Allowed

M/s Jindal Steel and Power Limited And Anr. v. State Of Chhattisgarh And Anr.

Chhattisgarh HC18 Sept 2025WPT/49/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Two writ petitions challenged terminal tax demand notices issued by Kirodimal Nagar Panchayat and Municipal Corporation Raigarh on steel goods dispatched from Jindal's plant. Holding that terminal tax applies only to goods exported from municipal limits and that the export journey began outside them, the High Court quashed the impugned notices, resolutions and enabling letter vis-a-vis the petitio

What did the court decide?

Demand notices dated 19.04.2011 to 22.04.2014, letter dated 23.03.2001 and resolutions dated 31.12.2010 and 15.04.2013 quashed vis-a-vis petitioners; refund refused.

M/s Jindal Steel and Power Limited And Anr… — Municipal and Town Planning | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

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Order reserved on 20.06.2025 Order pronounced on 19.09.2025

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPT No. 118 of 2014

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1. M/s Jindal Steel and Power Limited – A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its Registered Office at O.P. Jindal Marg, Hisar 125005, Haryana, through Mr. Kamal Agrawal, S/o Lt Shri Nathu Lal Agrawal, aged about 47 years, R/o Opp. Collector Bungalow, Civil Lines, Raigarh, having its Office At Post Box No. 16, Kharsla Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.)

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2. Mr. Rajat Saha, S/o Late Shri Rajendra Saha, aged about 47 Years, Shareholder of M/s Jindal Steel and Power Ltd, R/o D-5, Jindalgarh, Raigarh, Distt Raigarh (C.G.) --- Petitioners

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versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary, Local Self Government Department, Mantralaya, DKS Bhawan, Raigarh, District Raigarh (should have been Raipur) CG. 2. Kirodimal Nagar Panchayat Raigarh, Chattisgargh, through Its Chief Municipal Officer. --- Respondents

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WPT No. 49 of 2014

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1. M/s Jindal Steel And Power Limited – A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its Registered Office at O.P. Jindal Marg, Hisar 125005, Haryana, through Mr. Kamal Agrawal, S/o Lt Shri Nathu Lal Agrawal, aged about 47 years, R/o Opp. Collector Bungalow, Civil Lines,

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Raigarh, having its Office at Post Box No. 16, Kharsla Road, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.)

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Mr. Rajat Saha, S/o Late Shri Rajendra Saha, aged about 47 Years, Shareholder of M/s Jindal Steel and Power Ltd, R/o D-5, Jindalgarh, Raigarh, Distt Raigarh (C.G. -- Petitioners

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Versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh through Secretary, Local Self Government Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur, Dist Raipur (C.G.),

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2. Municipal Corporation, Raigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh through its Commissioner Respondents

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For Petitioners	: Shri Indrajeet Mohanty Sr. Advocate and Shri Ashish Shrivastava Sr. Advocate assisted by Ms. Neha Gulati,Ms. Subhangi Arora, Mr. Rahul Ambast, Mr. Hiya Sonchhatra and Mr. Abhishek Choudhary, Advocates
For R -1/State	: Mr. Dilman Rati Minj GA
For R - 2	Mr. H.B. Agrawal Sr. Advocate with Dr. Sudeep Agrawal and Ms. Subhi Rusia and Mr Kishore Bhaduri Sr. Advocate with Mr. Harsh Dave and Mr. Sabyasachi Bhaduri, Advocates

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(Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput)

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C A V Order

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As the aforesaid two Writ Petitions embrace in their fold the issue exactly the same in character, they are being disposed of by this common order.

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Apart from a direction for calling the record, the main reliefs sought for in these petitions are sketched hereunder:-

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WP (T) No. 118/2014

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(i) For quashment of letter dated 23.03.2001 (Annexure P-1); resolution dated 31.12.2010 (Annexure P-2); demand notices dated 19.04.2011, 30.05.2011, 30.06.2011, 05.08.11, 17.07.2012,

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27.07.2013, 06.11.2013 and 22.04.2014 (Annexure P-3).

