Budhram Kashyap Vs District Judge North Baster Kanker

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPS No. 5095 of 2018

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1 - Budhram Kashyap S/o Shri Sukaluram Kashyap Aged About 42 Years, Former Peon District Court Kanker, Presently Residing At Village Dakpal Block Lohandiguda, District Bastar, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - District Judge North Baster Kanker District Kanker, Chhattisgarh.

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2 - High Court Of Chhattisgarh, Through Registrar General Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Principal Secretary, Department Of Law, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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For Petitioner(s) : Shri T.K.Jha, Advocate For Respondents 1 and 2 : None For Respondent No.3 : Ms. Shailja Shukla, Dy.G.A.

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({Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput})

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Order on Board

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22/09/2025

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This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking for the following relief(s)-

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“I) That, this Hon’bl;e Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records relating to this case.

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II) That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and set aside the punishment order dated 28/11/22013 (Annexure P/1( passed by Respondent No.1 and order dated 21/08/2017 (Annexure P/2) rejecting the appeal of petitioner by the respondent No.2 and order (dated 29/08/2017) (Annexure P/3) and reinstate the petitioner in the service with all consequential benefits in the interest of justice.

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III) That any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper together with cost of the petition.”

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The facts which emerge from this writ petition are that the petitioner was working as a Peon and he was deputed to perform the bunglow duty of the then District Judge, Kanker North Bastar. The petitioner has been suspended by the concerned Judge on the allegation that he caused injuries to his wife with sickle at his residence. Charge sheet was issued against the petitioner for the above allegation. Thereafter, witnesses were examined and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 18/01/2011 and found proved the charge against the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was removed from service. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal which was rejected and then review application was filed, which was also rejected. Therefore, this appeal has been filed.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was working as a Peon in the bunglow of District and Sessions Judge, North Bastar Kanker, CG. A departmental enquiry was inititated against the petitioner on the allegation that on 10/07/2009 he assaulted Smt. Savita Tiwari in the bunglow / residence /office of the District Judge, Kanker with the help of Sickle resulting into injuries on her left wrist and between the elbow. He submits that the act of the petitioner is in violation of Rule 3 of Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1965 and is punishable under Rule 10 of the C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. He submits that the charge was framed by the District Judge, North Bastar, Kanker and the victim is his wife. He submits that there was biasness in the departmental enquiry as the injured was the wife of the then District Judge, the

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enquiry conducted was not fair, it was not conducted in accordance with law, no proper opportunity was afforded to him to defend himself and no proper document was provided. Thereafter, punishment order was passed terminating the petitioner from his services against which, the petitioner also preferred an appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Registrar General of the High Court of CG which was also dismissed as a result of which, the petitioner is out of service. He submits that though the allegation against the petitioner is serious in nature however there is no previous record of such conduct against him and punishment of termination from service is disproportionate to the charge against the petitioner. He submits that in the criminal case, the petitioner has been acquitted. Therefore, he submits that the impugned orders may be set aside and the petitioner may be reinstated in service with back wages.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the above submission and submits that the departmental enquiry was conducted, the petitioner was issued with charge sheet and supplied with documents and evidence purportedly relied upon by the enquiry officer. She submits that the petitioner was provided proper opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and looking to the injuries (incised wound) sustained by the wife of the then District Judge which has also been proved by the doctor, therefore, the impugned orders does not require any interference. She also submits that this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority against the finding of the departmental enquiry.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

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There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner was posted as Peon in the office of District and Sessions Judge and was working at the relevant point of time at the residence of District and Sessions Judge. The charge against the petitioner is quoted herein below –

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"आरो�प के� समर्थ�न म� अपचा�रो के� लां��छन� के� वि��रोण

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केम��के-1/दो�-12-2/2009 के��के�रो, दिदोन��के- 28.08.2009

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श्री� बु�धरो�ग केश्यप, न"त्य (�र्त�म�न म� विनलांम्बि&बुर्त म�ख्य�लांय म�न�प् र �पप�रो) के� वि�रूद्ध वि�भा�ग�य जां��चा हे�र्त� आरो�प� के� वि��रोण विन&न�न�स�रो हे. :-

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(1) यहे विके दिदोन��के 10.7.2009 के� लांगभाग प्र�र्त 9.00 बुजां� जिजांलां� न्य�य�ध�श, के��के�रो के� विन��स के�य��लांय म� श्री� बु�धरो�म केश्यप न"त्य के� पदो परो श�सके2य केर्त�व्य म� पदोस्थ रोहे�. र्तर्थ� दिदोए गए म6खि8के आदो�श के� प�लांन न केरोर्त� हुए श्री�मर्त� सवि�र्त� विर्त��रो� के� स�र्थ अमय��दिदोर्त व्य�हे�रो केरो उन्हे� ध�रोदो�रो औजां�रो (हे�सिसय�) स� म�रोकेरो चा�ट पहु�चा�य� जिजांसस� उनके� बु��य� हे�र्थ के2 केलां�ई ए�� के�हेन� के� मध्य चा�ट आय� ।

