Rajesh Kesharwani Vs the State of Chhattisgarh

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Petitioner : Mr. Aman Upadhyay, Advocate. For Respondent-State : Mr. Soumitra Kesharwani, PL

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Hon'ble Shri Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge

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Order on Board

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14.07.2025

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1. This writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for seeking following reliefs:

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“10.1 It is therefore prayed that, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner from the court below.

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10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in nature of mandamus whereby to set aside the impugned Order dated 16.12.2021 passed by Respondent Collector Surajpur District Surajpur in Revenue Case No. 5/A-82/17-18.

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10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in nature of mandamus whereby to direct to the Respondent No. 2 and 3 to determine the amount of compensation as per the market rate prevailing at the time of acquisition and further directed to the Respondent No. 2 and 3 to release the amount of compensation with interest within a stipulated time.

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10.4 Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon'ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.”

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2. Relevant facts for disposal of this writ petition are that the petitioner owns a land of Khasra No.130/1 admeasuring area 0.036 hectare at village- Chandarpur, Tehsil - Surajpur District - Surajpur, out of which, 0.02 hectare area of land was acquired by the respondent/State for the purpose of establishing common railway link for Coal transport under the scheme of Thermal Power Project, for which, respondent/State has determined the amount of compensation as Rs.39,536/-, to which, petitioner made an objection regarding the compensation so determined was unfair and illegal because said land is adjacent to the main road and its market value is higher, but objection of the petitioner has been rejected by respondent No.4/Tehsildar vide its order dated 15.07.2013. Aggrieved by which, petitioner has preferred the writ petition (WPC No. 1606/2013) before this Court, which was disposed of on 19.07.2018 with a following direction/order “ Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed

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of with reserving the aforesaid liberty in favour of the petitioner to make an application for reference before the Collector under Section 30 of the Act of 1894, if he so desired. The said authority would take notice of the fact that writ petition remained pending from 17.10.2013 till this date.” Pursuant to order of this Court dated 19.07.2018, the petitioner made an application under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘Act of 1894’) before respondent No.2/Collector, which was registered as Revenue Case No.5/A-82/17-18, however, respondent/Collector vide impugned order dated 16.12.2021 (Annexure P-1) has rejected the said application of the petitioner on basis of following three grounds, “ (1). Application filed by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act of 1894 is not applicable because there is no dispute with regard to the apportionment of the compensation; (2). As per Section 13(A) of the Act of 1894, after expiry of six months, there is no provision to correct the award by the Collector; (3). The Collector has observed that as per Section 18(1) of the Act of 1894, there is limitation prescribed only six months.” Hence, this writ petition.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that pursuant to order of this Court’s dated 19.07.2018, petitioner made an application under Section 30 of the Act of 1894 before respondent/Collector and Collector ought to have decided the application on merits, but the Collector considering the case on technical ground has rejected the application on the ground that the petitioner did not make any application/objection regarding determination of the amount of compensation within prescribed limited period, which is not proper as per relevant rules/law. Hon’ble Apex Court in a numbers of similar cases has observed that power exercised

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by the Collector under Sections 18(1) & 30 of the Act of 1894 are distinct and may be invoke in contingencies which do not overlap and the Collector should not reject the application under Section 30 on the ground of limitation. The Collector has committed gross error by not treating the reference under Section 30 as an original proceeding before him as well as not determined the compensation of the suit land as per the market value on the basis of material produced. The Collector under Section 30 not enjoy to make a reference, he may relegate the person raising a dispute as a apportionment, as the person to whom the compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the manner declared by the award. The Collector has not properly gone through the record which was produced by the sub-ordinate Revenue Officer in respect of land in question that the land in question of the petitioner is adjusted from the road, thus, the petitioner should have awarded the compensation as per the market value. The Collector did not evaluate the evidence in respect of document of suit land for providing compensation by determining the market value and rejected the reference on account of technical view on the ground of time barred. Hence, it is prayed that impugned order dated 16.12.2021 (Annexure P-1) be set-aside and direction be issued to concerned authority to determine the amount of compensation as per the market rate prevailing at the time of acquisition and, thereafter, release the amount of compensation in favour of the petitioner.

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4. Learned State Counsel opposes the submission of counsel for the petitioner and would submits that respondent-authority after considering all the aspect of the case has rightly passed the impugned order in

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which there is no need for interference.

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5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order including material/evidence available on record.

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6. For ready reference, Section 13(A) of the Act of 1894 reads as under:

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“13A . Correction of clerical errors, etc.-- The Collector may, at any time but not later than six months from the date of the award, or where he has been required under section 18 to make a reference to the Court, before the making of such reference, by order, correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake in the award or errors arising therein either on his own motion or on the application of any person interested or a local authority.

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[Provided that no correction which is likely to affect prejudicially any person shall be made unless such person has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in the matter.]

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7. On perusal of above provision of Section 13(A), it is clear that the provision applies only with regard to the ‘clerical or arithmetical mistakes’. In case at hand, case of the petitioner is not with regard to the ‘clerical or arithmetical mistakes’, as the petitioner has filed the objection/representation before the competent authority with regard to the calculation or valuation of the land acquired by the respondent/authority for the purpose of establishing common railway link for Coal transport under the scheme of Thermal Power Project.

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8. In case of ‘clerical or arithmetical error’, it can be only corrected within six months from the date of the award because there is an exclusion clause but not later than six months from the date of award.

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9. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act of 1963) reads as under:

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“ Section 29. Savings. —

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xxxxxxxx

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(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

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10. Perusal of above quoted Section reveals that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

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11. In view of above, Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963 only debars the petitioner as far as concerned of Section 13(A) of the Act of 1894, however, there is no debar in Section 18(1) of the Act of 1894. Section 8(1) of the Act of 1894 reads as under:

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“ 18. Reference to Court.--

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(1). Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

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(2). The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

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Provided that every such application shall be made,--

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(a). if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award;

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(b). in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collectors award, whichever period shall first expire.

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12. It is clear from the above quoted provision of section that if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors’ award and in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award, whichever period shall first expire.

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13. No doubt, there is a prescribed limitation for reference within 06 months from the date of passing of the award, but there is no exclusion clause under Section 29(2) of the Act of 1963, therefore, Section 14 of the Act of

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1963 would be applicable in this case. Section 14 of the Act of 1963 reads as under:

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“ 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —

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(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

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(2). In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

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14. Vide order dated, 19.07.2018 in WPC No. 1606/2013, this Court has given liberty to the petitioner to make an application for reference before the Collector under Section 30 of the Act of 1894 and in-turn said authority would take notice of the fact that writ petition remained pending

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from 17.10.2013 till this date, however, matter is not related to Section 30 of the Act of 1894, but it relates to Section 18 of the Act of 1894, since there is no exclusion clause, therefore, Section 14 of the Act of 1963 would be applicable in this case. Hence, in such situation/circumstances, impugned order is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed/set-aside.

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15. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 16.12.2021 (Annexure P-1) is hereby set-aside. Matter is remanded back to the concerned Collector for fresh adjudication of the case as per Section 18(1) of the Act of 1894 and in the light of Section 14 of the Act of 1963. However, it is made clear that the Collector shall decide the case afresh on its own merits without being influenced by this order.

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CC as per rules.

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Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge

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J/-

Rajesh Kesharwani v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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Rajesh Kesharwani v. the State of Chhattisgarh

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