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(ii) For a direction to respondent No.2 to refund the amount of Rs. 32,00,602 paid by the petitioner to respondent No.2 vide letters dated 10.10.2011, 28.3.2012, 02.08.2012 and 11.03.2013, for the period 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2013.

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(iii) Other appropriate reliefs have also been prayed for as the facts and circumstances of the case do necessitate.

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WP (T) No. 49/2014

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(i) For quashment of resolution dated 15.04.2013 (Annexure P-1); letter dated 29.11.2013 (Annexure P-2), letter dated 03.12.2013 (Annexure P-3), letter and demand notices dated 13.12.2013 (Annexure P-4) and 01.02.2014 (Annexure P-5).

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(ii) Other appropriate reliefs have also been prayed for as the facts and circumstances of the case do necessitate.

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The factual background: The petitioner No.1 is Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “Companies Act”) which established its steel plant in District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh, and has been operating the same having obtained necessary approvals, permits and licences required for this purpose. It is operating the said steel plant at Raigarh with a capacity of 3 MTPA and a captive power plant of about 350 MW by engaging over 9000 employees. The steel goods manufactured by the petitioner – Company in the said plant are loaded onto the vehicles and dispatched from its plant through MLSM Security Gate located in the area which falls under the Chiraipani Gram Panchayat, and admittedly outside the limits to which the Municipalities Act applies. Those goods pass through Chiraipani Gram Panchayat and then through Khairpur

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Gram Panchayat. Originally, the petitioner – Company was incorporated on 28.09.1979 as Orbit Strips Private Limited.

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The Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1961”) was enacted to govern the smaller urban areas and transitional area in the State of Madhya Pradesh, with effect from the date notified under Section 5 of the Act of 1961. Chapter VII of the Act of 1961 deals with Municipal Taxation, and Section 129 thereof deals with the imposition of taxes and fees leviable by the Council. Section 129 of the Act of 1961 further requires the Council to pass a resolution at the time of final adoption of the budget estimates for the next financial year so as to impose a tax, and the resolution so passed should contain the details as specified under Section 129(2) of the Act of 1961. Section 127 of the Act of 1961 deals with the taxes to be imposed by Municipal Corporation on a general or special order made by the State Government in this regard.

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State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of its powers under Section 433 read with Section 132(2)(o), Section 133,355 read with Section 127(XVI) and Section 129 of the Municipal Corporation Act,1956 framed Terminal Tax (Assessment and Collection) on the Goods Exported from Madhya Pradesh Limits, Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 1996”) to regulate the assessment and collection of the terminal tax on the goods which are exported from the limits of Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats. On 21.05.1998 name of petitioner No.1 – Company was changed from Orbit Strips Private Limited to Orbit Strips Limited. On 12.06.1998, the name of the petitioner No.1 was further changed from Orbit Strips Limited to Jindal Steel & Power Limited, which inter alia is engaged in business of manufacture of steel, with significant presence in mining, power

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generation and infrastructure.

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On 24.03.2001 respondent No.1 in WP (T) No. 118/2014 wrote a letter to respondent No.2 intimating it for imposition of Terminal Tax in terms of Rules, 1996. The letter dated 24.03.2001 further asked respondent No.2 that if the Terminal Tax had not been levied by the said date, it (respondent No.2) shall levy the same on goods exported from Nagar Panchayat. On 10.04.2001 respondent No.1 wrote another letter to respondent No.2 reminding of the letter dated 24.03.2001, and asking to implement the Terminal Tax at the earliest and report back to it (respondent No.1) on the levy status. On 31.12.2010, the Council purportedly passed a resolution seeking to levy Terminal Tax for the year 2011-2012 on ‘Iron and all sorts of machinery’, and accordingly proceeded on a wrongful assumption that the petitioner No.1 – Company is engaged in the export of ‘Iron goods and concrete’ from an area falling within the limits of respondent No.2.