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बु�धरो�म केश्यप न"त्य के� उपरो�क्र्त के" त्य श�सके2य के�य� के� प्रविर्त घो�रो लां�परो��हे�, असिशष्टर्त� ए�� अन�श�सनहे�नर्त� के� द्यो�र्तके हे., जां� विके छत्ती�सगढ़ सिसवि�लां स � � आचारोण विनयम 1965 के� विनयम 3 के� प्रविर्तकेG लां ए�� छ.ग. सिसवि�लां स � � (�गHकेरोण, विनय�त्रण ए�� अप�लां) विनयम 1966 के� विनयम 10 के� अन्र्तग�र्त दोण्डन�य हे.।

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Of course, the charge was framed by the District Judge, however, from perusal of record it appears that the Additional District and Sessions Judge, (FTC), Bhanupratappur was appointed as enquiry officer and Deputy Superintendent, office of District & Sessions Judge, Kanker was appointed as Presenting officer. The records reflect that charge sheet along with the details of the witnesses to be examined in the departmental enquiry were duly served upon the petitioner as also the documents.

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First submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to biasness. Simply because the charges were framed by the District Judge, it cannot be presumed that there was biasness particularly when the enquiry was not conducted by himself. In the enquiry, witnesses were also examined including the wife of the District Judge who suffered injuries. She has categorically stated that she was attacked by the petitioner with the help of sickle, as a result of which she sustained injuries, her bangles got broken and she also made report in the police station. She also stated that due to cut in her hand, she sustained five stitches. Her statement is also corroborated by the statement of the doctor who stated that there was incised wound near elbow of her right hand which was 12 cm x 1 cm x 1 cm which was caused by hard and sharp object. The other witnesses were also examined and these witnesses were permitted to be cross-examined by the petitioner as all the relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner including the witnesses. The witnesses were permitted to be cross examined. Therefore, this Court cannot find force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the enquiry conducted suffers from any procedural irregularity. Thereafter, taking

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into consideration the nature of charge and evidence collected, the services of the petitioner was terminated. The another submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal charge. This submission is also liable to be rejected in the light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors., (2011) 9 SCC 94.

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In a criminal case, the charge against the accused is required to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, however in the departmental enquiry, the charge against the delinquent employee can be proved by preponderance of probability. The law in this regard is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and ors. v. Heem Singh, (2021) 12 SCC 569 in which it has been held as under –

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38 In the present case, we have an acquittal in a criminal trial on a charge of murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court is a reflection of the vagaries of the administration of criminal justice. The judgment contains a litany of hostile witnesses, and of the star witness resiling from his statements. Our precedents indicate that acquittal in a criminal trial in such circumstances does not conclude a disciplinary enquiry. In Southern Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC 24 , this Court held:

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“37. Acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The High Court did not say that the said fact had not been taken into consideration. The revisional authority did so. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent official had been acquitted of the criminal charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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In State v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that unless the accused has an “honorable acquittal” in their criminal trial, as opposed to an acquittal due to witnesses turning hostile or for technical reasons, the acquittal shall not affect the decision in the disciplinary proceedings and lead to automatic reinstatement. But the penal statutes governing substance or procedure do not allude to an “honourable acquittal”. Noticing this, the Court observed:

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“ Honourable acquittal

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The meaning of the expression “honourable acquittal” came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal [(1994) 1 SCC 541 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 594. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame”, “fully exonerated” are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression “honourably acquitted”. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

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In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 787] it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari [1972 SLR 44 (SC)] this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] which is as follows:

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“8. … ‘The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term “honourably acquitted”.’” (Robert Stuart case [ILR (1934) 61 Cal 168] , ILR pp. 188-89)

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As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit

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including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.”

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Last submission of Shri Jha is that disproportionate punishment has been imposed looking to the charge against the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner is that when he was performing his duty in the bungalow of the District Judge, he attacked the wife of the District Judge. It is to be seen that the attack was done by the petitioner with the help of a sickle which resulted into injuries i.e. incised wound to her. The employees who perform duty in the bungalow are supposed to be faithful and trustworthy and family members of the officer would have to rely upon them for day to day work. If such an act is done by the petitioner, naturally it cannot be said to be a normal act but comes under a serious offence. Therefore, looking to the seriousness of charge, the punishment cannot be termed as disproportionate. Apart from this, in the light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi V. Union of India & ors. (1995) 6 SCC 749 , this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence brought in the departmental enquiry. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.

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Deepti

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Digitally signed by DEEPTI DEEPTI HARIKUMAR HARIKUMAR Date: 2025.09.26 12:56:48 +0530

Budhram Kashyap v. District Judge North Baster Kanker

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Budhram Kashyap v. District Judge North Baster Kanker

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