Samaar Singh Bhaina Vs State of Chhattisgarh

Samaar Singh Bhaina S/o Lt. Shri Bhajan Singh Panika Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Nawapara, Thana Gaurela, District Gaurela-Pendra-Marvahi, Chhattisgarh.

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Appellant(s)

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Versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Gaurela, District GaurelaPendra-Marvahi, Chhattisgarh.

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Respondent(s)

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant(s) : Mr. Hanuman Prasad Agrawal, Advocate

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For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shangarsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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10/12/2025

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This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23/12/2024, passed by the

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learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pendraroad, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 10/2022, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:

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Conviction under Section	Sentence
U/s 302 of the Indian Penal	Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.
Code	1,000/-, with default stipulation.

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Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 05.11.2021, complainant Santosh Karsayal lodged a report at Police Station Gaurela alleging that on the previous evening, i.e., 04.11.2021 at about 6:30 p.m., he had gone to a nearby temple-side shop to purchase some items when Aditya came there and informed him that his grandmother-in-law, Shyama Bai, was lying inside the house in a pool of blood. The complainant immediately returned home with him and, on inquiring from his father-in-law, Samaar Singh (Appellant herein), he was informed that their neighbour, accused Santosh Rajak, had come to the house carrying a bottle of mahua liquor, which he, Sanotsh Rajak and Shyama Bai consumed together. During this, Santosh Rajak allegedly told Samaar Singh to slap Shyama Bai twice, and upon his doing so, he himself became enraged and, with an intention to kill, struck Shyama Bai multiple times with a tangiya (axe-like weapon) on her right temple, head and ear, causing severe injuries. At that time, Sati Bai Karsayal and Aditya were present inside the house and witnessed the incident, and neighbours also arrived upon hearing the commotion. The injured Shyama Bai was taken in an 108 ambulance to the District Hospital, Gaurela, from where she was referred to CIMS Hosptial, Bilaspur and thereafter admitted in serious condition at a Raipur hospital.

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On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 406/2021 under Section 307 IPC was registered (Ex. P-07). During investigation, medical requisitions were sent, site inspection and inquest proceedings were conducted, and a merg intimation was later registered after the death of Shyama Bai. The Investigating Officer prepared the spot map, seized blood-stained and plain soil from the place of occurrence, recovered a tangiya with a wooden handle at the instance of the accused Samaar Singh under his memorandum (Ex. P-15), collected preserved clothes of the deceased, sent all seized articles for FSL examination, obtained query reports and patwari map, and recorded the statements of witnesses.

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On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pendraroad, and the case was committed for trial. The appellant abjured the guilt and entered into defense stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 27 documents.

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The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 23/12/2024 convicted the accused/appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 23.12.2024 is wholly unsustainable, as the learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. It is contended that the prosecution case rests entirely on weak, contradictory and

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unreliable evidence, and the testimonies of the alleged eye-witnesses do not inspire confidence. None of the material witnesses have supported the prosecution version in a consistent manner, and the entire case has been built on assumptions rather than concrete proof. It is argued that the appellant has been falsely implicated by the complainant party on account of strained family relations, and even according to the prosecution’s own version, the incident allegedly occurred after consumption of liquor by multiple persons, creating serious doubt about the manner of occurrence. The recovery of the alleged tangiya is also said to be doubtful and not linked to the crime through any independent witness or scientific evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish either motive or intention, and at the highest, the case would not travel beyond a suspicion, which cannot take the place of proof. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to acquittal by giving him the benefit of doubt. Alternatively, it is submitted that even if the prosecution case is accepted as it stands, there was no premeditation or deliberate intention to kill, and the incident, if at all, occurred during a sudden drunken altercation. Thus, the conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be set aside or, at the very least, altered to an offence under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC.

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Per contra , learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt through consistent witness statements, medical evidence, and the recovery of the tangiya at the appellant’s instance. The nature and location of the injuries on the head and temple clearly indicate a deliberate and forceful assault, establishing intention or, at minimum, knowledge of causing death. The

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defence plea of false implication or a drunken scuffle is termed an unsupported afterthought. It is argued that an unprovoked attack on an elderly woman with a sharp weapon excludes the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. The Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, and no ground exists for interference.