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On 28.02.2011 a notice was issued to the petitioner No.1 – Company by respondent No.2 to the effect that the Terminal Tax would be levied with effect from 01.04.2011 in pursuance of the resolution dated 31.12.2010 passed under Section 127 of the Act of 1961. Along with the notice dated 28.02.2011, a list of goods with the rate of tax to be levied, was also provided to the petitioner No.1 - Company. The said notice also mentioned that the objection, if any, should be raised in writing to the Council within 30 days from the date of notice being issued. Further, on 19.04.2011, on 30.05.2011 and then on 30.06.2011 respondent No.2 wrote a letter to the petitioner No.1 – Company informing that the Terminal Tax on the goods listed in the schedule forming part of the resolution will be levied with effect from 01.04.2011, and also asking it to provide the details of goods exported from

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the limits of respondent No.2, and then deposit the tax accordingly, within a period of ten days therefrom.

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On 10.07.2011 and 22.07.2011, the petitioner No.1 – Company replied to the aforesaid notices and demanded the copy of gazette notification in pursuance of which the Terminal Tax is sought to be levied from it. On 05.08.2011 the respondent No.2 issued a letter to the petitioner No.1 – Company enclosing the letter dated 24.03.2001 written by respondent No.1 with regard to imposition of Terminal Tax, and also a letter dated 10.04.2001 by which the respondent No.1 requested respondent No.2 to expedite the process of levy of Terminal Tax, and then inform it accordingly.

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Vide letter dated 10.10.2011 petitioner No. 1 – Company deposited the Terminal Tax for the period 01.04.2011 – 30.09.2011 amounting to Rs. 08,10,487/-. Vide letter dated 24.10.2011 the respondent No.2 wrote a letter to petitioner No.1 – Company to submit the detailed calculation of Terminal Tax deposited by it. In response to the said letter, the petitioner No. 1 – Company wrote a letter on 10.11.2011 giving the details asked for by respondent No.2 regarding Terminal Tax having been deposited, clarifying that the dispatch of goods from the plant is made from the exit gate located at Chiraipani Gram Panchayat, and only one stock area of the plant is situated within the Kirodimal Nagar Panchayat Limits, and that most of the material stocked in the above stockyard is dispatched through rail. The case of the Petitioner No.1 – Company is that vide letter dated 28.03.2012 it again deposited an amount of Rs. 08,87592/- through cheque dated 26.03.2012 for the period 01.10.2011 – 31.03.2012. Again on 17.07.2012 the respondent No.2 wrote a letter to petitioner No.1 – Company and demanded terminal tax for the period April 2012 – June 2012, in response to which on 02.08.2012

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the petitioner No.1 – Company deposited a sum of Rs. 04,48,033/- towards Terminal Tax for the said period. Again on 11.03.2013, petitioner No.1 – Company deposited a sum of Rs. 10,54,490/- for the period 01.04.2012 – 31.03.2013. Again on 27.07.2013 respondent No.2 issued a letter to petitioner No.1 – Company regarding deposit of Terminal Tax for the period April 2013 – July 2013. Respondent No.2 again issued a letter on 06.11.2013 to the petitioner No.1 – Company for depositing the Terminal Tax for the goods exported for the period April 2013 - October 2013, and on 22.04.2014 respondent No.2 issued another notice to petitioner No.1 – Company to deposit Terminal Tax for the period 01.04.2013 – 31.03.2014. On 08.05.2014 petitioner No.1 – Company made a representation to the concerned Chief Municipal Officer regarding illegal demand of Terminal Tax. 10. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that demand of Terminal Tax made by the respondents is without authority of law, and that respondent No.2 has no jurisdiction to impose the said Tax. It is submitted that the business of the petitioner No.1 – Company is that of manufacturing steel products. It is submitted that respondent No. 2 erred in issuing the impugned Demand Notices inasmuch as the same are without jurisdiction, patently illegal and bad in law. It is submitted that the letter dated 24th March, 2001 issued by the Respondent No.1 to the Nagar Panchayats is without authority of law as there is no provision under the Municipalities Act which empowers the Respondent No.1 to issue such directions. It is submitted that even assuming that the letter dated 24th March, 2001 is a requisition under Section 162 of the Municipalities Act, the same is invalid since it provides that the State Government shall take into consideration any objection which the Council or any inhabitant of the Municipality may make

