretation and relaxation, which reads as under:-

¶66

9

¶67

“ 20. Interpretation . If any question arises in relation to the interpretation of these rules, it shall be referred to the State Government, whose decision thereon shall be final.

¶68

21. Relaxation . Nothing in these rules shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the Governor to deal with the case of any person to whom these rules may apply, in such manner as may appear to it to be just and proper:

¶69

Provided that the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favorable to him than provided in these rules.”

¶70

The Rules of 2019 has been framed by exercising

¶71

the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Governor acts on the aid and advise of the council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the constitution to act personally without the aid and advise of the council of Ministers, or against the aid and advise of the council of Ministers. The Governor can also exercise his discretion in harmony with his council of Ministers.

¶72

The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of “ Vikram Singh Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, through- Principal Secretary and others ” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Chhattisgarh 1137 has held that:-

¶73

“30. The sole question for consideration is whether the aforesaid letter can be construed to be an approval/confirmation/consent of the State Government for amendment of the Regulation of 2011 on the ground that the same has not been expressed in name of the Governor.

¶74

31. Article 166 of the Constitution provides for the conduct of Government business. It is useful to quote this Article:

¶75

“166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State.— (1) All executive action of the

¶76

10

¶77

Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.

¶78

(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.

¶79

(3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.”

¶80

32. It will be appropriate now to take note of the decisions cited at the bar.

¶81

33. In Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar (supra), Hon'ble Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das observed that the decision of the appropriate Government to confirm the detention order was communicated to the District Magistrate by a confidential letter signed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department. It was noted that under Rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by the Government of Bombay under Article 166 the Constitution, the Assistant Secretary was authorized to sign orders and instrument of the Government of Bombay. An argument was advanced that no valid order of confirmation was made in proper legal form at all and that a confidential communication from the Home Department to the District Magistrate cannot be regarded as an order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (for short, the Act of 1950). It was observed that Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1950 required an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed. But the Act is silent as to the form in which the executive decision, whether it is described as an order or an executive action, is to be taken. No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act will be fully satisfied if it can be shown that the executive decision has in fact been taken. It was held that every executive decision need not be formally expressed and this is particularly so when one superior officer directs his subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a particular way, but when the executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India i.e., in the name of the Governor. It was held that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such

¶82

11

¶83

that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done. Strict compliance with the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution gives an immunity to the order and that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself. Observing so, it was held that while the Act of 1950 requires an executive decision, whether it is called an order or an executive action, for the confirmation of an order of detention under section 11 (1) the Act of 1950, does not itself prescribe any particular form of expression of that executive decision but omission to comply with the provision of Article 166 of the Constitution does not render the executive action a nullity. It was laid down that all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under section 11 (1) of the Act of 1950. It having been established from the materials on record that such a decision was taken by the appropriate Government, the writ petition was dismissed. Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice, agreed with the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das.

¶84

34. By the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Justice B.K. Mukherjea also, the writ petition was dismissed. Hon'ble Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar concurred with the view taken.

¶85

35. Dealing with the question relating to the order of confirmation not being expressed to be made in the name of the Governor, it was observed by Hon'ble Justice Mukherjea that Article 166(1) of the Constitution is confined to the cases where the executive action requires to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification or any other instrument. It was observed that Article 166(1) does not lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is to be performed; it only prescribes the mode in which such act is to be expressed. The manner of expression is ordinarily a matter of form, but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an act or not depends upon the intention of the legislature. It was held that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution are to be read together. While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated; and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State. Non-compliance with the provisions of either of the clauses would lead to the

¶86

12

¶87

result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted. It was held that the order is not a nullity even though it has not been expressed to be made in the name of the Governor.

¶88

36. It needs to be mentioned at this juncture that there is a minority opinion expressed by Hon'ble Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan.

¶89

37. In Kripalu Shankar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in the context of Article 166 of the Constitution that the functioning of the Government in a State is governed by Article 166 of the Constitution which lays down that there shall be a council of ministers with the Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions except where he is required to exercise his functions under the Constitution, in his discretion. Article 166 provides for the conduct of Government business.

¶90

38. In Kripalu Shankar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that Article 166(1) requires that all executive action of the State Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. This clause relates to cases where the executive action has to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification. It prescribes the mode in which an executive action has to be expressed. Noting by an official in the departmental file will not, therefore, come within this Article nor even noting by a Minister. Every executive decision need not be as laid down under Article 166(1) but when it takes the form of an order it has to comply with Article 166(1). Article 166(2) states that orders and other instruments made and executed under Article 166(1), shall be authenticated in the manner prescribed. While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the manner in which the order is to be authenticated and clause (3) relates to the making of the rules by the Governor for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government. It was also observed that notings in a notes file do not have behind them the sanction of law as an effective order.