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We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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The question for consideration would arise before this Court whether the appellant has committed such offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The prosecution for proving its case beyond reasonable doubt examined the witnesses whose statements have been recorded before the trial Court observed hereinbelow:-

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PW-1 Sati Bai stated that Samaar Singh is her father and the deceased Shyama Bai was her mother. On the day of Deepawali last year, she had gone to call her children for food while her parents were at home. When she returned after about ten minutes, she found the door of the house locked from inside. She called out to her mother but received no response. Her son Aditya arrived, inserted his hand through the gap, and opened the latch. Inside, she found her mother lying unconscious and covered in blood. She stated that at that time only her father was with her mother, and though she did not see him leaving, her son had seen him fleeing from the house. The injured was taken by ambulance to the local hospital, then referred to Bilaspur, and finally to Raipur, where she died during treatment. She proved her thumb impressions on the

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inquest papers.

In cross-examination, she admitted that the deceased was the wife of Samaar Singh and that she and her younger sister were both daughters of the deceased. She stated that her father possessed about 17–18 acres of land, already partitioned among brothers, and cultivated his share. Sometimes he stayed at the field house to watch the crops. She admitted that her parents had disputes regarding land but denied any dispute between her father and her or her husband. She denied that her husband ever quarreled with her father. She reiterated that the door was closed from inside, though she did not know who locked it, presuming her father as only her parents were inside. She admitted she had not told the police that her son saw Samaar Singh leaving, stating her son himself informed the police. She denied that the door was locked from outside or that neighbours had gathered immediately. She further stated she did not see Samaar Singh assaulting her mother and, because the door was locked, she could not say who entered or exited the house. She denied all suggestions regarding illicit relations with Ashok, denied any involvement in the killing, and denied falsely implicating Samaar Singh to obtain property. She stated that after seeing her mother injured, she informed neighbours.

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PW-2, Vijay Kumar deposed that on the date of incident, Sati Bai (PW1) came to his house and told him that her mother is lying in a pool of blood and subsequently, he went to the house of the Deceased Shyama Bai, where he saw that she was lying in a pool of blood. This witness further deposed that PW1, Sati Bai told him that her mother has been killed by his father (appellant).

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PW3- Md. Mukimur Rahman stated that on 05.11.2021 he was posted as

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Medical Officer at District Hospital, Gaurela–Pendra–Marwahi. On that day, injured Shyama Bai was brought before him for medical examination by Constable Naresh Yadav of Police Station Gaurela. On examination, he found multiple chop wounds: one on the right frontal region measuring 2 × 2 × 2 cm; one on the right parietal region measuring 7 × 3 × 1.5 cm; one behind the right ear measuring 4 × 2.5 × 3 cm; one on the right parietal region measuring 4 × 2 × 1 cm; one in front of the right ear measuring 1.5 × 1 × 2 cm; one on the left ear measuring 2.5 × 2.5 × 3 cm; and one on the left side of the forehead measuring 2 × 1 × 0.5 cm. Beneath injury No. 2, a fracture of the skull was present. According to him, the injuries were grievous in nature, caused by a hard, sharp and heavy object, and were sufficient to endanger life. He proved his report Ex. P-5, bearing his signatures. He further stated that on 26.12.2021, a tangiya (axe) made of iron with a wooden handle was produced before him for opinion. On physical examination, he recorded the measurements of the wooden handle and iron blade and noticed blood-like stains on the upper portion of the handle, the iron blade, and the portion of the wooden handle protruding above the blade. He opined that the injuries sustained by the injured could be caused by the said axe, though it could not be stated with certainty that the injuries were caused by this very weapon. He stated that the blood found on the axe appeared to be human blood, but a definite opinion could be given only after chemical analysis. He proved his query report Ex. P-6, bearing his signatures.

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In cross-examination, he stated that it is correct that his examination report mentions whether the injured was conscious or unconscious at the time

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of examination. He admitted that he did not record the history of injuries, nor did he note the colour or the type of the wounds. He also admitted that he had not mentioned in his report the approximate duration of the injuries prior to examination. He further admitted that Ex. P-6 does not mention the name of the person who brought the axe before him. He denied the suggestion that the length of 56 cm mentioned in his query report is not clearly specified as belonging to any particular part of the weapon. He also denied the suggestion that he did not specify the material of the blade. He admitted that he did not mention in his query report that the seized weapon was produced before him in a sealed condition.