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against the imposition or enhancement of such tax, but in this case no such opportunity has been granted to the petitioners before issuance of letter dated 24th March, 2001. According to learned Sr. counsel, the purported resolution dated 31st December, 2010 from which the respondent No.2 has derived the authority for imposition of Terminal tax, was passed by the Council without application of mind and only in pursuance of the directions issued by the Respondent No.1, and further that as the resolution was not in consonance with Section 129 of the Municipalities Act which provides for the manner in which it is to be passed, the same is not sustainable under the law. It is submitted that the resolution dated 31st December, 2010 is invalid as it proceeds on the wrong factual assumption that the petitioner-company is engaged in the manufacture and export of Iron goods and concrete whereas in fact, it is engaged in manufacturing of only steel products. It is submitted that the list issued along with the resolution also indicates levy of terminal tax on export of "Iron and all sorts of machinery", and therefore respondent No.2 without ascertaining the goods manufactured by the petitioner-company, has mechanically followed the direction of the respondent No.1 in an absolutely mechanical fashion.

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It is submitted that purported levy of the terminal tax sought to be made from the petitioner-company is wholly discriminatory and contrary to the Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India as the impugned Demand Notices are based on an assumption that the petitioner-company is engaged in the export or sale of iron-ore and other machinery from the limits of the respondent No.2. It is submitted that Entry 12 to the Schedule to Terminal Tax Rules, 1996 framed by the State of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of its powers under Section 433 read with Section 132 (2)(o) and Section 133 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and under Section 355

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read with Section 127 (1)(XVI) and Section 129 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961, provides for levy of Terminal Tax on "iron and all sorts of machinery", which admittedly are neither manufactured or produced in the subject area of the plant purportedly lying within the limits of the respondent No.2 nor exported by the Petitioner Company. It is submitted that respondent No.2 has erred in not considering the fact that Terminal Tax under the Municipalities Act can be imposed on the goods that are exported from the limits of the Municipal Area only, but in the case in hand the petitioner-Company does not export goods from the limits of respondent No. 2 and therefore it has wrongly issued impugned Demand Notices on a wrong conclusion that the goods dispatched from the petitioner's plant are exigible to terminal tax.

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It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that respondent No. 2 has erred in arriving at a conclusion that the steel products manufactured by the petitioner-Company are exported by the petitioner No.1 from within the limits of the respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 is further argued to have failed to consider that the petitioner-Company is neither engaged in the export of the scheduled goods nor does it sell any of the scheduled goods for the purpose of export from the said limits as the export of said goods for sale is effected from a place which is outside the limits of the Respondent No.2. According to learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, respondent No. 2 did not consider that the goods that are dispatched from the plant of petitioner No.1 are not exported from the limits of respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 is further argued to have erred in not appreciating the fact that the steel products manufactured and dispatched from the petitioner No.1’s manufacturing plant are in transit when they pass through the subject area. It is submitted that respondent No. 2 erred in not appreciating the fact that

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there was no export which took place from the subject area which is a precondition for imposition of Terminal Tax under the Municipalities Act and the Rules, and that any transfer of the goods from the subject area to the area of dispatch outside the limits of the Nagar Panchayat does not amount to export of goods from the Municipal area. It is submitted that after the goods are manufactured, they are halted in the plant for an incidental purpose to effectuate the journey to the final destination by unloading, sorting and reloading them at a particular place. Referring to a Supreme Court ruling it is submitted that in case goods are in course of transit, halting of goods in a municipal area is only for an incidental purpose to effectuate the journey of the goods to the final destination and therefore terminal tax cannot be levied, and that as the Company is not engaged in export of any of the goods listed in the schedule, the levy of terminal tax on the petitioner Company is illegal and not permissible in law. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, respondent No. 2 erred in not considering that the power to levy terminal tax originates at the point from where the goods are exported and not at the point where goods are merely halted to be taken to the final destination. Referring to a decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Northern Coal Fields Limited v State of Madhya Pradesh 2010 (2) MPLJ 202 learned Sr. counsel submits that the word "export" will not include the goods in "transit" when they pass through the Municipal Limits.