¶91

39. In Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the event it appears from the order and the records produced before the court, if any occasion arises therefor that even if a valid order is not authenticated in terms of clause (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the same would not be vitiated in law. Failure to authenticate an executive order is not fatal. The said provision is directory in nature and not mandatory.

¶92

40. In MRF Ltd. (supra), referring to Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1823, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Article 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India are only directory and not mandatory in character. It was also

¶93

13

¶94

held that the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution which are framed for convenient transaction of the Government, has to be transacted in a just and fit manner in keeping with the said Business Rules and as per the requirement of Article 154 of the Constitution. It was further held that the Rules of Business framed under the Provisions of Article 166 (3) of the Constitution are mandatory and must be strictly adhered. Any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eyes of law.

¶95

41. In Sunil Kumar Vaish (supra), amongst others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that unless an order is expressed in the name of the Governor and it is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Governor.

¶96

42. In Jaipur Development Authority (supra), reiterating the decision in Kripalu Shankar (supra), it is stated that unless an order is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order made on behalf of the Government. The aforesaid observations were made in the context of a letter dated 06.12.2021 which was neither expressed in the name of the Governor nor was it authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules and that the letter merely indicated the discussion made by the Committee and the decision taken by the Committee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by no stretch of imagination, the same can be treated as a policy decision of the Government within the meaning of Article 166 of the Constitution.

¶97

43. In Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business made under Articles 77(3) and 166(3) of the Constitution is the decision of the President or the Governor, respectively, and these articles do not provide for ‘delegation’. That is to say, that decisions made and actions taken by the Minister or officer under the Rules of Business cannot be treated as exercise of delegated power in real sense, but are deemed to be the actions of the President or Governor, as the case may be, that are taken or done by them on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. It was further held that the requirements of the Rules of Business must be complied with in order to give validity to the action or decision taken.

¶98

44. While noticing that a Two-Judge Bench in MRF Ltd. (supra) had taken a view that provisions of Article 166(3) is mandatory whereas another Two-Judge Bench in Crawford Bayley & Co. v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 25, had accepted that the Rules of Business framed under Article 77 of the Constitution are directory and not mandatory, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken note of the judgment in R. Chitralekha

¶99

14

¶100

(supra) and observed that MRF Ltd. (supra) was distinguishable on facts as that case dealt with rules pertaining to financial implications for which there were no provisions in the Appropriation Act, and so the rules required mandatory compliance.

¶101

45. This Court, in Rungta College of Engineering & Technology, Bhilai (supra), while dealing with the Chhattisgarh Engineering Snatak Pravesh Niyam, 2012 (for short, the Rules of 2012), observed that the Rules of 2012 was signed by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Technical Education and the same being not duly authenticated in the name of the Governor as mandated under Article 166(2) of the Constitution, the same cannot be held to be a valid statutory rule.

¶102

46. Perusal of the judgments noted above would go to show that every executive decision need not be formally expressed, but when an executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or communicated, it should be expressed in the name of the Governor. When there is compliance of the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution, the same gives an immunity to the order to the extent that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. Omission to comply with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution does not render an executive action a nullity.”

¶103

The power of relaxation in the Rules of 2019 was given in Rule 21 of the Rules of 2019 to the Governor, who deal with the case of any person, to whom the rule may apply in such manner, as may appear to it to be just and proper. In exercise of the powers of Rule 21, the order has been passed on 30.04.2025 after a Cabinet decision, by which the rules with respect to the qualification and method have been relaxed and the terminated Assistant Teachers are considered for the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) and the time to obtain necessary qualification was granted by the said order dated 30.04.2025.

¶104

15

¶105

In the matter of “ Old Jalukai Village Council ” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 19 that:-

¶106

“19. He submitted that the issue of granting recognition to a village falls within the domain of the executive decision making. It is well settled that in exercise of the power of judicial review, a writ court can only examine the decision-making process, and not substitute the decision under consideration with its own decision. Therefore, once the state government/cabinet had taken a decision to keep recognition of the respondent no. 1 village in abeyance upon a consideration of several relevant factors, the High Court had committed a serious error by issuing a mandamus and directing the grant of a formal recognition order, more so, when the question as to whether the respondent no. 1 village falls within the ancestral land of the appellant is a disputed question of fact which needs proper examination at the ground level. The impugned decision, which was passed in the absence of the appellant was neither alive to the existence of such a dispute nor did it have the assistance of the material now being placed on record by the appellant.”

