Dismissed

Xyz v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC23 Apr 2025CRR/141/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed the revision petition preferring a juvenile major in a murder case. Upholding the Juvenile Justice Board and Sessions Court orders, it held that reasonable grounds existed to deny bail as release might lead to association with known criminals, and no procedural error was found.

What did the court decide?

Revision petition dismissed; impugned orders refusing bail to the juvenile, allowing trial, and refusing to transfer for adult trial are affirmed.

Xyz Vs State of Chhattisgarh — Child Custody and Guardianship | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

2025:CGHC:18672

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

¶5

ORDER RESERVED ON 21.02.2025 ORDER DELIVERED ON 24.04.2025

¶6

CRR No. 141 of 2025

¶7

1 - Xyz Nil

¶8

... Applicant (s)

¶9

versus

¶10

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- District Magistrate, Bemetara, District- Bemetara, C.G.

¶11

... Respondent(s)

¶12

For Petitioner(s) : Shri Hemant Gupta, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Laxmeen Kashyap,PL

¶13

(Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma )

¶14

C A V Order

¶15

The present revision has been preferred under Section 102 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (in short 'the Act 2015') read with Sections 438 CrPC and Section 442 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the order dated 10.12.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal No.91/2024 by the First Additional Sessions Judge Bemetara (Children Court) whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge has dismissed the appeal arising

¶16

¶17

out of order dated 28.11.2024 passed in Crime No.151/2024 by the Principle Judge, Juvenile Justice Board, Bemetara dismissing the bail application of the present applicant.

¶18

This revision petition has been filed by the accused, who is juvenile. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on the date of incident ie. 18.06.2024, at about 3.00 am, four unknown persons committed the murder of Mehtaru Jagat Singh with sharp edged weapon while snatching the mobile and cash of Rs. 4500/- from Dujram and assaulted Raghavendra Singh Jagat and thereafter fled away from the spot. The incident was reported to the police station Nandghat and Crime No. 151/2024 was registered against four persons including the present revisionist for the offence punishable under Sections 341,394,397 and 302 IPC. The present applicant/juvenile in conflict with law has been arrested and kept in the observation home. Since the revisionist was involved in heinous offence, therefore, he was produced before the Juvenile Justice Board for preliminary assessment under Section 12 of J.J. Act, 2015. However, the same was dismissed.

¶19

Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the revisionist is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case due to ulterior motive. The revisionist was 17 years old at the time of the incident. He submits that the charge sheet has been filed by the police on 17.09.2024 and there are 42 witnesses in all. He submits that there is every possibility that the trial may take long time for its conclusion and therefore he may be granted bail. It is further submitted that the finding recorded by the court below is against the social information

¶20

¶21

report and is based on surmises and conjectures. It has been further submitted that there is no evidence to show that if the revisionist is released on bail, his release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal, or expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. No such findings were recorded as to how he will come in contact with known criminals and how he will be exposed to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or that his release would defeat the ends of justice.

¶22

It has been further submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board as well as the trial Court have not appreciated the Social Information Report of the Probation Officer in its right perspective and passed the impugned judgment and order in a cursory manner without considering the position of law and have declined bail to the revisionist. The bare perusal of the impugned orders demonstrates that the same has been passed on flimsy grounds, which have occasioned a gross miscarriage of justice. The judgment and order passed by the learned courts are illegal, contrary to law, and is based on the erroneous assumption of facts and law.

¶23

Per contra, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court as well as the Juvenile Justice Board and contended that the revisionist has committed a heinous crime. Considering the gravity of the offence, the present criminal revision is liable to be dismissed.

¶24

¶25

I have heard learned counsel both the parties and perused the material available on record.

¶26

The bail application under Section 12 of "JJ Act, 2015" has been rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board vide order dated 28.11.2024 observing that there appears a reasonable ground for believing that the guardian of the juvenile has no effective control over the revisionist and there is a possibility of re-occurrence of the offence after his release. Furthermore, he has committed the heinous offence and indulged in this activity due to lack of discipline. The appellate court has also affirmed the order passed by the Juvenile Justice Board. The appellate court without considering the social information report of the Probation Officer in its right perspective as well as without returning to any finding on the three exceptions declined the bail to the revisionist and rejected the appeal after observing that the parents of the juvenile are unable to keep the juvenile under control. There is a lack of availability of a consultant and if the juvenile is released on bail, he is likely to go into association with known criminals.

¶27

To examine the validity of the impugned order, it is useful to note the relevant provisions of the Act as well as the case laws relating to the subject.

¶28

On perusal of the record, it demonstrates that the juvenile in conflict with law has left his studies and was in association of bad company, his brother had also remained in observation home in a theft case. There is no denial of the fact that the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act would allow the juvenile offenders to

¶29

¶30

be tried as adults only after the Board along with psychologists, psycho-social workers or others has assessed them on certain factors such as the juvenile’s capability to commit a murder circumstances in which the murder was committed, and an offender’s ability to understand the consequences of an offence. It is the responsibility of the learned Juvenile Justice Board to complete the assessment within three months and after this they may transfer the juvenile offender to the Children’s Court if he committed the offence with knowledge of the consequence of the offence. The Juvenile Board has dismissed the application considering the fact that the appellant may repeat the crime in future in association with the bad company. Thereafter considering the above facts, the learned Sessions Judge, after cumulative study of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case as well as the social investigation report, had found that there are reasonable grounds available against the juvenile in conflict with law and there was likelihood that his release may bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to moral,physical or psychological danger or the person’s release would defeat the ends of justice. Therefore, the learned trial court dismissed the appeal.