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It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioner-company imports iron ore and manufactures steel. To substantiate that, he has filed a copy of the product broucher. Therefore, it is submitted that product of the petitioner-company does not fall under schedule 12. Thus according to the counsel for the petitioners, the impugned Demand Notices are contrary to the Rules and liable to be quashed. In support of his

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submissions, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Company, Limited, the Empress Mills, Nagpur v. Municipal Committee, Wardha reported in 1958 SCR 1102 wherein it has held that the terminal tax is not leviable on goods which are in transit and are only carried across the limits of the Municipality. Reliance is also placed on the decision of Supreme Court in the matter of Radha Krishnan Industries Ltd v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others reported in 2021 SCC Online 334 . Further reliance is placed on the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Associated Cement Company Limited and another versus State of Madhya Pradesh and another reported in 2002 (3) MPLJ 357 wherein it has been held that manufacturing of goods within the municipal area is not the acid test for levy of terminal tax. The real test is export of goods or transport from the manufacturing unit outside the limits of municipal area. Further reliance is placed on the decision of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Triveni Sheet Glass Works Ltd reported in 1990 STC 308.

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On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners and submits that the terminal tax imposed by respondent No.2 under Section 127 of the Act of 1961 is fully justified and no illegality can be attribute to such levy of tax sought to be made from the petitioner No.1. He submits that since there are documents on record to show that the goods are exported by the petitioner- company which is situated within the limits of respondent No.2, no illegality can be attributed to the imposition of terminal tax by it.

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Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 submits that terminal

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tax has rightly been imposed on the petitioner-company in strict adherence to the provisions of the Act of 1961. It is submitted that earlier the petitionercompany did not raise any objection to such demand notices and had been paying the terminal tax regularly as imposed by respondent No.2 under Section 127 of the Act of 1961, and therefore this subsequent conduct of the petitioner-company in dis-inclining to pay the terminal tax is not permissible as per the doctrine of estoppel operating against it. It is further submitted that before imposing the terminal tax resolution passed by respondent No.2 was duly published in the newspaper inviting objection, but the petitionercompany did not raise any such objection. It is submitted that manufacturing by the petitioner-company is within the municipal limits, therefore, levy of terminal tax is in accordance with law. Availability of alternative remedy against issuance of demand notices and also the delay and laches in challenging the same in pursuance of the order passed by respondent No.1 on 24.03.2011 has also been cited as one of the grounds for dismissal of the petition. In support of the submissions, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Man Mohan Tuli and another v. Union of India and others and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Man Mohan Tuli and another reported in ( 1981) 2 SCC 467 .

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Patient hearing to the arguments advanced at length and close scrutiny of the documents annexed to the petitions in depth has been resorted to.

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Before marching towards the factual analysis, this Court deems it necessary to take a look of the relevant provision dealing with the imposition of terminal tax.

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Section 2(c) of the Terminal Tax (Assessment and Collection) on the

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Goods Exported from Madhya Pradesh Municipal Limits, Rule, 1996, defines “terminal tax” as under:-

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“Terminal tax” means the terminal tax on goods exported from the Municipal limit in accordance with the sanction of State Government under clause (o) of sub section (2) of Section 132 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and the tax described in clause (xvi) of sub section (1) of Section 127 of the Act of 1961.”

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Likewise, the term “Municipal limit” is also defined in clause (d), which reads as under:-

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“Municipal limit” means a larger urban area notified under sub section (2) of Section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and smaller urban area or transitional area notified under Sub section (2) of section 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961”

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According to the Oxford Dictionary 'terminal' means end, boundary, situated at or forming the end or extremity of something; situated at the end of a line of railway; forming or belonging to, a railway terminus. The word 'Terminus' means the point to which motion or action tends, goal, end, finishing point, sometimes that from which it starts, starting point. An end; extremity, the point at which something comes to an end.