¶107

From bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it is quite vivid that the Court can examine the decision making process under the powers of judicial review, but should not substitute the decision under consideration with its own decision. In the present case, the special committee was constituted comprising of 05 members, who are the Chief Secretary and Secretaries of different departments. After receiving their recommendation based on the number of vacant posts, the earlier appointments of terminated teachers, Rules of 2019, their qualifications, their termination on the basis of the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Court, their future prospects, etc. the State Government by its Cabinet decision decided to

¶108

16

¶109

accommodate them against 4422 vacant posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) and even after their accommodation, total 2161 posts are still vacant. Most of them are having requisite qualifications and about 350 candidates were not having requisite qualifications of Biology/ Mathematics subject, for which they have been granted 03 years time to get the requisite qualification obtained.

¶110

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “ Devesh Sharma v. Union of India ” order dated 08.04.2024, passed in CA No. 5068 of 2023 has observed in its order that:-

¶111

“As it appears that a large number of candidates with B.Ed. degree had already been appointed on the basis of eligibility criteria specified by the educational authorities, we do not think it to be equitable to effect their removal. We, accordingly hold that the judgment delivered by this Bench on 11th August, 2023 shall have prospective operation. But prospective operation of this judgment shall be only for those candidates who were appointed without any qualification or conditions imposed by any Court of Law to the effect that their appointment would be subject to final outcome of the case which might have had been instituted by them and such candidates were in regular employment without any disqualification and were appointed in pursuance of a notice of advertisement where B.Ed. was stipulated to be valid qualification. Services of only such candidates shall not be disturbed because of this judgment. We make it clear that this benefit is only for the candidates who were appointed prior to the date our judgment was delivered, on 11th August, 2023. Mere selection of such candidates or participation in the process will not entitle them for a benefit under our present order.

¶112

Moreover, the candidates having B.Ed. qualification whose appointments we are protecting in this judgment, will have to undergo a bridge course and we direct the educational authorities to device such course, which would be applicable for each state and union territory, within a period of one year from today. This course shall be only for those appointees who

¶113

17

¶114

have been engaged with B.Ed. degree only in the subject-posts under conditions stipulated in the earlier part of this order. National Council for Teacher Education shall design such course under overall supervision of the Ministry of Education, Union of India. Upon formulation of such course, the same shall be publicly notified and a timeframe shall also be given within which the respective candidates shall participate therein. Failure of any candidate to participate and complete the course within the timeframe to be given by the concerned educational authorities will invalidate the appointment of such candidate.”

¶115

The another objection raised by the respondents that the petitioner has no right to challenge the said Cabinet decision of the State Government, because they are not the persons aggrieved and only the aspiring candidates. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is aspiring candidate, but neither he was earlier appointed nor terminated and they claimed that his chance of appointment would be affected by the absorption of terminated Assistant Teachers.

¶116

In the matter of “ Ayyub Khan Noor Khan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others ” 2013 (4) SCC 465, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered this aspect in Para 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 20, which are reproduced hereinbelow:-

¶117

“9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai MANU/SC/7106/2008 : AIR 2008 SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons.

¶118

10. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P. MANU/SC/ 0845/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 3031, this Court held:

¶119

18

¶120

The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.

¶121

11. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas corpus petition, has explained that the expression, 'next friend' means a person who is not a total stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is a complete stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal custody. (Vide: Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0009/1950 : AIR 1951 SC 41;Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration MANU/SC/0184/1978 : AIR 1980 SC 1579;Mrs. Neelima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0253/1987 : AIR 1987 SC 2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India MANU/SC/0058/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 280; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India MANU/SC/0059/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 284; and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0892/2012 : JT (2012) 10 SC 393).

¶122

12. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of the court. The right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court and that, "ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa". Many societal pollutants create new problems of nonredressed grievances, and the court should make an earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Anr. MANU/SC/0083/1980 : AIR 1980 SC 856;Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/1886/2009 : (2010) 2 SCC 114;State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. MANU/SC/0050/2010 : (2010) 3 SCC 402; andAmar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0596/2011 : (2011) 7 SCC 69)”

¶123

16. As Respondent No. 5 does not belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, the garb adopted by him, of serving the cause of Scheduled Tribes candidates who might have been deprived of their legitimate right to be considered for the post, must be considered by this Court in order to determine whether Respondent

¶124

19

¶125

No. 5, is in fact, in a legitimate position to lay any claim before any forum, whatsoever.