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PW-4 Aditya Kumar (a minor witness, aged about 12 years) was examined after preliminary questions to assess his understanding, and on being found capable of giving rational answers, his testimony was recorded. He stated that he knew the accused Samaar Singh, who is his maternal grandfather, and the deceased Shyama Bai was his maternal grandmother. On the day of Diwali in the year 2021, at about 6–7 PM, he was bursting crackers in the village. His mother came to call him for dinner, but he told her to go ahead and that he would come after finishing the crackers. His mother then went towards the house and knocked on the door. When he later went there, he inserted his hand through the gap and opened the door. On entering the house, the accused Samaar Singh ran out, and inside, in the room where they used to sleep, he saw his grandmother lying in a pool of blood with injuries on her head. He informed a villager known as ‘Chhabba’ about the incident, though he did not know his real name. He stated that Samaar Singh had killed his grandmother,

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and the police had recorded his statement. He further stated that he had also narrated the incident to Hiralal Maravi (who is called Chhabba) and to his father Santosh.

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In cross-examination, he stated that he had earlier come to court for evidence and that he, his parents, and his grandparents lived together. He admitted that his grandparents lived peacefully and that the house had no rear exit. His grandfather was engaged in agriculture and stayed in the fields only during harvest. He denied any disputes between his father and his maternal aunt. He knew neighbour Santosh Rajak, who often visited their house, and stated that this sometimes led to quarrels between his mother and grandfather. He stated that the police had not asked him whether it was dark or light at the time of the incident. He was playing about 25 metres from the house and entered the house along with his mother; no one else was inside. He switched on the TV in the verandah and, after seeing his grandmother injured, went alone to call his father at a nearby shop about 50 metres away. On returning, they found villagers gathered. He admitted that he did not note all injuries on his grandmother. He further stated that persons like Chhabba, Santosh Rajak’s mother and wife, and some Panchayat members had arrived but did not question him. He agreed that if anyone had run out of the house, his mother would have seen him. He stated that many villagers were outside due to Diwali. He admitted that there were disputes at home because his grandfather intended to give his land to his nephew. He denied suggestions that his parents killed his grandmother or that the accused was falsely implicated, and stated that Santosh Rajak was not present at the time of the incident.

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PW-5, Santosh, in examination-in-chief, stated that he knew the accused Samaar Singh as he was his father-in-law, and the deceased was his mother-in-law. The incident occurred two years ago on Diwali around 6–7 PM. He had gone to the shop to purchase items when his son Aditya informed him that his grandmother was lying injured. He reached home and found the deceased lying in blood near the TV in the room. He informed people on the way and the deceased was taken to Gaurela Hospital, then referred to Bilaspur and later to Raipur, where she died. He stated that the accused Samaar Singh was present in the house and had assaulted the deceased with a tangiya. He lodged the report (Ex. P-7) and identified his signatures on the spot map, patwari map and inquest papers.

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In cross-examination, he admitted that he lived in his in-laws’ house since marriage (about 13–14 years), worked and resided there, and that his inlaws always lived together peacefully. He admitted that the accused had two daughters his wife Sati and her sister Meena and that the agricultural land was cultivated separately by each branch. He denied suggestions of past disputes with Meena or any quarrel between his wife and the accused over land. He knew neighbour Santosh Rajak but denied frequent visits by him. He stated that after the deceased was referred to Bilaspur, he went to the police station two days after the incident with the Sarpanch and Kotwar to lodge the report. He denied bringing the accused to the police station and stated that the police had detained both his father-in-law and Santosh Rajak the next morning. He admitted that he had not himself called 112 or the ambulance. He admitted several omissions in the FIR, including not stating certain facts appearing in the

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FIR such as: that the deceased was seen lying “here”, that he informed neighbours, or that the deceased was taken to Raipur in serious condition. He stated that he did not know how those facts appeared in the FIR and that the contents were not read over to him. He admitted that he had not gone to Raipur; his wife had gone. He also admitted that the Patwari map was not read over to him. He denied that there were disputes involving neighbour Santosh Rajak, or that Santosh Rajak was caught once in the house. He stated he had not made inquiries from anyone regarding the incident and that even his sister-in-law (Meena) was not questioned by the police. He denied the defence suggestion that he, his wife, and Santosh Rajak falsely implicated the accused due to property issues, or that he was deposing falsely at his wife’s instance. He maintained that he did not witness the actual assault.