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In Corpus Juris, Vol. 62 it is stated at p. 729 that 'terminal' in connection with transportation means inter alia the fixed beginning or ending point of a given run.

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If 'terminal' besides the above meaning has an additional meaning also and that meaning signifies the termini or the jurisdictional limits of the municipal area, even then the construction to be placed on the term should be the one that favours the tax-payer, in accordance with the principle of

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construction of taxing statutes, which must be strictly construed and in case of doubt must be construed against the Taxing Authorities and doubt resolved in favour of the taxpayer. On this principle the word "terminal" must in the context be construed as having reference to terminus and has to be read to connote the idea of the end of something connected with motion and not that of an intermediate stage of a journey. Therefore terminal tax on goods imported or exported is similar in its incidence and is payable on goods on their journey ending within the municipal limits or commencing therefrom, and not where the goods were merely in transit through the municipal limits and had their terminus elsewhere. Manufacture of goods within the municipal limits is not the litmus test for imposition of terminal tax. This being the position, the contention of the respondent No.2 that since the plant lies within the limits of respondent No.2 and the manufacture of goods takes place within its municipal limits Terminal Tax is liable to be paid, does not appear to have any force and is liable to be discarded. In other words, merely because the plant lies within its limits and some activities relating to processing of goods take place, does not empower that Municipal Corporation to levy terminal tax unless goods have actually been exported from the area of respondent No.2 .

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Similarly, respondent No.2 cannot levy terminal tax if goods are stored in a Stockyard lying within its premises as only after goods leave the factory gate does their export journey commence. Terminal tax can be imposed by the municipality from where goods are exported only after commencement of their journey. Since, in the facts of the present case, the export journey of goods commences from Chiraipani Gram Panchayat once saleable goods are dispatched from the factory premises through MLSM gate, the respondents have no jurisdiction to demand terminal tax.

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This proposition is fortified by the decision of the Madhya Pradesh Court in the matter of Associated Cement Company Limited and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another (supra), wherein it was held that manufacturing of goods in a Municipal area is not the acid test for levy of Terminal Tax. The real test is export of goods or transport from the manufacturing unit outside the limits of the municipal area. In the facts of the present case, transit of goods takes place from Chiraipani Gram Panchayat premises, not from the municipal area of the Respondents, which would entail levy of Terminal Tax. Relevant portion of thereof reads as under:-

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“25. On a conspectus reading of the aforesaid decisions and understanding the ratio in proper perspective there remains no trace of doubt that transport by rail is not liable to terminal/export tax. Submission of Mr. V.K.Tankha is that as goods are manufactured in the municipal area at Kymore and the goods are transported by vehicle to the railway station they are liable to terminal tax and would be covered under Entries 52 and 56 of the List-II is not acceptable as such a submission is not in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court. It is noteworthy to mention here that the manufacturing of goods within the Municipal area is not the acid test. The real test is export of goods or transport from the manufacturing unit outside the limits of municipal area. The submission of Mr. Tankha is acceptable inasmuch as if the goods are to be exported by the Rail or carried by the Railways they have to be carried to the Railway Station. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that because they are carried by some vehicle from the manufacturing unit to the Railway Station terminal tax would be

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leviable. If such an interpretation is given acceptance, in my considered view Entry 89 would be frustrated and Entry 56 would be given the meaning beyond its comprehensive connotation. Entry 56 deals with goods 'carried by road'. In the case at hand, as has been stated above goods are taken out from the Municipal area by Rail. Hence, the terminal tax by the Municipality cannot be imposed.”

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As regards the argument that the the petitioner-company is engaged in production of steel goods and not the iron goods, it has been held by the full Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Triveni Sheet Glass Works Ltd (supra) as under:

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“6. The short question for consideration is whether glass sheets all within the ambit of the expression “goods made of glass and glassware”.