¶126

20 . While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in Raju Ramsingh Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhiavapurkar and Ors. MANU/SC/3754/2008 : (2008) 9 SCC 54 held:

¶127

We must now deal with the question of locus standi. A special leave petition ordinarily would not have been entertained at the instance of the Appellant. Validity of appointment or otherwise on the basis of a caste certificate granted by a committee is ordinarily a matter between the employer and the employee. This Court, however, when a question is raised, can take cognizance of a matter of such grave importance suo motu. It may not treat the special leave petition as a public interest litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in a proceeding of that nature, permissible for the court to make a detailed enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of the matter although it was initiated at the instance of a person having a private interest. A deeper scrutiny can be made so as to enable the court to find out as to whether a party to a lis is guilty of commission of fraud on the Constitution. If such an enquiry subserves the greater public interest and has a far-reaching effect on the society, in our opinion, this Court will not shirk its responsibilities from doing so. (See also: Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 619)”

¶128

It is settled law that, the aspirants do not have indefeasible or vested right of appointment. In the matter of “ State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha ” AIR 2025 SC 1318, in Para 54, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-

¶129

“54. Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a policy decision. It has to be borne in mind that securing public employment is the dream of many, who put their heart and soul to prepare for it. Nowadays, aspirants undertake rigorous study sessions as well as training modules to equip themselves, which also comes at a heavy cost. That apart, since every process of recruitment necessarily involves substantial expenses which are borne from the public exchequer and at the same time the aspirants for the posts (who, as per their own estimation, have performed sufficiently well and therefore stand a good chance of being appointed

¶130

20

¶131

upon figuring in the select list) cherish fond hopes of a bright and secure future, the law is clear that the policy decision not to carry the process forward must be taken bona fide, there has to be justifiable reason if the process is abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker. This acts as a check on the employer's power deciding against not making any appointment from the select list despite availability of vacancy/vacancies on the advertised/notified public post(s). A writ court may, upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner and make such directions as the facts and circumstances warrant. We, therefore, do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting achievement of their goals to secure public employment. Whether, and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend on the facts of each case.”

¶132

In the matter of “ Tinku v. State of Haryana and others ” 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3292, in Para 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-

¶133

“14. The very basis and the rationale, wherever such policies are framed for compassionate appointment is with an object to grant relief to a family in distress and facing destitution, and thus an exception is culled out to the general rule in favour of the family of the deceased employee. This is resorted to by taking into consideration the services rendered by such employee and the consequent legitimate legal expectations apart from the sudden change in status and affairs of the family because of the unexpected turn of events, i.e. the loss of the sole bread earner.”

¶134

The aforesaid judgments are inserted here to consider the factors, under which the Cabinet decision has been taken to accommodate terminated Assistant Teachers to the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). Since, the petitioner has no legal right to challenge the action of the State Government and the policy decision and it is the State prerogative to fill up the number of vacant posts, the judgment of “ State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha ” 1974 (3) SCC 220 is

¶135

21

¶136

relevant on this issue, and Para 9 is relevant to quote

¶137

here:-

¶138

“9. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. this Court has pointed out in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College [1962] (2) Suppl. S.C.R. 144. that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.”

¶139

Another objection with respect to the impleadment of the terminated candidates is concerned, this Court does not find any sufficient reason to consider the objection for the reason that, on the date when the writ petition was filed, no appointment orders were issued to such candidates and it is the Cabinet decision is challenged in the writ petition. Had they been participated in the counseling or their names appears in the list of candidates, who have to accommodate on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory), they may be proper/necessary party, but at present this Court deem it appropriate not to dismiss the writ petition on this ground.

¶140

Learned counsel for the petitioner would rely upon the judgment of “ Anand Kumar Yadav ” (supra), but there are certain distinguishable facts with the present case. In “ Anand Kumar Yadav ” case (supra), he

¶141

22

¶142

candidates were Shiksha-mitras and all the Shikshamitras have been absorbed on the post of Assistant Teachers, who does not possess the requisite qualifications, yet they have been absorbed in the post of Assistant Teachers, which were the teaching posts, but in the present case, the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is not the teaching post and even after their absorption in the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory), number of vacant posts are still there and therefore, their right or chance of the appointment of the petitioner would not be affected. Therefore, no benefit can be granted to the petitioner from the judgment of

¶143

“ Anand Kumar Yadav ” (supra).

¶144

In a similar matter of WPS No. 5039 of 2025 ( Sanjay Kumar and another v. Principal Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh and others ), vide order dated 26.09.2025, this Court has decided the issue involved in the present case, which is identical and therefore, this Court deem it appropriate, not to take a view other than what has been taken in WPS No. 5039 of 2025, decided on 26.09.2025.

¶145

Consequently, this Court do not find any merit in the present writ petition, and the same is hereby dismissed .

¶146

Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

¶147

ved

Aarya Jayant v. Principal Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Aarya Jayant v. Principal Secretary, State of Chhattisgarh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Bodhram Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Amar Sai Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Satish Kumar Nishad Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Abc (Child in Conflict With Law) Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Pellet Manufacturers Association of India Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Manisha Pradhan Vs State of Chhattisgarh