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From the material on record, it is evident that the learned trial Court rightly concluded that the appellant/accused, Samaar Singh, was present at the scene when the deceased Shyama Bai sustained fatal injuries. The testimony of Aditya Kumar (PW4) establishes that he saw his grandmother lying injured and bloodied inside the house, and witnessed the accused fleeing from the scene. PW5, Santosh Karsayal, confirmed that the deceased was attacked and subsequently taken to hospitals, where she later died. The medical evidence (PW3) shows that the injuries were grievous and caused by a sharp, heavy object, which could have been the tangiya recovered at the instance of the accused. However, no witness, including Aditya Kumar, directly saw the accused inflict the injuries. The appellant, in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., failed to provide a satisfactory explanation regarding the incident.

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Thus, the trial Court has rightly held that the appellant caused the death of the deceased; however, in the absence of conclusive proof of intention to cause death, the matter warrants consideration under Section 304 Part II IPC.

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The aforesaid finding raises the next question for consideration, namely, whether the case of the appellant falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, thereby amounting to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and whether his conviction under Section 302 IPC can be modified to an offence under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. In this context, the nature of the incident, the conduct of the appellant, and the circumstances under which the fatal act was committed must be carefully scrutinized.

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It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh¹ . The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu² has made the following observations :

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“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases

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1 (2012) 8 SCC 289

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2 AIR 1956 SC 488

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intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 of the IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC, it must be proved that there was an

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intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana³ has observed as under:-

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“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana⁴ has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as

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under :-

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3 (2002) 3 SCC 327

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4 (2009) 15 SCC 635

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“23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

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(a) Motive or previous enmity;

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(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

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(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

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(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;

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(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

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(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

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(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

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(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

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(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

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(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

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(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

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(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

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(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

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Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ?

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These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

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24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.”

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Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda⁵ , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.

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Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of

5 (2012) 8 SCC 450

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Chhattisgarh⁶ has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-

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“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 220, para 7)

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“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”

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Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)

6 (2017) 3 SCC 247

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“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”.

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In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

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Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of

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Delhi)⁷ has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:

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“ 16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

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(i) There must be a sudden fight;

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(ii) There was no premeditation;

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(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and

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(iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No. 2043 of 2023 disposed off on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:

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“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:

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(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.

7 (2019) 6 SCC 122

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Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

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(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused

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may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

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(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

¶147

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

¶148

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a

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lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

¶152

To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

¶153

(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

¶154

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is

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not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

¶158

(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

¶159

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

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(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

¶163

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

¶164

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”

¶165

Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments discussed above, it is evident from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that on the date of the incident, the accused/appellant, Samaar Singh, was present when the deceased, Shyama

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Bai, sustained fatal injuries during a sudden quarrel arising out of family disputes. There was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased. The appellant did not have any intention to cause death, but by inflicting such injuries, he must have had the knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death. Accordingly, his case falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as the act of the appellant satisfies the four necessary ingredients of this exception: (i) there was a sudden fight; (ii) no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the appellant did not take any undue advantage nor act in a cruel or unusual manner.

¶169

Considering the above facts, the nature and gravity of the injuries sustained by the deceased, the evidence of eyewitnesses, and the fact that the appellant has remained in custody for about 3 years 11 months and 3 days and he was aged about 62 years on the date of incident; his conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be altered/converted to a conviction under Section 304 Part-II IPC.

¶170

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is set aside. However, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC and sentenced to undergo to the period of imprisonment already served by him. The fine amount imposed by the trial shall remain as it is.

¶171

In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed in part, to the extent indicated hereinabove. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall remain operative for a period of six months in view the provisions of Section 481 BNSS, 2023.

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The Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

¶175

Sd/Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶176

Rahul/Amardeep

Samaar Singh Bhaina v. State of Chhattisgarh

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