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“9. Therefore, a glass sheet, as found by the Board, is "glass simpliciter". While considering the question as to whether a glass mirror can be classified as "glassware", the Supreme Court observed in Atul Glass Industries (P.) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise [1986] 63 STC 322, that a glass sheet undergoes a complete transformation when it emerges as a glass mirror. What was a piece of glass simpliciter, becomes another commercial product. Glass sheet is, therefore, a primary product "glass simpliciter" which can be used for producing "goods or articles made of glass". It is significant to note that whenever the legislature intended to include sheets of a primary product along with goods made of that product, in any entry, the legislature expressly made reference to sheets of that product as is evident from perusal of certain entries in Part III of the Schedule II of the Act. Entry No. 4 is "sheets, fabrics and goods made of plastic".

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Entry No, 12 is "asbestos sheets and goods made thereof". In entry No. 26 of Part II (now numbered as 36), there is, however, no mention of sheets along with "goods made of glass". The legislative intent, therefore, is clear that as regards glass, the primary product is not clubbed with goods and articles made of that primary product. The decisions reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mohanlal Ramkisan Nathani [1955] 6 STC 136. (Nag), Tribuwandas Gulabchand and Brothers v. State of Maharashtra [1965] 16 STC 452 (Bom) and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bombay Glass House [1986] 63 STC 350 (MP), with respect, do not take into account that a glass sheet in common parlance is "glass simpliciter" and is a primary product used for producing articles or goods made of glass. Glass sheets, therefore, cannot be equated with goods or articles made of glass. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Polychem Ltd. [1977] 39 STC 315, the question which arose for consideration before the Bombay High Court was whether polynite sheets used for making toys should be regarded as "plastics" or goods made from plastics. It was held that polynite sheets must be regarded as "plastics" and not goods made from plastics. We respectfully agree with that decision. In oar opinion, therefore, the decision in [1986] 63 STC 350 (MP) (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bombay Glass House), does not lay down correct law. “

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Further, as regards the availability of alternative remedy it has been held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Radha Krishnan Industries (supra) as under:

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“ 27 The principles of law which emerge are that :

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27.1 The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well;

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27.2 The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person;

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27.3 Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction;

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or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged;

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27.4 An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;

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27.5 When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and

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27.6 In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view

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would not readily be interfered with.”

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Further, in the matter of Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Company (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:-

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Even assuming that the words "imported into or "exported from " could be restricted only to their derivative meaning and thus construed to mean only "brought into or taken out or away from" this general meaning it was submitted by the appellant is qualified by the use of the prefix "terminal" used adjectively with the word " tax", which makes it necessary to determine the meaning of the term terminal tax". And the question then arises does it have reference to the jurisdictional limits of the Municipality or to the ultimate termination or the commencement of the journey of the goods as the case may be. In dealing with this the High Court said:

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" It remains t25. Even assuming that the words "imported into or "exported from " could be restricted only to their derivative meaning and thus construed to mean only "brought into or taken out or away from" this general meaning it was submitted by the appellant is qualified by the use of the prefix "terminal" used adjectively with the word " tax", which makes it necessary to determine the meaning of the term terminal tax". And the question then arises does it have reference to the jurisdictional limits of the Municipality or to the ultimate termination or the commencement of the journey of the goods as the case may be. In dealing with this the High Court said:

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" It remains to consider what is signified by the word " terminal ". It is obvious that it could refer either to the termini of the goods or the termini of the Municipality. It is clear to me that the word " terminal " refers not to the destination or origin of the goods but to the termini of the Municipal limits. Digby, J., pointed out that it refers to the traffic rather than the origin of the goods ".

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According to the Oxford Dictionary " terminal means end, boundary

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; situated at or forming the end or extremity of something; situated

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at the end of a line of railway; forming or belonging to, a railway terminus.

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26 " Terminus " means the point to which motion or action tends, goal, end, finishing point; sometimes that from which it starts; starting point. An end; extremity; the point at which something comes to an end.”

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“27. In Corpus Juris Vol. 62 it is stated at p. 729 that terminal " in connection with transportation means inter alia "the fixed beginning or ending point of a given run.”