¶31

It is a settled position of law that the use of the word 'shall' in sub-section (1) of Section 12 of "JJ Act, 2015" is of great significance. The use of the word 'shall' raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as the object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction. The word 'shall' has been construed as ordinarily mandatory, but is

¶32

¶33

sometimes not so interpreted if the context or intention otherwise demands.

¶34

Provisions of Section 12 of "JJ Act, 2015" manifest that ordinarily, the Juvenile Justice Board is under obligation to release the juvenile on bail with or without surety. The juvenile shall not be released in certain circumstances as the latter part of the section also uses the word 'shall' imposing certain mandatory conditions prohibiting the release of the juvenile by the Juvenile Justice Board. If there are any reasonable grounds for believing; (a) that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal; (b) that release is likely to expose him to moral, physical, or psychological danger and (c) that release of the juvenile is in conflict with law and would defeat the ends of justice. he gravity of the offence is not a relevant consideration for declining the bail to the juvenile. A juvenile can be denied the concession of bail if any of the three contingencies specified under Section 12(1) of "JJ Act, 2015" is available.

¶35

The term 'known criminal' has not been defined in "the Juvenile Justice Act" or Rules framed thereunder. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that in the absence of any statutory definition of any term used in any particular statute the same must be assigned meaning as is commonly understood in the context of such statute as held by Supreme Court in Appasaheb Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 in para 11 as under:

¶36

(SCC p. 726 para 11) "11......It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade,

¶37

¶38

business or transaction knows or understand to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. [See: Union of India V. Garware Nylons Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 413: AIR 1996 SC 3509 and Chemical and Fibers of India v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 664: AIR 1997 SC 558]..."

¶39

In the proviso of Section 12 of Juvenile Justice Act, observed that "as regards the first exception, before it can be invoked to deny bail to a juvenile there must be a reasonable ground for believing that his release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal. The expression known criminal is not without significance when the liberty of a juvenile is sought to be curtailed by employing the exception, the exception must be construed strictly. Therefore, before this exception is invoked, the prosecution must identify the 'known criminal', and then the court must have reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile if released would associate with this 'known criminal'. It cannot be generally observed that the release of the juvenile would bring him into association with criminals without identifying the criminals and without returning a prima facie finding with regard to the nexus between the juvenile and such criminal."

¶40

The age of applicant has been found above 16 years and below 18 years on the date of incident. On perusal of the records and the social investigation report, it appears that the juvenile in conflict with law had left his studies and was in association of bad company and his brother had also remained in the observation home in a case of robbery. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act would allow the juvenile offenders to be tried as adults only after the learned Board along with

¶41

¶42

psychologists, psycho-social workers or others has assessed them on certain factors such as the juvenile’s capability to commit a murder, circumstances in which the murder was committed, and an offender’s ability to understand the consequences of an offence. The Juvenile Justice Board has dismissed the application considering the fact that the appellant may repeat the crime in future in association with the bad company. The trial court by the impugned order dated 10.12.2024, dismissed the appeal, holding that the Juvenile Justice Board had followed due process and relied on the Preliminary Assessment Report, Social Investigation Report, and Physical-Mental Drug Assessment Report before concluding that Child in Conflict with Law should not be tried as an adult and has upheld the bail order, finding no procedural irregularity.

¶43

On perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that the learned ASJ confined its review to assessing procedural and jurisdictional correctness, finding that the Juvenile Board had acted within its authority and in accordance with the law. The learned ASJ affirmed the Board’s determination that CCL lacked the requisite mental and physical capacity to be tried as an adult, based on expert assessments and background reports, and upheld the grant of bail, noting the prosecution’s failure to establish any statutory exceptions under Section 12. No material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or miscarriage of justice is evident, and the applicant’s disagreement with the conclusions does not render the order perverse or unsustainable.”

¶44

On the issue of bail, the Court reiterated that Section 12 of the JJ Act mandates the grant of bail to juveniles unless their release

¶45

¶46

would bring them into association with criminals, expose them to danger, or defeat the ends of justice. The court found that neither Juvenile Board nor the Additional Sessions Judge had any material before them suggesting that CCL’s release would lead to such consequences. The mere seriousness of the offence was not sufficient to deny bail. The court cited precedent reaffirming the principle that bail for juveniles is the norm and that exceptions must be substantiated with evidence. The Court also addressed the juvenile’s claim of violation of natural justice, arguing that the complainant had no absolute right to be heard in bail proceedings under the JJ Act. It held that the legislative scheme prioritizes rehabilitation over retribution and that the Board’s decision-making process did not warrant interference.

¶47

There is no jurisdictional error, procedural irregularity, or legal infirmity in the impugned order. The trial court after considering the facts and circumstances of the present case as also the social investigation report, which reflects that there are reasonable grounds had dismissed the appeal. The manner in which the incident of murder has been committed, in itself reveals that the murder of deceased has been committed by the accused persons wherein role of the applicant is well established.

¶48

In the facts and circumstances of the instance case, as far as the challenge to the impugned orders in the present revision is concerned, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned orders, which are wholly impeccable. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the considered view that no

¶49

¶50

legal or factual error has been committed by the Courts below in passing the impugned order.

¶51