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“28. If "terminal " besides the above meaning has an additional meaning also and that meaning signifies the termini or the jurisdictional limits of the municipal area even then the construction to be placed on the term should be the one that favours the taxpayer, in accordance with the principle of construction of taxing statutes, which must be strictly construed and in case of doubt must be construed against the taxing authorities and doubt resolved in favour of the taxpayer. In Crawford on Statutory Constructions in para. 257 at p. 504 the following passage pertaining to construction of taxing statutes taken from Bedford v. Johnson (1) is quoted:

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" Statutes levying taxes or duties upon citizens will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used, nor will their operation be enlarged so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out, although standing upon a close analogy, and all questions of doubt will be resolved against the government and in favour of the citizen, and because burdens are not to be, imposed beyond what the statute expressly imparts".

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“In that case the court refused to regard automobile parking lots as falling within the scope of a statute which imposed a tax on general warehouse storage establishments. On this principle the word " terminal " must in the context be construed as having reference to terminus and has to be read to connote the idea of the end of

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something connected with motion and not that of an intermediate stage of a journey.”

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Having thus considered the arguments advanced at length by counsel for the rival parties and gone through the documents annexed with the petitions, there is no dispute that the manufacturing plant of the petitioners fall within the four municipal limits (I) Municipal Corporation, Raigarh (respondent No.2 in WPT No. 49/2014), Kirodimal Nagar Panchayat (Respondent No.2 in WPT No. 118/2014), Chiraipani Gram Panchayat and Khairpur Gram Panchayat (not a party in the present petitions). It is also evident from the record that the Terminal Tax under the Municipalities Act can be imposed on the goods that are exported from the limits of the Municipal Area only , but since in the cases in hand the petitioner-Company does not export goods from the limits of respondent No. 2 in both the cases, the respondents have wrongly issued impugned Demand Notices on a fallacious assumption that the goods dispatched from the petitioner's plant are exigible to terminal tax. The conclusion drawn by respondent No. 2 that the steel products manufactured by the petitioner-Company are exported by the petitioner No.1 from within the limits of respondent No.2 is not in conformity with the documents on record in both the cases because there is nothing to demonstrate on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner-Company is either engaged in the export of the scheduled goods or does it sell any of the scheduled goods for the purpose of export from the said limits.

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In aforesaid view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the demand notices issued by respondent No.2 acting upon the document of Annexure P-1 in WPT No. 118/2014 and resolution dated 31.12.2010 and 15.04.2013, are liable to be set aside.

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Since the matter has been dealt with on merit with respect to the core

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issue of imposition of terminal tax, nothing remains for this Court to dwell upon the arguments of the counsel for the respondents on availability of alternative remedy, for the reason that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is no constitutional bar for the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction when there is alternative remedy available, rather it is a self imposed restriction. As regards the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner-company that the goods manufactured at petitioner – company is steel and not iron and therefore does not fall in Entry 12 of the Schedule to the Terminal Tax Rules, 1996, this Court is not convinced with this submission because the iron is the raw material for manufacturing steel products which cannot be conceputalised without iron. Similarly, as regards refund of terminal tax already paid by the petitioners, looking to the fact that the petitioners did not challenge the same within a reasonable period of time after making such payment, at this stage they are estopped from raising the issue of refund.

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Thus in view of the observations made above, the petitions are allowed. Demand notices dated 19.04.2011, 30.05.2011, 30.06.2011, 05.08.11, 17.07.2012, 27.07.2013, 06.11.2013 and 22.04.2014 (Annexure P- 3) issued in pursuance of the letter dated 23.03.2001 (Annexure P-1) and resolution dated 31.12.2010 (Annexure P-2) in WPT No. 118/2014 AND resolution dated 15.04.2013 (Annexure P-1); letter dated 29.11.2013 (Annexure P-2), letter dated 03.12.2013 (Annexure P-3), letter and demand notices dated 13.12.2013 (Annexure P-4) and 01.02.2014 (Annexure P-5) in WPT No. 49/2014, are hereby quashed.

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